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One Man, One Vote. Part 2: Measurement of malapportionment and disproportionality and the Lorenz curve A: Introduction and measurement tools
No full textLes dispositions relatives à la police municipale de la loi n° 2021-646 du 25 mai 2021 pour une sécurité globale préservant les libertés
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Water Allocation, Crop Choice, and Priority Services
No full textWe analyze the problem of allocating irrigation water among het- erogenous farmers when water supply is stochastic. If farmers are risk-neutral, a spot market for water is e¢ cient; while the oft-used uniform rationing system is ine¢ cient, both ex-ante and ex-post. In- deed, we show that it leads farmers to overexpose to risk, thus making shortages more severe and more frequent in case of drought. We pro- pose instead a regulation by priority classes extending Wilson (1989), and we derive an e¢ ciency result. We characterize the set of farmers that would win or loose from such a reform. We also argue that a system of priority classes may be preferred to a spot market system, because scarcity is easier to manage ex-ante than ex-post, and because this system facilitates the supply of insurance to risk-averse agents
Secret professionnel de l'avocate et de l'avocat et confidentialité des échanges : vade-mecum. 2nde partie
No full textEssais en théorie économique
No full textLe résumé en français n'a pas été communiqué par l'auteur.Le résumé en anglais n'a pas été communiqué par l'auteur
Are Grassland Conservation Programs a Cost-Effective Way to Fight Climate Change? Evidence from France
No full textGrassland, especially when extensively managed and when replacing cropland, stores carbon in the ground. As a result, Grassland Conservation Programs, that pay farmers for maintaining grassland cover, might be an effective way to combat climate change, if they succeed in triggering an increase in grassland cover at the expense of cropland for a reasonable amount of money. In this paper, we use a natural experiment to estimate the cost-effectiveness of the French Grassland Conservation Program, the largest of such programs in the world. We exploit a change in the eligibility requirements for the program that generated a sizable increase in the proportion of participants in the areas most affected by the reform. We find that the expansion of the program lead to a small increase ingrassland area, mainly at the expense of croplands, which implies that the program expansion increased carbon storage. We also find that the elasticity of grassland provision is low, and that, as a result, the program has large windfall gains. To compute the benefit-cost ratio of the program, we combine our results with similar estimates from the literature using meta-analysis tools and we introduce the resulting parameter in a model of carbon storage in grassland. We find that, for a carbon price of 24 Euros/tCO2 eq, the climate benefits of the program are equal to 7±3% of its costs. When taking into account the other benefits brought about by grassland, we find the benefits of the program to be equal to 44±15% of its costs. We estimate that the program would break even for a carbon price of 194±122 Euros/tCO2 eq
Long Term Care Insurance with State-Dependent Preferences
No full textWe study the demand for actuarially fair Long Term Care (LTC hereafter) insurance in a setting where autonomous agents only care for daily life consumption while dependent agents also care for LTC expenditures. We assume that dependency decreases the marginal utility of daily life consumption. We rst obtain that some agents optimally choose not to insure themselves, while no agent wishes to buy complete insurance. We then show that the comparison of marginal utility of income (as opposed to consumption) across health states depends on (i) whether agents do buy LTC insurance at equilibrium or not, (ii) the comparison of the degree of risk aversion for consumption and for LTC expenditures, and (iii) the income level of agents. Our results then oer testable implications that can explain (i) why few people buy Long Term Care insurance and (ii) the discrepancies between various empirical works when measuring the extent of state-dependent preferences for LTC
