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Jan Patočka and French Phenomenology
Full text linkIn his phenomenological works Jan Patočka increasingly referred to movement and lived/physical corporeality. He conceived the concept of the world in terms of the correlation of life with its milieu. In conjunction with Edmund Husserl’s late phenomenology of the lifeworld, he took lived corporeality as his starting point and guiding motif in a way that is parallel to Merleau-Ponty’s work. The article expresses an opinion, that it was also one of the reasons why he kept his distance from Eugen Fink’s philosophical cosmology. And still, it is Patočka’s reference to this cosmological project that has had, and keeps on having, an important impact on the recent reception of his work in France.
Recension: Magali Bessone, Faire justice de l’irréparable. Esclavage colonial et responsabilité contemporaine (Paris: Vrin, 2020)
Full text linkRecension de Magali Bessone, Faire justice de l’irréparable. Esclavage colonial et responsabilité contemporaine (Paris: Vrin, 2020)
Book Review: Leonard Harris, A Philosophy of Struggle: The Leonard Harris Reader. Edited by Lee A. McBride III (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020).
Full text linkThe following paper serves as a review of a recent compilation of essays by Leonard Harris (edited by Lee A. McBride III), addressing the reimagining of philosophy contained therein and engaging a handful of views borne by this unique philosophical conception from a Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective, focusing on a few of the strategic merits and challenges faced by a potential alliance between these thinkers
The Surplus of Signification: Merleau-Ponty and Enactivism on the Continuity of Life, Mind, and Culture
Full text linkThis paper provides a critical discussion of the views of Merleau-Ponty and contemporary enactivism concerning the phenomenological dimension of the continuity between life and mind. I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s views are at odds with those of enactivists. Merleau-Ponty only applied phenomenological descriptions to the life-worlds of sentient animals with sensorimotor systems, contrary to those enactivists who apply them to all organisms. I argue that we should follow Merleau-Ponty on this point, as the use of phenomenological concepts to describe the “experience” of creatures with no phenomenal consciousness has generated confusion about the role of phenomenology in enactivism and prompted some enactivists to ignore or turn away from phenomenology. Further, Merleau-Ponty also emphasizes the stark distinction between the vital order of animals and the human order to a greater degree than many phenomenologically inspired enactivists. I discuss his view in connection with recent research in developmental and comparative psychology. Despite the striking convergence of Merleau-Ponty’s visionary thought with the most recent findings, I argue that he somewhat overstates the difference between human experience and cognition, and that of our closest animal kin. I outline a developmental-phenomenological account of how the child enters the human order in the first years of life, thereby further mitigating the stark difference between orders. This results in a modified Merleau-Pontian version of the phenomenological dimension of life-mind continuity which I recommend to enactivism
Bergson\u27s Theory of Free Will
Full text linkBergson argues that there is an incompatibility between free will and determinism: while free will has a dimension of creation, of invention, determinism corresponds to the idea that the future is fixed in advance by laws. In addition, he rejects determinism. According to him, the singularity of our deep-seated psychic states makes that their evolution cannot be governed by laws. However, Bergson does not defend classical indeterminism (of which contemporary indeterminism is only an extension) because it reduces free will to a choice between alternative possibilities, that is to say between pre-fixed futures. Such a conception does not take into account the creative dimension of free will. In fact, Bergson develops an original form of indeterminism based on a certain conception of causation. For determinism and classical indeterminism, causation is always the actualization of a pre-fixed virtual reality (single or multiple). For Bergson, causation can also be a creation, that is, the formation of something which is not pre-fixed
Becoming an Embodied Social Self Capable of Relating to Norms: Ricoeur’s Narrative Identity Reconsidered in the Light of Enactivism
Full text linkIn this paper, I argue for a revaluation of Paul Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity in light of what Miriam Kyselo has coined “the body-social problem” in enactivism (Kyselo 2014). It is my contention that while phenomenological perspectives upon the body and the self are considered relevant in enactivism, the hermeneutical, discursive facets are understood as a less essential facet of the self, for instance as the self’s reflexive side, that gives expression to an experiential self (Zahavi 2007: 182-184, 2014: 57-59). Yet, it is in language that the self is addressed by others and that the self reflects upon itself and understands itself. Especially in order to understand aspects of identity which are of importance for the social situation of the self, such as gender, the way we are addressed by others and address ourselves by means of language need to be taken into account
Time, Money, and Race: Simone de Beauvoir on American Abstraction
Full text linkIn 1947, Simone de Beauvoir traveled to the United States for a four-month stay, during which she toured the country extensively. Her copious notes taken during this time eventually became the travelogue, America Day by Day (L’Amérique au jour le jour) as well as a piece written for the May 25, 1947 edition of the New York Times Magazine, “An Existentialist Looks at Americans.” In both of these writings, Beauvoir offers an astute criticism of American culture from a foreign perspective.This paper explores Beauvoir’s treatment of American abstraction and race with three goals in mind: first, to understand the American relationship to time and money as abstractions. Ignoring the past and projecting an idealistic (but ultimately vacuous) future, leads to a strange kind of fatalism and lack of passion that profoundly impacts White and Black Americans but in distinctively different ways. The second part of the paper explores these differences through an analysis of how White Americans attempt to live with “good” consciences through the positing of and attachment to abstract values and things. This attitude, in turn, produces a largely instrumental and racist treatment of many populations, in particular, Black Americans. The final section focuses on how Beauvoir confronts the fact of her own whiteness, and in so doing undergoes the movement of race as an abstract theoretical category to one of lived embodiment.
Remarks on the Theory of Relativity (1922)
Full text linkOn April 22, 1922, the Societé française de Philosophie hosted Albert Einstein for a discussion of the theory of relativity. In the course of this discussion, Henri Bergson, who was at that time writing Duration and Simultaneity, which explored some of the philosophical implications of Einstein\u27s theory, was asked to share his thoughts. The resulting remarks offer a glimpse into Bergson\u27s analysis of the concept of simultaneity, and Einstein\u27s brief reply reveals his insistence that time itself, not just "the physicist\u27s time," is relative
The Place of Max Weber in Ricœur’s Philosophy: Power, Ideology, Explanation
Full text linkThis article offers an encompassing interpretation of Paul Ricœur’s reception of Max Weber’s sociology. Three main domains in which Ricœur redeployed and revised insights from Weber are examined: (1) political responsibility and the definition of the state, (2) significant categories for understanding social interaction (notably ideology and authority) and the social ontology implied by this view on action and, finally, (3) the role of explanation in the interpretive social sciences. As a whole, this article argues that Weber was a significant interlocutor of Ricœur on a number of significant themes in the philosopher’s work. In particular, the article profiles the Weberian aspect of Ricœur’s social and political philosophy
The Forgotten Phenomenology: “Enactive Perception” in the Eyes of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty
Full text linkThis paper compares the enactive approach to perception, which has recently emerged in cognitive science, with the phenomenological approach. Inspired by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the enactive theorists Alva Noë and Evan Thompson take perception to be a result of the interaction between the brain, the body and the environment. Their argument turns mostly on the role of self-motion and sensorimotor knowledge in perceptual experience. It was said to be entirely consistent with phenomenology, indeed its revival. However, this issue is under debate. To show this, I begin with analyzing the enactive conception as a physicalist attempt to overcome the challenge of dualism and representationalism. I then turn to Husserl’s transcendental method and argue that Noë’s solution, unlike Husserl’s, remains naturalistic, as it does not take the phenomenon of intersubjectivity and the constitution of the “cultural world” into account. Afterwards I turn to Merleau-Ponty and demonstrate that there is some certain common ground with Noë, but also major differences. I conclude that the enactive approach is not completely refuted by the phenomenological one, insofar as the latter partly contains the first. Yet the enactivists deal merely with the necessary physiological conditions of perception qua animal perception, not with the sufficient sociocultural conditions for the understanding of human perception, like the inquiry into the historical and linguistic circumstances under which the understanding of human mind is made possible. The reason why the recent transformation of phenomenology into neurophenomenology is perceived as a revival is virtually inherent to the specific scientific ethos of enactivism and reveals a certain oblivion of the objectives of philosophical phenomenology