82 research outputs found
Comparative Statics, English Auctions, and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem
No full textChanges in the parameters of an -dimensional system of equations induce changes in its solutions. For a class of such systems, we determine the qualitative change in solutions given certain qualitative changes in parameters. Our methods and results are elementary yet useful. They highlight the existence of a common thread, our ``own effect'' assumption, in formally diverse areas of economics. We discuss several applications; among them, we establish the existence of efficient equilibria in English auctions with interdependent valuations, and a version of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem for an trade model.effficient auctions, international trade theory, implicit function theorem
El comportamiento del ternero en la guachera : Observar y no solo mirar
No full textLos animales se comunican entre sí naturalmente, a través de diferentes maneras: a través de sonidos, de movimientos o la falta de ellos y es esa comunicación la que les permite generar vínculos que desde pequeños los ayudan a conseguir alimento y protección, asegurando su propia supervivencia. Por otro lado, la constante modificación en los sistemas de producción hace que las condiciones naturales se vean continuamente alteradas y es la intensificación en la producción animal la causa más importante de modificación de su medio ambiente natural.EEA Manfredi. AER San Francisco.Fil: Manelli, Daniel. Asesor privado; ArgentinaFil: Centeno, A. Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria (INTA). Estación Experimental Agropecuaria Manfredi. Agencia de Extensión Rural San Francisco; Argentin
Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games.
No full textWell-behaved infinite signaling games may have no sequential equilibria. The author proves that adding cheap talk to these games 'solves' the nonexistence problem: the limit of sequential equilibrium outcomes of finite approximating games is a sequential equilibrium outcome of the cheap-talk extension of the limit game. In addition, when the signaling space has no isolated points, any cheap-talk sequential equilibrium outcome can be approximated by a sequential [epsilon]-equilibrium of the game without cheap talk. Copyright 1996 by The Econometric Society.
share auctions with linear demands
No full textabstract: Buyers have private information on auctioning divisible goods. Linearity could be a useful property on measuring their marginal utility on those goods or on their bidding strategies under such a share auction environment. This paper establishes an auction model with independent private-values paradigm (IPVP) where bidders have linear demand. A mechanism design approach is applied to explore the optimal share auction in this model. I discuss the most popular auction formats in practice, including Vickrey auction (VA), uniform-price auction (UPA) and discriminatory price auction (DPA). The ex-post equilibriums on explicit solutions are achieved. I found VA does not generally constitute an optimal mechanism as expected even in a symmetric scenario. Furthermore, I rank the different auction formats in terms of revenue and social efficiency. The more private information bidders keep, the lower revenue VA generates to seller, and it could be even inferior to UPA or DPA. My study aggregates dispersed private information with linearity and is robust to distributional assumption.Dissertation/ThesisPh.D. Economics 201
Bayesian Cross Hedging:
No full textFollowing Lence and Hayes (1994), we study the problem faced by an Iowa farmer who wishes to hedge a soybean harvest using Chicago futures contracts. A time-series model for spot and futures prices is postulated, and numerical Bayesian procedures are used to calculate predictive densities and optimal hedges. The numerical procedures extend earlier analytical work, and easily accommodate alternative views about specification (levels vs. logarithms, trends vs. no trends, etc.), uncertainty about parameterizations (estimation risk), as well as other non-sample information (the likely size of the difference between spot prices in Iowa and Chicago, the tendency of the basis to be large in the spring, the shrinking of the basis as expiration of the future looms, etc.) We thank Dermot Hayes and Sergio Lence for helpful discussions and data, and the Iowa Department of Agriculture for daily historical data on soybean prices. Discussions with Ravi Jagannathan, Narayana Kocherlakota, Alejandro Manelli, Tom Smith, and Robert Whaley were helpful. In addition, comments by seminar participants at The Australian Graduate School of Management, Boston College, Indiana University, Iowa State University, Pennsylvania State University, University of Minnesota, University of Nebraska, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and The University of Texas at Dallas improved the paper considerably. Foster gratefully acknowledges the support of ARC SPIRT Grant C00001858. Whiteman gratefully acknowledges support of the Institute for Economic Research at The University of Iowa, as well as support provided for this research by the NSF under grant SBR 9422873 to the University of Iowa
On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information
No full textIn interim economies with asymmetric information, we show that the coarse core of Wilson (1978) does not converge to price equilibrium allocations as the economy is replicated. This failure of core convergence is a basic consequence of asymmetric information and extends to any reasonable notion of either (interim) core or price equilibrium.core, price equilibrium, asymmetric information, interim economies, sunspot economies.
Subgame Perfect Equilibria and Communication in Stage Gamges
No full textAny stage-game with infinite choice sets can be approximated by finite games obtained as increasingly finer discretizations of the infinite game. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the finite games converge to a limit distribution. We prove that (i) if the limit distribution is feasible in the limit game, then it is also a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the limit game; and (ii) if the limit distribution prescribes sufficiently diffused behavior for first-stage players, then it is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the limit game. These results are potentially useful in determining the existence of subgame perfect equilibria in applications. As an illustration of this potential, it is shown that the addition of cheap talk to the games considered restores the existence of subgame perfect equilibria.
Core Convergence Without Monotone Preferences or Free Disposal
No full textWe prove some core convergence theorems for finite economies without monotone preferences or free disposal of commodities. When these assumptions are relaxed, the relationship between the continuum and the large finite economies is lost. Extra conditions are needed, in general, to obtain convergence results
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