Policy Documentation Center

Maigre, Merle

  
 
 
 
www.icds.ee 
The EU Can Take a 
Number of Concrete 
Steps in Crimea 
Merle Maigre 
 
  
The EU Can Take a Number of Concrete Steps in Crimea | Merle Maigre 
 
 
International Centre for Defence Studies | Toom-Rüütli 12-6 | Tallinn 10130 | Tel: +372 6949 340 | Faks: +372 6949 342 | info@icds.ee | www.icds.ee 
The EU Can Take a Number of Concrete Steps in Crimea 
 
Presentation at the Conference 
 “Place and Importance of Black Sea Region in European Security Space” 
26 June 2009, Sevastopol 
 
Introduction 
As Edward Lucas has noted in his blog, when the people who run the Western world go on 
holiday, bad things happen in Eastern Europe. Last August, Russia invaded Georgia. Over 
Christmas, a gas conflict broke out between Russia and Ukraine. Easter brought violent 
protests against election results in Moldova. It can only be guessed what kind of trouble this 
summer will bring. A new war in Georgia is always a possibility. Crimea remains a dangerous 
mixture of incompatible military and ethnic interests.  
 
Europe must invest in its security. NATO and the EU have come up with some new approaches 
to the Black Sea security. How successful have they been? 
 
NATO 
At fifty, NATO was an alliance in renewal. At sixty, NATO is overextended and overburdened. 
Today, it is unclear whether currently ongoing debates will produce policies that can revive 
NATO. The implications for Ukraine are equally uncertain. Yet, not for the first time, NATO-
Ukraine relations will depend very much on what Ukraine does and does not do.  
 
Current NATO-Ukraine relations will be further developed on the basis of Ukraine’s 2009 Annual 
National Programme (ANP) – a decision of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs from December 
2008. This adds a concrete dimension of practical cooperation to the ongoing NATO-Ukraine 
dialogue. Ukraine has the opportunity to use its ANP to advance practical actions and reforms 
that will take it closer to Euro-Atlantic standards.  
 
NATO needs to refresh the agenda for a new Ukrainian president who will be elected soon, in 
January 2010. What issues will be set as priorities for the new President of Ukraine in the 
NATO-Ukraine dialogue? This agenda could have no better framework than the one set out in 
the latest report of the Kyiv Razumkov Centre for the NATO-Ukraine Partnership Network (May-
June 2009). 
 
NATO should not close the door on Ukrainian membership, but equally it should not close its 
eyes and pretend nothing has changed in the region. At the moment, the best course would be 
to work on the details of the military reform and integration, whilst avoiding the making of any 
distinct declarations on future status. The ANP provides the best means for doing so. 
 
The Ukrainian public has fragmented information on NATO. There are strong political and 
economic divides in society. As there is no popular pro-NATO movement in Crimea, it would be 
counterproductive to try to push it through. 
 
  
The EU Can Take a Number of Concrete Steps in Crimea | Merle Maigre 
 
 
International Centre for Defence Studies | Toom-Rüütli 12-6 | Tallinn 10130 | Tel: +372 6949 340 | Faks: +372 6949 342 | info@icds.ee | www.icds.ee 
 
The European Union 
Since the Orange Revolution in 2004, the EU has become a much more visible external actor in 
Ukraine.  
 
Currently, two European initiatives are relevant to Black Sea security. The European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched in 2003. The ENP offered economic integration, 
financial assistance and political dialogue to ‘neighbourhood countries’ in exchange for reforms 
and democratisation. So far, the ENP has received much more criticism than praise. 
 
The EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) was launched in May 2009 in response to criticism levelled 
at the ENP. The EaP seeks to complement the ENP by deepening bilateral relations between 
the EU and six ‘eastern neighbourhood’ countries – Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan.  
 
There are a number of concrete steps that the EU can take in 
Crimea.  
• In the framework of the EaP, the EU is currently considering the establishment of a 
Commission representation in the region. This is a good initiative, as more visibility for 
the EU in Crimea would offer local people an alternative ‘European’ perspective on 
looking at things. On their part, EU member state presidents, prime ministers and 
foreign ministers should make more of an effort to visit the region. One of the first 
projects of the EU representation should focus on how to support the diversification of 
local economy, particularly in the Sevastopol area.  
 
• In addition, the EU representation could significantly increase its efforts to award more 
scholarships to Crimean students and grants to academics. Communication and 
cooperation between NGO leaders, journalists and academics and their EU 
counterparts should also be stepped up.  
 
• The EU should give direct aid to NGOs supporting European integration and other civil 
society organisations in order to build the capacity of civil society groups and to 
broaden their influence and reach. The EU should provide assistance to projects 
aimed at building the administrative capacity of local governments in Crimea. 
 
• In the Crimean media sector, Russia clearly outperforms the EU. Few people in 
Crimea read the EU press or watch the EU media, although Ukraine has a free media 
market. In fact, Crimea is largely excluded from the general Ukrainian media 
environment. The Russian media has taken an active role in local politics in Crimea, 
shaping the way citizens see domestic and international events. What can be done 
about this? The best way for the EU to increase its popularity in the region would be to 
help Ukraine build up its independence and to resist Russia’s attempts to infringe on its 
sovereignty. 
 
  
The EU Can Take a Number of Concrete Steps in Crimea | Merle Maigre 
 
 
International Centre for Defence Studies | Toom-Rüütli 12-6 | Tallinn 10130 | Tel: +372 6949 340 | Faks: +372 6949 342 | info@icds.ee | www.icds.ee 
• In accordance with the EaP’s civil society dimension, the EU should help create a 
regional network of free media foundations and new media schools to encourage 
bloggers and Internet start-ups to promote stronger web networks and exchange of 
ideas.  
 
• The EU should support websites that translate Western media content and those that 
translate local Crimean news into English. It should also be considered whether to 
offer financial assistance to provide wireless Internet access in some areas in Crimea. 
 
• The EU could finance and support dialogue across communal divides in Crimea. On 
their part, local civil society organisations should monitor and linguistically analyse the 
use of hate language in the Crimean media. For example, the launching of high-quality 
Russian-language media channels and newspapers should be facilitated and 
supported by the EU. The EU needs to think imaginatively about how to find new ways 
of supporting media freedom in the neighbourhood, for example, by helping to build a 
lively and diverse media, by promoting a web environment that strengthens networks 
and exchange of ideas and by supporting websites that translate local and 
international media content. 
 
Conclusion 
Europe should also work with the government of Ukraine to provide more assistance – 
education opportunities, investments and balanced media information – to further integrate 
Crimea with the rest of Ukraine. Democratic Ukraine is an integral pillar of the European 
security architecture. The Black Sea region is among the most unstable and the most contested 
areas that lie under Russia’s ‘sphere of influence.’ It therefore remains the greatest security risk 
and also offers the greatest opportunities. If there is no stability in the Black Sea region, there 
will be no stability in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
 
 
 
 


The EU Can Take a Number of Concrete Steps in Crimea

Prohni\u21bchi, Valeriu

Popa, Ana

Oprunenco, Alex

Lupu\u219or, Adrian

Real Economy, no.7

Bryant, Rebecca

Hatay, Mete

Suing for sovereignty: property, territory, and the EU\u2019s Cyprus problem

Tokyay, Menekse

After the European Parliament elections: the Achilles heel of the democracy

Annual Report 2009

WTO and Fiscal Package 
 
In the framework of Albania’s WTO commitments and regional free trade agreements as 
well as the undergoing process of negotiations in the context of the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement with EU, considering the proposed changes on the 2004 draft 
fiscal package, the Albanian Center for International Trade (ACIT) calls attention to the 
following:  
1. From the moment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) membership, Albania 
shall respect all undertaken and agreed commitments within the WTO legal and 
regulatory framework. Any deflection from these rules is considered a violation of 
the Agreement and is subject to disciplinary measures from the WTO members.  
2. Even though the applied custom duty for some commodities should have been 
abolished since 2002, Albania continues to not respect this commitment. Such 
commodities include fishery products and vegetal oil, which custom duties should 
have become 0 starting from 2002 and beer, which should not have had increased 
its custom duty, while such change was done on last year’s fiscal package. 
Instead, a reduction of 10% from 15% foreseen in the fiscal package under 
discussion shall apply during 2004. The 2004 fiscal package foresees that 
Albania’s commitments regarding the reductions on custom duties shall not be 
respected for some other commodities as well such as the paper and cardboard 
industry, cast-iron, steel and thereof products, furnishings, etc. 
3. According to the in-force provisions of the WTO Agreement, after negotiating 
and agreeing on the commitments that the country will undertake, it is therefore 
not possible to postpone and putting new deadlines1 without respecting the 
foreseen procedures.  As the WTO membership protocol of Albania foresees, the 
list of custom duties in its annexes is an equivalent of the lists to be attached to 
the GATT commitments. Thus, their execution becomes an obligation at the 
moment of entering into force of the agreement and its protocol as an integral part 
of it2. Nevertheless, the WTO agreement allows certain exemptions from the 
obligations issued from multilateral agreements in extraordinary cases assuming 
the existence of a justification from the respective country and of the approval 
from the ministers’ conference with a participation of a ¾ of its membership3. List 
of commodities and the tariff duty reductions could also be modified, complying 
with the respective procedures as foreseen under article XXVIII of GATT.  
                                                 
1 According to article XII of the WTO Agreement, it is possible for each country to become member of this 
organization and multilateral agreements, by respecting certain conditions to be defined between the above 
country and existing member countries. These conditions are subject to preliminary negotiations and are 
considered as the “ticket” to WTO. Once defined, they cannot be renegotiated. Countries are allowed to 
demand for amendments of particular agreements, based on specific procedures as defined in article X of 
the WTO Agreement. Approval of amendment of particular agreement articles requires a participation of ¾ 
of the membership of the ministerial conference. 
2 Please see Albania’s WTO Membership Protocol, July 17, 2000, WT/ACC/ALB/53   
3 Please see article IX of the WTO Agreement  
4. The custom duties increase for particular commodities such as the beer, 
contradicts with the Free Trade Agreements (FTA) already in force with the 
countries of the region, where according to a specific provision, starting from the 
moment of their signing, it is prohibited any increase the custom duties levels4. 
We would like to highlight the fact that, when signing an FTA, recommendations 
and specifications in the WTO legislation, respectively in the article XXIV on 
regional integration, must be taken in consideration as well. This article 
anticipates that FTAs should include “substantial trade” and that in the text of 
Memorandum of Trade Liberalization between SEE-7 countries it is specified that 
FTAs shall include not less than 90% of commodities.  
5. Non accomplishment of the undertaken commitments is considered an intolerable 
act from country members both in the WTO and FTA context. Such behavior, 
other than transmitting negative signals to the international community and 
investors, impedes Albania’s progress in the process of EU membership.  
6.  In case that execution of commitments, both in the WTO and FTAs context, 
encourages unfair competition or threatens a national industry, application of 
temporary protection measures is allowed, presuming that respective procedures 
will be respected and this act will not be considered as a simply unilateral action. 
In this context, assuming that the beer production industry will face the unfair 
competition of foreign imports or present a bankruptcy risk for all the industry, 
the stakeholders must submit credible evidence on this purpose. In this view, trade 
policy formulation goes beyond the nationalist rhetoric and becomes subject of 
economic analyses.  ACIT wishes to express its willingness in assisting the 
groups of interest in formulating their opinions with respect to the required 
standards of international treaties where Albania adheres.  
 
Summing up, ACIT expresses its belief that the national interests as well as those for 
economic development have already defined the European integration as an aspired and 
welcomed process. Any negative signal or delay in these processes would on the contrary 
injure the country’s economic interests.  
 
Tirana, November 18, 2003 
 
Note: This material states ACIT expert staff opinion, which does not necessarily include 
the official opinion of USAID, its donor agency.  
 
                                                 
4 Please see article 4 of FTA with Macedonia, Croatia, etc. Amendments of FTA and attached annexes’ 
articles are as well reviewed according to specific procedures defined by the agreement and not unilateral 
decisions of member countries (see article 33 and on of the agreement with Macedonia). 
 


English

WTO and fiscal package

  
K OM I T E T I  S H Q I P T A R  I  H E L S I N K I T   
A L B A N I A N  H E L S I N K I  C O M M I T T E E  
 
  
 
Address: Rr. Gjin Bue Shpata,      Tel & Fax: ++355 (0)4 233671 
Pll. 5/1, Ap. 4, Tirana-Albania      e-mail: office@ahc.org.al 
P. O. Box /Kutia Postare No. 1752                   web address: www.ahc.org.al  
 
 
 
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 
OF JUNE 28, 2009 
 
HOTEL TIRANA, JUNE 29, 2009 
11:00 
 
 
The Albanian Helsinki Committee conducted the observation of the June 28, 2009, 
elections, activating 150 monitors accredited by the CEC. The monitoring was made 
possible also thanks to support from the American Embassy in Albania, spreading mainly 
in 8 counties of the country: Tiranë, Gjirokastër, Fier, Durrës, Elbasan, Shkodër, Vlorë and 
Kukës.  
 
The monitoring did not focus only on Election Day and the vote count. It involved different 
aspects of the electoral process. On Election Day, about 700 VCs were monitored in all of 
the mentioned counties. All 150 observers were trained before hand and remained in 
continued contact with AHC specialists to update their knowledge.  
 
AHC reached the conclusion that in the area of electoral reform and the conduct of 
elections, positive steps were made. In this context, we may mention the following 
achievements:  
 
a) for the first time, the law envisioned some special measures to ensure real equal 
gender opportunities; 
b) the legal obligation of equipping citizens with ID cards, besides the passport, was 
envisioned, thus excluding certificates that could allow for room for 
manipulations;  
c) we are of the opinion that the regional proportional electoral system, adopted by 
the Constitution and the Electoral Code, helped avoid the so-called “Dushk” 
phenomenon, which led to distortions of electoral will;  
d) In general, there was a calmer electoral campaign than in other elections. The 
voting process was also calm, and, in VCs that were the target of monitoring by 
AHC, there was a high voter turnout, approximately, 50%.  
 
Nevertheless, there were some problems, which have been highlighted below:  
 
1. Regarding guaranteeing the participation of citizens in elections, there were cases 
of difficulties of a technical-organizational character for voters seeking to be equipped 
with identity carsd. In meetings that our monitors had with these voters, according to 
on-site monitoring, there were cases of interruption of work, delays and wandering of 
citizens, lack of electricity, etc. 
 
Official data from the Ministry of Interior speak about 256,000 persons who did not 
apply for these identity cards. We are of the opinion that this figure shows a 
considerable number of voters who were not able to vote. Therefore, in terms of 
equipping citizens with ID cards, we are of the opinion that preliminary consultations 
  
K OM I T E T I  S H Q I P T A R  I  H E L S I N K I T   
A L B A N I A N  H E L S I N K I  C O M M I T T E E  
 
  
 
Address: Rr. Gjin Bue Shpata,      Tel & Fax: ++355 (0)4 233671 
Pll. 5/1, Ap. 4, Tirana-Albania      e-mail: office@ahc.org.al 
P. O. Box /Kutia Postare No. 1752                   web address: www.ahc.org.al  
 
 
should have been conducted, at the right time, as recommended by OSCE/ODIHR since 
2005. Regarding this issue, AHC, through its press statements, has made not only its 
remarks and suggestions, but also appeals that voters go as soon as possible to apply for 
them. 
2. Regarding the voter lists, it was noted that the preliminary lists and especially the 
final voter lists were announced late and voters’ sensitization about becoming 
acquainted with these lists should have been more intensive. It is a fact that 
immediately after the final voter lists were announced, there was dissatisfaction over 
duplicates and different errors, absence of names, etc. According to data from our 
observers, it appears that until June 26, 2009, the Tirana district court had received 430 
requests. There were requests to the court also in other districts, but in fewer numbers.  
The reasons for this situation could vary. However, it is disturbing that although an 
electronic register was put in place, this phenomenon was repeated in these elections. 
 
3. Regarding the election campaign, we found that political parties, during this 
campaign, compared to previous campaigns, did a better job of displaying alternatives 
and programs and had more positive tones. Public and private TVs held electoral 
debates. AHC found that the campaign began a long time before the official opening of 
the campaign as envisioned in the Electoral Code, especially by the two biggest parties. 
Of note are the excess spending and lack of transparency about the source of these 
funds. In this aspect, it is our opinion that it is necessary to have a more operational and 
effective control mechanism. Also, in some rallies and TV debates, there was unethical 
and hate language. Some incidents, related or not to political motives, to some extent, 
increased tension in the pre-election environment. In AHC’s opinion, the incident that 
occurred with the opposition regarding the permit for conducting its rally on the last 
day of the campaign should have been prevented or resolved calmly and quickly.  
 
4. Regarding the candidates name lists, we find that some candidates holding jobs 
as heads of municipality units or communes or prefects also run for MP. It appears 
they did not resign from their jobs before running, pursuant to article 69 of the 
Constitution. This problem was the target of discussions and debates in the CEC but 
was not resolved and could lead to problems of validity of mandates, if these 
candidates are elected MPs.  
 
5. Regarding the establishment of election commissions, the counting groups, and 
their training: Our observers reported that the ZCEAs were established late and 
VCCs even later. Almost two days before election day, the vote counting groups 
had not been set up. This was the result of political parties not submitting their 
proposed names to the ZCEAs on time. This fact raised questions especially about 
the training of VCC members and vote counting groups, which, carried out partially 
and late, was formal and lacking in quality. The above concern was made public by 
the CEC, especially its Chairman.  
 
I. Regarding procedures on opening the voting centers and the voting 
 
2. AHC monitors attended preparations for the start of the voting process in over 700 
VCs in the 8 counties mentioned above. The voting centers appeared orderly, in spite 
  
K OM I T E T I  S H Q I P T A R  I  H E L S I N K I T   
A L B A N I A N  H E L S I N K I  C O M M I T T E E  
 
  
 
Address: Rr. Gjin Bue Shpata,      Tel & Fax: ++355 (0)4 233671 
Pll. 5/1, Ap. 4, Tirana-Albania      e-mail: office@ahc.org.al 
P. O. Box /Kutia Postare No. 1752                   web address: www.ahc.org.al  
 
 
of problems in some cases, with facilities being too small (Tiranë), or cases of voting 
booths being very close to each other (Durrës). Initially, there were some delays and 
irregularities, but then the process proceeded calmly during the day. We may mention 
some delays in opening voting centers in Tiranë, Durrës, Elbasan (2364, 2343 and 
2301), Korçë, and Fier. This took place also because the materials arrived late, 
especially the stamp ink, or because of the fact that VCC members and some 
observers of electoral subjects were not all present at the time supposed for preparing 
the voting centers. It was disturbing that during Election Day, political parties 
continued to replace commission members, causing delays and suspensions of the 
voting process (a flagrant case is that of VC Kukës 0652, at 16:00). There were some 
cases of voting being suspended for some hours and then resuming calmly (Vlorë, 
Kukës). These took place because of absences in the voter lists, holding of pens that 
were considered photo tools, disagreements between commission members, etc. 
  
II. Regarding voting procedures 
 
In general, there was respect for voting procedures, but in some cases deviations were 
noted.    
 
1. Family voting. E.g., cases of family or group voting were highlighted, thus violating 
the fundamental principle of the secrecy of the vote. This phenomenon was noted in 
some voting centers in Durrës, Shkodër, Korçë, Tiranë. AHC observers presented in 
all identified cases written remarks, which helped stop the violation.  
2. Voting of disabled persons or persons unable to vote. AHC considers it an 
achievement that the possibility to provide the blind with special ballots. 
Nevertheless, monitoring in the field, showed that there were no special ballots for 
the blind in some voting centers. The same situation appeared with disabled persons 
who did not have the possibility to access voting centers through ramps, etc., in all 
VCs.  
3. Voter lists.  Based on AHC observers’ information, there were some cases of voters 
being unable to vote because they could not find their names on the voter lists. 
There were also inaccuracies in the first names and family names, particularly in 
Tiranë, Kukës, Vlorë, Durrës, Elbasan, Korçë, the Peqin Detention Institution and 
the Durrës Detention Institution. There were also few cases of mismatches of names 
between those in the final voter lists posted at voting centers and those that VCCs 
possessed. A problem was that some VCs did not allow women voters who carried 
their maiden name in their passports, but the husband’s family name in the voter 
lists. AHC notified the CEC about this.  
4. Freedom to vote. It is worth mentioning that in general, the voting process was 
conducted in an orderly and calm fashion. There were some sporadic incidents that 
created temporary tension in some voting centers, e.g., pressure by some party 
observers or militants on voters.  
5. Role of the police. In centers observed by AHC, it was generally noted that police 
officers behaved correctly. 
IV. Procedures for closing the voting process and the vote count 
 
  
K OM I T E T I  S H Q I P T A R  I  H E L S I N K I T   
A L B A N I A N  H E L S I N K I  C O M M I T T E E  
 
  
 
Address: Rr. Gjin Bue Shpata,      Tel & Fax: ++355 (0)4 233671 
Pll. 5/1, Ap. 4, Tirana-Albania      e-mail: office@ahc.org.al 
P. O. Box /Kutia Postare No. 1752                   web address: www.ahc.org.al  
 
 
6. Closing the voting process. Procedures for closing the voting process ended without 
problems. In most of them, voting was ended by 19:00. In some voting centers, it 
ended 30 or 60 minutes late. In only one case, due to the suspension of the voting 
process for several hours, the process ended about 2 hours late (Kukës). There were 
no incidents during the transport of ballot boxes. In a large part of the vote counting 
locations, ballot boxes arrived on time. There were delays in those VCCs belonging 
to communes far from vote counting sites.  
 
7. Establishment of Vote Counting Commissions and start of the counting. The vote 
count began at different times, but generally late. Of 25 VCGs that AHC monitored 
during the night, in some of them the counting process began 2-3 hours late and in 
two others it began at 4:00 am of today (ZEACs 25, 8).  
 
We deem it necessary to note that our monitoring is continuing in terms of the vote 
counting process.  
 
Thank you! 
 
 
 


PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS OF JUNE 28, 2009

 
 
BISS BLITZ 
BB #11/2009EN, 27 April 2009 
 
 
 
 
NATO IS 60: MISSION CONTINUED 
 
Viačasłaú Pazdniak 
 
Summary 
 
The main conclusion of the NATO jubilee summit is that time is not up yet for 
NATO to make conclusions.   
 
On April 4, 1949 12 states signed in Washington the North Atlantic Treaty, 
laying the foundations for the organization known as NATO. 60 years later, on 
April 3-4, 2009 Strasbourg, France, and the nearby Kehl, Germany, hosted the 
23rd meeting of the Heads of State and Governments of the Alliance to mark the 
anniversary. So what is today’s NATO like, what problems is it dealing with and 
what are its prospects?  
 
The first ‘double’ NATO summit in Strasbourg/Kehl was both a symbolic, solemn and 
working meeting. Its symbolic dimension lies in the fact that it marked the continuation 
of 60 years’ peace and co-operation between France and Germany, the restoration of 
united and free Europe after the end of the ‘Cold War,’ and France’s return to NATO 
military command bodies. The practical dimension of the summit is also very significant 
and diverse. 
 
The crisis of the established world order and the need to seek new institutional and legal 
supports in the unbalanced international system pushes all the leading actors of the 
international politics to co-operation. Under these circumstances, NATO’s role is 
expanding rather than diminishing. 
 
Strengthening Trans-Atlantic Solidarity and NATO Enlargement 
 
The Alliance is not isolated from new tectonic processes in the unstable international 
system. Both the system as a whole and its major structural components, including 
states, alliances and international organizations, are going through a complicated 
transformation or even an actual crisis, like the one experienced by the international 
financial architecture. 
 
However, it has become evident that yet another myth of NATO’s yet another death has 
blown up. All the anticipations of a fiasco concerning the agreements and a split-up on 
the grounds of the emerging contradictions as to the ways of solving internal and 
external problems were vain. France’s return to NATO military command bodies 
demonstrates a new level of trans-Atlantic co-operation and the Alliance’s further 
strengthening. 
 
The summit welcomed Albania and Croatia as new NATO members and reaffirmed that it 
remains open to east European states, which can join it if they are able to achieve the 
required standards and contribute to joint security. The number of NATO member 
states has reached 28. There are 22 states participating in the Partnership for 
Peace NATO-led program. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Montenegro are 
implementing individual partnership programs and have expressed their willingness to 
BB  #11/2009EN      
 
www.belinstitute.eu 
 
2 
join the Membership Action Plan. (MAP) Serbia has prepared the first Individual 
Partnership Program. The tools of NATO’s co-operation with the countries willing to 
obtain its membership and partner states are becoming more flexible. There will be a 
further development of the instruments of military and political co-operation within the 
framework of the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). 
 
In Strasbourg/Kehl NATO members confirmed the decision made at the previous summit 
in Bucharest in 2008 and at the December 2008 meeting of Foreign Ministers that 
Ukraine and Georgia would be its members. Towards this end, many-sided 
assistance they are receiving in implementing reforms will be strengthened to a ‘maximal 
possible degree.’ NATO has established bilateral commissions with Georgia and Ukraine 
and initiated annual national programs, actually equivalent to MAP. NATO information 
and communication offices in Kyiv and Chisinau will also come to play a more important 
role. The Alliance stresses that its mutually beneficial and fruitful relations with Ukraine 
and Georgia would make an essential contribution to regional and Euro-Atlantic security. 
 
 
Trans-Atlantic Strategy for Eastern Neighborhood?  
 
The April summit documents have no detailed statements on the East European region, 
as it was not a priority compared to Afghanistan, Russia, and strategies towards new 
worldwide threats.1 Furthermore, the situation in the region is becoming more 
complicated, and the Alliance members are continuing their debate on the subject. One 
of the approaches, proposed by Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus, foresees shaping a 
trans-Atlantic strategy for the whole Eastern Neighbourhood. It should also include such 
a component as energy security and concrete projects in the energy sphere2. Both NATO 
and the EU could be guided by this approach. 
 
It is noticeable that at the US and EU summit meeting in Prague, which took place just 
after the NATO summit, where US President Barack Obama expressed his support for the 
EU Eastern Partnership program, a lot of attention was given to the issues of energy 
security and ways of decreasing energy dependence within the EaP framework, among 
other things.3 Thus, the phrase ‘forgotten neighbors’, as the West often called Belarus 
until recently, may well forever be forgotten as a bad metaphor.  
 
US Permanent Representative to NATO Ambassador Kurt Volker aptly formulated the 
Alliance’s stance towards Eastern Europe, ‘We need to be helping people in Europe -- 
Ukrainians, Georgians, Moldovans, Belarusians, whomever -- who want to build the same 
kind of democratic, more prosperous, safe, secure societies that we have and that others 
in Europe have built since 1989 -- the Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, and so on. So those 
people deserve our support..’4 
 
NATO – Russia partnership was defined as a strategic component of strengthening 
security in the Euro-Atlantic region.5 NATO – Russia Council will resume its work. Instead 
of ‘zero sum game’ competition Russia is offered strategic dialog and practical co-
                                               
1 de Hoof  Scheffer, Jaap. NATO at 60: the way forward. 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/0902/090205/EN/index.htm  
2 President Adamkus: NATO must constantly review its poicy toward Russia. 04.04.2009. 
http://www.president.lt/en/activities/press_releases/president_adamkus_nato_must_constantly_review_its_policy
_toward_russia.html  
3 Pop, Valentina. US backs Eastern Partnership eyeing energy indpendence. 06.04.2009. 
http://euobserver.com/9/27920/?rk=1 
4 Volker, Kurt. ‘NATO:A Strong and Effective Alliance for the Future.’ World Affairs Council of Philadelphia. 
December 10, 2008. http://nato.usmission.gov/ambassador/2008/Amb_Volker_WACP_121008.htm  
5 Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg/Kehl on April 4 2009. 04 Apr. 2009. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm  
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www.belinstitute.eu 
 
3 
operation on such issues as AMD, Afghanistan, Iran, etc.,6 which, however, does not 
give it the right to veto other states’ sovereign decisions or create ‘zones of influence.’ 
 
New Strategic Concept 
 
The Declaration on Alliance Security, adopted at the summit, entitles the Secretary 
General to set up and head a group of qualified experts in order to develop a new 
Strategic Concept (the current one was adopted in 1999) in close co-operation with all 
the allies and submit proposals on its implementation for approval at the next summit.7 
Working up a new Strategy Concept is interconnected with a project on modeling NATO 
Futures, which involves both member states and partners. 
 
Among the most complicated problems that the Strategy Concept is supposed to throw 
light on is how to find the right balance between the obligations concerning NATO’s 
conventional collective defence, on the one hand, and the necessity to modernize and 
transform the Alliance in order to combat new threats, on the other. Paradoxically, 
while the Alliance is prepared to combat threats that are unlikely to come true 
any more, it is not yet prepared enough to combat newly emerging threats, to 
say nothing of unpredictable future risks. NATO has to find its way between two 
extremes: fixation on expeditionary operations, on the one hand, or return to 
conventional territorial defence, on the other. A natural alternative would be to regard 
both missions as complementary rather than mutually exclusive.8 According to military 
experts, modern requirements to be met by military forces do not presuppose any 
essential difference in their training and equipment for operations within the conventional 
control zone and beyond it. 
 
 
Belarus and NATO: a Window of Opportunity Is Open 
 
Belarus – NATO co-operation is being consistently intensified in the military field. The 
Belarusian Permanent Delegation to NATO has been functioning in Brussels since 1998. It 
consists of five diplomats with Ambassador Sianko at its head. In recent years, it has 
been working more and more actively. In addition, there is a Belarusian military 
representative and a communication officer of the Ministry for Defence attached to the 
Partnership Co-ordination Group in Monce near Brussels. 
 
At present, Belarus and NATO are implementing the 8th two-year Individual Partnership 
Program (the first one was prepared in 1997). Within its framework, Belarus has taken 
part in as many as 170 events, ranging from exchange visits, consultations, seminars 
and conferences to a variety of courses and some exercises. The area of co-operation 
includes combating international terrorism and transnational organized crime, 
counteraction against WMD proliferation, population and territory protection against 
emergencies of natural and technogenous nature, etc. 
 
In 2004 Belarus joined PARP, which allows it to obtain the required experience in 
enhancing the army’s training and their possible participation in peacekeeping 
operations. 
 
As a result of implementing a joint project of NATO Technical Maintenance Agency and 
the Belarusian Ministry for Defense to liquidate TNT-containing antipersonnel mines with 
the financial assistance of such NATO members as Canada and Lithuania, Belarus 
                                               
6 Kupchan, Charles. Decision time: NATO’s hard choices. NATO Review. 2009. No. 2. 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/0902/0902_NATOFUTURE/EN/index.htm  
7 Declaration on Alliance Security. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg/Kehl on 4 April 2009. 04 Apr. 2009. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52838.htm  
8 Korski, Daniel. Keeping in shape at 60. NATO Review. 2009. No. 2. 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/0902/090201/EN/index.htm  
BB  #11/2009EN      
 
www.belinstitute.eu 
 
4 
liquidated about 300,000 AP mines. Expert Council of Science for Peace and Security 
(SPS) NATO Committee adopted another joint Belarus – NATO project to build facilities to 
eliminate dangerous chemical substances kept on the territory of Belarus. Belarusian 
scientists are participating in a number of projects within the SPS framework. 
 
For Belarus, the restoration of trans-Atlantic unity and updating the Alliance’s 
strategy with a focus on multilateral co-operation in solving crucial 
international problems opens a window of opportunity to make a real 
breakthrough in its relations with the EU, the United States and NATO, and to 
get considerable tangible benefits from this engagement. As a possible initial step, 
Belarus could accept the Alliance’s offer made Deputy Assistant to NATO Secretary 
General Robert Simmons made during his visit to Minsk in December 2008 to move to a 
higher level of co-operation. It could also be possible to intensify a political dialogue 
between NATO and Belarus and to lift it, by using and developing the existing formats, to 
a higher level, such as the Partnership for Peace program on the bilateral level and the 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council on the multilateral level.  
 
For this purpose, would be worthwhile, among other measures, to restore the 
Belarusian parliamentary bodies’ associated membership in NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly, to set up an information center in Minsk, and to develop 
both multilateral co-operation between partners at the level of governments,  the 
governmental level, mixed bodies (such as the Consortium of Military Academies and 
Security Institutes) and non-governmental organizations, such as the Atlantic Treaty 
Association (that does not have any suitable partner in Belarus to be its member at the 
moment), to name a few.  
 


NATO and Belarus: towards a new beginning?

1                 
WHAT EASTERN PARTNERSHIP SHOULD BRING TO 
BELARUS
Policy proposal by 
Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies 
and
Office for Democratic Belarus 
23 April 2009
RESUME
Eastern Partnership initiative is an encouraging sign of the European Union’s 
commitment to the long-term political future and economic development and 
modernisation of former Soviet states. However, without a clear European 
perspective being offered to partner states, Eastern Partnership is not a wonder 
maker. The Partnership may still be successful if it focuses on realistic goals and 
provides incentives for internal Europeanization of partner states through 
pursuing ambitious economic modernization projects and promoting open borders 
for human movement, trade, investment, personal contacts, education, etc. With 
regard to problem states like Belarus, the EaP should be regarded as an 
instrument of restructuring and mindset change, rather than a regime change. The 
EU should therefore avoid inept application of political conditionality and promote 
politicise and projects that ensure reforms, societal transformation, geopolitical 
and civilisational gravitation of Belarus to Europe.  At the same time, EaP shall 
promote active participation of civil society at all stages and in all programmes.
EASTERN PARTNERSHIP BELARUS DILEMMA
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative of the European Union, originally suggested by 
Poland and Sweden in 2008, has been recognised as the EU’s primary instrument of 
extending its political and economic influence in the area of the former Soviet Union. A 
closer engagement offers opportunities to stabilise the region, extend the area of security 
and prosperity, and ensure economic and energy security of both the EU and its partners. 
Belarus’ participation in the Eastern Partnership is essential to the long-term economic and 
geostrategic goals of this initiative. However, inviting Belarus to join the programme posed 
a certain moral dilemma for the EU, as it meant that the latter was extending a partnership 
offer to the leader who not only has a proven track record of violations of human rights but 
also consistently and tenaciously ignored the offers of a dialogue. The Belarusian authorities 
expressed interest in participating in the EaP, considering this to be a sign of geopolitical 
loyalty to the EU for which, in return, they would expect the EU to abstain  from its  efforts 
to democratise the country.
If the EU decides to apply strong political conditionality, while offering little incentive to 
comply, the EU-Belarus partnership would never come to life. The ensuing isolation from 
Western influences will reduce the costs of maintaining the existing regime and strengthen 
political and military dependence of Belarus upon Russia. At the same time, the EU cannot 
2proceed in its engagement with Belarus posing no conditionality at all, for this would mean 
backtracking on the fundamental principles guiding its foreign policy and economic 
assistance abroad.
The European Partnership, as the European Neighbourhood Policy beforehand, offers no 
clear European perspective to the partner states. Without clear message on possible future 
membership in the EU, Brussels’ goals of securing peace, stability, and prosperity in the 
region are hardly achievable. Accordingly, the given initiative has to focus on realistic 
objectives, such as economic liberalisation and modernisation, energy security, 
administrative reform, increasing freedom of movement of goods, people, information and 
capital over the EU’s eastern borders. If these objectives are achieved, they would serve 
indirectly the goal of political liberalisation of troubled countries, like Belarus, in the long-
run. Hence, projects and cooperation in the framework of the EaP should not be 
derailed by the inept application of political conditionality. 
Today, the EU has to be ready to offer a sense of stakeholdership by pursuing and 
approving more ambitious economic modernisation and development initiatives than those 
currently debated. By making explicit commitments to open borders for human movement, 
trade, investment, personal contacts, education, the EaP initiative would have better 
chances for success. In is therefore important that all partner countries, including most 
problematic ones like Belarus, are engaged in the process to ensure their geopolitical 
gravitation to Europe and to raise their stakes of exiting the partnership, once the EU 
conditionality for further engagement is upgraded.
The development of breakthrough projects and appropriate application of conditionality in 
pursuing the EaP goals would reflect one of the programme’s strongest points – its flexibility 
vis-à-vis individual participants. At the same time, bilateral relations have to be 
complemented by a stronger multilateral track, where many of the region-wide programs 
will be concentrated. Ensuring a true spirit of partnership, cooperation, and openness of all 
EaP participants to each other would therefore be instrumental in promoting a greater 
openness and reform in all partner countries and, first of all, in Belarus. 
EASTERN PARTNERSHIP AND BELARUS: The Way Forward 
Within the given context, the goal of EaP with regard to Belarus should be specified as 
promoting the reform, the mindset change in the society, and absorbing Belarus into the 
European orbit.  Policies regarding Belarus’ participation in the programme have to pursue 
the following goals:
 Adaptation of EU norms in the Belarusian legislation;
 Closer integration of Belarus’ into the European economy;
 Elimination of barriers for people-to-people contacts and facilitating the 
spreading of European practices and values by gradually moving towards a visa-free 
travel regime;
 Establishing a permanent platform for a dialogue between pragmatic and 
reform-oriented segments in state institutions and civil society.
Removing restrictions on the free movement of people is of particular importance. In this 
context, making visa facilitation agreement a technical, not a political issue, and 
recording progress towards a visa-free regime should be one of the main priorities of the 
EaP, for facilitating cross-border movement is an instrument of ensuring positive changes in 
the country and the mindset of its people rather than as a reward for these changes. 
These goals can be reached through realisation of the following steps:
1. Taking the Belarusian authorities at face value
During initial discussions on the configuration of EaP, many raised the question whether 
Belarus could grow into a full-fledged participant of the programme. There were opinions 
that Belarus may only participate partially, with full benefits contingent upon political 
3progress. However, the Belarusian authorities declared that they would accept full 
partnership – or none at all.  The EU should take Minsk’s declarations at face value and 
insist that Belarus has to be prepared to commit itself to the code of good behaviour vis-à-
vis the community of European partners. 
It is worth considering institutionalising such code of good behaviour at the 
multilateral level and to oblige partners from both sides to respect a set of 
common rules that would make the entire partnership configuration truly 
operational. These rules could, for example, include: 
o Respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of all partner countries;
o Respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms, including abolition of 
death penalty;
o Respect for free and uninhibited flow of information across the partner states;
o Respect for free movement of people; 
o Respect for civil society’s activities, including elimination of artificial barriers 
for civil society cooperation, humanitarian aid, educational exchanges, etc. 
The Belarusian authorities should also have a clear perception of the advantages 
of establishing a close partnership with the EU. Among other advantages, this 
concerns the economic benefits associated with Investment Facility provided for 
by the ENP.
2. Promoting breakthrough projects on bilateral level
On a bilateral level, promotion of ‘breakthrough’ projects aimed at the economic 
liberalisation and the market reform as pre-requisite for their implementation should be 
one of the key steps. One needs to propose and develop projects in areas where alternative 
economic and geopolitical sponsors may pose long-term threats to the interests of 
Belarusian elites and viability of the country’s economy and independence, or where their 
capability to assist Belarus’ development is rather limited. “Grand projects may thus be 
developed in the following areas 
o Restructuring of the country’s power generation sector with the goal of 
increasing efficiency of power generation and reducing dependence on 
imports of Russian energy resources (It is worth noting that the Belarusian 
authorities seem to be particularly interested in projects relating to energy)
o Developing and pursuing small town adjustment programs (solving 
problems of small towns’ big enterprises);
o Developing a program of ‘Flagship’ privatisation and modernisation of 
key industrial enterprises;
o Investing into projects Belarus could participate on multilateral basis, 
such as connection of the Northern and Southern branches of Druzhba 
pipeline (Baltic-Black Sea Collector) or linking Odessa-Brody pipeline to Mozyr 
refinery;
o Creation of a free trade zone with the EU and promoting Belarus’ 
accession to the WTO.
o Developing a program of scientific cooperation to ensure Belarus’ 
exports of high-tech products to the EU and promoting linkages between EU 
businesses and Belarusian scientific establishments.
The EU should engage in presentation of these projects to the Belarusian society by hosting 
events and debates, engaging experts and policy makers, pursuing media campaigns, 
soliciting expertises and opinions. 
3. Expanding the role of civil society in the EaP 
While a civil society forum is already part of the EaP architecture, it is essential that the role 
of civil society is not limited to just one platform. In fact, a spirit and practices of 
partnership and cooperation between state and civil society should be nourished 
4and promoted at all stages and in all programmes. Ideally, civil society groups should 
have a voice in approval of all main EaP activities and be a tool of control and transparency. 
It is therefore essential that EaP programmes are not fully government-oriented and 
administered through centralised sources. Independent NGO groups ought to be fully-
fledged participants in the EaP. This can be achieved through
 Extending invitation to NGO groups to monitor the political and human rights 
situation and provide assessments of partnership initiatives, e.g. their 
environmental or human rights impact and establishing a platform for consultation 
and dialogue between government and civil society representatives 
 Making sure that that civil society exchanges and events form an integral part of the 
EaP and that a significant number of such events is held in ‘problem’ countries, such 
as Belarus. 
 Investing in capacity building of civil societies, thereby enabling their active 
participation in EaP programmes.
4. Sponsoring  and promoting political dialogue inside Belarus
 Initiating discussions about the long-term political future of the country, 
including the prospects of its European integration. 
 Sponsoring and promoting all possible forms of dialogues between European 
elites and Belarusian authorities, between Belarusian officials and civil 
society.
 Promoting a perspective of a possible negotiated scenarios of political and 
economic transition in the country under the EU guidance and political 
sponsorship within the context of the European integration. 
 Offering a long-term alternative that both sides will find attractive over 
revolutionary scenarios or Russian meddling.
5. Making the full use of the multilateral track to ensure Belarus’ engagement in regional 
initiatives and projects. 
 Encouraging participation of Belarus in the EU flagship projects as a tool of 
socialising, promotion of reforms, boosting administrative capacities, and 
reorienting economic and geopolitical linkages of the country. (In particular, the 
EU could study the possibility of engaging with Belarus and neighbouring 
countries on projects relating to energy security, transit infrastructure, and 
transportation. Such projects may include linking of the Northern and Southern 
branches of the Druzhba pipeline, extension of the the Odessa-Brody pipeline to 
the Mozyr refinery, construction of a Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania energy bridge; 
construction of transport and logistical facilities on the territory of Belarus to be 
used by European businesses, etc.)
 Economic and administrative reforms aimed at ensuring positive business 
climate, protection of investments; establishing the rule of law and 
approximation of business and legal practices with the European standards; 
ensuring the proper management of the joint infrastructure, should be required 
as condition for such projects to be taken part. 
It is worth noting that appointing a coordinator in Brussels dealing exclusively with the EaP 
should facilitate the implementation of programmes.


What eastern partnership should bring to Belarus

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