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Is quantum mechanics merely a theory for us?
Get PDFThis paper develops an agent-centric account of measurement that treats the preferred-basis problem is fundamentally perspectival. On this view, the system–apparatus–environment decomposition and the observables that are apt to become classically robust are determined by the physical constitution and epistemic constraints of an embodied class of agents. Decoherence then stabilises those agent-specified observables, yielding facts that are stable for us without positing an absolute, observer-independent basis. On this picture, ‘measurements’ are public not because they are metaphysically privileged, but because agents like us share the relevant sensorimotor and operational structure. I motivate this account through a discussion of two recent no-go results for relational quantummechanics(RQM) (Brukner,2021;Pienaar,2021), and a subsequent response (DiBiagio and Rovelli, 2022): my aim is not to defend RQM per se, but to refine the relational insight with a principled account of basis selection rooted in embodiment. I provide a phenomenological gloss, drawing on body-schema considerations, to argue that quantum mechanics is best understood as an idiosyncratically human description of interactions with the physical world—a structurally constrained, agent-indexed framework within which classicality emerges
An apology for the simple and small
Get PDFRecent work on the philosophy of high energy physics experiments has
considerably advanced our understanding of their epistemology, for in-
stance concerning measurements by the ATLAS collaboration at the large
hadron collider (Beauchemin 2017). In this paper we aim to highlight and
analyze complementary low energy ‘tabletop’ experiments in particle (and
other kinds of fundamental) physics. In particular, we contrast ATLAS
measurements with high precision measurements of the electron magnetic
moment. We find, for instance, that the simplicity of the latter exper-
iment allows for uncertainties to be minimized materially, in the very
construction of the apparatus. We also suggest that a better appreciation
of the capacities of such comparatively ‘frugal’ experiments broadens our
conception of ‘cutting edge’ physics, and ultimately helps to inform value
judgments about possible research programs in the field
The Epistemic Organism: A Defense of Other-Regarding Epistemic Obligations
Get PDFIt’s a well-recognized truth that what’s morally or politically required can come apart from what’s best for you individually. But this thought—the thought that what’s epistemically required may be divorced from what’s epistemically best for you—is mostly absent in epistemology. On the traditional picture, epistemic obligations are assumed to be self-regarding. In this paper, I argue against this dogma. I argue that we have other-regarding epistemic obligations and epistemic obligations to the groups we are members of. Further, I show how these obligations can play a role in justifying the levying of epistemic taxes
Strategic communication by scientists: the case of climate tipping points
Get PDFStrategic communication by scientists has sparked debate among researchers, philosophers, and the
broader public. This article firstly presents a case study for such phenomenon, namely framing choices
in research and communication on climate tipping points. It then reviews normative arguments for and
against such strategic communication by scientists within the tipping point discourse itself and in
philosophy of science. I argue that these arguments answer to mainly three concerns: (1) concerns
about the legitimacy of practical aims guiding scientific research and communication, (2) the ethical
implications of specific communicative strategies, and (3) the likelihood of either desired effects or
unintended effects to actualise. While these concerns help explain why strategic communication is
viewed critically by some, the article argues that reasonable disagreement can exist both about the
concerns themselves and about their relevance to specific cases
Constraints and Causal Powers
Get PDFI propose a variant on a Humean dualist view of lawhood in which the world is ultimately governed by global constraints, but we extract local content from it by formulating conditional descriptions in terms of concrete entities and causal powers, where the entities and powers are arrived at jointly on the basis of the pragmatic usefulness of the patterns they encode. Thus in this picture we have both a realm of global constraints, and also a realm of causal powers which earn their status in our ontology in virtue of featuring in the best set of conditional statements that can be extracted from the global constraints. I argue that this approach has an advantage over Humean dualist views in which causal powers are irreducible, because it is a better fit with important trends in modern physics
The Epistemological Status of the Direct and Indirect Observation Distinction
Get PDFFor various reasons, it has become common wisdom in science that there exists a principled epistemic distinction between direct and indirect observation. In this paper, I present a twofold argument. First, I argue against such a principled epistemic distinction. Second, I highlight a pervasive incongruence between the methodological and epistemological distinctions between direct and indirect observations. My arguments revolve around the idea that it is one thing to make a methodological distinction between observations and another to ascribe epistemic significance to them. I begin by unfolding the historical and philosophical foundations of the distinction, identifying three tenets that have served to sustain the distinction to the present day. I then provide a detailed analysis of two recent philosophical efforts to preserve the epistemic distinction in astrophysics and specific areas of astrophysics, ultimately suggesting that these approaches face significant challenges
Arguments against the Value-Free Ideal
Get PDFDebates about the cogency of the value-free ideal (VFI) have been central to the contemporary literature on values and science. This chapter provides an overview of the major arguments that have been leveled against the VFI and concludes on the basis of those arguments that it is very difficult to maintain the VFI in its traditional form. It is possible that alternative characterizations of the VFI could be developed and defended, but any plausible characterization of the VFI would have to allow for values to play significant roles in scientific reasoning and practice. Thus, moving forward it seems more fruitful to focus on exploring the best ways to manage value influences in science responsibly rather than debating the VFI
Responses to Milagros Maribel Barroso Rojo, Job de Grefte, Julien Tricard
Get PDFThis document collects drafts of my responses to commentaries in a book symposium on my monograph, The Large-Scale Structure of Inductive Inference
Variance Normalization and Disagreement
Get PDFShould we use Variance Normalization to make different utility functions comparable? No
De-extinction and the risk of moral hazard
Get PDFMoral hazard occurs when the presence or promise of a new technology or policy reduces incentives for responsible behaviour, because the consequences of risky behaviour are perceived to be reduced, transferred, or mitigated. Moral hazard risk has been widely empirically investigated in the case of geoengineering for climate change, but other novel technologies have not been subject to such scrutiny. Ever since de-extinction was announced to the public as a viable possibility with modern biotechnology, a series of commentators have argued that the promise of de-extinction will create a moral hazard. The thought is that extinction has been perceived as permanent. Any change in this belief, such as the idea that species can be brought back, potentially undermines the motivation for current conservation efforts. This is an empirical claim that we investigate. Our study assesses the public's support for conservation in scenarios that promise the use of de-extinction to address actions that are likely to cause extinction. We did not find that people were more likely to accept the extinction of a species if its de-extinction was promised in the future. We did, however, find an association between extinction acceptance and judgments that de-extinction could successfully resurrect species. The findings of this study represent a crucial step in assessing the risks novel biotechnology creates