Pakistaniaat: A Journal of Pakistan Studies
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English Education in India: Hindu Anamnesis versus Muslim Torpor
Get PDFEnglish education was introduced by the British with the twin purpose of impressing upon the natives the value of western thought and of preparing them for taking up jobs to assist in the administration of the country. The first protégés were Hindus and there developed a Hindu middle class which began to demand concessions from the government without offering subservience in return. The British then began to encourage the Muslims to adopt English education in order to develop a counterpoise to Hindu middle class assertiveness. But among both communities English education was strictly an upper class affair in which the lower castes had no role.Written primarily for an Indian audience, the author hopes that this article will also be useful to Pakistani scholars and students of colonial history
Superpower Relations, Backchannels, and the Subcontinent
Get PDFIn his 1978 memoirs, President Nixon claimed, “By using diplomatic signals and behind-the-scenes pressures we had been able to save West Pakistan from the imminent threat of Indian aggression and domination. We had also once again avoided a major confrontation with the Soviet Union.â€[1] Kissinger’s far more detailed chapter on “the tilt,†in the first volume of his memoirs, White House Years, complements and largely corroborates Nixon’s. Kissinger argued that Nixon did not want to “squeeze Yahya†and tried to put forward a neutral posture to the bloodshed in East Pakistan so as not to encourage secessionist elements within an ally, Pakistan, which was divided into two wings over 1,000 miles apart astride India.[2] Above all, before his secret trip to China in July 1971, Kissinger wanted to preserve the special channel to the P.R.C., and he saw three obstacles to handling the situation in South Asia: “the policy of India, our own public debate, and the indiscipline of our bureaucracy.†Kissinger stressed that the U.S. attempted to restrain India by making clear American opposition to Indo-Pakistani conflict and attempting to force the Soviet Union to control their ally, India. Nevertheless, the two South Asian countries marched towards conflict following a string of natural disasters in East Pakistan—later the independent nation of Bangladesh, an election loss for Pakistan President Yahya Khan to Mujib Rahman, and Yahya’s subsequent crackdown in East Pakistan against Bangladeshi independence. [1] Nixon, RN, p.530. [2] Nixon famously wrote by hand on a memo of April 28, 1971, on “Policy Options Towards Pakistan: “To all hands. Don’t squeeze Yahya at this time.†Aijazuddin correctly notes that the language did not originate with the President, but actually with Alexander Haig, who wrote in a cover memo, “Henry has suggested…you could include a note to the effect that you want no actions taken at this time which would squeeze West Pakistan.†The cover memo is in Aijazuddin, The White House and Pakistan, p.241. The longer memo from Kissinger to the President in Ibid, pp.242–247; and FRUS, IX, pp.94–98
Pakistani-Chinese Relations: An Historical Analysis of the Role of China in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971
Get PDFThe purpose of this essay is to bring into focus the cordial relations that existed between Pakistan and China during the Bhutto Era from 1969 to 1977, and to highlight the role of China during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971. Both countries had different ideologies and backgrounds. Relations between the two countries developed on the basis of national interest rather than ideology. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto writes: States deal with states, as such, and not with their social systems or ideologies. If such an argument was carried to its logical conclusion, Pakistan should have friendly relations only with Muslim states and should isolates itself from the rest of the world. It is a historical fact that Islam, as a political force, has suffered more at the hands of Christian states than of others... It is unlikely that China is going to be responsible for the fall of Granada or Pakistan or for wrestling of Jerusalem from the Muslim States. Our reactions are based on the Bandung principles and on the adherence to the concept of non-interference. Nowhere is it mentioned in the scriptures of Islam that fostering friendship with non-Islamic states involves a compromise of identity.1. This research article undertakes a historical, analytical and documented study of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's foreign relations and politics with China with the goal of explaining how and why Pakistan had friendly and cordial relations with China. The main question is if both countries have different ideologies why are they so close to each other? In international relations, there is neither a permanent friend nor enemy; interests are preferred. Â 1 Â Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1969,) Pp. 132-133 Â Â Â Â Â