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Fair or Flawed? Rethinking Grant Review with Generative AI
Get PDFWe analyze and systematize the methodological and ethical challenges arising from the potential use of AI in grant review. From the methodological perspective, one has to ensure that data are appropriately curated and that parameter choices are meaningful to predict a project’s success, while from the ethical perspective, we require accuracy and transparency in the process. The use of rebuttal systems in the grant review process and locally stored data tools for assessment brings us closer to the trustworthy use of AI. Moreover, we argue that full automation of the grant review process is undesirable as it could lead to disregarding normative metascientific theory, where diversity, exploration, and intellectual inclusion have an important role. Instead, a moderate path of using AI as an addition to the standard review process could be considered. Since science evaluation requires the dynamic updating of both knowledge and research values from the expert public, funding agencies should not reduce this endeavor to machines. Instead, they should empower peer reviewers to override AI-generated suggestions when they see fit
Global Gauge Symmetry Breaking in the Abelian Higgs Mechanism
Get PDFThis paper aims to resolve the incompatibility between two extant gauge-invariant accounts of the Abelian Higgs mechanism: the first account uses global gauge symmetry breaking, and the second eliminates spontaneous symmetry breaking entirely. We resolve this incompatibility by using the constrained Hamiltonian formalism in symplectic geometry. First we argue that, unlike their local counterparts, global gauge symmetries are physical in the presence of boundary conditions. The symmetry that is spontaneously broken by the Higgs mechanism is this global one. Second, we explain how the Coulomb gauge is the preferred gauge for a gauge-invariant account of the Abelian Higgs mechanism. Based on the existence of the physical global gauge symmetry, we resolve the incompatibility between the two accounts by arguing that the correct way to carry out the second method is to eliminate only the redundant gauge symmetries, i.e. those local gauge symmetries which are not global. We extend our analysis to quantum field theory, where we show that the Abelian Higgs mechanism can be understood as spontaneous global U(1) symmetry breaking in the C*-algebraic sense
What is this sophistication thing anyway?
Get PDFFollowing Dewar (2019), 'reduction' and 'sophistication' are supposed to be two different ways of articulating the shared content of symmetry-related models of physical theories. And yet: there does not exist in the literature a maximally clear, maximally general statement as to what the distinction between reduction and sophistication amounts to. In this article, we present a proposal in order to redress this issue: the proposal is to understand reduction and sophistication not as intrinsic properties of physical theories, but rather as four-place relations between two theories, a map between those theories, and a set of symmetries of the former theory. We go on to extol various virtues of this way of thinking about the reduction/sophistication distinction
On the action principle as a guide to substantive general covariance
Get PDFWhile Einstein was guided by the principle of general covariance in formulating general relativity, Kretschmann later argued that this principle lacks physical significance, since any space-time theory can be reformulated in a generally covariant form. This critique has prompted an ongoing debate over how to distinguish substantive general covariance from mere formal general covariance. Some proposals for defining substantive general covariance are based on the requirement that a theory be derivable from a diffeomorphism-invariant action. The present work aims to critically assess these proposals by examining canonical examples of Kretschmannian formulations of special relativistic theories. It will be shown that these formulations -- which seem merely formally generally covariant -- can always be derived from a diffeomorphism-invariant action. Although these actions involve auxiliary variables, these variables are trivial in the sense that they are either pure gauge or dynamically fixed by the other variables. Consequently, the theories described by these actions are arguably equivalent to the original Kretschmannian formulations. This stands in contrast to the actions proposed by Rosen and Sorkin, which include non-trivial auxiliary variables and hence seem to describe distinct physical theories. More recently, Freidel and Teh have suggested an additional criterion for substantial general covariance, namely that the action should also yield a non-trivial corner charge associated to diffeomorphism invariance. However, this too appears insufficient, since such actions can always be constructed
Not Quite Killing It: Black Hole Evaporation, Global Energy, and De-Idealization
Get PDFA family of arguments for black hole evaporation relies on conservation laws, defined through symmetries represented by Killing vector fields which exist globally or asymptotically. However, these symmetries often rely on the idealizations of stationarity and asymptotic flatness, respectively. In non-stationary or non-asymptotically-flat spacetimes where realistic black holes evaporate, the requisite Killing fields typically do not exist. Can we 'de-idealize' these idealizations, and subsequently the associated arguments for black hole evaporation? Here, I critically examine the strategy of using 'approximately Killing' fields to de-idealize black hole spacetimes and approximately extend conservation laws to non-idealized cases. I argue that this approach encounters significant challenges, undermining the use of these idealizations to justify the evaporation of realistic -- rather than idealized -- black holes, and raising questions about the justified use of such idealizations
Performative Paternalism
Get PDFPerformativity refers to the phenomenon that scientific conceptualisations can sometimes change their target systems or referents. A widely held view in the literature is that scientists ought not to deliberately deploy performative models or theories with the aim of eliciting desirable changes in their target systems. This paper has three aims. First, I cast and defend this received view as a worry about autonomy-infringing paternalism and, to that end, develop a taxonomy of the harms it can impose. Second, I consider various approaches to this worry within the extant literature and argue that these offer only unsatisfactory responses. Third, I propose two positive claims. Manipulation of target systems is (a) not inherently paternalist and can be unproblematic, and is (b) sometimes paternalist, but whenever such paternalism is inescapable, it has got to be justifiable. I generalise an example of modelling international climate change coordination to develop this point
On Feyerabend's "On the Responsibility of Scientists"
Get PDFIn this paper, we provide a critical overview of Feyerabend’s unpublished manuscript “On the Responsibility of Scientists.” Specifically, we locate the paper within Feyerabend’s corpus and show how it relates to his published remarks on topics such as expertise, democracy and science, opportunism, science funding, and the value of scientific knowledge. We also show how Feyerabend’s views anticipate and point novel directions for contemporary philosophical literature on values in science
The life cycle of scientific principles – a template for characterizing physical principles
Get PDFScientific principles can undergo various developments. While philosophers of science have acknowledged that such changes occur, there is no systematic account of the development of scientific principles. Here we propose a template for analyzing the development of scientific principles called the ‘life cycle’ of principles. It includes a series of processes that principles can go through: prehistory, elevation, formalization, generalization, and challenge. The life cycle, we argue, is a useful heuristic for the analysis of the development of scientific principles. We illustrate this by discussing examples from foundational physics including Lorentz invariance, Mach’s principle, the naturalness principle, and the perfect cosmological principle. We also explore two applications of the template. First, we propose that the template can be employed to diagnose the quality of scientific principles. Second, we discuss the ramifications of the life cycle’s processes for the empirical testability of principles
Physical, Empirical, and Conditional Inductive Possibility
Get PDFI argue that John Norton’s notions of empirical, hypothetical, and counterfactual possibility can be successfully used to analyze counterintuitive examples of physical possibility and align better with modal intuitions of practicing physicists. First, I clarify the relationship between Norton’s possibility notions and the received view of logical and physical possibility. In particular, I argue that Norton’s empirical, hypothetical, and counterfactual possibility cannot coincide with the received view of physical possibility; instead, the received view of physical possibility is a special case of Norton’s logical possibility. I illustrate my claims using examples from Classical Mechanics, General Relativity, and Quantum Mechanics. I then arrive at my conclusions by subsuming Norton’s empirical, hypothetical, and counterfactual possibilities under a single concept of conditional inductive possibility and by analyzing the types and degrees of strengths that can be associated with it