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Particles before symmetry
Full text linkThe standard model of particle physics is usually cast in symmetry-first terms. Recently, a geometry-first picture has been proposed, in which the relevant symmetries do not appear explicitly at the ground level of ontology. In this paper I extend this approach to two central mechanisms of the standard model: spontaneous symmetry breaking and the Yukawa coupling, both essential for particles to acquire mass. These reformulations offer alternative explanations cast in purely geometric terms. For example, a particle’s quantum numbers correspond to the internal space it inhabits and to the geometric type of object it is (e.g.\ an -tensor). I argue that a symmetry-first account in terms of principal and associated bundles admits a genuine geometry-first counterpart only when the group’s representation coincides with the automorphism group of the fibre—a condition that cuts the slack tolerated by the symmetry-first view.In particular, the quantisation of charge arises here as a purely geometric
consequence of the tensorial construction of matter fields from the fundamental
bundles—a mechanism that is both more general and more transparent than the usual
topological account based on the compactness of . More generally, I argue that a symmetry-first account in terms of principal and associated bundles admits a genuine geometry-first counterpart only under certain conditions
Incomplete yet existent objects: a Nuclear Meinongian approach to quantum metaphysical indeterminacy
Full text linkThis article proposes a reading of quantum metaphysical indeterminacy from the perspective of Parsons' Nuclear Meinongianism. In doing so, we identify a fundamental incompatibility between a key feature of Parsons' theory and standard quantum mechanics. Our approach interprets quantum indeterminacy as property incompleteness. However, this move, when combined with Parsons' framework, leads to what we term the ``Incompleteness-Entails-Nonexistence Principle'' (IENP), which implausibly entails the nonexistence of quantum objects. For Meinongianism to be a suitable tool for the metaphysics of quantum mechanics, this principle must be addressed. We argue for dropping the IENP and discuss the resulting metaphysical and metametaphysical consequences
Physical Probability in the Everett interpretation and Bell inequalities
Full text linkI define a notion of local causality LOC, closely modelled on Bell’s principle, construed as the condition that single-case probabilities cannot be modified by actions at spacelike separation. The new principle, like Bell’s, forces Bell inequalities, but with two loopholes: one is retrocausation, known to Bell, but the other is non-uniqueness of remote outcomes, a loophole only for LOC, not for Bell’s principle.
I also set out a theory of physical probability, applicable to the Everett interpretation, in agreement with the Born rule, and therefore violating Bell inequalities. I show it is consistent with LOC. Surprisingly, both loopholes are exploited. I conclude not only that probability in the Everett interpretation involves no action-at-a-distance, but that the observed violations of Bell inequalities is powerful evidence for many worlds
Missing the Subject: Introspection in Large Language Models
Full text linkRecent philosophical work has proposed a “lightweight account” of introspection, on which a system introspects when it represents its own mental states in a way that makes these states accessible for guiding behavior. This approach has informed empirical proposals for detecting introspective abilities in current LLMs. I argue that this lightweight account is too permissive and fails to capture what is essential to genuine introspection. This paper proceeds through three increasingly concessive but individually sufficient challenges to the attribution of introspective abilities to LLMs. First, LLMs lack the persistent subject necessary for genuine introspection, as current models lack the psychological continuity relationship needed for self knowledge. Second, LLM self-reports violate the immunity to error through misidentification that characterizes genuine introspection, because they are based on public textual information that could equally support judgments about another system’s states. Third, by centering on functional self-monitoring and behavioral control, the lightweight account fails to distinguish introspection from ubiquitous self-regulatory processes in complex systems
The emergentist dimensions of organicism
Full text linkThe study of organicism has been revived in the past few decades. Usually, organicism is seen as a "third way" between mechanism and vitalism. I argue that philosophical views of emergence are central to the understanding of organicism. While this is routinely acknowledged, the specific nature of the role of emergence in organicism has not been closely examined. Here, I do so by first tracing the historical roots of emergentist ideas in the works of C. H. Waddington and J. Needham. I make a comparison with ideas in condensed matter physics where new theoretical ideas were described in the language of emergence, just as molecular biology became ascendant. I then argue that Waddington's landscape should be seen as an example of an emergent description, and I describe some similarities and differences from emergence in physics
Causal Pluralism: Primary and Secondary Features of Causation
Full text linkWhile references to “causal pluralism” are exceedingly common in the philosophical literature, these references make different claims that are not often distinguished and that have varying implications for causation debates. This paper provides an analysis of two distinct types of causal pluralism that are important in the life sciences. These include pluralism about the definition of causation and pluralism about “distinctions within causation”. These are referred to as definitional pluralism and distinctional (or secondary feature) pluralism, respectively. In capturing these causal pluralism types, and advancing causation topics more generally, a novel framework is introduced that differentiates primary and secondary features of causation. This primary and secondary feature distinction is examined and described in detail, it is explored in relation to mainstream philosophy of causation work, and it is used to provide clarity regarding common types of causal pluralism and types of causation in the life sciences
THE THEORIES OF QUASI-SETS Q AND Q−: A COMPARISON WITH ZFA ANDZFC, ALONG WITH A GLIMPSE INTO THEIR POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS IN THE QUANTUM DOMAIN
Full text linkQuasi-set theories are forms of quantum set theories that take into account the possibility of conceiving the basic entities as devoid of standard identity conditions. The main purpose of this article is to compare the two versions of
the theory: one with atoms and the other without them, thereby contributing to a clearer understanding of the role played by the different versions
Philosophy of Cosmology
Full text linkThis chapter deals with the philosophical questions and debates surrounding modern cosmology. It identifies the challenges posed by the standard model in cosmology (underdetermination, dark sector, and meaning of explanation) and discusses recent developments of quantum cosmology and quantum gravity in portraying the early universe
Epistemic Gaps and the Attribution of (AI) Discovery
Full text linkWhat does it take to properly recognize someone as having made a scientific discovery? According to the 'Cognitivist', discovery attribution properly depends on the exercise of distinctive cognitive capacities such as competence, meta-reflective awareness, or domain-general understanding. Since AI systems lack such capacities, they cannot, on this view, be discoverers. If the Cognitivist is right, AI-driven science will be a markedly impoverished enterprise. Here, we argue otherwise. We develop an alternative, non-cognitivist conception of scientific discovery according to which discovery turns on successfully negotiating epistemic gaps. This reconception, we argue, better captures both familiar human cases and novel AI contributions, thereby re-framing the grounds for attributions of discovery in contemporary science. AI systems, we argue, can be appropriately attributed scientific discoveries. Along the way we develop a general moral for philosophical reflection in the age of AI-infused science
Research in the multiplex: Navigating tensions and opportunities in transdisciplinary environments
Full text linkThis paper examines the environments in which researchers operate in applied fields such as agricultural and phytosanitary science, where transdisciplinary interactions are the norm. In contrast to understandings of scientific research in terms of distinct traditions, methods and areas of research, we argue that transdisciplinary researchers operate in a highly dynamic, multi-sited and distributed research landscape, which we call multiplex research environments. As we illustrate with two case studies of crop-related research in Ghana and Italy, multiplex research environments are neither consistent nor easy to navigate, due to the presence of diverse, divergent, and dynamic commitments and demands. Individual researchers thus need to continuously negotiate tensions for knowledge to be successfully developed, while also fostering the ability to leverage unexpected exchanges or the absence of certain forms of collaborations towards fruitful forms of discovery