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Saving Space With UN-Authorized Acts: Questioning the Authority of the United Nations to Oversee Humankind’s Exploration and Development of Outer Space
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Stealing Time: The Propriety of Alleging Common Law Conversion in Modern Wage Theft Lawsuits
Get PDFThe words “wage theft” frequently make headlines when workers sue employers for underpayment or nonpayment of wages.[1] Wage theft is “the illegal refusal by an employer to pay a worker the wages and benefits that he or she has legally earned.”[2] In the United States, employer violation of wage and hour laws is a vast and enduring problem, affecting as many as two-thirds of workers. In an attempt to combat this epidemic threat to hourly workers’ bottom lines, legislatures have fashioned numerous laws, some even invoking the power of “wage theft” terminology, such as New York’s Wage Theft Prevention Act.[3] However, despite the pervasive usage of the term “wage theft” by the media, politicians, and pundits, a search of the term “wage theft” in legal libraries yields little precedent. This begs the question: can employers be liable for conversion for failing to compensate employees for time-spent working? The efficacy of conversion claims in wage related lawsuits remains an unsettled question. However, if as a society we are sounding the alarm in every incidence of possible wage and hour law violations, we ultimately misinform the population of potential plaintiffs regarding the viability of a claim for theft, or conversion, of earned yet unpaid wages.The term “wage theft” is not a term of art; its closest legal corollary is the common law tort of conversion. Although we as a society frequently identify underpayment or nonpayment of wages as “wage theft,” pleading and proving that the employer has converted an employee’s wages presents an array of challenges that few plaintiffs can overcome. In this paper, we will explore the term “wage theft” as used in our society, and we will contrast this common understanding with the strict legal framework within which plaintiffs must present “wage theft” claims. Finally, we will explore this disconnect in an attempt to reconcile why such a gap exists, and persists, between the commonplace description of a worker’s reality, and the laws available to make the worker whole again. While it appears the term “wage theft” equates more readily with an exclamation of outrage than an effective claim for relief, its persistence underscores the continuing need for common law remedies, like conversion, to fill in the enforcement gaps left behind by persistently reactive legislation. [1] See Brady Meixell and Ross Eisenbrey, An Epidemic of Wage Theft Is Costing Workers Hundreds of Millions of Dollars a Year, Economic Policy Institute (Sep. 11, 2014), http://www.epi.org/publication/epidemic-wage-theft-costing-workers-hundreds/; Josh Eidelson, LinkedIn Stiffed its Own Employees, Agrees to Pay Millions, BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-05/linkedin-stiffed-its-own-employees-agrees-to-pay-millions; and Monica Potts, The Very Real Scourge of Wage Theft, THE DAILY BEAST (Feb. 15, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/15/the-very-real-scourge-of-wage-theft.html.[2] Hilda L. Solis, Wage Theft Harms All of Us, The Huffington Post (July 19, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hilda-l-solis/wage-theft-harms-all-of-u_b_7829514.html.[3] Wage Theft Prevention Act, 2009 N.Y.S.N. 8380 (Apr. 12, 2011)
How Do You Qualify as a Whistleblower Under The Dodd-Frank Act? Blowing the Whistle on a Circuit Split
Get PDF Recently, a circuit split has arisen with regard to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The circuit split concerns the question of what it takes for an individual to qualify as a “whistleblower” under the terms of the statute. This circuit split is surprising, as the Dodd- Frank Act purports to answer this question itself by providing a definition of this term, a definition which the Fifth Circuit has treated as being conclusive. Nonetheless, the Second and the Ninth Circuits have held that with respect to some, but not all, of the Dodd-Frank Act, this statutory “whistleblower” definition does not apply. Shortly, the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to resolve the matter when it hears an appeal of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Somers v. Digital Realty Trust Inc. This article provides three broad reasons why the Supreme Court should reject the Second and Ninth Circuits’ interpretations. First, the interpretation endorsed by the Second and Ninth Circuits is the result of a flawed exercise in statutory interpretation that incorrectly applies principles recently set down by the Supreme Court in King v. Burwell, and Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA. Secondly, while the Second and Ninth Circuits rejected the Fifth Circuits’ interpretation on the basis that it withholds the protection of the Dodd-Frank Act from auditors and attorneys, the Second and Ninth Circuits’ preferred interpretations also fail to protect auditors and attorneys. Finally, the policy reasons in favor of extending the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower protections to auditors and attorneys are insufficiently strong to warrant departing from the natural meaning of the statutory language at issue.
The Political Philosophy of Impersonation: A Libertarian Analysis
Get PDFImpersonation is a criminal act; it constitutes invasion and, in some cases, fraud. Although often associated with the term “identity theft,” impersonation is primarily a violation of the rights of the recipient of the communication, rather than that of the person being impersonated, whose rights are only sometimes violated. The present paper is devoted to defending this position. It attempts to overcome the objection that there is no violence necessarily connected to this act, or that the violence is directed toward the person being impersonated instead of the recipient of the impersonating message
On Parr: The Use and Propriety of Appraisal Methods in Computing Fracking Awards
Get PDFParr v. Aruba Petroleum, Inc. made headlines in 2014 for being the first hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) case to result in a jury verdict. In Parr, a Texas jury awarded 3 million verdict, the jury awarded $275,000 for diminution in property value. Thanks to the fiercely litigated and highly publicized trial and appeal, scholars, practitioners and academics received a rare glimpse into an area of litigation otherwise insulated from public view by out of court resolutions and confidential settlement agreements.In this interdisciplinary paper we will provide an overview of the valuation process, addressing issues specific to diminution in value in the context of fracking and similar incidences of environmental contamination. We will then explain the various appraisal methods within the context of real estate litigation, including the Sales Comparison Approach, Income Approach and Cost Approach. Using Parr as a test case, we will then analyze the unique appraisal challenges presented by the hydraulic fracturing and analogous toxic torts fact patterns, evaluating the probative value and persuasive necessity of each approach. Finally, we will make predictions about the rapidly evolving fracking litigation sphere, analyzing new challenges presented to homeowners, energy companies and the judiciary when faced with allegations of diminished property values.
