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A Category-theoretic Interpretation of the Homology Concept in Biology
Full text linkHomology is a fundamental but controversial concept in biology, referring to the sameness of biological characters across organisms. Despite its crucial role, its ontological nature has been a subject of intense debate, with a dichotomy between individualist and natural kind views. This study proposes a category-theoretic framework to reconcile these views by emphasizing the processual nature of homology. We first review major philosophical views of homology with their respective advantages and disadvantages. Next, we highlight the dynamic and evolving nature of homologs through two thought experiments. Through mathematical formulation, we then show that the individualist and natural kind views represent ordered set- and groupoid-like aspects, derived from a primary category-theoretical model based on a process-first dynamic view of homology. Our model covers a
wide range of phenomena linked with homology, such as atavism, deep homology, and developmental system drift (DSD). Furthermore, it provides a unified perspective on the ontological nature of homology, overcoming the longstanding dichotomy between individuals and kinds in Western philosophy
The Relativity of Branching
Full text linkI argue that different ways that branching fits within Minkowski spacetime are merely different descriptions of an invariant notion of branching and are due to the relativity of simultaneity. The argument fits in the wider framework of Everett branches as real patterns, and is both developed in the abstract setting of the (generalised) histories formalism, and discussed comparing the concrete examples of hypersurface-dependent branching and of branching along the forward lightcone. I formulate the latter in terms of branching spacetime, suggesting this is a way in which spacetime can emerge from the universal wavefunction, and I make tentative connections with causal set theory. The proposed view is compatible with both the Schroedinger and Heisenberg picture. [To appear in A. Ney (ed.), Locality and the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Health Concepts in Medicine and the Role of Philosophy
Full text linkPhilosophers interested in medicine and healthcare research should focus on the choice of health concepts. Conceptual choice is akin to conceptual engineering but, in addition to assessing whether a concept suits an objective, or offering a better one, it evaluates objectives, ranks them, and discusses stakeholders’ entitlement. To show the importance of choosing health concepts, I summarize the internal debate in medicine, showcasing definitions, constructs, and scales. To argue it is a philosophical task, I analyze the medical controversy over health as adaptation and self-management. I conclude with a to-do list of conceptual choice tasks, generalizable beyond medicine
Are Widely Known Findings Easier to Retract?
Full text linkFailures of retraction are common in science. Why do these failures occur? And, relatedly, what makes findings harder or easier to retract? We use data from Microsoft Academic Graph, Retraction Watch, and Altmetric---including retracted papers, citation records, and Altmetric scores and mentions---to test recently proposed answers to these questions. LaCroix et al. (2021) employ simple network models to argue that the social spread of scientific information helps explain failures of retraction. One prediction of their models is that widely known or well established results, surprisingly, should be easier to retract, since their retraction is more relevant to more scientists. Our results support this conclusion. We find that highly cited papers show more significant reductions in citation after retraction and garner more attention to their retractions as they occur
Is the value-free ideal of science untenable? Part I: Inductive risk
Full text linkThe inductive risk argument challenges the value-free ideal of science by asserting that scientists should manage the inductive risks involved in scientific inference through social values, which consists in weighing the social implications of errors when setting evidential thresholds. Most of the previous analyses of the argument fall short of engaging directly with its core assumptions, and thereby offer limited criticisms. This paper critically examines the two key premises of the inductive risk argument: the thesis of epistemic insufficiency, which asserts that the internal standards of science do not suffice to determine evidential thresholds in a non-arbitrary fashion, and the thesis of legitimate value-encroachment, which asserts that non-scientific value judgments can justifiably influence these thresholds. A critical examination of the first premise shows that the inductive risk argument does not pose a unique epistemic challenge beyond what is already implied by fallibilism about scientific knowledge, and fails because the mere assumption of fallibilism does not imply the untenability of value-freedom. This is demonstrated by showing that the way in which evidential thresholds are set in science is not arbitrary in any sense that would lend support to the inductive risk argument. A critical examination of the second premise shows that incorporating social values into scientific inference as an inductive risk-management strategy faces a meta-criterion problem, and consequently leads to several serious issues such as wishful thinking, category mistakes in decision making, or Mannheim-style paradoxes of justification. Consequently, value-laden strategies for inductive risk management in scientific inference would likely weaken the justification of scientific conclusions in most cases
Quantum Entanglement, Internality and Dependence
Full text linkThe metaphysics of quantum entanglement has been a subject of interest among philosophers of physics in recent decades. Entanglement is commonly described as a relation that does not depend on the intrinsic properties of its relata. This feature has led some authors to propose that the quantum reality is fundamentally relational and/or holistic. Moreover, it has been employed to support various influential metaphysical perspectives within the metaphysics of science, including structuralism, monism, and, recently, coherentism. This paper advocates a non-reductionist approach to internal relations, drawing on Fine’s analysis of propositions involving essential properties. Assuming the pervasiveness of quantum entanglement, it is argued that treating it as an internal relation is the most compelling option. Under this interpretation, entanglement can be accommodated within different metaphysical frameworks: (1) as a fundamental internal relation, it aligns with structuralism; (2) as a derivative internal relation, it is compatible with monism; and (3) as a relation of dependence, it supports coherentism
Open Questions on Spacetime and Gravitation
Full text linkIn this paper, open questions about the nature of gravitation and spacetime are discussed, including the emergence of spacetime, and the quest for a theory of quantum gravity. The contribution highlights the contingent nature of the question of spacetime emergence and concludes with some remarks on the possibility of reading different programs in quantum gravity in terms of scientific theory change
Imagination and Fiction in Otto Neurath’s Scientific Utopianism
Full text linkThis article examines the role of imagination and fiction in Otto Neurath’s work, particularly in his scientific utopianism. Using contemporary philosophical tools to understand different senses of the concept of imagination, this article argues that scientific utopianism proposes to employ scientific data and data analysis to construct imaginary social arrangements, and then to shift our attitude toward these constructions so that utopias can be compared as technological projects. This shift in attitude toward imaginary constructions is typical of utopia as a literary genre. Thus, Neurath’s methodology brings the social sciences closer to utopian fiction. Imagination also plays a role in Neurath’s ISOTYPE projects, in which imagistic resources become part of reasoning in visual arguments that allow visualizing new ways to organize knowledge. Learning to reason with images is important for overcoming the rigidity of traditional formulations. This article argues that the cognitive operations required by Neurath’s scientific utopianism contribute to showing that there is no matter of necessity in historically given or current social arrangements. More generally, in Neurath’s view, imaginative works contribute to the Enlightenment task of the Vienna Circle of clearing away the metaphysical remnants of outdated worldviews that pose obstacles to scientific and social progress
Modeling Causal Processes
Full text linkWe offer a category-theoretic representation of the process theory of causality. The new formalism allows process theorists to (i) explicate their explanatory strategies (etiological and constitutive explanations) using the compositional features of string diagrams; (ii) probabilistically evaluate causal effects through the categorical notion of functor; (iii) address the problem of explanatory irrelevance via diagram surgery; and (iv) provide a theoretical explanation for the difference between conjunctive and interactive forks. We also claim that the fundamental building blocks of the process theory---namely processes, interactions, and events---can be modeled using three types of morphisms. Overall, categorical modeling demonstrates that the philosophical theory of process causality possesses scientific rigor and expressive power comparable to those of its event-based counterparts, such as causal Bayes nets
Many Discrete Worlds
Full text linkWe present the case for a fixed, finite number of discrete, non-interacting, spatiotemporally finite, decohered spacetimes emerging from Everett’s Universal Wave Function, which we refer to as “Many Discrete Worlds” (MDW). No universes “split” in MDW. We argue that a Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) branching structure that emerges after decoherence is equivalent to individual, weighted universes, each of which is divided into an immense number of discrete, identical copies, the number being proportional to the individual weighting. This ensures that repeated experiments within any such universe will demonstrate consistency with the Born rule. Each of these universes should be considered as complete, containing every decohered outcome over the entire extent of its spacetime, including every event/interaction occurring beyond any cosmological particle horizon for the entire duration of the given universe. We show that a countably infinite number of interactions needs an uncountably infinite number of universes, and show why measures such as the Lebesgue measure will fail in that case, with the result that the Born rule would not be demonstrable. This leads to the conclusion that the number of universes in the multiverse must be finite and, as a surprising corollary, that the universes themselves are finite, both in space and duration