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Systematizing the Interpretation of Quantum Theory via Reconstruction
Get PDFFor a century, quantum theory has posed a fundamental challenge to philosophical thinking. On its face, it repudiates many of the key features of the mechanical conception of physical reality. However, the challenge of developing a precise, coherent alternative to that conception has yet to be met. Here, I argue that a major hindrance to the project of quantum interpretation is its existing interpretative methodologies, which suffer from a lack of systematicity in their judgements about what aspects of the theory are interpretational relevant. In particular, I argue that current interpretations tend to marginalize the informal part of the theory in favour of its formal part, and place inappropriate emphasis on the natural language component of the formalism over its detailed mathematical structure. To counterbalance these biases, I propose that an interpretation-free zone be constructed around the theory, wherein an interpreter initially adopt a descriptive stance which considers all parts of the theory, and that the results of this deliberation~(and the judgements about what facts are interpretationally relevant) are reported as part of their interpretation.
I argue that the interpretation of quantum theory poses special challenges and difficulties which necessitate this interpretation-free zone, and that existing interpretative methodologies are insufficient to address them. Further, I argue that a reconstructive interpretative methodology, which harnesses the recent results of the quantum reconstruction program, provides a powerful means to identify almost all facts that could be interpretationally relevant, and naturally meets these challenges and difficulties. Moreover, I argue that the quantum reconstruction program offers a powerful way to discover new physical principles, and offers a systematic pathway to build a rich, coherent conception of quantum reality
Intelligent Design, Testability, and Heuristics
Get PDFWhile many criteria of testability focus on the effect (or lack thereof) of observations on the theory, as suggested by Karl Popper, the more appropriate approach is to focus on the theory’s effect on observations, as suggested by A. J. Ayer and Elliott Sober. Under this assumption, Intelligent Design fails to be testable, and Creationism either is disconfirmed or, if it is shielded from disconfirmation by the modification of other theories, fails to be testable as well. Untestable claims can provide a heuristic framework for the development of a testable theory, but to develop such a framework, Intelligent Design proponents would have to develop Intelligent Design by specifying the designer
Determinism and Indeterminism as Model Artefacts: Toward a Model-Invariant Ontology of Physics
Get PDFThis paper argues that the traditional opposition between determinism and indeterminism in physics is representational rather than ontological. Deterministic–stochastic dualities are available in principle, and arise in a non-contrived way in many scientifically important models. When dynamical systems admit mathematically equivalent deterministic and stochastic formulations, their observable predictions depend only on the induced structure of correlations between preparations and measurement outcomes. I use this model-equivalence to motivate a model-invariance criterion for ontological commitment, according to which only structural features that remain stable across empirically equivalent representations, and whose physical effects are invariant under such reformulations, are candidates for realism. This yields a fallibilist form of structural realism grounded in modal robustness rather than in the specifics of any given mathematical representation. Features such as conservation laws, symmetries, and causal or metric structure satisfy this criterion and can be encoded in observable relations in mathematically intelligible ways. By contrast, the localisation of modal selection—whether in initial conditions, stochastic outcomes, or informational collapse mechanisms—is not invariant under empirically equivalent reformulations and is therefore best understood as a gauge choice rather than an ontological feature. The resulting framework explains how certain long-standing problems in the foundations of physics, including the measurement problem and the perceived conflict between physical determinism and free agency, arise from the reification of representational artefacts. By distinguishing model-invariant structure from modelling conventions, I offer a realist ontology for modern physics that combines empirical openness with resistance to metaphysical overreach
What is Liberty? Philosophical and interdisciplinary perspectives on Free Will
Get PDFThe concept of free will has been a central topic in philosophy, theology, and science for centuries. However, its understanding remains fraught with complexities, particularly in defining the scope and limitations of freedom in human and non-human beings. This article explores which ontological conditions are required for the emergence of free will, arguing that determinism and reductionism are incompatible both with the existence and understanding of stricto sensu free and willed action. By analysing some developments in key areas such as neuroscience, molecular biology and quantum physics, we examine free will in relation to decision-making, consciousness and social context to argue that only anti-reductionist ontologies compatible with some form of possibilism can provide space for free will to exist. Moving beyond traditional notions, we introduce a more specific definition of free will-based actions, distinguishing between general, contingent, and disruptive free will-based actions. Disruptive free will actions lie beyond deterministic and probabilistic laws acting at lower levels of reality, enabling creative and voluntary actions. These actions can be exerted by a variety of entities, including individuals, social groups and even artificial intelligence systems. This interdisciplinary ontology of freedom fosters further inquiry into how agency may operate across different systems and opens new avenues for understanding moral, ethical and political implications of free will and liberty
The Vehicle Indeterminacy Problem
Get PDFProponents of some recent accounts of neural representations avoid classic issues with content indeterminacy by taking an antirealist or pragmatic stance toward representational content and a realist stance toward representational vehicles (e.g., Shea 2018; Egan 2020; Burnston 2020). To establish the reality of representational vehicles, such vehicle realists must rely on the fact that patterns of neural activity are putatively re-identified as the same pattern across systems. Re-identification shows that the pattern exists across means of detection, which shows that the pattern is robust and, therefore, real. But it is entirely unclear by what measure patterns should be determined as similar. Drawing on neuroscientific expertise, I show that determining the relevant details by which to assess similarity is done in practice by coarse-graining vehicles, i.e., compressing, abstracting, or suppressing variations in patterns. I conclude that this coarse-graining strategy vindicates neuroscientific practice but not realists’ appeal to robust vehicles
Do DNNs explain the visual system? Guidelines for a better debate about explanation
Get PDFDeep neural networks (DNNs) achieve impressive results in computer vision, translation, and text generation. They are now offered as predictively powerful models of neural systems like the ventral visual system. This raises a question that has sparked a debate in the cognitive sciences: if these models predict the neural activity of a system, do they explain how this system works? To help researchers tackle this question, we propose five guidelines: (1) define ‘explanation,’ (2) specify what about the system the model explains, (3) specify what about the model does the explaining, (4) specify how much explanatory information the model contains, and (5) clarify how much information must be intelligible, and to whom, to explain. We argue that most disagreement about whether DNNs explain divides along these guidelines. We unpack and explicate these guidelines, highlighting why we must consider them whenever we ask whether a model explains something
Transformative Transdisciplinarity. An Introduction to Community-Based Philosophy
Get PDFIn the face of planetary crises — from biodiversity loss to climate change to food security — transdisciplinary methods promise effective and just responses through equal collaborations. However, transdisciplinarity also creates complex challenges by bringing together different actors with different frameworks, like scientists, Indigenous and local communities, and policy makers. Successful collaboration among such actors requires navigating different forms of knowledge, worldviews, values, and positions of power.
In Transformative Transdisciplinarity, David Ludwig and Charbel N. El-Hani synthesize insights from the philosophy of science and empirical action research to address these challenges through a framework of partial overlaps. On the one hand, the framework highlights the overlapping concerns and perspectives of actors that provide common ground for collaboration and mutual understanding. On the other hand, it emphasizes partialities that require navigating differences and tensions between actors. This book addresses the fundamental epistemological, ontological, and political questions of transdisciplinarity through this framework of partial overlaps, aiming for a transformative vision of collaborative science in the face of planetary crises
Revisiting Modular Momentum in the Aharonov-Bohm Effect: A Resolution of Aharonov’s Paradox
Get PDFThe Aharonov-Bohm (AB) effect demonstrates that electromagnetic potentials can influence quantum systems in field-free regions, challenging classical intuitions. In 2004, Aharonov and Kaufherr proposed that the AB phase shift arises from a nonlocal exchange of modular momentum, a gauge-invariant quantity, occurring at a definite time before wave packet interference. This framework, however, introduces a paradox: the expectation value of the modular momentum operator, , changes abruptly when the electron’s wave packets cross the solenoid, yet local, gauge-invariant properties of the electron, such as its velocity distribution, remain continuous. We resolve this paradox by showing that and the velocity operator have distinct spectral measures, and the abrupt change in reflects a global topological change in the electromagnetic environment, not a dynamical alteration in the electron’s state. Through a corrected, gauge-invariant formulation, we demonstrate that encodes the AB phase but does not explain the AB effect’s mechanism. This resolution reaffirms the conventional explanation of the AB effect while clarifying the nonlocal nature and experimental limitations of modular momentum
Rethinking Holism and Underdetermination
Get PDFMature scientific hypotheses are confirmed by large amounts of independent evidence. How could anyone be an anti-realist under these conditions? A classic response appeals to confirmational holism and underdetermination, but it is unclear whether traditional arguments succeed. I offer a new line of argument: If holism is interpreted as saying that the confirmation of every part of a hypothesis depends on the confirmation of the whole hypothesis, we must formulate conditions under which the confirmation received by the whole can be transferred to its parts. However, underdetermination suggests that relevant conditions are typically not met. If this is true, the confirmation received by the whole remains bounded by the priors for the parts, and we lack compelling reasons to believe substantive hypotheses based on evidence beyond the degree to which the posits involved in them are antecedently believed. A rejoinder comes from selective realism: If some posit is preserved throughout theory change, it is confirmed beyond the degree to which the containing hypothesis is. However, the variant of holism considered here exactly implies that we cannot confirm such posits in isolation. As I will show, the realist is thus forced into a dilemma: Either she succumbs to the holistic challenge, or she must embrace meta-empirical facts, such as the posit's recurrence, as confirmatory
Alternative Biochemistries of Life Making Universal Constraints Testable
Get PDFSynthetic biology defies traditional views about the scope of biological inquiry (Hull 1978; Waters 2007; Weber 2013;). Some authors are skeptical about the epistemic value the field has to the rest of the life sciences (Keller 2009a). This paper demonstrates how artificial biochemistries of life serve an essential epistemic function as semifactual models in biology (Knuuttila and Koskinen 2021). As semifactual models, alternative biochemistries of life facilitate the testing of hypotheses about universal biological constraints. Importantly, clarifying this role also unveils further research questions that would lend greater rigor to synthetic biology research programs