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Letting-be: Dwelling, Peace and Violence in Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s Petals of Blood
Full text linkIt is dwelling that allows mortals to initiate themselves in time and space. As such, dwelling constitutes the event of being. In his essay “Building Dwelling Thinking,” Martin Heidegger stipulates that dwelling can only be achieved through harmonious relations among the constituents, earth, sky, mortals and gods (“divinities”), of the “fourfold.” Heidegger writes, “To preserve the fourfold, to save the earth, to receive the sky, to await the divinities, to initiate mortals – this fourfold preserving is the simple essence of dwelling.” Initiating themselves in time and space is the great difficulty that the residents of Ilmorog, the remote village in postcolonial Kenya in which Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s novel Petals of Blood is set, experience; in Petals of Blood, dwelling is what defines mortals’ being
The Saint and the Cynic: Resentment and Jewishness in Améry, Sloterdijk, and Wyschogrod
Full text linkThe constellation of pain, resentment, the body, and time – as they exist in the wake of the Enlightenment and in the dawn of a new barbarism - is found throughout the work of Jean Améry and Peter Sloterdijk. Both thinkers were especially influenced by Nietzsche’s readings of resentment, his challenge to the Enlightenment, and his turn to the body as the basis of a new kind of thinking which starts with pain, dwells in irreversible time, and ends with the possibility of action and joy. While this new thinking is novel and appeals to all humankind, the most unexpected points of convergence between Améry and Sloterdijk can be found in their particular neo-Nietzschean articulations of Jewishness: using what Harold Bloom would call revision, they both propose a revision of Nietzsche’s reading of Judaism as resentment. Améry associates Jewishness with “revolt” while Sloterdijk associates what he calls “kynicism” (as opposed to cynicism) with Jewishness.1 Intensely aware of the mortal blows that have been dealt to the Enlightenment, philosophy, and modernity as well as to the human body during the Holocaust, Améry and Sloterdijk both address – either directly or indirectly – the meaning of cynicism in relation to Jewishness, in particular, and the modern condition, in general.
The Bearded Ones: Dwelling in a History of Radicalism, Authenticity, and Neoliberalism
Full text linkBeards are a sort of dwelling. Much like Heidegger\u27s linguistic play with related etymologies of building and dwelling, beards are in a constant state of becoming, forever changing length, shape, and color. To the person—usually, but not always, a man—who grows a beard, the end product is always projected out into the future, like Heidegger’s concept of being. The beard is trimmed and groomed constantly; it is cultivated in a way that feels authentic to its wearer. But the same ontological problems that Heidegger applies to dwelling in a home also apply to beards. Long facial hair symbolizes wisdom in many cultures, but anyone who has grown a beard can attest to the existential dilemma of long facial hair. I didn’t recognize you with the beard, someone will say. Beards can serve as symbols of erudition, yes, but they are also masks for our social selves. The beard is, after all, is a curious appendage, as it is an extension of the self, but not the self per se. Herman Melville called beards “suburbs of the chin.” If, like Heidegger, we are to see being as not a fixed entity divorced from other beings, but a being-in-the-world, a set of relations among other beings, then beards are not simply static accessories or styles, but an example of the slippery nature of being itself
Home and Dwelling: Re-Examining Race and Identity Through Octavia Butler’s Kindred and Paul Beatty’s The Sellout
Full text linkThe question of how to exist, to dwell, within one’s physical and psychological home has become an urgent one in an increasingly globalized world. Yet the answer to this question has never been more fleeting. Lacking universal political or sociological narratives in what can be oversimplified as a post-colonial or post-modern milieu, reformulating the question of how one dwells within one’s home has become both relevant and essential. This essay explores a return to the question of how one dwells, not in pursuit of a theoretical harmonizing answer, but to reevaluate how the question is generally framed—a return to the foundation of how one exists, or more precisely, how a one exists. Through Martin Heidegger’s essay on dwelling and Michel Foucault’s understanding of history as power, my reading of two works of modern fiction captures the struggles of subjects attempting to define their place in the world. Examining how the protagonists of Octavia Butler’s Kindred and Paul Beatty’s The Selloutdwell within their homes provides much insight into how race, identity, and history impact dwelling in a global age
Introduction: Forum on Creolizing Theory
Full text linkThis introduction outlines why the author assembled a community of scholars with the task not of commenting on Jane Anna Gordon’s work on creolizing political theory but instead placing it in dialogue with their own. The idea is that the value of theory depends also on the extent to which it could be engaged as a communicative practice with other theories dedicated to a shared concern. In this case, it is scholars committed to thought devoted to concerns of dignity, freedom, and liberation as well as the critical question of the ultimate value of doing theoretical work.
Bergson(-ism) Remembered: A Roundtable
Full text linkBergson(ism) Remembered: A RoundtableCurated by Mark William Westmoreland with Brien Karas (Villanova University, USA)Featuring Jimena Canales (University of Illinois-UC, USA), Stephen Crocker (Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada), Charlotte De Mille (The Courtauld Gallery, UK), Souleymane Bachir Diagne (Columbia University, USA), Michael Foley (University of Westminster, UK), Hisashi Fujita (Kyushu Sangyo University, Japan), Suzanne Guerlac (University of California, Berkeley, USA), Melissa McMahon (Independent Scholar, Australia), Paulina Ochoa Espejo (Haverford College, USA), and Frédéric Worms (L’École Normale Supérieure, France
Beauvoir\u27s Reading of Biology in The Second Sex
Full text linkThis article offers a systematic treatment of Beauvoir\u27s reading of biology in The Second Sex. Following Gatens (2003)\u27s suggestion that this chapter has not received the scholarly consideration it demands and deserves, it explains key aspects of Beauvoir\u27s relationship to biological reason by (i) re-telling the story of Beauvoir\u27s early life from the perspective of her scientific education, (ii) rationally reconstructing her argument in the chapter on "Biological Data," and (iii) exploring the philosophical orientation of her argument using the Frankfurt School model of \u27immanent critique.\u27 By illuminating Beauvoir\u27s reading of biology (including evolutionary theory, developmental biology, and physiology), this article contributes to our understanding of her philosophy while also deflating the widespread assumption that existentialist philosophy (including Beauvoir\u27s brand of it) is inherently \u27anti-science.\u27
The Intuitive Recommencement of Metaphysics
Full text linkIf we are to understand the complex relationship between Bergson and Kant, we must not approach the former’s philosophy as if it could only be either pre-critical or post-Kantian. Instead, the present essay seeks to shed light on this relationship by treating Kant (after Descartes and before Spencer) as another “missing precursor of Bergson.” In Bergson’s eyes, Kant, like Descartes, contains two possible paths for philosophy, which reflect the two fundamental tendencies that are mixed together in the élan vital and continued in humankind: intuition and intelligence. Bergson breaks with Kant from the interior of his philosophy, which he divides into two Kantianisms: the one, which he rejects as ancient, and the other, which he appropriates. What the analysis of this Bergsonian appropriation of Kant reveals, however, is not the existence of a latent Bergsonism in Kant, but rather the recovery of a Kantianism that is completed in Bergson—a Kantianism that embarked down a path that Kant himself, who held himself back from following it in order to dispense with all “intellectual” intuition, had only sketched. Thus, if Bergson is to be believed, an intuitive metaphysics, which installs itself in pure duration, is neither below nor beyond Kantian critique, but can pass through it, can traverse it in its entirety, since it proposes to surpass it, to prolong it following the path that Kant himself had cleared in order to fulfill its suppressed virtualities
Is There a Flesh Without Body?
Full text linkThis paper was originally presented at a colloquium on Michel Henry’s book Incarnation at the Institut Catholique Paris. Michel Henry’s response to the present study can be found in “À Emmanuel Falque,” in Phénoménologie et christianisme chez Michel Henry, ed. Ph. Capelle (Paris: Cerf, 2004): 168-182. This response was reprinted recently in Michel Henry, La Phénoménologie de la vie, vol. 5 (Paris: PUF, 2015)
Alterity is a Negative Concept of the Same
No full textPhilosophical anthropology is a tradition that is as old as philosophy itself, so much so that it might be said to be indistinguishable from philosophy itself. Philosophical anthropology, extending as it does from Socrates to Sartre, best describes the work of V.Y. Mudimbe. Anthropology, broadly conceived as the science that studies human origins, the material and cultural development of humanity (philosophical anthropology concerns itself with human nature, particularly what it is that distinguishes human beings from other creatures and how philosophy allows human beings to understand themselves), is always Mudimbe’s first line of philosophical inquiry. It is certainly Mudimbe’s interest in anthropology that allows him to conduct his investigations into Africa, its modes of thinking, and colonialism and its continuing effects on the continent. Writing on the latter issue in The Invention of Africa, Mudimbe, with his customary deftness of mind, argues that colonialism and its aftermath cannot by itself account for the continent’s extant condition: “The colonizing structure, even in its most extreme manifestations . . . might not be the only explanation for Africa’s present-day marginality. Perhaps this marginality could, more essentially, be understood from the perspective of wider hypotheses about the classification of beings and societies.”[ Making sense of Africa, in Mudimbe’s terms, must begin with a hypothesization that explicates how “beings and societies” come to be classified, the anthropological undertaking par excellence, which also requires a study of the forces that construct, implement and maintain these classifications