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Publication Bias is Bad for Science if not Necessarily Scientists
Get PDFIt might seem obvious that the scientific process should not be biased. We strive for reliable inference, and systematically skewing the results of inquiry apparently conflicts with this. Publication bias—which involves only publishing certain types of results—seems particularly troubling and has been blamed for the replication crisis. While we ultimately agree, there are considerable nuances to take into account. Using a Bayesian model of scientific reasoning we show that a scientist who is aware of publication bias can (theoretically) interpret the published literature so as to avoid acquiring biased beliefs. Moreover, in some highly specific circumstances she might prefer not to bother with policies designed to mitigate or reduce the presence of publication bias—it would impose a cost in time or effort that she would not see any benefit in paying. However, we also argue that science as a social endeavour is made worse off by publication bias. This is because the social benefits of science are largely secured via go-between agents, various non-experts who nonetheless need to make use of or convey the results of scientific inquiry if its fruits are to be enjoyed by society at large. These are unlikely to be well-informed enough to account for publication bias appropriately. As such, we conclude, the costs of having to implement policies like mandatory pre-registration are worth imposing on scientists, even if they would perhaps not view these costs as worth paying for their own sake. The benefits are reaped by the go-between agents, and we argue that their perspective is quite properly favoured when deciding how to govern scientific institutions
Modern Alchemy: Neurocognitive Reverse Engineering
Get PDFThe cognitive sciences, especially at the intersections with computer science, artificial intelligence, and neuroscience, propose `reverse engineering' the mind or brain as a viable methodology. We show three important issues with this stance: 1) Reverse engineering proper is not a single method and follows a different path when uncovering an engineered substance versus a computer. 2) These two forms of reverse engineering are incompatible. We cannot safely reason from attempts to reverse engineer a substance to attempts to reverse engineer a computational system, and vice versa. Such flawed reasoning rears its head, for instance, when neurocognitive scientists reason about what artificial neural networks and brains have in common using correlations or structural similarity. 3) While neither type of reverse engineering can make sense of non-engineered entities, both are applied in incompatible and mix-and-matched ways in cognitive scientists' thinking about computational models of cognition. This results in treating mind as a substance; a methodological manoeuvre that is, in fact, incompatible with computationalism. We formalise how neurocognitive scientists reason (metatheoretical calculus) and show how this leads to serious errors. Finally, we discuss what this means for those who ascribe to computationalism, and those who do not
Relativistic Length and Space Contractions for Light-Speed Systems in Discrete Space-Time
Get PDFIn this paper we argue that because photons experience change, such as coming into and going out of existence and interacting with other particles, that photons must experience time...we then calculate how much time photons experience. We start with a discussion of the philosophical position advocated by Aristotle and most philosophers: in the absence of time, no change, no interaction, no ``becoming'' is possible for an entity. We then review the laws of special relativity, first reviewing the conventional laws of relativity if both space and time are continuous, and then show how the laws change if both space and time are discretized (atomized, granular...). We show that if space and time are discretized, then the Lorentz factor describing length contraction and time dilation no longer diverge to infinity as the velocity of a system approaches and reaches the speed of light. In doing so, we derive equations that provide the finite Lorentz factors and time durations experienced by light-speed particles. We then discuss how these results significantly strengthen the case that space and time are discretized
Psychometric Intelligence Research: A Case of Degenerate Bootstrapping
Get PDFIn this paper I propose a concept to describe the circular developmental trajectory of psychometrics of intelligence in the twentieth century, and I argue that this circularity explains the degenerate character of the field. Defining, measuring, and explaining intelligence formed a closed circuit of reciprocal refinement activities. I call this circular, internally guided, and non-progressive refinement process degenerate bootstrapping. Bootstrapping, especially in the initial stages of a science, is inevitable and might end up with better measuring instruments and a better theoretical foundation. In the psychometric intelligence case, the absence of truly test-independent benchmarks, over-reliance on test score correlations, and the absence of genuine theorizing prevented the field from making significant conceptual progress. The circularity is specific to psychometric intelligence research and the diagnosis of degenerate bootstrapping does not apply to neighboring fields and approaches. To describe the bootstrapping process, I will offer a conceptual history, starting with Alfred Binet and focusing on the work of American founders, namely, Lewis M. Terman and David Wechsler. Methodological and conceptual aspects of the circular modifications will be discussed with special emphasis on the definition and measurement of intelligence as well as the status of factor-analytic theories. A current brain based theory of intelligence, Parieto-Frontal Integration Theory (P-FIT) can escape this circularity to the degree that it goes beyond the conceptual confines of psychometrics
Einstein, Free Creations, and His Worldly Cloister
Get PDFThis paper examines "Free Creations of the Human Mind: The Worlds of Albert Einstein" by Diana Kormos Buchwald and Michael D. Gordin. The authors seek to dispel the long-standing myths of Einstein as the ”lone genius” of Bern and the ”stubborn sage” of Princeton, drawing on newly uncovered archival materials to illuminate his intellectual networks
and collaborative engagements. By exploring the authors’ reasoning, this paper engages with their interpretations, highlighting the strengths of their archival revelations and areas where alternative perspectives may enrich the understanding of Einstein’s intellectual development
Poincaré on Gibbs and on Probability in Statistical Mechanics
Get PDFThis paper reviews a paper from 1906 by J. Henri Poincaré on statistical mechanics with a background in his earlier work and notable connections to J. Willard Gibbs. Poincaré’s paper presents important ideas that are still relevant for understanding the need for probability in statistical mechanics. Poincaré understands the foundations of statistical mechanics as a many-body problem in analytical mechanics (reflecting his 1890 monograph on The Three-Body Problem and the Equations of Dynamics) and possibly influenced by Gibbs independent development published in chapters in his 1902 book, Elementary Principles in Statistical Mechanics. This dynamical systems approach of Poincaré and Gibbs provides great flexibility including applications to many systems besides gasses. This foundation benefits from close connections to Poincaré’s earlier work. Notably, Poincaré had shown (e.g. in his study of non-linear oscillators) that Hamiltonian dynamical systems display sensitivity to initial conditions separating stable and unstable trajectories. In the first context it precludes proving the stability of orbits in the solar system, here it compels the use of ensembles of systems for which the probability is ontic and frequentist and does not have an a priori value. Poincaré’s key concepts relating to uncertain initial conditions, and fine- and coarse-grained entropy are presented for the readers’ consideration. Poincaré and Gibbs clearly both wanted to say something about irreversibility, but came up short
Creative Contingencies : A Model for Literary Writing from 4E Cognition and Predictive Processing
Get PDFThis article presents a model for analysing creative writing through the frameworks of 4E cognition and predictive processing. Creativity is conceptualised through contingency – namely, the sense that things do not have to be the way they appear to us now. Writers integrate contingency into their practices, by provoking and by managing it, and they design literary forms where the contingent is given shape in alternative worlds, strange minds and plot events that depend on the unexpected. When working on a draft, writers alternate between material agency with its spontaneous processes and epistemic agency with its cognitive control. Writers often also embed other texts, fictional minds or representations of writing and reading. I will discuss this process as “mise-en-abyme modelling”, where the tension between material contexts and representations becomes productive. My proposal provides an alternative to traditional, linear process models of writing or creativity more generally. Instead, it traces the interactions between contingency, form and practices through the recursivity between material engagements and fictional representations
Perspectives on the Quantum State
Get PDFThere are two main styles of interpreting the quantum state: either focusing on the fundamentality of the quantum state (a wavefunction or state realist view), or on how projection operators represent observable properties (an observable-first approach). Rather than being incompatible, I argue that these correspond to taking a 3rd person and 1st person perspective respectively. I further contend that the 1st person perspective - and the observable-first approach that goes with it - is better suited to explain measurement, based on the way that the metrology literature, as well as the work of Bohr, characterises measurement through the properties of a system. Finally, I show how the 1st person, observable-first approach can emerge in the world through the process of decoherence, hence showing the compatibility of the two approaches and resolving the need to choose absolutely between them
Dynamics of a particle in the double-slit experiment with measurement
Get PDFSpontaneous collapse models use non-linear stochastic modifications of the Schr\"odinger equation to suppress superpositions of eigenstates of the measured observable and drive the state to an eigenstate. It was recently demonstrated that the Born rule for transition probabilities can be modeled using the linear Schr\"odinger equation with a Hamiltonian represented by a random matrix from the Gaussian unitary ensemble. The matrices representing the Hamiltonian at different time points throughout the observation period are assumed to be independent. Instead of suppressing superpositions, such Schr\"odinger evolution makes the state perform an isotropic random walk on the projective space of states. The relative frequency of reaching different eigenstates of an arbitrary observable in the random walk is shown to satisfy the Born rule. Here, we apply this methodology to investigate the behavior of a particle in the context of the double-slit experiment with measurement. Our analysis shows that, in this basic case, the evolution of the particle's state can be effectively captured through a random walk on a two-dimensional submanifold of the state space. This random walk reproduces the Born rule for the probability of finding the particle near the slits, conditioned on its arrival at one of them. To ensure that this condition is satisfied, we introduce a drift term representing a change in the variance of the position observable for the state. It is argued that the drift term accounts for the energy transfer and trapping incurred during the particle's interaction with the detector. A drift-free model, based on equivalence classes of states indistinguishable by the detector, is also considered. The resulting random walk, with or without drift, serves as a suitable model for describing the transition from the initial state to an eigenstate of the measured observable in the experiment, offering new insights into its potential underlying mechanisms
Four Formal Versions of The Two-Envelope Paradox
Get PDFPhilosophical discussion of the Two-Envelope Paradox has suffered from a lack of formal precision. I discuss various versions of the paradoxical argument using modern probability theory, which helps to make diagnoses that are simpler, more insightful, and provably correct. Paradoxical arguments are revealed to be fallacious for one of three reasons: (1) the argument makes a formal mistake such as an equivocation fallacy; (2) the argument disregards relevant uncertainty about or variability in a unit of measurement; (3) the argument uses an invalid decision rule. I improve upon various existing diagnoses and discuss what kind of philosophical and decision-theoretic import the paradox has