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The Question of Re-turning: Toward or Away from the Virtual?
Get PDFIt is by now generally understood that the nature of events are central to Deleuze’s philosophical endeavour. This has not meant, however, that the process mapped out by this concept has been adequately grasped. Indeed, the lines mapping out events are obscured, theoretical, even otherworldly, whenever the complexities of the creating of the virtual and the actual as the created, are reductively conceived as giving way to two separated domains; two separated domains whereby the repeater would be forever condemned to be the result of an otherworldly will that “works through it,” one that would signal that they would never be capable of becoming worthy of the events that make a life.[i] The perspectival reality of the virtual with respect to the actual, which despite its fragmentary nature is in its entirety encompassed in each singular event, requires of us that we grasp what it is that Antonin Artaud’s points to when saying, I “am my son, my father, my mother, and myself.” It is not as though events perceived in the form of a virtual complex render beings inconsequential; instead, events are capable of ousting the verb “to be” in a double sense, because they enfold what is most affirmative in the activity of beings, the being of becoming whereby a life is born, always yet again, and as a function of which, as Alfred North Whitehead notes, what an actual being is, is how that entity becomes. It is adequate to its becoming. The actual as present-being expresses the verb “to be” in an ephemeral sense, or it is expressed by it in a restrictive way, while when affirmed as indistinct from the virtual, being, the verb “to be,” implies nothing else than the return of becoming. It is an untimely instant in which what is affirmed is the continuation of becoming; an instant that makes each event be the infinite becoming-finite of an actual being. So as to explore the nature of events in Deleuze’s philosophy, it is this displacement, the ousting of the verb “to be,” that I focus in on in this paper
The Significance of Narcissism
Get PDFThis essay briefly reviews the significance of Pleshette DeArmitt\u27s book, The Right to Narcissism. The essay, originally presented at the 2015 Kristeva Circle, was part of a panel celebrating the work of Pleshette
Book Review: Johann Michel, Quand le social vient au sens (Bruxelles: PIE Peter Lang, 2015)
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For A Time
Get PDFAn assessment of Michael Naas\u27s Miracle and Machine, which is devoted to a careful reading of Derrida\u27s essay "Faith and Knowledge". This article focuses on survival and its temporality
Book Review Janae Sholtz, The Invention of a People: Heidegger and Deleuze on Art and the Political (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015)
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Another Time
Get PDFThis paper celebrates the work of Pleshette DeArmitt. In this essay, I show how Pleshette DeArmitt\u27s book, The Right to Narcissism, is haunted by Freud\u27s essay "On Narcissism.
Eating Well with Pleshette DeArmitt
Get PDFWritten from a student’s perspective, this essay focuses on Pleshette’s engagement with Derrida in The Right to Narcissism: The Case for an Im-possible Self-Love and attests to the manner in which she lived this influence through her teaching and writing.
Book Review: Michaël Foessel, Le temps de la consolation (Paris: Seuil, 2015).
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Echoing Sentiments: Art and Melancholy in the Work of Pleshette DeArmitt
Get PDFDuring those first few days, those first few weeks, truth be told, still today, something in me has wanted simply to echo the sentiments of others. That’s because I myself didn’t know exactly what to say and, truth be told, I still don’t know today. But it’s also because others, including and especially some of the people here today, beginning with my co-panelists and, perhaps especially, early on, Leigh Johnson, knew at the time just what had to be said and so expressed so well the sentiments that we all—that I at least—just wanted to echo. Just to echo, that’s what I wanted to do, because by echoing the sentiments of others I would be able to protect myself just a bit longer, I thought, though also, I self-justified, by echoing others I would be able to give back in some way to Pleshette herself, who showed us in her work that Echo does not simply repeat but initiates even when it looks or sounds as if she is not, Echo who gives back even when it sounds as if she has nothing to give, Echo who not only has her own Narcissus but her own narcissism—which Pleshette would have been the first to tell us is not only not a bad thing but a necessary one, and perhaps just what is needed for a new thinking of empathy, of mourning, and, perhaps, as I will try to say, of the ephemeral
Répondre à la vulnérabilité: Paul Ricœur et les éthiques du care en dialogue
Get PDFNous voudrions, à partir de la prise en compte de la vulnérabilité humaine et de la réponse à y apporter, questionner la conception ricœurienne de l’homme capable.Au sein des théories morales contemporaines dominantes, la vulnérabilité fait figure d’oubliée. C’est en effet plutôt à partir d’une conception de l’individu considéré comme autonome qu’elles se sont élaborées. Pourtant, qui n’a pas expérimenté au cours de sa vie des périodes de vulnérabilité ? L’enfance peut, à cet égard, être tenue pour paradigmatique. C’est cette expérience humaine universelle de fragilité que les éthiques du care visent à penser et dont elles cherchent à rendre visible la valeur morale. Elles partent du constat qu’en tant qu’êtres incarnés, nous avons besoin des autres pour satisfaire nos besoins fondamentaux. Humains, nous sommes des êtres de relation : nous dépendons des autres. Ce qui nous porte, ce qui permet à la vie de se maintenir, c’est le souci (care) dont d’autres font preuve à notre endroit, c’est-à-dire l’attention à nos besoins et l’activité pratique consistant à y répondre, autrement dit, une « capacité de care ».Or, si Ricœur, dans son anthropologie philosophique, fait certes la part belle à la vulnérabilité, s’il reconnaît que l’homme capable est tout autant homme fragile, quelle réponse, cependant, apporte-t-il à la vulnérabilité ? Certes, il nous montre que les capacités humaines (à dire, à faire, à se raconter, à être responsable) peuvent faire place à leur envers : la capacité à dire, par exemple, se muer en impuissance à maîtriser le verbe. Il reconnaît donc tout à fait que l’actualisation de nos pouvoirs n’est pas garantie. Mais, voudrions-nous demander : qu’est-ce qui vient alors soutenir ces pouvoirs ? Qu’est-ce qui leur permet de se déployer ? Qu’est-ce qui leur permet de se restaurer ? Prenant appui sur les éthiques du care, nous nous proposons de développer l’hypothèse selon laquelle l’actualisation des pouvoirs du soi dépendrait, fondamentalement, de relations de care. Les différentes capacités humaines que Ricœur décline et déploie ne sont-elles pas, au fond, soutenues par la capacité de care dont dépend, du début à la fin de sa vie, le soi ?