Toulouse 1 Capitole Publications
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Do risk preferences really matter? the case of pesticide use in agriculture
No full textEven if there exists an extensive literature on the modeling of farmers’ behavior under risk, actual measurements of the quantitative impact of risk aversion on input use are rare. In this article, we use simulations to quantify the impact of risk aversion on the optimal quantity of input and farmers’ welfare when production risk depends on how much of the input is used. The assumptions made on the technology and form of farmers’ risk preferences were chosen such that they are fairly representative of crop farming conditions in the USA and Western Europe. In our benchmark scenario featuring a traditional expected utility model, we find that less than 4% of the optimal pesticide expenditure is driven by risk aversion and that risk induces a decrease in welfare that varies from −1.5 to −3.0% for individuals with moderate to normal risk aversion. We find a stronger impact of risk aversion on quantities of input used when farmers’ risk preferences are modeled under the cumulative prospect theory framework. When the reference point is set at the median or maximum profit, and for some levels of the parameters that describe behavior toward losses, the quantity of input used that is driven by risk preferences represents up to 19% of the pesticide expenditure
Exécution provisoire facultative d'une décision en matière de procédure collective (obs. sous Cass. com., 17 févr. 2021, n° 19-12.417, n° 173 P)
No full textHors le cas d'un excès de pouvoir, la décision du premier président qui arrête ou refuse d'arrêter l'exécution provisoire facultative d'une décision concernant une procédure collective ne peut faire l'objet d'un pourvoi en cassation
Health care insurance payment policy when the provider and patient May Collude
No full textThis article explores a three‐party contracting problem when the patient and the provider possess private information that is unobservable to the insurer. We show that for an insurance mechanism to be collusion‐proof, it suffices for the insurer to rely on the incentive for one side of the patient‐provider coalition. If the risk premium for the patient is smaller than the provider's informational rent, placing the incentive on the patient generates a lower social cost than placing the incentive on the provider. We show that if the provider's effort is highly valued by the patient, the insurer should rely on the patient's incentive to implement a collusion‐proof second‐best insurance. Interestingly, an altruistic provider may lead to a higher social cost than a self‐interested provider. However, even if the insurer does not know the degree of provider altruism, it may still achieve the second‐best outcome by assuming that the provider is self‐interested. The model can be further extended to allow for different objective of the insurer, provider's informational advantage over patient, and auditing
Green energy pricing for digital europe
No full textThis paper investigates the trade-offs associated with the digitalization of the energy sector. Arguing
that digitalization has both bright and dark sides, we study the extent to which it can help make energy
systems efficient and sustainable. We first discuss how digitalization affects the responsiveness of
demand, and explore its implications for spot pricing, load shedding, and priority service. In particular,
we highlight the conditions under which digital technologies that allow demand to be more responsive
to supply are likely to be used. We then turn to the way digitalization can contribute to the
decarbonization of the energy sector, and discuss the promises and limitations of artificial intelligence
in this area. Finally, we contend that policymakers should pay special attention to the privacy concerns
raised by the digitalization of the energy sector and the cyberattacks that it enables
Autonomous algorithmic collusion: economic research and policy implications
No full textMarkets are being populated with new generations of pricing algorithms, powered with Artificial Intelligence, that hve the ability to autonomously learn to operate. This ability can be
both a source of efficiency and cause of concern for the risk that algorithms autonomously and tacitly learn to collude. In this paper we explore recent developments in the economic literature and discuss implications for policy
The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy
No full textWe propose an analysis of platform competition based on the academic literature with a view towards competition policy. First, we discuss to which extent competition can emerge in digital markets and show which forms it can take. In particular, we underline the role of dynamics, but also of platform differentiation, consumers multi-homing and beliefs to allow competition in platform markets. Second, we analyze competition policy issues and discuss how rules designed for standard markets can perform in two-sided markets. We show that multi-sided externalities create new opportunities for anti-competitive conducts, often related to pricing and contractual imperfections
La responsabilité pour insuffisance d'actif d'un dirigeant bénévole d'une société en liquidation judiciaire (Note s/s Cass. com., 9 déc. 2020, n° 18-24.730)
No full textL'article 1992, alinéa 2, du code civil, selon lequel la responsabilité générale du mandataire est appliquée moins rigoureusement à celui dont le mandat est gratuit, ne concerne pas la situation du dirigeant d'une personne morale en liquidation judiciaire poursuivi en paiement de l'insuffisance d'actif de celle-ci sur le fondement de l'article L. 651-2 du code de commerce, la responsabilité de ce dirigeant s'appréciant, sur le fondement de ce texte spécial, de la même manière, qu'il soit rémunéré ou no