National Foundation of Political Science
SPIRE - Sciences Po Institutional REpositoryNot a member yet
39339 research outputs found
Sort by
L'économie-monde romaine et les rapports entre Rome et les mondes lointains - Entretien avec Katia Schörle
No full texthttps://cashf.substack.com/p/leconomie-monde-romaine-et-les-rapport
Forêts en chantier. Adapter les écosystèmes aux machines
No full textInternational audienceForêts en chantier. Adapter les écosystèmes aux machines
Sur les traces des machines forestières. Le développement du machinisme forestier à l’épreuve des sols
No full textInternational audienceSur les traces des machines forestières. Le développement du machinisme forestier à l’épreuve des sols
Les arbitrages résidentiels : entre logiques institutionnelles et contingences personnelles
No full textInternational audienc
No Such Thing as Free Brain Time: For a Pigouvian Tax on Attention Capture
No full textInternational audienceIn our age of digital platforms, human attention has become a scarce and highly valuable resource, rivalrous, tradable, and increasingly subject to market dynamics. This article explores the commodification of attention within the framework of the attention economy, arguing that attention should be understood as a common good threatened by over-exploitation. Drawing from philosophical, economic, and legal perspectives, we first conceptualize attention not only as an individual cognitive process but as a collective and infrastructural phenomenon susceptible to enclosure by digital intermediaries. We then identify and analyze negative externalities of the attention economy, particularly those stemming from excessive screen time: diminished individual agency, adverse health outcomes, and societal and political harms, including democratic erosion and inequality. These harms are largely unpriced by market actors and constitute a significant market failure. In response, among a spectrum of public policy tools ranging from informational campaigns to outright restrictions, we propose a Pigouvian tax on attention capture as a promising regulatory instrument to internalize the externalities and, in particular, the social cost of compulsive digital engagement. Such a tax would incentivize structural changes in platform design while preserving user autonomy. By reclaiming attention as a shared resource vital to human agency, health, and democracy, this article contributes a novel economic and policy lens to the debate on digital regulation. Ultimately, this article advocates for a paradigm shift: from treating attention as a private, monetizable asset to protecting it as a collective resource vital for humanity
Minimum Wages and Informality
No full textHow do minimum wages affect informality? We study the near-doubling of the real minimum wage from 2000 to 2009 in Brazil, where 46% of the workforce is informal. Using labor force surveys covering the informal sector, we show the minimum wage exhibits near full passthrough to informal employees working in formal firms, about half of all informal employees. The formal-to-informal reallocation elasticity with respect to the formal wage is small: -0.28. Our findings illustrate how minimum wages can positively affect living standards for workers thought beyond the reach of labor law, a sizable share of the workforce in developing economies
Éric Savaux, Jacques Flour et Jean-Luc Aubert, Droit civil, Les obligations, L'acte juridique
No full textInternational audienceSirey, 18e éd., 2024, 1335 p
The Proper Scope of Antitrust: Behavioural Remedies Between Competition Law Enforcement and Regulatory Interventions
No full textOFCE WP 22/2025This article examines the evolving role of behavioural remedies in antitrust enforcement and their increasing convergence with regulatory approaches. Based on a typology of remedy design, it identifies a continuum from rule-based injunctions to adaptive conduct obligations that resemble sectoral regulation. While dynamic markets - particularly in the digital economy - may justify greater flexibility, we argue that unconstrained discretion or permanent oversight risks transforming antitrust into de facto regulation. The paper proposes a framework for implementing bounded flexibility through predefined revision mechanisms, ensuring remedies remain both effective and consistent with competition principles. By delineating the frontier between competition law and regulation, this analysis contributes to ongoing debates on the proper institutional scope of antitrust enforcemen
