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A Maximal Domain for Stragegy-proof and No-vetoer Rules in the Multi-object Choice Model
Get PDFApril 2011, Revised February 2013Following Barber?a, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategy proofness and no-vetoer
コウショクセンキョホウ 14ジョウ 1コウ ベッピョウ ダイ3 ノ ゴウケンセイ
No full text判例研究最高裁判所平成二四年一〇月一七日大法廷判決（裁判所ウェブサイト）（平成二三年行（ツ）第六四号
