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Power in plurality voting games
No full textSimple games in partition function form are used to model voting situations where a coalition being winning or losing might depend on the way players outside that coalition organize themselves. Such a game is called a plurality voting game if in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. In the present paper, we introduce an equal impact power index for this class of voting games and provide an axiomatic characterization. This power index is based on equal weight for every partition, equal weight for every winning coalition in a partition, and equal weight for each player in a winning coalition. Since some of the axioms we develop are conditioned on the power impact of losing coalitions becoming winning in a partition, our characterization heavily depends on a new result showing the existence of such elementary transitions between plurality voting games in terms of single embedded winning coalitions. The axioms restrict then the impact of such elementary transitions on the power of different types of players
Outside Employment and Parliamentary Priorities
No full textMany democracies allow their legislators to engage in private employment, but the consequences for parliamentary priorities are still poorly understood. We collect large-scale longitudinal data on outside employment and biographic characteristics for all members of the 18th German Bundestag, and link this information to all spoken words and voting behavior in parliament. We present novel evidence that outside employment is associated with parliamentary priorities. Legislators address topics of sectors from which they receive private income more often, are more positive about these sectors, and take a generally more pro-industry stance in legislation. Our results have important implications regarding the independence of legislators
Pay to be green? The effect of corporate social responsibility contracting on green innovation performance
No full textThis study examines how the integration of corporate social responsibility (CSR) criteria in executive compensation can improve green innovation performance in European countries. Using agency theory and stakeholder theory, and a database of 5,603 firm-year observations from European companies in the period 2012-2021, we find that CSR aligns the interests of senior executives with the company's green innovation goals through green compensation contracts. We also explore the indirect effect in this relationship and reveal that the implementation of green practices mediates the impact of CSR contracting on green innovation performance. These findings indicate that CSR contracting as an effective governance mechanism could be strengthened by green practices, such as reducing resource use, water efficiency, energy reuse, emission reduction and pollution prevention. This study offers valuable insights for senior executives and policymakers who wish to manage CSR initiatives and green practices to improve their green innovation performance
Policy Interventions to Mitigate the Long-Run Costs of Brexit
No full textThis paper examines the long-term macroeconomic impacts of Brexit on the UK economy employing a dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates endogenous firm entry, price markups and market competition. By integrating the trade frictions introduced by Brexit, the model explains how increased trade costs have altered firm behaviour, market structure, and broader economic performance. We assess a range of policy responses, from theoretically optimal but practically difficult tax-subsidy schemes, to more realistic measures aimed at reducing firm entry barriers, encouraging private and public investment, and subsidising labour costs. Our findings underscore the critical role of policies that can most directly influence firm creation, investment, and competition in addressing the structural challenges Brexit has introduced
What Do (Thousands of) Union Do? Union-Specific Pay Premia and Inequality
No full textWe study the role of union heterogeneity in shaping wages and inequality among unionized workers. Using linked employer-employee data from Brazil and job moves across multi-firm unions, we estimate over 4,800 union-specific pay premia. Unions explain 3–4% of earnings variation. While unions raise wages on average, the standard deviation in union effects is large (6-7%). Validating our approach, wages fall in markets with higher vs. lower union premia following a nationwide right-to-work law. Linking premia to detailed data on union attributes, we find that unions with strike activity, collective bargaining agreements, internal competition, and skilled leaders secure higher wages. High-premium unions compress wage gaps by education while the average union exacerbates them. Post right-to-work, however, worker support for high-premium unions falls when between-group bargaining differentials are large. Our findings show that unions are not a monolith–their structure and actions shape their wage effects and, consequently, worker support
Engpass Breitbandversorgung: Mehr als 60 Prozent der Unternehmen fühlen sich beeinträchtigt
No full textTrotz milliardenschwerer Förderprogramme bleibt die digitale Infrastruktur ein Nadelöhr für die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit Deutschlands. Mehr als 60 Prozent der Unternehmen berichten von Einschränkungen durch eine mangelhafte Breitbandversorgung
Social risk, fairness types, and redistribution
No full textInequality often arises from strategic interactions among individuals. This is so because risky investments can not only be resolved by chance (natural risk), but also by others' actions (social risk). We study how these different sources of inequality shape fairness judgments and the level of redistribution in a controlled experiment with a total of 2,152 participants. We find significantly less inequality acceptance, and thus much more redistribution, under social risk. In addition to the well-known types of Libertarians, Egalitarians and Choice Egalitarians, we identify a novel, hitherto unnoticed, fairness type - Insurers - who always compensate unlucky risk-takers and are especially prevalent when one is let down by others rather than simply unlucky by chance. This suggests that impartial spectators view betrayal as more deserving of support than bad luck. Our findings show that fairness ideals depend jointly on risk-taking and the way in which risk is resolved, either by nature or another human actor, thus highlighting the important role of strategic interaction for fairness types and redistribution
Are M&As spurring or stifling innovation? Evidence from antidiabetic drug development
No full textThis paper provides empirical evidence on which M&A deals spur innovation, and which stifle it. To do so, we consider not only the product market position of the acquiring firm, but also the position of both target and acquirer in the technology space. Focusing on the antidiabetic drugs market, our dataset tracks the lifecycle and patenting of all individual antidiabetic projects in development between 1997 and 2017. We show that most terminations of acquired projects occur while the projects are still far from product market entry. Nevertheless, a number of these early-stage acquisitions have a positive impact on innovation. These cases arise when incumbents acquire projects close to their own projects in product markets, but only if these projects are also close in technology markets. Those deals are associated with increased subsequent patenting, which is consistent with the exploitation of technological synergies. Our results point to the crucial role of combining both product market and technology market positions in assessing the innovation effects of pharmaceutical M&As
