101362 research outputs found
Sort by
Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver
Get PDFISER discussion paperJune 2009. Revised June 2015This paper considers a model of strategic information transmission with an imperfectly informed receiver and provides a simple logic by which the receiver’s prior knowledge becomes an impediment to efficient communication. We show that the extent of communication is severely limited as the receiver becomes more informed. Moreover, in a simple example with two signals, we show that no information can be conveyed via cheap talk for an arbitrarily small degree of preference incongruence. This result draws sharp contrast to the case with an uninformed receiver which always yields a fully separating equilibrium as long as the preferences are sufficiently congruent
Are Investment Promotion Agencies Doing the Thing Right? Evidence from China
Get PDF*Revised：What Determines Inward FDI in China? --An empirical study using firm-level data(DP-2013-E-004, April 7)This paper tries to verify how the establishment of investment promotion agencies (IPAs) affects the decisions of foreign firms regarding their subsequent investment by combining firm-level data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey with city-level information on (IPAs) in China. After correcting for potential endogeneity problems, the result confirms the IPAs’ role in promoting incremental foreign direct investment (FDI) into China. Furthermore, it is shown that Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (HMT) firms are less sensitive to IPAs’ efforts in making further investment than are non-HMT foreign firms. In addition, IPAs are found to be more successful in enhancing foreign firms’ investment in high-tech than in low-tech industries
Strategic Obscurity in the Forecasting of Disasters
Get PDFFebruary 2012, Revised July 2014A principal acquires information about a shock and then discloses it to an agent. After the disclosure, the principal and agent each decide whether to take costly preparatory actions that yield mutual benefits but only when the shock strikes. The principal maximizes his expected payoff by ex antecommitting to the quality of his information, and the disclosure rule. We show that even when the acquisition of perfect information is costless, the principalmay optimally acquire imperfect information when his own action eliminates the agent's incentive to take action against the risk
The Chinese Phonetic Transcriptions of Old Turkish Words in the Chinese Sources from 6th -9th Century : Focused on the Original Word Transcribed as Tujue 突厥
Get PDF
ネットワーク カンキョウ ニ オケル チョサクケン ノ ホゴ ニ カンスル チュウゴクホウ ノ サイキン ノ ドウコウ サイコウ ジンミン ホウイン シンシホウ カイシャク ノ セイテイ ヲ チュウシン ニ
No full text論
Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution
Get PDF* Revised：Inequality, Growth and the Politics of Education and Redistribution [12-09, 2012]* Revised：Inequality Dynamics and the Politics of Redistribution [12-09-Rev., 2013]This paper analyzes the political economy of public education and redistributionin an overlapping-generation model of a two-class society in which growth is drivenby the accumulation of human capital. The levels of public education and lump-sum nancial transfers are determined by voting, while private education whichsupplements public education is purchased individually. The model, which includestwo-dimensional voting, demonstrates multiple steady-state political equilibria. Oneis an equilibrium with a high share of public education in government expenditure;the other is an equilibrium with a high share of lump-sum transfers. Numericalanalysis shows empirically plausible result of growth, inequality and the compositionof redistributive expenditures