14065 research outputs found
Sort by
On the value of pseudoscience and its philosophical study
Get PDFIn philosophy of science, the pseudosciences (like cryptozoology, homeopathy, Flat-Earth Theory, anti-vaccination activism, etc.) have been treated mainly negatively. They are viewed not simply as false, but even dangerous, since they try to mimic our best scientific theories, thus gaining respect and trust from the public, without the appropriate credentials. As a result, philosophers have traditionally put considerable effort into demarcating genuine sciences and scientific theories from pseudoscience. Since these general attempts at demarcation have repeatedly been shown to break down, the present paper takes a different and somewhat more positive approach to the study of pseudoscience. My main point is not that we should embrace and accept the pseudosciences as they are, but rather that there are indeed valuable and important lessons inherent in the study of pseudoscience and the different sections of the paper list at least six of them. By showing, through numerous examples, how (the study of) pseudoscience can teach us something about science, ourselves, and society, it makes the case that as philosophers, we should devote more time and energy to engaging with such beliefs and theories to help remedy their harmful effects
How uncertainty and underdetermination allow measurement to produce useful results
Get PDFRecent philosophical literature on the epistemology of measurement has relegated measurement uncertainty to a secondary issue, concerned with characterizing the quality of a measurement process or its product. To reveal the deeper epistemological significance of uncertainty, we articulate the problem of usefulness, which is concerned with the tension between the specificity of the conditions under which particular measurements are performed and the broader range of conditions in which measurement results are intended to be – and are – used. This is simultaneously an epistemological and a practical problem. To articulate the problem and explain its solution we employ a philosophically pragmatist framework that treats measurement as a form of inquiry. Drawing on that framework, we claim that measurement uncertainty is crucial to understanding how in practice investigators solve the problem of usefulness. Explaining exactly how that works, however, yields a surprising result. The contribution of measurement uncertainty to the solution of the problem of usefulness exploits the underdetermination of measurement procedures by the aims of a measurement and the resources available for performing that measurement. Underdetermination of measurement, its treatment in terms of the investigation of uncertainty, and the relationship of uncertainty to sensitivity, are key to enabling investigators to successfully complete measurement inquiries. Our account thus shows how two features of scientific inquiry typically thought of in epistemically negative terms – uncertainty and underdetermination – promote positive objectives in the pursuit of knowledge
Overlapping Scientific Consensus theory: extending quasi-truth for scientific knowledge in historical sciences
Get PDFThe theory of quasi-truth was developed by Newton da Costa and collaborators as a more realistic account of truth, encompassing the incompleteness and inconsistency of scientific knowledge. Intuitively, the idea is that truth is reached when consensus is established at the end of inquiry; until that is reached, we have something less than the whole truth, we have partial or quasi-truth. Formally, the view faces some challenges that have been recently addressed in the literature; they concern a mismatch between the offered formalism and the expected claims to be formalized. In this paper we use inspiration from quasi-truth theory to develop an account of consensus in science encompassing the notion of quasi-truth. We not only present the formal system capturing the idea of a scientific consensus, but also show how quasi-truth may be represented within it too. We compare the original quasi-truth approach to ours, and argue that the latter is able to face some of the difficulties that plagued the former
From Mollusk to Swarms of Observers: A Fully General, Observer-Based Operational Framework for General Relativity
Get PDFWe present a thought experiment extending Einstein's reference mollusk to explore operational realizations of coordinate systems in general relativity. Observers carrying four independently programmable clock-like devices assign numerical labels to events, constructing coordinate charts without the structural constraints of mollusk-type frames. This approach decouples coordinate assignment from both motion and geometry, enabling the representation of arbitrary charts. The framework offers pedagogical clarity: coordinate freedom appears as the capacity to freely program clocks, subject only to the (pre-deployment) programming condition that their collective readings fulfill the minimum mathematical properties required of all charts (in particular smoothness). Following the logical structure of differential geometry, charts precede metric determination, which arises from comparing displayed values with measurements in local inertial frames. We emphasize two key aspects. First, any smooth observer congruence suffices to construct every valid coordinate chart, generalizing Einstein's construction. Second, and more strongly, a single congruence suffices to simultaneously also represent any other chart: by corresponding programming of displays, observers following fixed timelike worldlines can display multiple charts (if more than four numbers are displayed), and emulate also any smooth coordinate transformation, including displaying charts with null coordinate directions in the spacetime in which the swarm is deployed. The timelike motion of the observers is only required to fulfill the task of covering a spacetime region, but does not restrict the freedom of programming
Three grades of subject-dependency in object perception
Get PDFIn this paper, we argue that a perceiver’s contributions to perception can substantially affect what objects are represented in perceptual experience. To capture the scalar nature of these perceiver-contingent contributions, we introduce three grades of subject-dependency in object perception. The first grade, “weak subject-dependency,” concerns attentional changes to perceptual content like, for instance, when a perceiver turns their head, plugs their ears, or primes their attention to a particular cue. The second grade, “moderate subject-dependency,” concerns changes in the contingent features of perceptual objects due to action-orientation, location, and agential interest. For instance, being to the right or left of an object will cause the object to have a corresponding locative feature, but that feature is non-essential to the object in question. Finally, the third grade, “strong subject-dependency,” concerns generating perceptual objects whose existence depends upon their perceivers’ sensory contributions to perception. For this final grade of subject-dependency the adaptive perceptual system shapes diverse representations of sensory information by contributing necessary features to perceptual objects. To exemplify this nonstandard form of object perception we offer evidence from the future-directed anticipation of perceptual experts, and from the feature binding of synesthetes. We conclude that strongly subject-dependent perceptual objects are more than mere material objects, but are rather a necessary combination of material objects with the contributions of a perceiving subject
On Values in Fairness Optimization with Machine Learning
Get PDFStatistical criteria of fairness, though controversial, bring attention to the multiobjective nature of many predictive modelling problems. In this paper, I consider how epistemic and non-epistemic values impact the design of machine learning algorithms that optimize for more than one normative goal. I focus on a major design choice between biased search strategies that directly incorporate priorities for various objectives into an optimization procedure, and unbiased search strategies that do not. I argue that both reliably generate Pareto optimal solutions such that various other values are relevant to making a rational choice between them
Creativity and Practical Underdetermination: How Experimental Science Steps into the Epistemic Adjacent Possible
Get PDFThis paper offers a novel take on what philosophers have called problems of "practical
underdetermination" in order to identify a form of creativity epistemic agency operative
in the means by which researchers cope with such problems. In developing my
analysis, I contrast my "experimental dead-space" (EDS) formulation of practical
underdetermination with the more standard "epistemic gap" formulation. I embed
the idea of an EDS within a broader unit of analysis--a "research program"--and identify
an experimental dead-space with what I call, borrowing terms from Stuart Kauffman, an
"epistemic adjacent possible." This enables me to characterize the form of creativity I
have in mind. Finally, I revisit the case study for which the idea of an experimental
dead-space was originally formulated in order to show how my expanded analysis
enables us to appreciate how research platforms in experimental science can
creatively develop in genuinely novel, "unprestatable" ways
Relationalism versus realism: a dilemma for relational quantum mechanics
Get PDFAre absolute representations of reality---i.e., representations of reality from no particular point view---possible? Moore (1997) has offered abstract arguments for the following answer to this question: 'yes, invariably'. But there are questions regarding whether (and how) this conclusion can be compatible with modern physics, where absolute representations often seem hard to come by. These questions were taken up by Jacobs & Read (2025) in the context of classical spacetime physics; here, we turn our attention to quantum mechanics. In particular, when the arguments of Moore (1997) are brought into contact with the 'relational quantum mechanics' of Rovelli (1996) and collaborators, one finds that the latter is unstable: either it is not relational view, or it is not a realist view
The WHO and the 'Whose Values?' Problem: On the Partial Democratisation of Science
Get PDFThat science is value-dependent has been taken to raise problems for the democratic legitimacy of scientifically-informed public policy. An increasingly common solution is to propose that science itself ought to be ‘democratised.’ Of the literature aiming to provide principled means of facilitating such, most has been largely concerned with developing accounts of how public values might be identified in order to resolve scientific value-judgements. Through a case-study of the World Health Organisation’s 2009 redefinition of ‘pandemic’ in response to H1N1, this paper proposes that this emphasis might be unhelpfully pre-emptive, pending more thorough consideration of the question of whose values different varieties of epistemic risk ought to be negotiated in reference to. A choice of pandemic definition inevitably involves the consideration of a particular variety of epistemic risk, described here as ontic risk. In analogy with legislative versus judicial contexts, I argue that the democratisation of ontic risk assessments could bring inductive risk assessments within the scope of democratic control without necessitating that those inductive risk assessments be independently subject to democratic processes. This possibility is emblematic of a novel strategy for mitigating the opportunity costs that successful democratisation would incur for scientists: careful attention to the different normative stakes of different epistemic risks can provide principled grounds on which to propose that the democratisation of science need only be partial
Dennett, Nonhuman Animals, and Consciousness
Get PDFDaniel Dennett’s view about consciousness in nonhuman animals has two parts. One is a methodological injunction that we rely on our best theory of consciousness to settle that issue, a theory that must initially work for consciousness in humans. The other part is Dennett’s application of his own theory of consciousness, developed in Consciousness Explained (1991), which leads him to conclude that nonhuman animals are likely never in conscious mental states. I defend the methodological injunction as both sound and important, and argue that the alternative approaches that dominate the literature are unworkable. But I also urge that Dennett’s theory of consciousness and his arguments against conscious states in nonhuman animals face significant difficulties. Those difficulties are avoided by a higher-order-thought theory of consciousness, which is close to Dennett’s theory, and provides leverage in assessing which kinds of mental state are likely to be conscious in nonhuman animals. Finally, I describe a promising experimental strategy for showing that conscious states do occur in some nonhuman animals, which fits comfortably with the higher-order-thought theory but not with Dennett’s