Policy Documentation Center

Changes in visa policies of the EU member states. New monitoring report

Cianciara, Agnieszka K.

English

The European policy of Donald Tusk\u2019s government

Around the world, governments commit flagrant and widespread human rights violations against 
people who use drugs, often in the name of "treating" them for drug dependence. Suspected 
drug users are subject to arbitrary, prolonged detention and, once inside treatment centers, 
abuses that may rise to the level of torture. In many countries, military and police force people 
who use drugs into treatment without any medical assessment, and then rely on chains and 
locked doors to keep them there. Drug users who voluntarily seek medical help are sometimes 
unaware of the nature or duration of the treatment they will receive. In fact, treatment can 
include detention for months or years without judicial oversight, beatings, isolation, and addition 
of drug users’ names to government registries that deprive them of basic social protections and 
subject them to future police surveillance and violence.
         Mechanisms to force people who use drugs into treatment, and the methods of treatment 
used, are rarely documented. United Nations or national assessments of drug dependence treat-
ment frequently report numbers of those treated without additional detail about the nature or 
quality of what constitutes “treatment.” The accounts below, drawn from published literature and 
from those who have passed through treatment in Asia and the former Soviet Union, detail the 
range of abuses practiced in the name of drug dependence treatment, and suggest the need for 
reform on grounds of health and human rights.
     
Arbitrary Deprivations of Liberty  
and Denial of Due Process  
A common way for people to enter drug treatment is 
involuntarily through the criminal justice system. People 
suspected of using drugs, whether actual drug users or 
those simply swept up in police or military raids, are 
frequently detained for treatment on the basis of mere 
police suspicion or a single positive urine test. They are 
remanded to treatment for months or years without medi-
cal assessment or right of appeal. Even those who enter 
treatment voluntarily find themselves confined for years 
at a time without due process. 
•	 Malaysia’s drug treatment system makes no distinc-
tion between occasional drug users and those actually 
dependent on drugs.1 Anyone can be detained for up to 
two weeks and forcibly tested by police on suspicion of 
drug use. Those testing positive, even in the absence of 
possession, can be flogged and interned for up to two 
years in a compulsory drug treatment center.2 
•	 In Cambodia, drug users and others are picked up in 
police raids and confined in treatment and rehabili-
tation centers run by military staff with no training 
in addiction or counseling. Drug users, people with 
mental disabilities, sex workers, and the homeless 
Human Rights Abuses in the Name of Drug 
Treatment: Reports From the Field
P u b l i c  H e a lt H  F a c t  S H e e t 
International Harm Reduction Development Program (IHRD)
OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE
Public Health Program 
are sometimes confined together. There is no judicial 
supervision or process for appeal, though detainees 
report being able to bribe their way out of internment.3 
There is no clear criteria for release, which may depend 
on being able to recite the Cambodian national drug 
laws from memory.4
•	 Drug users in Vietnam can be committed by family 
members or community focal points that keep lists 
of known drug users, and there is no due process to 
appeal commitment or extension of internment.5 In 
response to high rates of return to drug use (as high as 
95 percent by those leaving the centers6) the govern-
ment in some cities has extended terms of detention 
to as long as six years, including labor in facilities 
built near the treatment centers.7,8 Between 50,000 
to 100,000 drug users are now interned in Vietnam’s 
compulsory rehabilitation centers.9,10 
•	 As many as 350,000 people are in China’s reeducation 
through labor and compulsory detoxification centers, 
which have recently been renamed, but which continue 
to intern people upon suspicion of drug use or a posi-
tive test for illicit substances.11 The involuntary nature 
of treatment is revealed by one 2004 study, which 
found that nearly 10 percent of those apprehended by 
the police on suspicion of drug use swallowed nails, 
metal filings, or ground glass in order to obtain a medi-
cal exemption and escape internment.12 
Abuses in Confinement
What is referred to as “treatment” in many centers in 
fact includes painful, unmedicated withdrawal, beatings, 
military drills, verbal abuse, and sometimes scientific 
experimentation without informed consent. Forced labor, 
without pay or at extremely low wages, at times in total 
silence, is used as “rehabilitation,” with detainees pun-
ished if work quotas are not met. These abuses violate the 
right to be free from torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrad-
ing treatment and punishment; the right to health; and 
other fundamental human rights.
Physical and mental abuse
•	 People formerly detained in Malaysian government 
treatment centers describe being kicked, punched, 
made to crawl through animal excrement, “act like 
a whale” by drinking and spitting out dirty water, 
and being abused and caned by a religious leader 
while being told that they are “worse than an ani-
mal.” Overcrowding forces as many as 40 inmates to 
sleep in one cell.13 
•	 In Vietnam, detainees are punished for failing to meet 
work quotas by being denied baths for a month, beaten 
with clubs, and being chained and forced to stand on 
their toes for more than 24 hours. Some internees 
report being put in isolation for up to a week in a cell so 
small that they are forced to sleep, urinate, and defecate 
in a standing position. Several people interviewed after 
completing compulsory treatment said they felt “lower 
than animals” after serving such sentences.14 
•	 In Guangxi province, China, a recent study found 
reports of sexual abuse of female inmates by guards. 
Inmates received mandatory HIV tests but were not 
told the results. Guards repotedly used the data to know 
which inmates they could sleep with without using a 
condom.15 
•	 In Nagaland, India, drug users have been crammed 
into thorn-tree cages in a sitting position.16 In Punjab, 
drug treatment patients are routinely tortured, and in 
some cases have been beaten to death.17 
•	 Drug users in Nepal recount that being taken for treat-
ment has included suspension by the arms or legs for 
hours, beatings on the soles of the feet, threat of rape, 
and verbal abuse that includes assertions that they do 
not belong in the “new Nepal.”18
•	 Former detainees in Cambodia report being locked 
in cement facilities where they are forced to withdraw 
“cold turkey,” and not allowed to use the toilet despite 
the diarrhea that is commonly associated with such 
withdrawal, subjected to sexual violence and beatings 
with batons and boards, and compelled to confess to 
unsolved criminal cases. Detainees also describe short-
ages of food so severe that some eat grass and leaves.19
•	 In Russia, drug users in some facilities are chained to 
their bed and offered “flogging therapy.”20  
•	 In South Africa, unregistered treatment centers are 
allowed to operate without government regulation 
or medical oversight. Former residents of one center 
report being kicked and beaten if they did not main-
tain sufficient speed during physical training, which 
consisted of carrying boulders on their bare backs, 
rolling long distances on hot pavement, or running 
while carrying as much as 25 liters of water and then 
being forced to drink it all, pausing only to vomit.21 
P u b l i c  H e a l t H  F a c t  S H e e t
Human Rights Abuses in the Name of Drug Treatment: Reports From the Field
|  2  |
Despite the reported deaths of two teenage patients, the 
center still in operation.22,23,24 Methods used to at other 
centers in South Africa include stranding patients in 
remote areas for three days, or prohibiting them from 
talking to, looking at, writing messages to, or touching 
another person while in treatment.25
Non-evidence-based and experimental treatment
•	 Malaysia’s drug treatment centers are commonly run by 
ex-army personnel, and there are few trained paramed-
ics or counselors.26 Treatment is largely military-style 
discipline and drills in the hot sun. Methadone, a 
proven treatment for opioid dependence, is unavail-
able in most centers.27 Condoms are also unavailable 
in many centers, despite accounts of sexual behavior 
among residents and between residents and guards.28 
•	 Antiretroviral treatment is not available in most of 
Vietnam’s treatment centers, although HIV prevalence is 
reported at 75 percent.29  Some centers conduct manda-
tory HIV testing without informing those tested of their 
results.30 Treatment of tuberculosis and other oppor-
tunistic infections is also unavailable, except through 
bribes, and there is no access to sterile injection equip-
ment despite documented drug use in many centers.31 
•	 Those interned in China’s centers are often offered little 
treatment other than mandated chants such as “drugs 
are bad, I am bad,” long hours of forced labor, and 
military-style drills.32 Private and voluntary treatment 
methods include partial lobotomy through the insertion 
of heated needles clamped in place for up to a week to 
destroy brain tissue thought to be connected to crav-
ings.33 The technique is a variation of a Russian tech-
nique in which very cold, rather than heated, rods were 
used to destroy brain tissue.34 This surgery is one for 
which families save and pay significant money, despite 
reports of adverse effects and widespread condemna-
tion of such procedures as experimental and unethical.
•	 One treatment center in India runs on the motto 
“changed when chained,” and shackles participants’ 
legs together and loosens links the longer they remain 
drug free.35 Some centers administer drugs that have 
been discontinued in Europe due to their adverse 
effects, while treatment with methadone or buprenor-
phine, both on WHO’s list of essential medicines, is 
often not available.36
•	 Throughout Eastern Europe and Central Asia, “narcolo-
gists” charged with treating drug and alcohol addiction 
administer hypnoid therapies used in Soviet times, 
where patients have ampoules or substances injected 
under the skin and are told that they will explode 
and poison them if they drink or use drugs, or where 
patients are shown films with subliminal anti-addiction 
messages.37 Prescription of methadone or buprenor-
phine, either for maintenance or detoxification, is 
illegal in Russia.  
Forced labor
•	 Human rights groups assert that drug treatment cen-
ters in Vietnam are in reality forced labor camps, with 
inmates required to work long hours under extremely 
harsh conditions38 at far below market wages. Tasks 
included carrying heavy buckets of water and excre-
ment, hauling clay on their shoulders,39 or making 
trinkets for market sale. Those who fail to meet work 
quotas are isolated and punished severely.40 
•	 One study in China found that detained IDUs reported 
working from 7 a.m. to 2 a.m., seven days a week,  
performing unpaid factory labor, with the threat of  
punishment, including beatings, if production quotas 
were not met.41  
P u b l i c  H e a l t H  F a c t  S H e e t
Human Rights Abuses in the Name of Drug Treatment: Reports From the Field
|  3  |
 
“The Special Rapporteur wishes to recall that, from a human rights perspective, drug dependence should 
be treated like any other health care condition. Consequently, he would like to reiterate that denial of 
medical treatment and/or absence of access to medical care in custodial situations may constitute cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and is therefore prohibited under international human 
rights law. Equally, subjecting persons to treatment or testing without their consent may constitute a vio-
lation of the right to physical integrity. He would also like to stress that, in this regard, States have a posi-
tive obligation to ensure the same access to prevention and treatment in places of detention as outside.”
— Manfred Nowak 
Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Geneva, January 14, 2009)
   
   22 Independent Online. Government to Probe Second Death 
at Noupoort. 27 June 2001. Accessed February 19, 2009 at 
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_
id=qw993639661144B224. 
   23 Report of the Inspection Conducted at the Noupoort Christian Care 
Center on 17 and 18 June 2004. Unpublished report. 
   24 Email Communication with Sarah Fisher, Executive Director of 
SMART: Substance Misuse: Advocacy, Research and Training, 19 
January 2009. Notes on file at OSI offices.
   25 Ibid.
  26 World Health Organization, Regional Office for the Western Pacific. 
Assessment of Compulsory Treatment.
 27 Ibid.
 28 Interview, Shaharudin bin Ali Umar.
 29 Hammett, et al. “Social Evils.”
 30 Open Society Institute. At What Cost?
 31 Ibid.
 32 Human Rights Watch 2003. Locked Doors: The Human Rights of 
People with HIV/AIDS in China. New York: Human Rights Watch.
 33 Gao G, Wang X, He S, Li W, Wang Q, Liang Q, et al. 2003. “Clinical 
Study for Alleviating Opiate Drug Psychological Dependence by 
a Method of Ablating the Nucleus Accumbens with Stereotactic 
Surgery,” Stereotactic and Functional Neurosurgery, 81, 96-104.
 34 Polyakov U., Anichkov, A., & Konenkov, S. 2002. Sterotaxic Bilateral 
Cryocingulotomy in Complex Treatment of Opioid Drug Addicts. In 
Functional neurosurgery: Materials of the third all-Russia congress of 
neurosurgeons. Available at www.neuro.neva.ru (in Russian). 
 35 Dorabjee J. 2007. “In the Name of Treatment – Insights from India.” 
Presentation at International Conference on the Prevention of Drug-
Related Harm. Warsaw, Poland.
 36 Letter from Luke Samson, Executive Director of SHARAN, and 
Anand Grover, Project Director of the Lawyer’s Collective HIV/AIDS 
Unit, to the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment and the 
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare of the Government of India. 
September 19, 2008, New Delhi. 
 37 Elovich, Richard. 2008. Behind Every Doctor Is A Policeman: 
Narcology, Drug Users and Civil Society In Uzbekistan. PhD 
Dissertation, Department of Sociomedical Sciences, Columbia 
University.
 38 Vietnam Committee on Human Rights. 2000. Notes on criminal 
penalties for drug users in Vietnam. Boissy Sant Leger.
 39 BBC, Interview of a Drug User Who Was Sent to a Drug Treatment 
Center of Hanoi. (Translation of a Vietnamese audio interview). 
Accessed February 13, 2009 at http://www.bbc.co.uk/vietnamese/
vietnam/story/2008/05/080522_drug_human_right.shtml. 
 40 Open Society Institute. At What Cost?
 41 Cohen and Amon. “Health and Human Rights.”
P u b l i c  H e a l t H  F a c t  S H e e t
Human Rights Abuses in the Name of Drug Treatment: Reports From the Field
|  4  |
Endnotes
 1 World Health Organization, Regional Office for the Western Pacific. 
2009. Assessment of Compulsory Treatment of People Who Use Drugs 
in Cambodia, China, Malaysia and Viet Nam: An Application of 
Selected Human Rights Principles. Unpublished document. 
 2 Interview, Shaharudin bin Ali Umar, Malaysian AIDS Council, 
October 21, 2008. Notes on file at OSI offices.
 3 Interview with Holly Bradford, harm reduction worker in Cambodia, 
October 17. Notes on file at OSI offices.
 4 Thomson, Nicholas. 2008. Compulsory Drug Treatment Centers for 
Amphetamine-Type Stimulant Users in Southeast Asia. Unpublished 
document.
 5 Wolfe D and Malinowska-Sempruch K. 2004. Illicit Drug Policies and 
the Global HIV Epidemic: Effects of UN and National Government 
Approaches. New York: Open Society Institute.
 6 World Health Organization, Regional Office for the Western Pacific. 
Assessment of Compulsory Treatment.
 7  Ibid.
 8 Hammett TM, Zunyou W, Duc TT, Stephens D, Sullivan S, Liu 
W, et al. 2007. “‘Social Evils’ and Harm Reduction: The Evolving 
Policy Environment for Human Immunodeficiency Virus Prevention 
among Injection Drug Users in China and Vietnam,” Addiction, 103: 
137-145.
 9 Hammett et al. “Social Evils.”
 10 World Health Organization, Regional Office for the Western Pacific. 
Assessment of Compulsory Treatment.
 11 Cohen JE, Amon JJ. 2008. “Health and Human Rights Concerns of 
Drug Users in Detention in Guangxi Province, China.” PLoS Med 
5(12): e234. 
 12 Juny A, Huili S. 2004. “Analysis of 272 Cases of Swallowing 
Foreign Body in Compulsory Detoxification,” China Journal of Drug 
Dependence (zhongguo yaowu yilaixin zazhi), 13(3), 221-223.
 13 Interview, Shaharudin bin Ali Umar.
 14 Focus group discussions, commissioned for the Asian Harm 
Reduction Network. Unpublished manuscript.
 15 Cohen JE, Amon J. “Health and Human Rights.”
 16 Nagaland Post, February 18, 2004. 
 17 Ibid.
 18 National Association for People Living with HIV/AIDS in Nepal. 
2008. Unimaginable Atrocities toward Drug Users in Nepal. 
Unpublished report.
 19 Open Society Institute. 2009. At What Cost? HIV and Human Rights 
Consequences of the Global War on Drugs. New York: Open Society 
Institute.
 20 Mendelevich V. 2006. Narcology: Drug treatment in Russia. In Open 
Society Institute Briefing on Drug Treatment, HIV, and the Challenge 
of Reform.
   21 Affidavits of former treatment center residents and medical staff at 
Noupoort Christian Care Center. Unpublished documents. Notes on 
file at OSI offices.
International Harm Reduction Development Program (IHRD)
The International Harm Reduction Development Program (IHRD), part of the Open Society Institute’s Public Health Program, works to reduce 
HIV and other harms related to injecting drug use and to press for policies that reduce stigmatization of illicit drug users and protect their 
human rights. Since 1995 IHRD has supported more than 200 programs in Central and Eastern Europe and Asia, and bases its activities on the 
philosophy that people unable or unwilling to abstain from drug use can make positive changes to protect their health and the health of others. 
Since 2001, IHRD has prioritized advocacy to expand availability and quality of needle exchange, drug dependence treatment, and treatment for 
HIV; to reform discriminatory policies and practices; and to increase the participation of people who use drugs and those living with HIV in shap-
ing policies that affect their lives.


Human rights abuses in the name of drug treatment: reports from the field

Dubrovskiy, Vladimir

Golodniuk, Inna

Szyrmer, Janusz

CASE Network Reports
No. 85 Composite leading indicators for Ukraine: an early warning model

Melchior, Arne

CASE Network Studies and Analyses
No. 379 East-West integration and the economic geography of Europe

Papa, Mihaela

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
POLICY PAPER 
 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SWEDISH 
PRESIDENCY OF EU 
 
 
 
BRENDAN DONELLY (The Federal Trust for Education and Research) 
 
HANNA OJANEN (The Finnish Institute of International Affairs) 
 
PETR KRATOCHVÍL (The Institute of International Relations, Prague) 
 
 
 
The Trans European Policy Studies Association 
May 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. The Swedish Presidency certainly prepares a strategy for the reaction of the European 
Council to the possible outcomes of the Irish referendum likely to be held on the Lisbon 
Treaty in autumn of this year. Even if the Swedish Presidency believes that the Irish electorate 
will, in this second referendum, endorse the Treaty, it would be particularly damaging to the 
Union if a negative Irish vote seemed to take the Presidency by surprise. The Swedish 
Presidency should also be prepared to deal with the contingency of another country or other 
countries failing to quickly complete their ratification procedures even after a positive vote in 
Ireland. 
 
2. The Swedish Presidency, while recognizing that the great bulk of political and economic 
choices in this sphere are made by the member states, should encourage the European Council 
to speak about and act towards the current economic and financial crisis in as united a fashion 
as possible. Criticisms exchanged between the member states on their apparently differing 
economic policies can only create an appearance of European disunity. Under the Swedish 
Presidency, the European Council should lose no opportunity to stress the similarity of 
analysis and policies that underlies national macro-economic programmes in the member 
states; the contribution made toward a recovery by the European Union’s Economic Recovery 
Plan; and the central role of the euro in enhancing the economic stability of Europe over the 
past twelve months. 
 
3. The Swedish Presidency should ensure that the recommendations of the de Larosière report 
on financial regulation are fully discussed and that necessary decisions are taken as soon as 
possible. The consolidation of European banking over the past decade has, in any case, 
reinforced the case for a more effective system of European regulation. The present financial 
crisis has rendered this need even more acute. The Union must demonstrate under the 
Swedish Presidency that it has a coherent strategy for preventing the recurrence of those 
elements in the present financial crisis which stemmed from lax or poorly implemented 
regulation and that this strategy is one with global as well as European validity. The Union’s 
strategy in this field must strike a balance between the need to protect the stability of the 
banking system together with the legitimate interests of depositors and savers, and the need to 
encourage innovation and flexibility in financial markets. 
 
4. The Swedish Presidency should prepare with the member states an ambitious contribution 
from the European Union to the Copenhagen Climate Summit in December.  This should 
involve the elaboration of and first steps towards the implementation of a comprehensive 
European approach to climate change, an approach based on binding commitments and 
realizable timetables for intermediate goals. On all environmental questions, the European 
Union now finds itself exposed to greater political pressure to deliver tangible results than it 
was in the time of the Bush administration. It is vital that the Union avoid the twin tendencies 
to which it has sometimes succumbed in the past: that of setting distant targets, while action to 
their accomplishment is indefinitely postponed, and the tendency to lecture others on their 
environmental shortcomings while having itself an often modest record in these matters. In 
particular, the Union should work with developing countries to ensure that they are not 
penalized for their failings in this area of the developed world. 
 
5. The Swedish Presidency should see as its most urgent priority in external relations the 
establishment of a clear and predictable relationship between the European Union and Russia 
that would be well understood by both sides. This relationship is vital for political stability on 
the European Union’s borders and to the security of European energy supplies. Legitimate 
differences of opinion exist between the European Union’s member states on this issue, 
differences which in the past have led to the adoption by the European Council of generalized 
declarations allowing the member states to pursue contradictory approaches. The Swedish 
Presidency should use its well established expertise in Russian questions not merely to 
encourage constructive discussion between Russia and the European Union, but also, and 
more importantly, to encourage constructive discussion within the European Union on the 
question of relations between Russia and the European Union. This structured discussion 
should take place at the ministerial, official and academic level, and should continue beyond 
the Swedish Presidency. The Russian awareness of European disunity is a powerfully 
destabilizing element of the relationship between Russia and the European Union.  
 
6. The Swedish Presidency should use the forthcoming review of the Lisbon Strategy to 
encourage member states to pursue more effectively the shared goals of the strategy. In 
particular, the Presidency should recall to member states that the Lisbon Strategy is primarily 
a blueprint for intergovernmental action rather than a legislative programme of the European 
Union comparable to the Internal Market programme. If member states do not wish to fulfil 
their role in the strategy, they cannot legally be compelled to do so. While recalling to the 
member states their self-imposed undertakings under the Lisbon Strategy, the Presidency 
should at the same time avoid in its public utterances unrealistic hopes or aspirations for the 
Strategy. Such unrealism can only lead to disappointment and disillusion.  
 
7. The Swedish Presidency should work energetically towards the adoption of the next five 
year programme in the field of Justice, Freedom and Security.  This programme should be 
designed to reassure citizens that action by the European Union can help to protect their 
physical safety while at the same time respecting their human rights and those of others. Both 
the Presidency and the Union in general should regard these two aspects of the Justice, 
Freedom and Security agenda as complementary and not as in any sense contradictory. The 
Union’s citizens are at the same time concerned that open borders may help the activities of 
criminals operating across frontiers and that pan-European co-operation between security 
forces may work to the disadvantage of legal certainty and transparency. Unless both of these 
legitimate concerns are met, the area of Justice, Freedom and Security will not be a means of 
bringing the European Union closer to its citizens. The areas of migration and asylum in 
particular require balanced political consideration if the Union is to simultaneously remain 
true to its values and pursue its shared economic and social goals. 
 
8. As a demonstration of good faith towards all its negotiating partners, the Swedish 
Presidency should seek to conclude the accession negotiations with Croatia this year. This 
accession should not be dependent upon the ratification or otherwise of the Lisbon Treaty, 
although the precise terms of the instrument of accession might be affected by the fate of the 
Treaty. The negotiations for the other accession candidates to the European Union should be 
continued in the manner and at the pace appropriate to the circumstances of the applicant 
country. Building upon the Swedish-Polish initiative leading to the establishment of the 
Eastern Partnership, the Presidency should continue the European Union’s multilateral 
dialogue with its eastern partners. This dialogue should concentrate upon proposals and 
initiatives which can be implemented in the short or medium term and which will reinforce 
the range of economic, social and political contacts between the European Union and its 
eastern neighbours. 


Recommendations for the Swedish Presidency of EU

Swoboda, Hannes

  
 
1 
 
The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in 
Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses events in the Middle East and the Balkans. 
Hannes Swoboda, Member of the European Parliament, member of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs of the EP, the Vice-President of the PSE/PES Group and the vice-
president of the European Parliament's delegation for relations with south-east 
Europe as well as the rapporteur of the European Parliament for Croatia, in his 
contribution "Balkans: Longer Stay in the Waiting Room" presents an 
overview of the current situation in the Slovenian-Croatian relations as well as in the 
region concerned, referring to its EU ambitions. His contribution is published in its 
entirety. 
.  
Hannes Swoboda, MEP, 
Member of the European Parliament (/PSE/PES/SPÖ)  
Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the EP, and 
Rapporteur of the EP for Croatia 
 
 
BALKANS: LONGER STAY IN THE WAITING ROOM 
 
  
 
At the beginning of each of the last years we said: "In this year we have to take a big 
step forward towards integration of the Balkans into the EU". And at the end of each 
year we were disappointed. And I fear the same will be true for 2009. We have to 
  
 
2 
recognise that developments in South East Europe are going much slower than we 
expected. Perhaps this is well accepted in some EU-circles who would not like to 
proceed with enlargement to quick anyway. But of course it could enhance this 
tendency and create new fears and disappointments in the region. It may lead to 
despair and emigration especially of the younger generation.  
 
This "common" contribution to the slowing down or even interruption of the 
enlargement process is no good news. It could also undermine some of the existing 
conflicts and invite some groups and countries to invent or bring some new conflicts 
to the surface. Therefore all the countries of the region should try to do their 
homework and solve the bilateral conflicts.  
 
Croatia did a lot of its homework. A new boost was given to its fight against 
corruption and organised crime. The work is not yet finished but on a good way to be 
in a satisfactory status very soon.  But there are still two open questions: one 
concerns the full cooperation with the International Criminal Court in The Hague. 
The other concerns the boarder conflict with Slovenia.  
 
The recent proposal by Commissioner Olli Rehn to set up a mediation group headed 
by Martti Ahtisaari is definitely a step forward and gives a clear sign to the two 
partners, that the EU wants a quick solution to the dispute.  
 
But I think that the argument about the legal basis to solve the conflict is not 
respected enough and must be part of the method and procedure to solve the crises. 
Both aspects the political, which is underlined by Slovenia and the legal, which is the 
main concern of Croatia, must be respected. 
 
Basically it would be the best to follow both tracks at the same time. The two partners 
could agree to go to an international body and agree to negotiate a political solution 
which meets the central demands of the Slovenian side concerning the Piran Bay and 
the free access to the sea. If the court would decide in that direction anyway an 
additional agreement between the two sides is no longer necessary. 
 
If the court would decide in the direction of the Croation position, Croatia must offer 
a voluntary but legally binding agreement with Slovenia to meet their basic demands. 
In that way Croatia would have a conformation of their legal position and Slovenia 
would have a political success out of negotiations with Croatia. 
 
The mediation team proposed by the EU Commission could work on the details of 
this double track approach and help to find a negotiated solution in addition to the 
court decision. If the two sides could agree not to appeal to an international court but 
agree to include the international law more strongly and directly into the 
deliberations of the mediation commission to find a solution for the border dispute, 
this of course could also be accepted. 
  
 
3 
 
In any way without the respect of the international law it will be difficult to come to a 
compromise on even the road map to find a solution. Political and legal aspects must 
be combined for both countries to convince their own population of any compromise 
as justified and fair. 
 
And in my widely accepted and voted recent report on Croatia in the European 
parliament I introduced the following amendment: "Recalls the informal agreement 
reached on 26 August 2007 by the Prime Ministers of Croatia and Slovenia on the 
submission of their border dispute to an international body; welcomes the readiness 
of Croatia and Slovenia to accept the mediation offer made by the Commission and 
takes the view that this mediation should be based on international law; in this 
context, looks forward to a rapid advancement of the accession negotiations;" 
 
One can only hope that both countries can find an agreement on the mandate and 
road map for the mediation commission.  
 
Macedonia is still not ready to open negotiations according to the evaluation of the 
Commission so far. In addition the name issue and dispute with Greece threatens to 
block the opening of the negotiations. Therefore we agreed in the European 
Parliament to state: " Supports the efforts of mediator Matthew Nimetz within the 
UN, as envisaged by the above-mentioned UN Security Council resolutions 
S/RES/817 and S/RES/845 of 1993, aimed at resolving the differences that have 
arisen over the constitutional name of the state in order to reach final agreement 
between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Greece as soon as possible, 
on the basis of his proposal of 6 October 2008 as to how the distinction between the 
various areas which belong to different states but have in common the fact that they 
are called Macedonia can be clarified internationally; realises that this proposal is 
viewed with hesitation by both parties; takes note of the appointment of the new 
negotiator for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; requests both parties to 
remain committed to the talks under the auspices of the UN and to reach a 
compromise solution, so that the issue does not continue to represent an obstacle to 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's membership of international 
organisations, as provided for in the above-mentioned Interim Accord of 1995, which 
is still in force; warns that unless agreement is reached quickly between the two 
states, this could result in a long delay in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
joining the EU; takes the view that such outstanding bilateral issues in the Balkans 
should not obstruct accession or take precedence over the process of European 
integration;" 
 
So there are specific problems for the two candidates' countries in the region: for 
Croatia to open some of the chapters, for Macedonia to open negotiations as such. A 
mixture of internal deficiencies and unsolved bilateral issues block at the moment 
further progress. Some politicians ask that all bilateral issues are solved before 
  
 
4 
accession-negotiations start. But perhaps we should demand that at least a clear 
procedure for solving the bilateral issues must be accepted by both sides, before these 
negotiations for membership in the EU start.  
 
For the moment we cannot see how opening of negotiations will proceed with the 
other countries on the Balkans. And of course irrespective of opening negotiations 
(Montenegro) or of applying for membership (Albania) there are many still bigger 
problems specifically with Bosnia and Herzegovina and with Kosovo and in 
consequence also with Serbia.  
 
We need patience in the EU in order not to lose interest in the integration of that 
region. And of course we can not enforce the necessary reforms and changes in minds 
and attitude from the outside. But a discouragement by sending messages of 
disinterest or disengagement to the region is not only negative for the countries 
concerned but also for our interest in stability and development of our neighbouring 
region. Especially in the weeks before the election for the European Parliament 
populistic slogans against the enlargement of the Balkan-countries should be 
avoided. The countries concerned need a clear but also clearly positive answer to 
their European aspiration.  
 
Ljubljana, 20th March 2009 
              
                                                                      International Institute for Middle-East 
                                                                      and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) – Ljubljana 
                                                                      Directors: 
                  Bakhtyar Aljaf                                                                
                  Zijad Bećirović, M.Sc. 
 
                                                    


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