MiCISAN

González Herrera, Irina

Velasco Montante, Astrid

MiCISAN (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico)

Mayor Judith Irina González Herrera, Ejército Mexicano

Parra, Carlos A. de la

Heredia, Carlos

Lecciones del desarrollo de la cooperación binacional y de la sociedad civil en materia de administración de agua en la frontera Estados Unidos-México

Estévez, Ariadna

Vázquez, Daniel

9 razones para (des)confiar de las luchas por los derechos humanos

Martínez-Zalce Sánchez, Graciela

Cultura y sociedad

Cárdenas Alamios, Nuty

Tigau, Carmelia

Segunda parte: Canadá multicultural

Aquino Moreschi, Alejandra

Contreras Pastrana Isis Violeta

104
Voices of Mexico •  104
Community, Migration,  
And Youth Cultures in the
Northern Mountains of Oaxaca
Alejandra Aquino Moreschi*
Isis Violeta Contreras Pastrana**
Migration has been part of Mexico’s First Peoples’ 
lives throughout their history. For most of the 
twentieth century, they migrated internally toward 
other rural areas and the country’s major urban centers. How-
ever, beginning in the 1970s, they increasingly joined the 
migratory flows toward the United States. By the 1990s, an 
entire field of studies specializing in indigenous migration 
had already developed with important results such as the anal-
ysis of trans-national communities and the study of racializa-
tion processes and their links to labor relations.1 
Among these studies, one issue still underexplored is that 
of young indigenous migrants, whether international or do-
mestic, to large urban centers. The systematic exploration of 
how young indigenous migrants experience their youth and 
what effects their migration has on their communities of 
origin and their own lives can no longer be postponed.
This article is an effort to contribute to that analysis. Our 
central aim is to explore from an ethnographic perspective 
how youth is constructed and experienced in different Ayuujk 
and Zapotec communities in Oaxaca’s Northern Mountains, 
which are immersed in both domestic and international mi-
gratory processes. To do that, we will look at the generational 
disputes and negotiations over the definition of subjectivi-
ties, particularly the tensions around issues of the body, iden-
tities, and individual and collective life projects.
generational disputes oVer  
migration and lifestyles
Young people from the Zapotec municipality of Yalalag mi-
grat ed massively to the United States in the 1990s. This 
caused a great deal of tension with their parents’ generation, 
which had dreamed of their children studying and then com-
mitting themselves to their struggles for indigenous rights 
and community spaces. As Flor, a young woman of that gen-
eration, explains, “My Dad’s hope was that we would get a 
little more involved in town issues, in its struggle; he would 
*  Professor-researcher at Mexico City’s Center for Research and 
Study in Anthropology (ciesas); alejandra.aquinom@yahoo.com.
**  Doctoral candidate at the Berlin’s Freie Universität; yolotzina 
catl@gmail.com.
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send me to the meetings of women, the community meetings 
that happened. My Dad got me involved so that I would love 
the popular movement” (interviewed in Los Angeles, 2006).
Even though Flor quite liked participating in commu-
nity life, her plans did not include “dedicating her life to the 
struggle.” Like many other young people, she was concerned 
with earning a living. For people in her age group, particular-
ly the women, it is not easy to get a good job in their town. 
They can embroider, make shawls and sandals, wash clothing, 
or work in the fields, but these activities are not enough to 
support themselves. As Flor said, 
I was in the movement’s youth group and we could study dance. 
It was all very nice culturally and politically and in terms of 
education, but when I thought in terms of money, I realized 
there was no way forward. So, that’s when I said “What is there 
in this for me? It would be better to emigrate.” (interviewed in 
Los Angeles, 2006)
Her parents were against her leaving because it was not 
the future they had dreamed of for her and because they 
knew that most of the young people who leave do not come 
back. Her mother said, “I don’t want to lose another child. I 
don’t want to go through that again. This business of the mon-
ey is just a lie. What you always need is family unity; it’s no use 
to us if they leave to help us if we lose them anyway. Because, 
once you leave, you won’t come back” (interviewed in Los An-
geles, 2006).
For the adult generation, their children’s migration was 
painful. They were convinced that no great future awaited 
them, since they had seen that, although most migrants man-
aged to save money and build big houses in the town, on the 
other side of the border, they faced being “illegals,” racism, 
and exploitation every day of the week. In addition, the prob-
lem is that it is very difficult for young people to earn a living 
in a situation devastated by neoliberal policies.
disputes oVer control of sexuality
Another of the areas in which the subjectivity of young peo-
ple and adults came into conflict is sexuality. Until the 1970s, 
the Yalalag controlled young people’s sexuality, particularly 
that of the women, in different ways. So, a great many of the 
women from the previous generation had been locked away 
in the home as soon as they entered puberty and went into 
marriages arranged by their parents without ever experien-
cing courtship before marriage, among other practices.
While young Yalaltecs have obtained greater autonomy 
in leading their lives, strict control continues to exist over their 
intimacy, producing a great deal of tension between the two 
generations. For example “it looks bad” for a young woman 
to walk through the community by herself. One of them, Elvia, 
explains: “Here, nobody walks down the street; everybody is 
locked up in her house. Very few people visit other homes, 
even of family members, because right away, tongues start 
wagging” (interviewed in Yalalag, 2005).
Gossip or outright criticism are ways the community exerts 
strong pressure for young women to stay at home, and when 
they do not, they run the risk of being stigmatized: “Since 
I’m somebody who says hello to other people and I do go out 
because I got used to doing that when I was a young girl be-
cause I used to go out to sell things, sometimes people bad-
mouth me and don’t want their daughters to associate with 
me” (Elvia, interviewed in Yalalag, 2005).
For parents, controlling their daughters’ leaving the house 
is to “protect” their reputations and preserve their “honor” 
and that of the family, something still closely perceived as 
being related to their children’s sexuality. As Clara, a young 
migrant, says, 
In my time, I was brought up with that custom that said that 
starting in primary school, nobody could go out. That happened 
to me. My grandfather locked me up; that’s why I think to my-
self, thank God my mother came in time and took us to the 
United States with her. Otherwise, they would have married 
me off already.” (interviewed in Yalalag, 2005)
Young people also are pressured to behave in accordance 
with dominant gender codes. A girl is expected to be “decent” 
and hard-working, which for the past generations means doing 
all the housework, being demure, serious, not having boy-
friends, and not going out with friends, among other things. 
In the case of the boys, while their mobility is more accept-
ed, they are also pressured to behave according to the norm. 
young people imagine the North as 
bursting with freedom, where they will be able 
to live their own lives without being 
criticized or judged by the community.
106
Voices of Mexico •  104
As Mauricio, a young man of 23 who has been in the United 
States for some time, explains, “People are really closed off 
and quick to judge there [in Yalalag]. People are really criti-
cal. You can’t do anything. For them, if you have a girlfriend, 
it’s a sin; if you’re seen kissing her in the middle of the street, 
even worse” (interviewed in Yalalag, 2005).
In the face of all this control, they imagine the North as 
bursting with freedom, where they will be able to live their 
own lives without being criticized or judged by the commu-
nity. Even though that is not always the case, for many young 
people, the United States represents a place of greater free-
dom where they have the possibility of enjoying this period 
of their lives for longer. As one young woman says, “There, 
you have the freedom to express yourself and do what you 
want. Nobody criticizes you. I see that clearly, for example, 
in the way they dress, how they can go out of the house and 
have a boyfriend. Here [in Yalalag] they judge you for that” 
(Irma, interviewed in Yalalag, 2005).
disputes oVer “dressing right 
and Being a good ayuuJk” 
José González was walking in downtown Tlahuitoltepec, in 
the Oaxaca Mixe Mountains, sporting his “punk Mohawk.” 
It was the 1990s, and the whole aim of the fashion of the 
time was to “look evil, heavy, and crazy” (José, interviewed in 
Tlahuitoltepec, 2012). Countercultural performances and mu-
sic like rock and reggae were part of how this generation of 
young Ayuujk was constructed, by appropriating certain ele-
ments of urban youth cultures and breaking with their par-
ents’ generation.
Toward the end of the 1980s, many young people who 
emigrated to cities to work came into contact with different 
urban youth cultures and, on returning to their hometowns, 
congregated around rock music, which became an element 
for marking their identity that broke with older generations.
Young rockers questioned the communities’ principles 
and discourses about “being a good Ayuujk,” linked, for ex-
ample to wearing “traditional” clothing, but also to a code of 
“good” behavior. These new identities were rejected by the 
communities, which saw them as “cultural contamination” 
and “ethnocide.” As one young man of that generation said, 
“They [the previous generation] were the ones who would say 
‘get those kids in line’ or ‘it makes the community look bad 
for them to walk around like that’ ” (interviewed in Tlahuitol-
te pec, 2012). This led to community assemblies often dis-
cussing the issue of “gangs” and taking preventive measures 
like censoring young people’s bodies: “When some kids were 
brought before the justice system, they would have their hair 
cut at the local alderman’s office and be made to dress properly 
in white shirts, dress shirts” (Rigoberto, interviewed in 2012).
In the late 1990s, violence among gangs and punishment 
condoned by the community increased throughout the re-
gion; after that, the Ayuujk youth countercultural movement 
took other forms.
disputes oVer the ayuuJk identity 2
One generational debate in some Ayuujk communities con-
tinues to be about identity. This is the case of a collective of 
Tamazulapam youth, who identify with reggae music and the 
Rastafarian movement. They are between 15 and 30, and in 
2005, they created the Ayuuk Culture and Resistance Col-
lective (ccrea). These young people have inherited from 
their parents a commitment to community life and an inter-
est in continuing to value their own language and culture.
The direct Ayuuk-Rasta inspiration was the Razteca move-
ment that they encountered during their stay in Mexico City.3 
They saw coincidences between the Rastafarian philosophy 
While the young have inherited the 
struggles of those who came before them, 
they are putting forward other ways  
of being young, of being Ayuujk or Zapotec.
107
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and Ayuujk philosophy, but think of 
their community of origin as a place 
in which their most significant cultur-
al references meet and which they 
want to be the starting point of a “cul-
tural return” and a critique of society. 
They have created their own Rasta-
farian music in Ayuuk and Spanish 
and have adopted certain performa-
tive elements like dreadlocks and 
the colors green, yellow, and red, also 
the colors of the Ayuuk flag.
In the words of one member of the 
collective, “A Rasta-Ayuujk is a person 
with self-awareness, awareness of 
what he/she is and what he/she does, 
and who also maintains his/her tradi-
tion and language” (anonymous, Tama-
zulapam, 2012). These young people 
say that being Rastafarian is synonymous with living with 
“respect among brothers,” being “respectful of nature,” 
“thinking positively,” or “having a positive vibe,” “being inter-
ested in the community” and “being aware of what’s going 
on in the community and the country.” For others, Ayuuk 
Rastafarianism is also a way of opposing the individualistic 
system promoted by “Babylon” or “the oppressive system.” 
For them, this is represented by “the government, injustice, 
inequality, and the oppression of the indigenous peoples of 
the country.” However, they have been severely questioned 
by the community; for example, some say that reggae and 
Rastafarianism come from “outside.” All this generates reflec-
tions inside the collective about what it means to be Ayuuk 
today.
As one of the young founders of the movement says, “We 
would meet and talk about whether we were still Ayuuk or 
not. . . . We eventually said that, yes, were were Ayuuk be-
cause we spoke the language, we were born here, our parents 
are from here, and we also wanted to continue being from 
here” (Timio, interviewed in Tamazulapam, 2012). However, 
being a Rastafarian inside the community continues to be 
viewed as a bad attitude; this means that they have often been 
accused of promoting “something alien to the community” 
and of no longer being Ayuuk. They, however, feel differ-
ently, saying, “We are Ayuuk and we want to continue to be. 
Just because we like it [the Rastafarian philosophy] doesn’t 
mean we’re no longer Ayuuk. On the contrary, we want to be 
and to be in the community, to be a 
part of it and contribute what we can 
to it” (Timio, interviewed in Tamazu-
lapam, 2012).
conclusions
We have covered generational con-
flicts between systems of aspirations 
and hegemony over the production 
of subjectivities among adults who try 
to change younger people’s behavior 
and preferences. While the young 
have inherited the struggles of those 
who came before them, they are put-
ting forward other ways of being 
young, of being Ayuujk or Zapotec 
and of being in the community; 
these new forms have destabilized the prevailing subjectivities 
and practices. The young are therefore questioned when they 
see in migration a new life project or when they appropriate 
urban youth cultures. However, in the cases we have ana-
lyzed here, this leads them to create new youth identities 
previously not experienced in their towns, which spark ten-
sions there and question the national hegemonic representa-
tions of “indigenous” identities as immutable and defined by 
tradition. 
notes
1  See Federico Besserer, “Luchas culturales en la agricultura del capitalis-
mo tardío,” Alteridades vol. 22, 2000, pp. 15-22; Jonathan Fox and Gaspar 
Rivera-Salgado, comps., Indígenas mexicanos migrantes en los Estados Unidos 
(Mexico City: University of California, Sta. Cruz/Universidad de Zacatecas/
Miguel Ángel Porrúa /lix Legislatura, 2004), pp. 9-74; Michael Kearney, 
“The Effects of Transnational Culture, Economy and Migration on Mix-
tec Identity in Oaxacalifornia,” in Peter Smith and Joe R. Feagin, eds., The 
Bubbling Cauldron, Race, Ethynicity and the Urban Crisis (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1995), pp. 226-243; and Carol Nagengasr 
and Michael Kearney, “Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Con-
sciousness and Political Activism,” Latin American Research Review vol. 25, 
no. 2 (1990), pp. 61-91.
2  People in Tlahuitoltepec call themselves “Ayuujk,” while those in Tamazu-
lapam refer to themselves as “Ayuuk.” This accounts for the different 
spelling.
3  The Raztecs merged the basic principles of Rastafarianism with what they 
imagined as the Aztec culture. 


English

Special Section

Navarrete López, Jorge Eduardo

Maldonado Rivera, Silvia

Trump: comercio, inversiones… y otras amenazas

Santos Ayala, Irma de los

Contraalmirante Irma de los Santos Ayala, Armada de México

Valdés-Ugalde, José Luis

7
*  Researcher at cisan, unam, and regular member of the Mexican 
Academy of Sciences; jlvaldes@unam.mx and @JLValdesUgalde.
C
ar
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Ba
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Re
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Trump versus Fromm:
Breaking Bad1
José Luis Valdés-Ugalde*
“The sadistic tendency is the wish to make
others suffer or to see them suffer.
This suffering can be physical, but more often
it is mental suffering. Its aim is to hurt actively,
to humiliate, embarrass others, or to see them
in embarrassing and humiliating situations.”
Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom
ed in Indonesia in the Muslim faith, facts that Obama was 
supposedly hiding. Trump also demanded that the then-pre s-
ident present prove that he had graduated from Harvard Law 
School and that he had also become the first Afro-American 
to be elected president of the Harvard Law Review.
In a single stroke, the undesirable Mr. Trump questioned 
that the Democrat was a U.S. American, a Christian —a re-
ligion that Obama does indeed profess—, and that he was 
intellectually capable of being a respected lawyer graduated 
from a prestigious university. Obama did present his birth 
certificate, and even then, Trump insisted it could be a fake. 
In two words: pure sadism.
Trump spread doubts about Obama’s citizenship and oth-
er qualities to disqualify him as president; with that he laid 
the foundations for the strengthening of the hyper-conser-
vative movement, the so-called “birthers,” that sprang up in 
2008. Later we heard that during the presidential campaign, 
hounded by the media, Trump emphatically said, “Obama 
was born in the U.S. Period.” Just like that, tyrannically, and 
with no apology. Clearly his immediate objective was to win 
the Afro-American vote. The Afro-American congressional 
caucus rejected Trump’s peculiar mea culpa, classifying it as 
fake and demanding a public apology.
Patricia J. Williams writes, “Trump doesn’t want to lead 
the country —he wants to lead a culture war.” 2 And, in effect, 
PoLiTiCS
the Beginnings of sadism
It has always been clear to the media and the discerning pub-
lic that from the start of his relatively successful political 
period, Donald Trump has built a discourse based on lies 
about everything and everyone. This was a constant in his 
campaign: against Mexicans, Muslims, women, the disabled, 
war veterans, and Afro-Americans. And it continues unabat-
ed now that he is ensconced in the presidency.
This constant was not enough for his candidacy to de-
flate. Toward the end of the campaign, the polls put him crit-
ically close to Hillary Clinton and the final heroic deed was 
performed by Vladimir Putin, whose intervention in the Dem-
ocratic campaign’s operating system handed Trump the win. 
One of the reasons for this is that there is an entire sector of 
very resentful U.S. Americans who identified with the Re-
publican discourse, thanks in part to the fact that the mag-
nate guaranteed ratings for the media and also surprisingly 
managed to impose his agenda and manipulate them given 
his undeniable media stature.
More than five years ago, Trump had already publicly 
demaned Barack Obama present his birth certificate. He 
wanted him to prove he was a U.S. citizen, that he had not 
been born in Kenya, and that he had not later been educat-
8
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4
Trump has followed the textbooks of the Alt Right, which he 
has been associated with since before being president, and 
which is aligned with white supremacism and nationalism, 
anti-Semitism —“We’re not racists; we just hate the Jews” 
is one of their slogans—, right-wing populism, nativism, and 
the neo-reactionary movement. All these currents of extrem-
ist white nationalism, including the Ku Klux Klan and its 
Grand Wizard David Duke (former candidate to the Senate 
who has supported Trump, who in turn has not distanced 
himself from him) are anti-feminist, anti-multiculturalists, 
anti-pluralist, anti-Muslim, anti-black, and anti-Latino. In 
short, they are not democrats and they lean toward totali-
tarianism. They are the ones marking the direction of the 
Trump narrative, and it is to his followers —today empow-
ered— to whom this narrative is aimed.
They think that white people are genetically predisposed 
to being more honorable and intelligent than the black pop-
ulation and that some races are inherently superior to others. 
They reject the idea that the races are basically equivalent 
or interchangeable. Added to the most aggressive misogynist-
xenophobic project in the history of the United States and 
cultural insularity is the trade and economic insularity that 
Trump preaches at every opportunity. This view defends the 
idea of the “Fortress American” and the right to civic-social 
belonging as a function of a racial right; therefore, it denies 
membership in the nation to any race that is not white, based 
on its being “the other.” That is how Trump represents and 
preaches a return to the U.S. apartheid that was so damaging 
to the country’s social fabric. More of Trumpism’s sadism.
It is also a fact —polemics included— that job losses are 
not the only thing that have created a resentful mass of peo-
ple who have become the ideal recipients of the nationalist, 
nativist discourses dominant mainly in Central Europe and 
now in the United States under Trump. Added to this resent-
ment is the defense of racial and religious rights in the process 
of establishing order and social organization. All of this in-
cludes a rejection of the huge number of migrants pouring in 
due to the negative effects of globalization, of the wars, and 
the local conflicts in the Middle East and Northern Africa. 
Whiteness and Christianity over blackness and Islam in 
Europe. In the United States, it’s the same; added to this the 
rejection of the migrant “other,” mainly of Latino origin, and 
the old negritude that defines the United States historically. 
Not to mention the phobia against Muslims, guilty in this 
discourse of terrorist penetration.
More than his supposed mental unbalance, Trump is the 
pure discursive expression of that discontent that exists in 
different sectors of U.S. society. This is a majority white, 
lower-middle-class, aging population without much school-
ing, having stagnated in middle and high school, and, that as 
a result, has gotten mired down in the face of the swift ad-
vances of globalization.
In the short time since his inauguration, Trump has not been 
capable of presenting a comprehensive proposal that con-
vinces the majority of voters, not even of his permanent elec-
toral clientele. In addition to his generalizations —nafta; 
Mexico and China, guilty of the economic crisis; Muslims, 
guilty of the security crisis, etc.—, Trump has challenged the 
limits of the ridiculous and has spent his time exhibiting his 
demagoguery and pathological lying, leading the New York 
Times, The Washington Post, USA Today, local dailies, and 
members of the political and economic establishment to 
emphatically reject him. This, even though the social and 
economic polarization are rooted in the system that they are 
a part of.
These important sectors of public opinion are frightened 
of Trump’s temperament. His lack of control is perceived as 
potential incompetence and clumsiness in the art of govern-
ing for all; and all of this could turn into the generation of 
bigger local and global crises than the U.S. is already facing, 
particularly at this time of relative decline in its hegemony 
—attacking North Korea and Iran from the UN has been 
counterproductive, for example.
With Trump at the head, Washington has begun an even 
greater process of local and global polarization —perhaps 
irreversible—, since he has no conciliatory proposals for solv-
ing problems: his are all total, inflexible recipes. If this mi-
grates to the global order, we will be in the presence of the 
most unilateralist government in history. This will mean that 
we could witness the risk of the North Atlantic pact ending 
given his demand to condition the existence of nato, among 
other delicate issues with grave implications, even though his 
military advisors, starting with Secretary of Defense James 
Mattis, are the ones who rein him in every time he goes too 
far —which is every day.
Added to the most aggressive 
misogynist-xenophobic project in the history 
of the United States and cultural insularity 
is the trade and economic insularity that 
Trump preaches at every opportunity.
9
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the fall
The New York Times called it the “Republican Hell.” Donald 
Trump’s words, lies, and affronts are becoming his own pris-
on. Like a self-fulfilling prophesy, he is in the middle of a 
shipwreck, long-anticipated since he was a candidate. He is 
constantly in free fall and his approval ratings have not re-
turned to the 40-percent mark he had when he took office.
Trump has achieved several things with the complacen-
cy of the Republican Party: he has managed to break apart 
Lincoln’s party more than it already was, condemning it to a 
painful, perilous renewal process. From the moment that he 
began his pre-campaign with a discourse charged with path-
ological lying impulses, slinging insults at all his opponents; 
from June 2015 when he accused Mexicans of being rapists 
and delinquents, and later when he threatened to veto Mus-
lim citizens and scorned a Gold Star Muslim military family 
(veterans and fallen in war); when he attacked women call-
ing them “dogs” and “pigs,” until now, after nine months in 
the White House, he does not have a single achievement to 
show for it, even with regard to Obamacare (which cost him 
dearly when the Senate voted against his alternative); not to 
mention his regressive attempts in the fields of education 
and migration and the lack of cohesion in his cabinet, who 
are afraid of him and in frank retreat —i.e., the recent firing 
of his Health Secretary Tom Price, among 14 important col-
laborators who have also been fired. This says it all.
Pick any topic you want (the wall; Islam; white suprem-
acists; relations with North Korea, China, Iran, Mexico, Ger-
many, Russia, Cuba, or Australia; cultural wars; the health 
system; denial of global warming; infrastructure; natural di-
sasters like Hurricane Maria; and a long, long “etcetera”), and 
we can see that the chief executive has lost his way and con-
trol over the situation, which complicates his staying in of-
fice. At this point of his self-destructive, wasted presidency, 
no matter what Donald Trump does, he is perceived as fake, 
a liar, and even perverse. In short, this is a period of such 
regression that the U.S. government is not only discombob-
ulated, it is in the biggest institutional crisis since Richard 
Nixon fired Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox as part of his 
“Madman” strategies during the ill-fated days of Watergate 
when he was trying to intimidate his opponents showing ap-
parent emotional instability.
In his attempts to fight the establishment, Trump’s stub-
born narcissism and utter ignorance of public affairs makes 
him incapable of understanding his constitutional obligations 
and the separation of powers in U.S. democracy. Until now, 
the latter has been maintained thanks mainly to the federal-
ism within which local governments have acted against his 
measures, containment actions of the judiciary, and, to a 
certain extent, the actions of Congress.
Added to his lack of sensitivity, surpassed only by his meg-
alomania, Trump shows himself as an actor without the 
slightest democratic conviction. His style is personalist and 
authoritarian. This is an unbalanced actor in permanent emo-
tional crisis, insecure and paranoid, who is putting the U.S. 
constitutional order at serious risk, along with the many local 
and global agreements that he is consistently dissolving 
—G5+1 is a grave case in point.
It is Trump and his ego against the world and anyone who 
questions him. He is caught in a zero-sum game in defense 
only of himself and in which his sole objective is to win, re-
gardless of national interests and security. The institutional 
wear and tear caused by Trumpism has meant that the pres-
ident is being devoured by all the devils he has awakened, and 
things are becoming worse and worse as a result of the appear-
ance of an ignorant, grotesque, sadistic despot in the purest 
style described by Erich Fromm in the magnificent work in 
which he draws a portrait of an authoritarian, perverse leader 
whose only thought was to get and preserve power for power’s 
sake, in order to satisfy his sick ego-centrism more than to 
govern democratically and wisely for his people.3  
notes
1  This article was written in the framework of papiit project number 
IG300217, “Los polos de poder dominantes en el sistema internacional 
del siglo xxi, Estados Unidos, la Unión Europea y China: el problema del 
declive relativo de Estados Unidos frente a sus contrapartes.” The author 
wishes to thank the unam General Office for Academic Personnel (dgapa) 
for its support.
2  Patricia J. Williams, “Trump Doesn’t Want to Lead the Country —He Wants 
to Lead a Culture War,” The Nation, September 26-October 3, 2016, 
https://www.thenation.com/article/trump-doesnt-want-to-lead-the 
-country-he-wants-to-lead-a-culture-war/.
3  Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Open Road, Integrated 
Media, first published in 1941).
Trump has followed the textbooks 
of the Alt Right, which is aligned with white 
supremacism and nationalism, anti-Semitism 
right-wing populism, nativism, and the  
neo-reactionary movement.


Politics

Alcorn, Amy R.

Commander Amy R. Alcorn, US Navy

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

Not a member yet