Toulouse 1 Capitole Publications
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Inopposabilité de la déclaration notariée d'insaisissabilité publiée postérieurement à l'ouverture de la procédure de sauvegarde (note sous Cass. Com. 10 mars 2021, n° 19-21.971, F-P)
No full textDéfaut de publication des comptes et injonction sous astreinte du Président du tribunal : l'atteinte à la vie privée de l'associé unique est proportionnée au but légitime de détection et de prévention des difficultés (note sous Cass. Com. 24 juin 2020, n° 19-14.098, PB)
No full textEnvironnement
No full textL'entrée "environnement" dans le Dictionnaire juridique des Outre-mer définit et synthétise les éléments de la sauvegarde de l'environnement selon les différents statuts juridiques des départements, régions et collectivités ultramarins
Airline cooperation effects on airfare distribution: an auction-model-based approach
No full textAirline alliances have a long history yet there is no academic consensus on how they affect price levels and their impact on price dispersion has not yet been studied. We address this question using a novel methodology motivated by the service homogenization and increased price competiton in this industry in the recent years. Establishing an equivalence between the online sales process and a reverse English auction, we use methods from auction econometrics to work in a new way with the standard industry data set: using individual ticket sales where only aggregated prices have been used in the past. Applicable to other industries where sellers compete in prices, this approach allows us to reconsider the effect of airline alliances on the distribution of airfares in the US domestic market. We find lower price mean and dispersion in markets where airlines belong to an alliance as a result of the lower variability of costs. The methodology we apply here can be used to study any distribution of individualized prices, which are now prevalent since the advent of the digital economy
La nullité d’une décision excluant abusivement un associé (Note s/s Cass. 1re civ., 3 février 2021, n° 16-19.691)
No full textLa décision prise abusivement par une assemblée générale d'exclure un avocat associé affecte par elle-même la régularité des délibérations de cette assemblée et en justifie l'annulation
Pourquoi et comment réguler la production et la consommation de produits animaux ? Le cas de l'Union européenne
No full textAbatement strategies and the cost of environmental regulation: emission standards on the European car market
No full textThis paper studies the introduction of an EU-wide emission standard on the automobile market. Using panel data from 1998-2011, I find that firms decreased emission ratings by 14%. Firms use technology adoption and gaming of emission tests to decrease emissions, rather than shifting the sales mix or downsizing. I find that the standard missed its emission target, and from
estimating a structural model, I find that the standard was not welfare improving. The political environment in the EU shaped the design and weak enforcement and resulted in firms’ choices for abatement by technology adoption and gaming
Trust in the image of God: Links between religiosity and reciprocity in Haiti
No full textAre religious believers more prosocial than other people? In a trust game field experiment with 774 subjects in Haiti, we elicit willingness to pay to play in the presence of religious images, and argue that this can be interpreted as a measure of the strength of religiosity. More religious individuals trust others more and reciprocate more than others, with effect sizes between 14% and 21% of mean behaviour depending on the measure. They do not reciprocate more in the presence of religious images than without them, nor towards members of the same denomination as themselves. The results support the view that religious affiliation is correlated with intrinsic trustworthiness. We show that lab behaviour correlates with intuitive measures of religiosity outside the lab and with participation in borrowing and lending networks
Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
No full textWe study competing-mechanism games under exclusive competition: principals first simultaneously post mechanisms, after which agents simultaneously choose to participate and communicate with at most one principal. In this setting, which is common to competing-auction and competitive-search applications, we develop two complete-information examples that question the relevance of the folk theorems for competing-mechanism games documented in the literature. The first example shows that there can exist pure-strategy equilibria in which some principal obtains a payoff below her min-max payoff, computed over all principals' decisions. Thus folk-theoremlike results may have to involve a bound on principals' payoffs that depends on the spaces of messages available to the agents, and not only on the players' actions. The second example shows that even this nonintrinsic approach is misleading when agents' participation decisions are strategic: there can exist incentive-feasible allocations in which principals obtain payoffs above their min-max payoffs, computed over arbitrary spaces of mechanisms, but which cannot be supported in equilibrium
Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation
No full textProcuring an innovation involves motivating a research effort to generate a new idea and then implementing that idea efficiently. If research efforts are unveriable and implementation costs are private information, a trade-off arises between the two objectives. The optimal mechanism resolves the trade-off via two instruments: a cash prize and a follow-on contract. It primarily uses the latter, by favoring the innovator at the implementation stage when the value of the innovation is above a certain threshold and handicapping the innovator when the value of the innovation is below that threshold. A cash prize is employed as a supplementary incentive only when the value of innovation is sufficiently high. These features are consistent with current practices in the procurement of innovation and the management of unsolicited proposals