Toulouse 1 Capitole Publications
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Interdependence and cooperation in daily life
Philosophers and scientists have long debated the nature of human social interactions and the prevalence of mutual dependence, conflict of interests, and power asymmetry in social situations. Yet, there is surprisingly little empirical work documenting the patterns of interdependence that people experience in daily life. We use experience sampling to study how people think about 3 dimensions of interdependence in daily life and how these dimensions relate to cooperation. In Study 1, 139 romantic couples (n = 278) reported on situations experienced with their partner (k = 6,766); in Study 2, individuals (n = 284) reported on situations experienced with any other person (k = 7,248), over the course of 1 week. Across both samples, we found that most social interactions were perceived as containing moderate mutual dependence, equal power, and corresponding interests. When couples reported on the same situation (Study 1), they largely agreed on their experienced interdependence and cooperation, suggesting that their reports reflect an underlying shared reality. In daily interactions across both samples, higher mutual dependence and lower conflict of interests were associated with more cooperation, whereas relative power was not directly related to cooperation. These associations replicated in laboratory experiments (Study 2). In daily life, high mutual dependence and high relative power exacerbated the negative relation between conflict of interests and cooperation. Finally, prevalent patterns of interdependence and the experience of specific interdependent situations affected multiple relationship outcomes. Our findings stress the importance of studying a diverse array of interdependent situations—and especially situations with corresponding interests—to better understand cooperation in daily life
Random Utility Models, Wine, and Experts
By conducting a field experiment, we investigate whether consumers value expert opinion labels on wine as a form of reducing asymmetric information about product quality. We use two types of data. First, we use a macro-level monthly-product-store dataset,collected before and after our field experiment, which involves treating a random subset of wine products by displaying expert scores in one store, and comparing sales with wine sales in similar, non-treated stores. Secondly, we use a micro-level panel dataset from the treated store that provides information on products purchased and household characteristics. We combine these data with additional information on products, such as, varietal, region of production, price point relative to other wines, and expert scores. Using the macro-level data for treated and control stores, we estimate
a structural random coefficient demand model for wine. With the household micro dataset, we estimate a random coefficient mixed logit demand specification, allowing for consumer heterogeneity in demand for wine. In order to capture the demand for wine, the products are defined as bundles of attributes, including the expert score that is experimentally introduced into the market. We find robust results in terms of consumer valuations for expert scores, using both datasets. In particular, we obtain an implied average willingness to pay (WTP) between 2 (using the macro level dataset for treated and control stores) and 3.2 dollars (using the micro level dataset for the treated store) for an average score of 83. Although not all of the consumer demographics help explain the heterogeneity in the value of expert scores, the wine ratings matter significantly less to consumers that have higher incomes, or are more likely to own a home. Finally, using counterfactual simulations we estimate the changes in consumer surplus resulting from available quality information in the form of expert opinion scores. Using the micro level dataset we find that removing scores leads to significant welfare losses especially for lower income consumers and for men. Overall, using the macro level dataset for treated and control stores, we estimate there to be a significant welfare loss eliminating scores of roughly one percent of total wine revenue in the treated store
Dispersed Information and Asset Prices
We argue that noisy aggregation of dispersed information provides a unifixed explanation
for several prominent cross-sectional return anomalies such as returns to skewness, returns to disagreement and corporate credit spreads. We characterize asset returns with noisy information aggregation by means of a risk-neutral probability measure that features excess weight on tail risks, and link the latter to observable moments of earnings forecasts, in particular forecast dispersion and accuracy. We calibrate our model to match these moments and show that it accounts for a large fraction of the empirical return premia. We further develop asset pricing tools for noisy information aggregation models that do not impose strong parametric restrictions on economic primitives such as preferences, information, or return distributions
Lanceurs d’alerte et droit social
Les progrès juridiques dans la protection du lanceur d’alerte sont évidents. Pour autant, la multiplicité des textes les concernant dans de nombreux domaines (droit du travail, environnement, finance…) et certaines hésitations de la jurisprudence amènent à s’interroger sur leur statut . Une unification européenne pourrait permettre une simplification et une mise en cohérence des dispositifs au profit des lanceurs d’alerte eux-mêmes
Coemploi et responsabilité
Les deux arrêts que la chambre sociale a rendus le 25 novembre 2020, en formation plénière, sur les pourvois n° 18-13.769 et 18- 13.771, offrent l’occasion de s’interroger sur l’état actuel du coemploi, dont la mort avait été annoncée ou désirée, et sur les autres moyens dont disposent des salariés licenciés pour motif économique, lorsqu’ils entendent imputer la perte de leur emploi à un comportement fautif de leur employeur ou d’un tiers. Cette interrogation est d’autant plus nécessaire, que depuis une dizaine d’années, des évolutions se sont produites dans l’approche de la chambre sociale, qui ont donné lieu à de nombreux commentaires doctrinaux. La note explicative diffusée sur le site public de la Cour de cassation rappelle en partie les étapes de cette évolution. Institution décriée par une partie de la doctrine parce qu’elle mettrait en péril les principes qui s’attachent à la personnalité morale et, particulièrement, la séparation et l’autonomie des patrimoines, elle a été victime d’un succès d’estime excessif de la part de certains salariés, au point que des ajustements sont apparus nécessaires pour en marquer les limites. Mais alors que, dans la première affaire, l’Avocat général invitait la chambre sociale à l’abandonner, par un « retour aux sources » fondé sur le seul critère de la subordination et sur le régime de la responsabilité civile délictuelle, le coemploi est toujours là, même s’il a perdu de sa vigueur. Il s’agira donc d’analyser les évolutions qu’il a connues et leurs raisons, puis, d’évoquer, notamment à partir du second arrêt, les autres actions qui sont ouvertes aux salariés licenciés lorsqu’ils entendent dénoncer des manquements ayant contribué à la perte de leur emploi
Labor leverage, coordination failures, and aggregate risk
This paper studies an economy where demand spillovers make firms’ production decisions strategic complements. Firms choose their operating leverage trading off higher fixed costs for lower variable costs. Operating leverage governs firms’ exposures to an aggregate labor productivity shock. In equilibrium, firms exhibit excessive operating leverage as they do not internalize that an economy with higher aggregate operating leverage is more likely to fall into a recession following a negative productivity shock. Welfare losses coming from firms’ failure to coordinate production are amplified by suboptimal risk-taking, which magnifies the impact of productivity shocks onto aggregate output
Shadow banking and the four pillars of traditional financial intermediation
Traditional banking is built on four pillars: SME lending, insured deposit taking, access to lender of last resort, and prudential supervision. This paper unveils the logic of the quadrilogy by showing that it emerges naturally as an equilibrium outcome in a game between banks and the government. A key insight is that regulation and public insurance services (LOLR, deposit insurance) are complementary. The model also shows how prudential regulation must adjust to the emergence of shadow banking, and rationalizes structural remedies to counter bogus liquidity hoarding and financial contagion: ring-fencing between regulated and shadow banking and the sharing of liquidity in centralized platforms
The effect of fee shifting on litigation: evidence from a policy innovation in intermediate cost shifting
We study the effect of fee shifting rules on litigation. First, we build a model to study the theoretical effect of a change in cost-recovery rules on case filings, (post-filing) settlement, win rates, and plaintiffs' average litigation expenditures. We then undertake an empirical analysis of the introduction of an intermediate cost shifting rule that falls between the English and American Rules: a reform that limits the size of fee awards to successful litigants in cases decided by the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (IPEC), one of two venues where IP cases may be filed in England and Wales. Our empirical analysis takes advantage of heterogeneity among case types and compares IPEC cases with intellectual property cases litigated at the High Court of England and Wales, which was not subject to this reform. We find that patent case filings increased following the IPEC’s shift from a pure English Rule to a rule that caps costs awards. Consistent with our model's predictions, we also find evidence that smaller plaintiffs both won less often and settled more often post-reform, as well as evidence that larger plaintiffs spent less on litigation post-reform
3« Clause d’objet social et pouvoir du gérant d’une SCI » (Cass. 3ème civ. 5 nov. 2020, n° 19-21.214)
Le juge territorialement compétent en matière d'instruction in fututum (note s/s Cass. 2e civ., 2 juillet 2020, n° 19-21.012)
Le juge territorialement compétent pour statuer sur une requête fondée sur l'article 145 du Code de procédure civile est le président du tribunal susceptible de connaître de l'instance au fond ou celui du tribunal dans le ressort duquel les mesures d'instruction in futurum sollicitées doivent, même partiellement, être exécutées