588 research outputs found
Connections Among Farsighted Agents
No full textWe study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from those formed by myopic players. We adopt Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch’s (Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming) notion of pairwise farsightedly stable set. We first investigate in some classical models of social and economic networks whether the pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks coincide with the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks and the set of strongly efficient networks. We then provide some primitive conditions on value functions and allocation rules so that the set of strongly efficient networks is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set. Under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, the set of strongly efficient networks and the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks that are immune to coalitional deviations are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if the value function is top convex.Farsighted Players, Stability, Efficiency, Connections Model, Buyerseller Networks
Bargaining and Delay in Patent Licensing
No full textWe consider amodel for licensing a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside innovator) negotiates either up-front fixed fees or per-unit royalties with two firms producing horizontally differentiated brands and competing `a la Cournot. We investigate how licensing schemes (fixed fee or per-unit royalty) and the number of licenses sold (exclusive licensing or complete technology diffusion) affect price agreements and delays in reaching an agreement.We show that, under complete information, the patent holder prefers to license by means of upfront fixed fees whatever the degree of product differentiation, the innovation size and the level of bargaining power. Once there is private information about the relative bargaining power of the parties, the patent holder may prefer licensing by means of per-unit royalties even if market competition is strong. Moreover, the delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the patent holder chooses to negotiate up-front fixed fees instead of per-unit royalties
Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
No full textWe adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable sets to determine which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus, contrary to the vNM (myopically) stable sets [Ehlers, J. of Econ. Theory 134 (2007), 537-547], vNM farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching problems with substitutable preferences: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is in the strong core.Matching problem, von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets, farsighted stability
Myopic-Farsighted Absorbing Networks
No full textWe propose the notion of myopic-farsighted absorbing set to determine the networks that emerge in the long run when some players are myopic while others are farsighted. A set of networks is a myopic-farsighted absorbing set if (no external deviation) there is no myopic-farsighted improving path from networks within the set to some networks outside the set, (external stability) there is a myopic-farsighted improving path from any network outside the set to some network within the set, and (minimality) there is no proper subset satisfying no external deviation and external stability. Contrary to the notion of myopic-farsighted stable set [Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (J. Econ. Theory, 2020), Luo, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (Econ. Theory, 2021)], we show that a myopic-farsighted absorbing set always exists. We partially characterize the myopic-farsighted absorbing sets and we provide sufficient conditions for the equivalence between a myopic-farsighted absorbing set and a myopic-farsighted stable set. We also introduce and fully characterize the notion of proper myopic-farsighted absorbing set that refines the concept of myopic-farsighted absorbing set by selecting the more absorbing networks. Finally, we consider a threshold game that illustrates the role of the relative number of farsighted and myopic players for reaching efficienc
Myopic or Farsighted? An Experiment on Network Formation
No full textPairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) is the standard stability concept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network formation experiment to test these theories. Our results provide support for farsighted stability and strongly reject the idea of myopic behavior.Network Formation, Experiment, Myopic and Farsighted Stability
Connections among farsighted agents
No full textfarsighted players, stability, efficiency, connections model, buyer-seller networks
Market Integration and Strike Activity
No full textWe consider a two-country model of wage determination with private information in unionized imperfectly competitive industries. We investigate the effects of separated product markets opening up for competition as well as of further market integration on the negociated wage and the maximum delay in reaching an agreement. From an initial situation of reciprocal intra-industry trade, an increase in product market integration will decrease the maximal delay in reaching an agreement. However, markets opening up for competition have an ambiguous effect on both the wage outcome and the maximum real delay time in reaching an agreement.economic integration; product market competition; wage bargaining; strike activity
Market integration in network industries
No full textWhat is the effect of product market integration on the market equilibrium in the presence of international network externalities in consumption? To address this question, we set up a spatial two-country model and we find that the economic forces at work may have an ambiguous effect on prices
Market integration and network industries
No full textWhat is the effect of product market integration on the market equilibrium in the presence of international externalities in consumption ? To address this question, we set up a spatial two-country model and we find that the economic forces at work may have an ambiguous effect on prices.compatibility; horizontal differentiation; network effect
Unions' relative concerns and strikes in wage bargaining
No full textWe consider a model of wage determination with private information in an oligopoly. We investigate the effects of unions having relative concerns on the negotiated wage and the strike activity. We show that an increase of unions' relative concerns has an ambiguous effect on the strike activity
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