2,892 research outputs found
Mary Ware Dennett letter to Lucile Atcherson, April 13, 1914
No full textOn April 13, 1914, Mary Ware Dennett, a women's rights activist, wrote this letter to Lucile Atcherson, a suffragist in central Ohio who served as executive secretary of the Franklin County Woman Suffrage Association. In the letter, Dennett is answering a request from Atcherson for a list of female Labor movement speakers who could have come to Ohio to campaign for women's suffrage. Dennett listed several speakers who could have been available to come to Ohio.
The Franklin County Woman Suffrage Association was formed in 1912, after the Ohio Constitutional Convention elected to bring to a vote the question of removing the words "white male" from the state constitution with regard to voting rights. Headquartered in the Chamber of Commerce building in Columbus, Ohio, the organization put out regular publications, organized public speeches and meetings, distributed literature and held parades in support of the suffrage movement. Women's suffrage in Ohio was defeated in a special election in 1912 and again in 1914 and 1916 before a resolution narrowly passed in 1917 allowing municipal voting by women in Columbus. In 1920, the 19th Amendment passed, extending the vote to women and prohibiting state and federal government from denying suffrage on the basis of sex
Letter, 1913, October 16, Mary Ware Dennett to Mrs. M. McClellan Brown [Martha McClellan Brown]
No full textA letter from Mary Ware Dennett of the National American Woman Suffrage Association to Martha McClellan Brown regarding an estimate of the total number members of the association.https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/special_ms147_correspondence/1030/thumbnail.jp
Dennett, A, VX43579
No full textThis record was harvested from a previous catalogue system and will be withdrawn in 2025. Information in this record may be superseded or incomplete. Visit this record in UMA's new catalogue at: https://archives.library.unimelb.edu.au/nodes/view/381507Surname: DENNETT. Given Name(s) or Initials: A. Military Service Number or Last Known Location: VX43579. Missing, Wounded and Prisoner of War Enquiry Card Index Number: 31797.197566
Item: [2016.0049.13800] "Dennett, A, VX43579
Dennett, A F, Tiaping
No full textThis record was harvested from a previous catalogue system and will be withdrawn in 2025. Information in this record may be superseded or incomplete. Visit this record in UMA's new catalogue at: https://archives.library.unimelb.edu.au/nodes/view/381505Surname: DENNETT. Given Name(s) or Initials: A F. Military Service Number or Last Known Location: TIAPING. Missing, Wounded and Prisoner of War Enquiry Card Index Number: 17820.197564
Item: [2016.0049.13798] "Dennett, A F, Tiaping
La estrategia intencional de dennett y el escepticismo
No full textLa idea de que la mayoría de nuestras creencias son verdaderas constituye uno de los corolarios más importantes de la doctrina de los sistemas intencionales de Dennett por su significación epistemológica. En este ensayo examino el argumento de Dennett a favor de dicha idea teniendo como marco de referencia el tradicional debate en tomo al escepticismo y luego esbozo rápidamente las consecuencias de este examen para la estrategiaintencional
Dennett, P B, 418927
No full textThis record was harvested from a previous catalogue system and will be withdrawn in 2025. Information in this record may be superseded or incomplete. Visit this record in UMA's new catalogue at: https://archives.library.unimelb.edu.au/nodes/view/381504Surname: DENNETT. Given Name(s) or Initials: P B. Military Service Number or Last Known Location: 418927. Missing, Wounded and Prisoner of War Enquiry Card Index Number: 55069.197563
Item: [2016.0049.13797] "Dennett, P B, 418927
Tiptoeing Past the Covered Wagons: A Response to Carr
No full textDavid Carr complains, in "Dennett Explained, or The Wheel Reinvents Dennett," (Report #26), that I have ignored deconstructionism and Phenomenology. This charge is in some regards correct and in others not. Briefly, here is how my own encounters with these fields have looked to me
DENNETT ON THE BASIC ARGUMENT
No full textAbstract: I argue that Dennett does not adequately support his rejection of the ''Basic Argument'' for the incompatibility of causal determinism and the sort of free will that involves genuine access to alternative possibilities (sometimes referred to as the ''Consequence Argument''). In addition, I seek to highlight the plausibility and importance of the incompatibilist's interpretation of this sort of free will. Keywords: Basic Argument for Incompatibilism, could have done otherwise, Dennett, Taylor, van Inwagen. In recent work, Daniel Dennett has offered a critique of what might be called the ''Basic Argument'' for the incompatibility of causal determinism and the sort of free will that involves genuine access to alternative possibilities Christopher Taylor has greatly clarified my thinking on this topic and shown me how to launch a deeper and more radical campaign in support of my earlier claims to this effect, and our coauthored paper (Taylor and Dennett 2001) provides more technical detail than is needed here. Here I will attempt a gentler version of our argument, highlighting the main points so that non-philosophers can at least see what the points of contention are, and how we propose to settle them, while leaving out almost all the logical formulae. Philosophers should consult the full-dress version, of course, to see if we have actually tied off the loose ends, and closed the loopholes that are passed by without mention in this telling. (Dennett 2003, 64
Dennett e Chalmers: argumentos e intuição Dennett and Chalmers: arguments and intuition
No full textChalmers e Dennett se encontram em lados opostos da discussão do problema da consciência. Para Chalmers, ela é um dado indubitável que não pode ser explicada em termos de outra coisa. Para Dennett, o que existe verdadeiramente são múltiplos julgamentos sobre nossa consciência. Cada um acusa o outro de circularidade. Isto só é possível porque a diferença entre estas duas teorias é verdadeiramente uma diferença de princípios. A mesma oposição que encontramos no aparato teórico encontramos também em suas pressuposições mais básicas e fundamentais. Este fato torna extremamente difícil escolher entre as duas ao mesmo tempo em que radicaliza a diferença entre elas. De um lado temos que argumentos podem refutar intuições, de outro temos que é preciso primeiro sondar nossas intuições para depois criar argumentos a partir delas. Entre um extremo e outro nos encontramos com o velho dilema de "o que vem primeiro?". No entanto, mais importante do que escolher lados é mostrar o quanto é difícil escolher.Chalmers and Dennett are at opposite sides of the debate on the problem of conciousness. For Chalmres, conciousness is an unquestionable fact that cannot be explained by something else. For Dennett, what exists is really multiple judgements about our conciousness. Each author accuses the other of circularity. This is only possible because the difference between the two theories is actually a difference of principles. The same opposition that we find in their theoretical apparatus we also find on their more fundamental and basic premises. This feature .makes it very difficult to choose one of the two theories, while it also radicalizes the difference bewteen them. On one side we have arguments that can refute intuitions, on the other we find that that one must first scrutinize our intuitions to then create arguments based on them. Between the two extreems we meet with the old dilemma of "what came first?". However, more important than to choose sides is to show how difficult the choice is
A consciência vista de fora : a perspectiva de Dennett
No full textDissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Humanidades, Departamento de Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Gradução, 2009.Esta dissertação discute alguns dos problemas contemporâneos da consciência. Não basta a consciência ser evidente de um ponto de vista de primeira pessoa. Uma explicação do mental deve passar pela compreensão de seu lugar na natureza. Para Chalmers, a consciência não pode ser explicada a partir dos conceitos e teorias científicas atuais. Ele sugere sua incorporação em nossa ontologia como uma propriedade fundamental. Dennett, por outro lado, defende a possibilidade de uma explicação da consciência a partir de uma perspectiva de terceira pessoa. Para isso, o trabalho das diversas disciplinas científicas deve ser levado em consideração. Como Dennett, a autora desta dissertação acredita que uma explicação apropriada da consciência deve partir da compreensão do ser humano em suas dimensões biológica e cultural. A primeira parte deste trabalho discute criticamente as idéias de Chalmers. A segunda apresenta as propostas de Dennett para tratar do tema, além de dois modelos apresentados pelo autor. A última parte trata da evolução cultural e da sua relevância para a discussão sobre a mente humana. _________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACTThis thesis discusses some of the contemporary problems of consciousness. It's not enough for consciousness to be evident from a first person point of view. An explanation of consciousness depends on a comprehension of its place in nature. According to Chalmers, consciousness cannot be understood in terms of the present scientific concepts and theories. Instead, it must be assimilated into our ontology as a fundamental property. Dennett, on the other hand, argues that it is possible to give an account of consciousness in terms of the current scientific framework. In order to accomplish this, scientific advances in many disciplines must be taken into consideration. For him, the correct perspective should be the third person point of view. Like Dennett, the author of the present work thinks that a proper theory of consciousness must be based on an understanding of how human beings fit in both their biological and cultural dimensions. The first part of this thesis tackles Chalmers’s ideas on consciousness and its shortcomings. The second part of the thesis deals with Dennett's views on consciousness and two models he advances. Its last part discusses cultural evolution and its relevance to the discussion concerning the human mind.Instituto de Ciências Humanas (ICH)Departamento de Filosofia (ICH FIL)Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofi
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