Policy Documentation Center

  
 
1 
 
The International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in 
Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses events in the Middle East and the Balkans. 
IFIMES has prepared an analysis of the current political situation in Albania in the 
light of the forthcoming parliamentary elections scheduled for 28 June 2009. The 
most relevant and interesting sections from the comprehensive analysis entitled 
”Socialist Alliance for Integration – the key to composing the new 
government‟ are given below. 
 
ALBANIA AND 2009 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: 
 
SOCIALIST ALLIANCE FOR INTEGRATION – THE 
KEY TO COMPOSING THE NEW GOVERNMENT  
 
 
After the list of candidates for deputies to the new Assembly of the Republic of 
Albania was published, the election race for the parliamentary elections scheduled for 
28 June 2009 started. Political parties launched intensive campaigns by presenting 
their candidates. This does not exclude the possibility of various tensions, which is 
quite different from the situation at the last elections which took place four years ago.  
 
There will be 45 political parties competing at the parliamentary elections, of which 
36 parties are united in four large coalitions. The largest of these four coalitions is 
”Alliance for Changes‟ uniting as many as 17 parties and run by the Democratic Party 
(PD) led by Prime Minister Sali Berisha. The ”Unification for Changes‟ is the second 
coalition run by the Socialist Party (PS) and headed by Tirana’s Mayor Edi Rama, 
covering another four parties (G99, Social Democratic Party (PSD), Party for Social 
Democracy (PDS) and Party of the Greek Minority (PBDNJ)). The third coalition is 
called ”Socialist Alliance for Integration‟ run by the Socialist Movement for 
Integration (LSI) of the former Prime Minister Ilir Meta, and comprising also Petro 
Koci’s PSV91, the Green Party of Albania, the Movement for Human Rights and 
Liberties, the Immigration Party and the party called “new tolerance”.   The fourth 
coalition called ”Poli i Lirisë‟ (Freedom Pole) is led by the Christian Democratic Party 
and unites also the Conservative Party, the Movement for National Development, the 
Party for Democratic Union, the “Way to Freedom” Party and the Party for 
Democratic Reforms.  
 
EDI RAMA WANTS TO BE PRIME MINISTER BUT NOT HEAD OF THE PS 
CANDIDATE LIST 
 
In their election campaign the leaders of political parties are mostly using some 
general political slogans, lacking the original political messages. According to the 
latest surveys the Democratic Party (PD) led by the incumbent Prime Minister Sali 
  
 
2 
Berisha ranks highest, with its margin increasing at the expense of Edi Rama’s 
Socialist Party (PS). The surveys carried out a few weeks ago showed PS as the 
highest ranking party,  but it is now losing support in favour of the ruling PD.  
 
The results of surveys carried out in Albania do not always reflect the attitude of the 
electorate on the election day. Nevertheless, they are used as the basis for 
determining the election strategies and for leading discussions and analyses on the 
results.  
 
According to the IFIMES International Institute the reasons for the decrease in the 
support of the Socialist Party (PS) in favour of the PD are: 1) The Socialist Party has 
been active in the election campaign for over one and a half year and it is 
experiencing fatigue in the final part of the race. 2) The election campaign run by the 
Democratic Party is much more intensive, using the political rhetoric which is 
appealing to the Albanian voters. 3) PS has not modernised its political vocabulary, 
which pushes it into a vicious circle and arouses dislike among the voters. 4) The 
activities of the opposition are still dim and lack the strategy for victory. 5) The 
opposition continues to spend too much energy on internal disagreements, leaving 
the voters with a bitter taste of divergence and mistrust in case of its eventual victory. 
6) The evidence and arguments used by the ruling party against the opposition, 
especially related to building permits issued by the mayor of Tirana and the 
opposition leader Edi Rama (PS), have compromised the image of PS leader. 7) The 
most unpleasant surprise Edi Rama has prepared for his Albanian voters was his 
rejection of heading the PS candidate list, which is a completely irrational decision for 
an opposition party leader who wishes to become the next prime minister.   
 
In addition to the above main reasons for the development of situation in Albania 
there are many other causes for the present state of affairs.  
 
Usually it is the ruling party that experiences fatigue at the end of its term of office, 
but in Albania the situation is opposite. Still, there is little margin between the ruling 
PD and the opposition PS, and this is not expected to change significantly by the end 
of the elections. Thus, the parties united in the ”Socialist Alliance for Integration‟ will 
hold not only the victory of the left wing but also the key to composing the majority in 
the government. 
 
HISTORICAL LEFT WING LEADER FATOS NANO IS NOT ON THE PS 
CANDIDATE LIST   
 
The publishing of party lists containing the names of candidates has stirred up the 
attention of the wider and professional public regarding their quality. Two largest 
parties (PD and PS) have adopted the same approach to composing their lists. 
 
  
 
3 
The Democratic Party decided to present a larger number of intellectuals and avoided 
including strong political personas on the list. The Socialist Party is trying to convince 
the public of its tendency to support progressive intellectualism, but the reality is that 
it tends to support people with business connections and dubious past, which points 
to manipulation in composing the candidate lists.  
 
Neither of the major parties (PD and PS) have paid much attention to political 
elitism, avoiding putting on their lists the leading political personas with rich political 
biographies who have been politically active during the past 18 years of political 
pluralism. Thus the stubbornness and arrogance of PS leaders even led to the 
exclusion of the historical left wing leader Fatos Nano and his followers. The same 
logic was followed by PD leader Sali Berisha, whose list does not include the former 
foreign minister Besnik Mustafa, nor Prec Zogaj, Gezim Karapicit, Bujar Leskaj, 
Alexander Biberaj – who are all important people within PD – as well as many others 
known to be the followers and supporters of president Bamir Topi. 
  
According to one of the surveys carried out, 57% of voters will not be influenced by 
the composition of the candidate list since they will vote the parties as such, while 
43% of voters will decide on who to vote on the basis of the composition of the 
candidate list. Based on these figures it may be expected that the composition of the 
candidate lists will influence significantly the voters’ decision on who to vote on the 
election day. Regardless of all the persistence shown by Edi Rama and Sali Berisha in 
persuading their voters of the good quality of their respective candidate lists although 
they do not include people with the strongest political background, it is the elections 
that will have the final say.  
 
THE MAJORITY GOES TO THE LEFT 
 
The political vocabulary and communication used during the campaign will 
significantly affect the election results. The election favourites are the above stated 
four coalitions, of which two represent left political coalitions: the ”Socialist Alliance 
for Integration‟ run by former prime minister (1999-2002) Ilir Meta and comprising 
also the Socialist party PSV91 led by former minister of the interior Petro Koci, and 
the ”Unification for Changes‟ run by the PS leader Edi Rama. The two right political 
coalitions are ”Alliance for Changes‟ run by the incumbent prime minister Sali 
Berisha, and ”Freedom Pole‟ led by former prime minister (1992-1997) Aleksander 
Meksi. The two large coalitions –  Unification for Changes (PS) and Alliance for 
Changes (PD) –  have targeted their campaign rhetoric against each other while the 
smaller two coalitions have used the election campaign to present their programmes, 
paying attention to the interests of Albanian citizens. Despite the general trend 
according to which the voters chose among the two largest parties, the so called 
minor parties are gaining increasing support of the public because of the language 
they use in political communication with the voters, presenting concrete actions 
which lead to changes. 
  
 
4 
 
Although the electoral system favours major parties, surprise is still possible at the 
election day. Thus the left block has better chances as a whole for winning the 
election. There are two parties with a clear political profile: LSI and PSV91.    
 
Unlike other parties PSV91 has shown that it has a clear election basis and that it is 
not a “laboratory” party like some other small parties. PSV91’s socialists protect the 
historical memory of the party with which they had split (PS) while they are 
determined to preserve the created value and at the same time to be coherent with 
the future by building the profile and identity of a true left party with a clear political 
programme. During a short period of time this party has spread throughout Albania, 
which is a guarantee that PSV91 will come out as a surprise at the upcoming 
elections. Together with LSI it will not only maximise the efficiency of votes for the 
left wing but also decide on who will comprise the next parliamentary majority.  
 
Regardless of the fact that the Democratic Party will (individually) be the strongest at 
the June elections, the next parliamentary majority will be left-oriented, since PD will 
not be able to compose the government together with the “Freedom Pole” whose 
votes will not suffice to form the government with PD. Most probably the talks on the 
composition of the new government will be held by PS, LSI and PSV91, whereby the 
three parties will have to sit at the table and overcome the disagreements, which do 
not seem to be that small at the moment.               
                                                                                                                                     
Ljubljana, 9 June 2009                              International Institute for Middle-East  
                                                                         and  Balkan Studies (IFIMES) - Ljubljana 
                              
                                                                         Directors: 
                   Bakhtyar Aljaf                                                                
        Zijad Bećirović, M.Sc. 
 
 
                                                    
 
 
 


English

Socialist alliance for integration \u2013 the key to composing the new government

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Terziyski, Kiril et al.

Access to Information Litigation in Bulgaria 2005 \u2013 2008

Melyantsou, Dzianis

 
 
BISS BLITZ 
BB #07/2009EN, 30 March 2009 
 
 
 
 
Eastern Partnership: Incomplete Gestalt 
 
 
Dzianis Melyantsou 
 
 
Summary 
 
On March 20th the EU summit in Brussels adopted the final version of 
the EU’s Eastern Partnership policy (EaP), which is aimed at the EU’s 
closer integration with six post-Soviet states, including Belarus. 
Belarus is going to participate in the EaP as an equal partner, free 
from any preconditions. At the same time, Alexander Lukashenka’s 
invitation to the EaP inaugural summit in May is still in the balance. 
 
 
New Words, Old Sense 
 
Just as BISS’s earlier analyses1 predicted, the Declaration of Eastern Partnership adopted by 
the European Council has been considerably amended as compared to its previous versions, 
published at the end of 2008. 
 
What was changed most significantly is the motivation part of the paper. It had openly 
stated the EaP’s geopolitical importance and a need to strengthen the EU’s eastern 
neighbors’ security following Russia’s aggression in the Caucasus in August 2008. The EaP 
version announced in December 2008 unequivocally declared the EU’s intentions to increase 
its political influence in the six post-Soviet states to be included in the EaP and create a 
buffer zone of loyal countries on the EU’s eastern border. 
 
The EaP Declaration of March 20th, instead of the emotional rhetoric of threat from Russia, 
states the necessity to sustain stability in the post-Soviet countries and facilitate their 
economic development through closer cooperation with the EU.2 However, the geopolitical 
rhetoric may have been left out, but the project’s geopolitical motivation is still there. The 
Eastern Partnership policy essentially aims to gradually engage the post-Soviet states in the 
European integration process, bringing them consequently under the EU’s political influence. 
Thus, what Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov said about the EU’s attempts to spread its 
sphere of influence appears to be completely true. 
 
In launching its new policy for the eastern neighbors, the European Union seeks to create an 
economic integration bloc as an alternative to the one being formed by Russia on the post-
Soviet territories. The early version of the European Commission’s proposal for Eastern 
Partnership subordinated the EU’s integration with the six East European states to the EU – 
Russia relations, the latter being defined as strategically important. At present the EaP and 
the EU – Russia relations are treated as parallel projects. 
 
                                                 
1 http://belinstitute.eu/images/stories/documents/bb122008ru.pdf  
2 PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS. BRUSSELS EUROPEAN COUNCIL 19/20 MARCH 2009. – 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_data/docs/pressData/en/misc/106577.pdf  
BB #07/2009EN      
 
www.belinstitute.eu 
 
2
Unlike the earlier EaP proposals, the Declaration of March 20th focuses on values, which 
should be shared by all the member states. This has a number of reasons. The first one is 
the necessity to counterbalance the noticeable geopolitical bias of the previous EaP 
proposals, which was already causing serious discontent. The second one is that the value 
approach gives grounds to criticize and issue additional conditions for such undemocratic 
countries as Belarus or Azerbaijan. 
 
The Eastern Partnership policy itself offers equal terms to all the participants. The fact that 
Belarus has been invited to take part completely legitimizes the Belarusian leadership on the 
one hand and cancels its previous status as ‘the last dictatorship in Europe’, on the other. 
For this reason, in order to have further grounds for its attempts to democratize Belarus, the 
European Union has to apply its value requirements to all the EaP participants. Belarus has 
shown considerable understanding of these measures, the press secretary of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs pointing out the EaP’s non-discriminatory character.3 
 
 
Conditionality Again 
 
Participation in all the projects and activities of the Eastern Partnership is not a single event, 
as the progress and degree of integration will be determined by the member states’ 
willingness and efforts taken in this direction. Mutual no-visa regimes, integration into the 
common market and association agreements for each of the six countries will depend on 
their adopting European legal standards and meeting economic requirements, etc. 
 
In other words, the European Union is going to keep to its classical conditionality approach. 
There is, however, a difference: unlike the Central European and Baltic states, the East 
European six are not offered a prospect of EU membership. On the contrary, the EaP should 
be viewed as something given instead of EU membership, providing at the same time a 
profound inclusion into the European integration process. 
 
Whereas some of the six states may consider the EaP advantages too modest, from the 
Belarusian perspective they are more than might have been expected. So the conditionality 
approach towards the official Minsk may become an efficient tool for a controlled political 
and economic rapprochement with the EU. 
 
Belarus’ inclusion into the EaP as an equal partner can be viewed as making overtures to the 
Belarusian government, as it has not taken any considerable steps to liberalize the country’s 
political system during the six-month suspension of the visa ban. Yet, the EU should be 
given credit for its political foresight, as European policy-makers have chosen to apply an 
engagement policy to Belarus, which at present appears to be virtually the only option to 
democratize Belarus and bring it into the European line of development in the long run. 
Unlike Russia with its pushing post-Soviet countries into debt through loans, the EU stakes 
on ‘mild’ engagement of its neighbors in attractive integration processes. In any case, this 
imposes certain obligations on the participants, thus facilitating their gradual transformation 
as envisioned by the EU. So in the long run, the EU’s ‘mild force’ will prove much more 
effective than Moscow’s aggressive techniques. 
 
 
To Recognize or Not to Recognize 
 
The Eastern Partnership will be officially launched at its inaugural summit, which is to be 
held on May 7th in Prague or Brussels (there is no final decision about its venue yet). As for 
Belarus, whether Alexander Lukashenka is going to be invited to the summit is still in the 
balance. Although Belarus has already been included into the Eastern Partnership policy, the 
EU is persistent in making the invitation to the Belarusian President conditional on non-
recognition of the Georgian dissenting territories by the official Minsk. 
                                                 
3 http://mfa.gov.by/ru/press/news/dcd17feffd682cc7.html  
BB #07/2009EN      
 
www.belinstitute.eu 
 
3
 
If Belarus recognizes Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence, firstly, it will signal that 
Belarus remains politically dependent on Russia and its leadership lacks motivation for 
further rapprochement with the EU. Secondly, it will cause an embarrassing situation, with 
the summit taking place in the absence of one of the leaders of the East European six, be it 
either Lukashenka or Saakashvili. However, both Georgia and Belarus are equally important 
for the Eastern Partnership, as the absence of either country renders the whole EaP policy 
pointless. There is also an understanding that if Belarus is not to be represented at the EaP 
inaugural summit on a summit level, the prospect of engaging Belarus in a full-scale co-
operation within the EaP framework does not seem quite feasible, as the official Minsk 
demands all or nothing. 
 
For Minsk, the leader’s visit to Prague (or Brussels) is also of crucial importance, as it would 
symbolize the final coming to terms with ‘Europe’s last dictator’, at the same time sending a 
powerful signal to Moscow, which would strengthen Lukashenka’s position in his negotiations 
with its eastern neighbor. Besides, participation in the EaP summit would be the first official 
visit to the EU since the visa ban was suspended, a touchstone, which would in many 
aspects determine the terms and format of the Belarusian President’s official visit to the EU 
capital and major European states. 
 
So it can be predicted that in all likelihood, the official Minsk is not going to recognize 
Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s sovereignty at least until May 7th, in spite of the Kremlin’s 
constant pressure, and the EU will invite the Belarusian President to the inaugural summit. 
 
Even if Belarus recognizes Georgia’s dissenting regions, which is exactly what the Kremlin is 
coercing it into, and Lukashenka misses the EaP inaugural summit, it will not be a fatal blow 
to the EU–Belarus dialog or the country’s participation in the EaP in general. Belarus may 
refuse to attend the EaP’s political forums to be held regularly on the level of heads of 
governments and ministries, but it has a profound interest in a number of projects and co-
operation spheres, for example, access to the EU market, so it may participate on a 
technical level. Such a scenario would still leave room for conditionality and facilitate 
Belarus’ engagement into European cooperation. Although it would limit Belarus’ 
opportunities for multilateral cooperation within the EaP framework due to its stance on 
Georgia, the bilateral EU–Belarus mechanism would still be working.  
 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Firstly, the EU has included Belarus unconditionally into its regional integration project, 
which should offer an alternative to the CIS and the Common Economic Space project. This 
is a powerful claim to reshape spheres of influence in Eastern Europe to the advantage of 
the growing EU, which cannot but provoke a negative reaction from the Kremlin. For the 
official Minsk, this means a multiple expansion of its room for maneuver and increasing its 
geopolitical weight. 
 
Secondly, the EU has included values and conditionality into the EaP project, which 
strengthens its leverage on the East European six and political transformations in the post-
Soviet countries, allowing the EU to control dialog with such partners as Belarus. 
 
Thirdly, the degree of Belarus’ involvement in the EaP is still undecided, as there is still no 
decision on whether to invite President Lukashenka to the EaP inaugural summit. The issue 
of non-recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia is viewed as a litmus test of the Belarusian 
government’s pro-European intentions and its dependence on the Kremlin. 
 
Fourthly, irrespective of the Belarusian President’s participation in the EaP summit, Belarus 
has already become engaged in integration processes that will have a long-term influence on 
Minsk’s domestic and foreign politics. Political dialog with the EU will be continued in any 
BB #07/2009EN      
 
www.belinstitute.eu 
 
4
case. The EU faces the task of maintaining the dialog and persistently engaging Belarus in 
the process of European integration. 
 


Eastern partnership: unfinished gestalt

Mese\u17enikov, Grigorij

Grigorij Mesežnikov 
 
WILL UNION LOSE ITS FACE? 
(HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN UNION POLICY) 
 
(Translated from Slovak original Stratí únia svoju tvár? published in Sme daily, 
April 29). 
  
European Union must prove that human rights matter, regardless of where 
their holders live. 
  
European Union is a community of states based on respect for human rights. 
Primacy of human rights is the axiom for the internal development of the Union 
and is a guide for its operation within the system of international relations. As a 
community of democracies the Union should always and unconditionally insist on 
respect for basic human rights and oppose those for whom the concept of human 
rights is just an empty term. However, maintaining own principles is not easy 
even for the Union, as it has been confirmed by two international events. 
  
The first event was last week's UN conference on combating racism and racial 
discrimination in Geneva (the so-called "Durban II"). A similar conference, held in 
Durban in South Africa in September 2001, has become a world festival of anti-
Semitism, blame of the West and Israel of racism and colonialism and 
manifestation of hatred towards liberal democracy. 
  
“Pragmatic” Union 
From the beginning, the preparation of the Geneva conference on racism was 
accompanied by disputes about the content of the basic document. The 
preparatory committee, headed by Libya, presented a document for the 
negotiations that was almost identical with the first Durban resolution, full of anti-
Semitic, anti-Israeli and anti-Western formulations. In response, Western 
countries announced the proposed wording for unacceptable. They conditioned 
their participation at the conference only in case of the document’s change.  
 
Scramble for the content of the document gradually made Canada, Israel, 
Australia, New Zealand, USA, but also the Netherlands, Italy, Germany and 
Poland to refuse their participation in the conference. A few days before the 
conference the draft of the document was modified under the threat of boycott of 
Western countries. The most scandalous provisions were removed (although 
some others ones considered by the Union problematic remained unchanged). 
The rest of the Union, including Slovakia has decided to attend the conference. 
  
What happened in Geneva is generally known. The biggest "star" of the 
conference became the known Holocaust denier, Iranian President Ahmadinejad. 
In protest against his speech, delegations of the Union left the negotiating room. 
However, with the exception of the Czech Republic, which reported to leave the 
conference, they returned to the hall after the speech of the Iranian leader, and 
later endorsed the final document referring to the "Durban I". The Union, 
unfortunately, showed that in the international arena it applies the selective 
approach to the defense of principles on which it has been built. Although the 
Union did not lose completely its face in the "Durban II" case, its inability to take 
an intransigent attitude towards supporters of totalitarian views from the very 
beginning testified that the notorious "pragmatism" in the Union is now stronger 
than value idealism.  
 
Unjustifiable discrimination  
 
Second major event that will test the Union’s commitment to the principle of 
human rights universality will be the vote on Taiwan observer status at the 
forthcoming meeting of the World Health Organization (WHO). In accordance 
with the "One China" policy the Union does not recognize Taiwan as an 
independent state, although it develops with the country an intense economic 
cooperation. For European countries, this cooperation is extremely beneficial, 
since Taiwan is one of the world's leaders in the field of information and 
communication technologies. Taiwan is a free country with a democratic regime, 
in full respect for human rights.  
 
Communist China blocks Taiwan membership in many international 
organizations - from the UN to the WHO. The West has succeeded in resisting 
the pressure of China in case of economic groupings WTO and APEC, since 
Taiwan is such a powerful economic actor, that its possible isolation could 
severely damage the Western countries themselves. This, however, does not 
apply to the WHO, a humanitarian organization. However, in this case, the 
refusal to grant Taiwan any (including observer) status means the denial of basic  
rights in health care for 23 million people, especially for protection against mortal 
diseases.  
 
Due to power-political factors, the population of Taiwan is inadequately protected 
against the risk of pandemics. This is an unjustifiable discrimination.  
 
At the forthcoming meeting of the WHO the Union will get a chance to prove that 
human rights are inalienable, regardless where their holders live. Let’s leave 
aside the consideration that for the Union, a community of democratic states, 
Taiwan is the most natural partners for full scale cooperation. What matter now 
are especially human rights. Will the Union show that it takes the credo of the 
primacy of human rights seriously? 
 
 


Will Union lose its face?

Mykhailychenko, Kostyantyn

Political stream \u2013 between a letter to the IMF and cabinet reshuffles

Sargsian, Manvel

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CAUCASUS 2008  
International Conference 
 
Yerevan, Armenia 
 
28-29 April 2009 
 
The U.S. and the Caucasus in 2008 
 
Richard Giragosian 
Director 
Armenian Center for National and  
International Studies (ACNIS) 
 
 
 
ԱՄՆ և Կովկաս 2008թ. 
Ռիչարդ Գիրագոսյան 
Ռազմավարական և ազգային հետազոտությունների  
հայկական կենտրոնի տնօրեն 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard Giragosian  1 
 Richard Giragosian  2 
 
The U.S. and the Caucasus in 2008 
 
Richard Giragosian 
Director 
Armenian Center for National and  
International Studies (ACNIS) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In terms of the US and the Caucasus in 2008, there were three important milestones:  
 
(1) the August war in Georgia, which not only resulted in the Russian recognition of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and dealt a fatal blow to Georgian aspirations for 
NATO membership, but which also virtually remade the “geopolitical map” of the 
South Caucasus region; 
 
(2) the September visit to Armenia of Turkish President Abdullah Gul, representing 
a first-ever, historic visit of a Turkish head of sate to Armenia and marking the be-
ginning of the public aspect of Armenian-Turkish “football diplomacy,” seeking to 
“normalize relations between the two countries; 
 
(3) the November election of US President Barack Obama, a significant turning 
point in US politics and foreign policy and promising a “course correction” after the 
eight-year leadership of the Bush Administration. 
 
But it also necessary to include developments in 2009 as well, in order to both properly 
assess the US and the Caucasus and to project shifts in US policy into 2010.  Most impor-
tantly for the US and the Caucasus, there is a new promise of opportunity from the new 
Obama Administration, offering a fresh sense of change and more responsible, multilateral 
global leadership, encompassing an adjustment to US policy regarding Russia, a pursuit of 
a dialogue with Iran and a renewed engagement of Turkey.   
 
The Absence of a New US Policy for the South Caucasus 
 
At the same time, however, there is a serious divide between the promise and potential of 
a new US policy and the reality of the current regional situation.  More specifically, there is 
not yet a new US policy for the South Caucasus, with the region generally viewed as a 
secondary consideration and distant priority.   
 
This lack of any implementation or even broader reformulation of US policy toward the 
Caucasus stems from three key reasons.  First, the US remains distracted and consumed 
by “other priorities,” mainly rooted in dealing with the domestic economic downturn in the 
United States and the aftermath of the global financial crisis.  Second, there is a serious 
delay in putting new Democratic officials in place, with key positions within the US De-
partment of State, National Security Council and Pentagon that normally deal with the re-
gion on a daily basis un-appointed or un-confirmed.   
 
 Richard Giragosian  3 
 
And third, the US continues to be distracted from the region by other concerns, including 
an attempt to “reset” or redefine US-Russian relations, an effort to manage its two main 
foreign policy priorities of stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan, and a response to new devel-
opments in other areas, such as Moldova, Ukraine, and Central Asia. 
 
Three Dynamic Trends 
 
In light of the absence of any modification to US policy toward the South Caucasus, allow 
me to assess three dynamic trends now underway throughout the region, each of which is 
now influencing the interests and activities of the United States, at times as both a pro-
active and reactive player in the region.  For US interests, these three trends pose an often 
contradictory impact, whereby US engagement in the South Caucasus is largely defined 
by a regional approach that is viewed as a piece of the larger “geopolitical puzzle,” but, at 
the same time, is simultaneously pursued on a country-specific basis, with the three coun-
tries of the region each posing a different set of objectives and challenges for US interests.   
 
From a broader view, however, it would also be fair to add that the US approach to the 
South Caucasus region is also driven by a decision to no longer “unnecessarily provoke” 
Russia or to disregard Russian interests and influence.  These three dynamic regional 
trends include: 
 
Trend One: Armenian-Turkish Engagement 
 
The most significant regional trend impacting US policy is the process of Armenian-Turkish 
engagement, in terms of “football diplomacy” and a delicate diplomatic effort to “normalize” 
relations between Armenia and Turkey that would encompass the establishment of normal 
diplomatic relations, Turkey’s opening of its long-closed border with Armenia and the for-
mation of a special “inter-governmental commission,” empowered to resolved a wide range 
of outstanding bilateral issues.  
  
For the US, there has a been a renewed effort of engagement in this process, reflecting a 
degree of “catch-up,” in the wake of an initial Russian diplomatic victory in encouraging 
and even facilitating the Turkish-Armenian initiative.  Moreover, this policy of “catch-up” 
has also been driven by US unease and concern over Turkey new “Stability Platform” for 
the region, as Turkish leaders neither informed nor consulted US officials in advance.   
 
Second, the US has also exerted efforts more covertly, adopting a more active role in the 
“secret” diplomatic meetings between Turkish and Armenian officials in Switzerland, and 
culminating in US assistance, and pressure, in forging a trilateral declaration issued on 
22/23 April 2009 by the Armenian, Turkish and Swiss Foreign Ministries hailing the diplo-
matic process and pointing to the preliminary agreement over a new “roadmap” for normal-
izing relations between Armenia and Turkey.   
 
The trilateral statement declared that “Turkey and Armenia, together with Switzerland as 
mediator, have been working intensively with a view to normalizing their bilateral relations 
and developing them in a spirit of good-neighborliness, and mutual respect, and thus to 
promoting peace, security and stability in the whole region.”  The statement went on to 
note that “the two parties have achieved tangible progress and mutual understanding in 
this process and they have agreed on a comprehensive framework for the normalization of 
their bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner. In this context, a road-map has 
been identified.”   
 
 Richard Giragosian  4 
 
Concluding by stating that “this agreed basis provides a positive prospect for the on-going 
process,” the joint statement represents one of the most serious strategic blunders by the 
Armenian government to date.  Although this brief 95-word statement may accurately re-
flect an opportunity for a genuinely historic breakthrough in relations between Armenia and 
Turkey, the message of its text and the timing of its release raised important concerns.   
 
The declaration, issued only days before the traditional Armenian Genocide commemora-
tion of 24 April, led to the perception that Armenia seemingly endorsed Turkish attempts to 
pressure US President Barack Obama from fulfilling his campaign promises to recognize 
the Armenian genocide in his traditional April 24th statement.  The statement was also 
largely perceived as an effort to pressure all sides to move forward with the possible nor-
malization agreement and to exert leverage to maintaining the momentum of the process.   
 
This US leverage was also designed to exploit the “asymmetry of power” between not only 
Turkey and Armenia, but also between Armenia and the West in general.  In addition, 
there also seems to be an effort by the United States to exert pressure on the parties to 
achieve or at least demonstrate some degree of parallel progress over the Nagorno Kara-
bagh conflict, as the sole “frozen conflict” in the region.  This effort to add the Karabagh 
issue to an already complicated process, however, may only inject an insurmountable and 
unnecessary obstacle into the Armenian-Turkish process. 
  
Trend Two: Broader Geo-Strategic Interests 
 
Clearly, the US is now driven by a set of broader geo-strategic interests tied to its two main 
policy priorities: stabilizing and securing both Iraq and Afghanistan.  Based on these 
needs, US policy has elevated several new concerns for each theater.  For Iraq, the need 
to re-engage Turkey and rebuild US-Turkish military-security relations, while reassuring 
Ankara over the emergence of a Kurdish “proto-state” in northern Iraq, is a priority for both 
Turkish support in Iraqi stability and in order to assist US plans for an eventual military 
withdrawal from Iraq.  In addition, the Obama Administration’s outreach to Iran can also be 
seen as an integral factor in solving the security and stability dilemma of Iraq.  
 
For Afghanistan, the US faces a different set of challenges, defined more by military bas-
ing and logistical requirements, ranging from the need for airspace and territorial access 
through Central Asia and the Caspian “air corridor,” each of which necessitates bilateral 
agreements with several individual Central States, such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan, etc., as well as active cooperation and consent from Azerbaijan.   
 
In this way, Russian cooperation is also essential in terms of facilitating US operational re-
quirements for the Afghan theater.  And in the wake of problems with Kyrgyzstan over the 
use of the Manas airbase, Azerbaijan has acquired an even greater degree of strategic 
significance for US military planning, which has thereby only enhanced Azerbaijan’s stand-
ing in US policy toward the South Caucasus.  
    
Trend Three: Engaging Iran 
 
The third dynamic trend driving US policy in the South Caucasus relates to the Obama 
Administration’s effort to engage Iran and craft a new approach stressing a dialogue with 
Iran, to not only resolve outstanding issues, such as the main obstacle of Iran’s burgeon-
ing nuclear program, but to also forge a common approach to regional security, based on 
shared interests. 
 
 Richard Giragosian  5 
 
Although the US effort seems to reflect a concerted policy decision to engage Iran by 
stressing common interests, the process has yet to fully start, suggesting some delay until 
after Iran’s presidential elections set for June 2009.  Most practically, the effort may also 
be bolstered by the capacity for the US to exploit two key factors: Iran’s exclusion from 
Turkey’s “Stability Platform” agenda for the region, and Iran’s profound sense of mistrust 
and frustration with Russia. 
 
The Outlook for 2009-1010 & Shortcomings of US Policy 
 
As each of these three trends exert some form of influence on US policy, the outlook for 
the US in the South Caucasus will remain defined by the outcomes of each trend.  But at 
the same time, there are five rather serious shortcomings to US policy toward the region: 
 
1. too little follow-through to US policy, as American interests seem to lack sufficient 
institutionalization, compounded by the slow pace of appointments and confirmations of 
key decision-making officials.  Most notably, even the April 209 visits to Turkey by both 
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and President Obama need to be followed up by more 
concrete and specific policies, ranging from the issue of Kurdish separatism and terrorism 
within Turkey proper (demonstrated by the threat from the PKK), to the pressing challenge 
of allaying Turkey’s valid concerns over the situation in Iraq;     
 
2.  far too little focus on domestic political deficiencies and shortcomings within the 
three states of the region, exacerbating a perception of double standards on democracy 
for the sake of short-term energy or security objectives; 
 
3.  no clear consensus of decision of what to do with Georgia in the wake of the Au-
gust war, either in terms of Georgia’s NATO aspirations or its increasingly fragile domestic 
political situation.  Moreover, now that Georgia is no longer the “center of gravity” for the 
West, the US needs to either craft a new mechanism to deal with its interests over Georgia 
or to find a new “center of gravity” in the region, which does not unnecessarily provoke or 
threaten Russia’s positions and interests in the region;    
 
4.  too early to predict but almost too late to implement a real policy shift toward the 
region, fostering frustration in the region amid already high expectations for a sudden and 
complete course correction of US policy after general disdain and disappointment with the 
eight-year Bush record.  In this way, many are now looking to the European Union and its 
new “Eastern Partnership” for offering a fresh promise of change and opportunity; 
 
5.  an outdated regional energy strategy based more on old realities and reflecting 
less of current conditions and needs, only enhancing the lack of consensus on regional 
energy security and posing new challenges to ongoing efforts, such as the Nabucco gas 
pipeline project.   
 
 
 


The US and the Caucasus in 2008

Stepanov, Sergey

Shareholder Protection and Outside Blockholders: Substitutes or Complements?