263 research outputs found
Introduction: varieties of disjunctivism
No full textThis introductory chapter argues that there are a number of different varieties of disjunctivism. But it is suggested that a mark of disjunctivism, in all of its varieties, is a refusal to credit a certain kind of significance to the fact that a pair of states can be indistinguishable from the subject's point of view. Three different varieties of disjunctivism about experience are introduced: experiential disjunctivism, according to which indistinguishable experiences can differ in intrinsic nature; epistemological disjunctivism, according to which indistinguishable experiences can differ in epistemic significance; and phenomenal disjunctivism, according to which indistinguishable experiences can differ in phenomenal character. A comparison is made with disjunctivism about bodily movement, and disjunctivism about reasons for acting. It is suggested that each variety of disjunctivism stands opposed to a Cartesian picture of the relation between the inner and the outer worlds
Acting for reasons: a disjunctivist thesis
No full textBook synopsis: Disjunctivism has attracted considerable philosophical attention in recent years: it has been the source of a lively and extended debate spanning the philosophy of perception, epistemology, and the philosophy of action. Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson present seventeen specially written essays, which examine the different forms of disjunctivism and explore the connections between them. This volume will be an essential resource for anyone working in the central areas of philosophy, and the starting point for future research in this fascinating field
Protein and energy nutrition of marine gadoids, Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua L.) and haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus L.)
No full text Primary goals of this thesis were to: 1) examine the in vivo digestion of macronutrients from conventional or alternative feed ingredients used in practical diets of juvenile gadoids (Atlantic cod and haddock), 2) document growth potential of fish at the juvenile grower phase given varying levels of dietary protein and energy and 3) assess the potential of in vitro pH-Stat methods for rapid screening protein quality of feed ingredients, specifically for gadoids. All primary research questions were linked to and built upon one another with the goal of gaining a better understanding of protein and energy utilization of juvenile grower phase gadoids. Studies showed that cod and haddock have a high capacity to utilize a wide range of dietary feed ingredients, such as fish meals, zooplankton meal, soybean products (meal, concentrate and isolate) and wheat gluten meal. New dietary formulations for gadoids may also utilize pulse meals, corn gluten meal, canola protein concentrate and crab meal. Digestibility data in this thesis is currently the only research that examined both in vivo and in vitro macronutrient digestibility of a large number and wide range of individual ingredients, specifically for gadoids. This is essential to gain new knowledge on protein and energy utilization as well as for least-cost ration formulations and effective substitution of ingredients into new formulations. Data has demonstrated a dietary digestible protein/digestible energy (DP/DE)ratio of 30 g DP/MJ DE is required for gadoids during the juvenile phase (in vitro closed-system pH-Stat assay for rapid screening protein quality of test ingredients that is ‘species-specific’ to gadoids. It is demonstrated that in vitro results generally reflected results obtained through conventional in vivo protein digestibility methods. Studies resulted in the first generation of a ‘gadoid-specific’ proteolytic enzyme extraction method and in vitro closed-system pH-Stat assay which may be useful to investigate protein digestion, absorption and metabolism of gadoids and further development of their feeds. </p
The Disjunctive Conception of Perceiving
No full textJohn McDowell's conception of perceptual knowledge commits him to the claim that if I perceive that P then I am in a position to know that I perceive that P. In the first part of this essay, I present some reasons to be suspicious of this claim - reasons which derive from a general argument against 'luminosity' - and suggest that McDowell can reject this claim, while holding on to almost all of the rest of his conception of perceptual knowledge, by supplementing his existing disjunctive conception of experience with a new disjunctive conception of perceiving. In the second part of the essay, I present some reasons for thinking that one's justification, in cases of perceptual knowledge, consists not in the fact that one perceives that P but in the fact that one perceives such-and-such. I end by suggesting that the disjunctive conception of perceiving should be understood as a disjunctive conception of perceiving such-and-such
"I am NN": A Reconstruction of Anscombe's "The First Person"
No full textThis paper develops a way of understanding G.E.M. Anscombe’s essay “The First Person”, at the heart of which are the following two ideas: first, that the point of her essay is to show that it is not possible for anyone to understand what they express with “I” as an Art des Gegebenseins—a way of thinking of an object that constitutes identifying knowledge of which object is being thought of; and second, that the argument through which her essay seeks to show this is itself first personal in character. Understanding Anscombe’s essay in this light has the merit of showing much of what it says to be correct. But it sets us the task of saying what it is that we understand ourselves to express with “I” if not an Art des Gegebenseins, and in particular what it is that we understand ourselves to express with sentences with “I” as subject that might seem to express identity-judgments, such as “I am NN”, and “I am this body”
Knowledge Aided by Observation
No full textAccording to G.E.M. Anscombe, knowledge “in intention”—“the knowledge that a man has of his intentional actions”—is not “knowledge by observation”. But Anscombe does not deny that observation-knowledge can play a role in knowledge in intention. She seems to think that, even though knowledge in intention is not knowledge by observation, it can be aided by such knowledge. This essay explains how we should understand this.
The mentoring cycle
No full textThe aim of this chapter is to explore the mentoring cycle and in particular, the concept of phases within the context of the mentoring relationship. The chapter begins by outlining a number of models that describe how mentoring relationships develop over time, such as Kram (1980, 1983), Missirian (1982), Clutterbuck (1985; 2004), and Westland (2015). The mentee and mentor perspective is explored by understanding the experiences of each, through insight, during various stages of the relationship. Next, the author identifies a number of empirical studies that have ‘tested’ the models to better understand their application to specific contexts (Westland, 2015). The models are compared and contrasted in order to identify the challenges associated with the concept of the mentoring cycle. The author also considers factors that influence the mentoring cycle and the effectiveness of the mentoring relationship. Finally, the author considers the implications of the mentoring cycle from a number of perspectives: mentoring relationships, program design, training for mentees and mentors, and future research agendas for both researchers and practitioners
Disjunctive theories of perception and action
No full textBook synopsis: Seventeen previously unpublished papers on one of the hottest topics in philosophy
The first collection of essays on the topic
This book will be the definitive volume on disjunctivism for many years to come
Stellar line-up of contributors
Disjunctivism has attracted considerable philosophical attention in recent years: it has been the source of a lively and extended debate spanning the philosophy of perception, epistemology, and the philosophy of action. Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson present seventeen specially written essays, which examine the different forms of disjunctivism and explore the connections between them. This volume will be an essential resource for anyone working in the central areas of philosophy, and the starting point for future research in this fascinating field
Temporal Passage and Being in Time
No full textThis paper agues that the passage of time cannot be understood in a certain ‘objective’ manner; it is not something comprehensible ‘as from no one and nowhen’. This does not mean that its reality should be denied, that we should lower our sights to explaining instead the experience of time as passing. Rather, passage is to be elaborated in the context of a metaphysical account of the subject in time – an account, that is, of being in time
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