10 research outputs found
Exploring compatibilities between the Free Energy Principle and Heideggerian existential phenomenology as alternative dynamic conceptualizations of depression
No full textThis study concerns an interdisciplinary theoretical analysis of the underlying ways the depressed individual is related to the world. Specific aspects of this relation, namely time, mood and perception of affordances will be characterized. By understanding these relations from both an existential phenomenological Heideggerian approach and through the modern neuroscientific paradigm of the Free Energy Principle, we formulate a complementary conceptualization of the depressed person’s relation to the world. Furthermore, we argue that this interdisciplinary approach bears a synergic coupling, despite obvious epistemic and disciplinary differences. In essence The Free Energy Principle conceptualizes any human world relation as a dynamic process in a self-organizing system that attempts to minimize entropy from the surroundings by predicting the states of the world. To Heidegger, the human world relation constitutes Dasein as a being-in-the-world, where the world gets its meaning from Dasein's care. Dasein does this by projecting possibilities of the future based on its facticity. We argue that this interdisciplinary compatible conceptualization constitutes an epistemically useful alternative based on dynamic assumptions, unlike the conceptualization offered by DSM-5, We argue that these underlying assumptions are important to challenge, as recent research in psychedelic treatment of “treatment resistant” depressed patients provides interesting findings challenging our current view of depression. Because experiences of connectedness are the strongest predictor for positive clinical outcomes in these trials, we argue that a dynamic characterization of depression is beneficial. We argue that this dynamic characterization is beneficial to pursue, as it offers an interdisciplinary approach to understand how the depressed individual fundamentally is connected to the world
Actual and perceived polarisation in people’s opinion on behavioural policy interventions
No full textBehavioural policy interventions, primarily nudges, are being adopted by policymakers in increasingly polarised political environments worldwide. Nudges steer individuals towards desirable behaviours and outcomes, whilst maintaining individual autonomy in decision-making (Sunstein, 2015). Overall, people’s baseline political ideology has been shown not to be predictive of people’s support for behavioural policy interventions (Reisch & Sunstein, 2016). However, if these interventions are presented alongside political cues (e.g., political examples of how these interventions can be used or information about their political sponsor), partisan nudge bias can occur such that people approve of behavioural policy interventions as an approach to policy-making more when they are paired with goals or proposed by policy sponsors that match their political affiliation (Tannenbaum et al., 2017). Thus, even though behavioural policy interventions do not seem to be polarising per se, they can easily become an area of polarisation if salient political information is included.
Tannenbaum et al. (2017) examined this partisan nudge bias in the context of the United States, but this project will be the first one to examine it in the context of two European countries - Slovenia and the UK. More specifically, we will examine whether partisan nudge bias arises when people evaluate behavioural policy interventions and whether the magnitude of this bias might change depending on how behavioural policy interventions are communicated - (a) in a politically neutral way; (b) in a one-sided political way - illustrated with either conservative or liberal examples of their use; or (c) in a two-sided political way - illustrated with both conservative and liberal examples of their use. To our knowledge, no previous research examined how people might respond when examples across the political spectrum are included in the communication of behavioural policy interventions (as in the two-sided political condition), and in this study, we aim to test its debiasing potential suggested by Tannenbaum et al. (2017) (see also Bohnet et al., 2016).
In addition to examining actual partisan nudge bias, we will investigate whether people expect others - political ingroup and outgroup members; to show a partisan nudge bias when evaluating behavioural policy interventions (perceived partisan nudge bias). We expect this perceived partisan nudge bias to occur due to different forecasts of how political ingroup and outgroup members would react to the same behavioural policy interventions. Similarly, we are also interested to test whether the magnitude of this perceived partisan nudge bias changes depending on how behavioural policy interventions are communicated. We are unaware of any previous studies examining to what extent people assume behavioural policy interventions to be polarising, but recent research has shown that people tend to exaggerate both issue-based and affective polarisation in society (e.g., Lees & Cikara, 2020; Moore-Berg et al., 2020; Westfall et al., 2015). Addressing perceived political polarisation in addition to actual political polarisation is important as people guide their political feelings and behaviour based on their perceptions of political reality, and not based on the actual political reality (Enders & Armaly, 2019).
In total, this project includes 4 equivalent pilot studies (2 in Slovenia, 2 in the UK) and 4 equivalent main studies (2 in Slovenia, 2 in the UK). Pilot studies will be conducted to pre-select political goals that are most reliably perceived as ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ in the context of these two countries (Pilot 1) and to validate the stimuli to be used in the main studies (Pilot 2). Study 1 will examine both actual and perceived partisan nudge bias in the general public sample. In Study 2, we will recruit relevant policy-makers and policy advisors who have the potential to apply behavioural policy interventions in their everyday work. In this pre-registration, we only describe pilot studies and Study 1, since the design for Study 2 is still not finalised at the time of the pre-registration submission
Actual and perceived polarisation in people’s opinion on behavioural policy interventions
No full textBehavioural policy interventions, primarily nudges, are being adopted by policymakers in increasingly polarised political environments worldwide. Nudges steer individuals towards desirable behaviours and outcomes, whilst maintaining individual autonomy in decision-making (Sunstein, 2015). Overall, people’s baseline political ideology has been shown not to be predictive of people’s support for behavioural policy interventions (Reisch & Sunstein, 2016). However, if these interventions are presented alongside political cues (e.g., political examples of how these interventions can be used or information about their political sponsor), partisan nudge bias can occur such that people approve of behavioural policy interventions as an approach to policy-making more when they are paired with goals or proposed by policy sponsors that match their political affiliation (Tannenbaum et al., 2017). Thus, even though behavioural policy interventions do not seem to be polarising per se, they can easily become an area of polarisation if salient political information is included.
Tannenbaum et al. (2017) examined this partisan nudge bias in the context of the United States, but this project will be the first one to examine it in the context of two European countries - Slovenia and the UK. More specifically, we will examine whether partisan nudge bias arises when people evaluate behavioural policy interventions and whether the magnitude of this bias might change depending on how behavioural policy interventions are communicated - (a) in a politically neutral way; (b) in a one-sided political way - illustrated with either conservative or liberal examples of their use; or (c) in a two-sided political way - illustrated with both conservative and liberal examples of their use. To our knowledge, no previous research examined how people might respond when examples across the political spectrum are included in the communication of behavioural policy interventions (as in the two-sided political condition), and in this study, we aim to test its debiasing potential suggested by Tannenbaum et al. (2017) (see also Bohnet et al., 2016).
In addition to examining actual partisan nudge bias, we will investigate whether people expect others - political ingroup and outgroup members; to show a partisan nudge bias when evaluating behavioural policy interventions (perceived partisan nudge bias). We expect this perceived partisan nudge bias to occur due to different forecasts of how political ingroup and outgroup members would react to the same behavioural policy interventions. Similarly, we are also interested to test whether the magnitude of this perceived partisan nudge bias changes depending on how behavioural policy interventions are communicated. We are unaware of any previous studies examining to what extent people assume behavioural policy interventions to be polarising, but recent research has shown that people tend to exaggerate both issue-based and affective polarisation in society (e.g., Lees & Cikara, 2020; Moore-Berg et al., 2020; Westfall et al., 2015). Addressing perceived political polarisation in addition to actual political polarisation is important as people guide their political feelings and behaviour based on their perceptions of political reality, and not based on the actual political reality (Enders & Armaly, 2019).
In total, this project includes 4 equivalent pilot studies (2 in Slovenia, 2 in the UK) and 4 equivalent main studies (2 in Slovenia, 2 in the UK). Pilot studies will be conducted to pre-select political goals that are most reliably perceived as ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ in the context of these two countries (Pilot 1) and to validate the stimuli to be used in the main studies (Pilot 2). Study 1 will examine both actual and perceived partisan nudge bias in the general public sample. In Study 2, we will recruit relevant policy-makers and policy advisors who have the potential to apply behavioural policy interventions in their everyday work.
Pre-registration: https://osf.io/nuzc
Actual and perceived polarisation in people’s opinion on behavioural policy interventions
No full textBehavioural policy interventions, primarily nudges, are being adopted by policymakers in increasingly polarised political environments worldwide. Nudges steer individuals towards desirable behaviours and outcomes, whilst maintaining individual autonomy in decision-making (Sunstein, 2015). Overall, people’s baseline political ideology has been shown not to be predictive of people’s support for behavioural policy interventions (Reisch & Sunstein, 2016). However, if these interventions are presented alongside political cues (e.g., political examples of how these interventions can be used or information about their political sponsor), partisan nudge bias can occur such that people approve of behavioural policy interventions as an approach to policy-making more when they are paired with goals or proposed by policy sponsors that match their political affiliation (Tannenbaum et al., 2017). Thus, even though behavioural policy interventions do not seem to be polarising per se, they can easily become an area of polarisation if salient political information is included.
Tannenbaum et al. (2017) examined this partisan nudge bias in the context of the United States, but this project will be the first one to examine it in the context of two European countries - Slovenia and the UK. More specifically, we will examine whether partisan nudge bias arises when people evaluate behavioural policy interventions and whether the magnitude of this bias might change depending on how behavioural policy interventions are communicated - (a) in a politically neutral way; (b) in a one-sided political way - illustrated with either conservative or liberal examples of their use; or (c) in a two-sided political way - illustrated with both conservative and liberal examples of their use. To our knowledge, no previous research examined how people might respond when examples across the political spectrum are included in the communication of behavioural policy interventions (as in the two-sided political condition), and in this study, we aim to test its debiasing potential suggested by Tannenbaum et al. (2017) (see also Bohnet et al., 2016).
In addition to examining actual partisan nudge bias, we will investigate whether people expect others - political ingroup and outgroup members; to show a partisan nudge bias when evaluating behavioural policy interventions (perceived partisan nudge bias). We expect this perceived partisan nudge bias to occur due to different forecasts of how political ingroup and outgroup members would react to the same behavioural policy interventions. Similarly, we are also interested to test whether the magnitude of this perceived partisan nudge bias changes depending on how behavioural policy interventions are communicated. We are unaware of any previous studies examining to what extent people assume behavioural policy interventions to be polarising, but recent research has shown that people tend to exaggerate both issue-based and affective polarisation in society (e.g., Lees & Cikara, 2020; Moore-Berg et al., 2020; Westfall et al., 2015). Addressing perceived political polarisation in addition to actual political polarisation is important as people guide their political feelings and behaviour based on their perceptions of political reality, and not based on the actual political reality (Enders & Armaly, 2019).
In total, this project includes 4 equivalent pilot studies (2 in Slovenia, 2 in the UK) and 4 equivalent main studies (2 in Slovenia, 2 in the UK). Pilot studies will be conducted to pre-select political goals that are most reliably perceived as ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ in the context of these two countries (Pilot 1) and to validate the stimuli to be used in the main studies (Pilot 2). Study 1 will examine both actual and perceived partisan nudge bias in the general public sample. In Study 2, we will recruit relevant policy-makers and policy advisors who have the potential to apply behavioural policy interventions in their everyday work.
Pre-registration: https://osf.io/nuzc
The psychology and policy of overcoming economic inequality
No full textThis project will use secondary data analysis to explore financial behaviors and economic inequality globally. We will investigate the patterns and predictors of positive deviance across and within 60 countries. Using this framework, we aim to better understand what incremental behaviors or individual factors might form the basis of more effective interventions to reduce financial inequality
Poor but not by choice(s): The persistence of cognitive biases across economic groups
No full textWhile economic inequality continues to rise within countries, efforts to address it have been largely ineffective, particularly those involving behavioral approaches. It is often implied but not tested that patterns among low-income individuals may be a factor impeding behavioral interventions aimed at improving upward economic mobility. To test this, we assessed rates of ten cognitive biases across nearly 5,000 participants from 27 countries, comparing between low-income adults and individuals that had overcome financial disadvantages as children, known as positive deviants. Using discrete and complex models, we find robust evidence of no differences within or between groups or countries. We therefore conclude without reservation that choices impeded by cognitive biases alone cannot explain why some individuals do not experience upward economic mobility. Policies must combine both behavioral and structural interventions to improve financial well-being across populations
The psychology and policy of overcoming economic inequality
No full textRecent arguments claim that behavioral science has focused – to its detriment – on the individual over the system when construing behavioral interventions. In this commentary, we argue that tackling economic inequality using both framings in tandem is invaluable. By studying individuals who have overcome inequality, “positive deviants,” and the system limitations they navigate, we offer potentially greater policy solutions
The persistence of cognitive biases in financial decisions across economic groups
No full textAbstract While economic inequality continues to rise within countries, efforts to address it have been largely ineffective, particularly those involving behavioral approaches. It is often implied but not tested that choice patterns among low-income individuals may be a factor impeding behavioral interventions aimed at improving upward economic mobility. To test this, we assessed rates of ten cognitive biases across nearly 5000 participants from 27 countries. Our analyses were primarily focused on 1458 individuals that were either low-income adults or individuals who grew up in disadvantaged households but had above-average financial well-being as adults, known as positive deviants. Using discrete and complex models, we find evidence of no differences within or between groups or countries. We therefore conclude that choices impeded by cognitive biases alone cannot explain why some individuals do not experience upward economic mobility. Policies must combine both behavioral and structural interventions to improve financial well-being across populations
The robustness of mental accounting: a global perspective
No full textThis pre-registered work tests the replicability of seven studies covering the most important effects associated with mental accounting across 5,589 participants from 21 countries. Findings support the robustness of the original studies across time and culture, confirming the role of mental accounting as a critical driver of human decision-making
