Policy Documentation Center

\u218aran, Vladislav

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Policy 
Documentation 
Center Feature Article
How to support Moldovan diaspora in Italy? Tate’s foreign 
policy
Saran Vladislav1
Activity of diplomatic missions of the Republic of Moldova is inevitable in the process of coordinating migration 
flows and maintaining links with Moldovan diaspora. Moldova Embassy and Consulate represent an essential 
bridge to homeland. In general, embassy serves Moldovan citizens legally residing in those countries, whereas 
Consulate in parallel meets the consular needs and can also get in touch with those who are staying illegally 
in that particular. Community of Moldovans in Italy is one of the few that relatively managed to consolidate in 
a whole, so we can talk about a Moldovan diaspora. The difficulties faced by our citizens in the peninsula lies 
in the lack of information about their status of immigrant, incognizance of their rights and authorities where 
they can address to improve their situation.
Wishes of Moldovan diaspora towards diplomatic mission
According to the Law of diplomatic service of the Republic of Moldova, Nr.761-XV of 27.12.2001, article 3,1 
item d, provides that diplomatic mission has as objective ,,protection of rights and interests of the Republic 
of Moldova, its citizens (physical and corporate persons) according to international practice and within limits 
admitted by rules and principles of international law”. Starting from this point, the diplomatic corps must be 
directly interested in activities and problems of citizens established in the country of residence of the Embassy. 
The objective named above is mostly applied by providing services related to legalization of documents, 
issuance of transit visa, or travel conditions in Schengen area. RM citizens are less interested in obtaining 
information from the embassy on staying regime, work conditions and preparation of documents they need.
Even though by definition diplomatic missions must deal with issues of its fellow citizens, there are several 
problems and our citizens living abroad are more dissatisfied than satisfied with their performance. ISTAT data 
show that Republic of Moldova had in 2005 a community of 37.971 citizens in Italy, and in 2010 their number 
increased to approximately 109.000 Moldovans, which represents an increase of 187, %. According to official 
data of Italian Government, confirmed by current RM ambassador in Italy, Gheorghe Rusnac, on the territory 
of Italy in 2010 there were legally 132.000 Moldovan citizens. The real figure of all Moldovans in Italy is difficult 
to quantify because a good part of them are illegally established there and cannot be monitored. According 
to ambassador Rusnac, total number of Moldovan citizens would reach 200.000, which is the second largest 
country of Moldovan diaspora2.
According to a study on links between Republic of Moldova and Moldovan communities abroad, conducted 
by Dr. R. Schwartz for the International Organization of Migration Moldova, lack of information on Moldova 
and Italy is the most serious problem of Moldovan immigrants. This is explained by the fact that access to 
information can have an important role in solving their issues. Within this study, an immigrant that lives in 
Bologna considers that “Moldovan government has serious issues when dealing with Moldovans outside Rome 
and even if it attempts to have representatives in outlying areas, the volume of services they should offer 
requires a number of employees to cope with the large number of solicitations on behalf of diaspora”. The 
same immigrant from Bologna complained that “embassy does not represent them at all.”
1. The author is the winner of IDIS contest for young professionals of writing a Policy Brief on a foreign policy issue.
2. Rusnac Gh., Issues of Moldovan citizens in Italy//Republic of Moldova: migration challenges, Chisinau 2010 , p. 118
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Embassy always faces difficult problems and in the best case this is an opportunity to obtain documents, but 
certainly does not represent the Moldovans”3.
Serious problems that Moldova is facing are weakening the connection between Moldovan diaspora in Italy and 
Republic of Moldova. Schwartz also says that „even if a durable connection of migrants in Italy with Moldova 
has remained and will continue to exist through direct links with family and close relatives, general interest 
towards events in Moldova is decreasing and the opportunity to return home and invest in national economy 
is unlikely”. Such immigrants are disappointed with the situation in their home country and integrate with 
relative ease in the country of residence. Therefore, we would like to note that Moldovan immigrants prefer to 
accept protection of the state of residence which offers them a greater care that Moldovan authorities which 
have proven to be incapable of creating necessary conditions for work and living, and the diplomatic mission 
is not able to give them the support our fellow citizens really need. In light of this situation, returning home of 
Moldovans to reintegrate into society and employment is unlikely, at least in the near future.
Like other migrants’ communities, Moldovan diaspora in Italy is evolving and it’s self-organizing to overcome 
the problems they encounter. Thus, the most common forms of organization of Moldovans in Italy are 
associations that reach an approximate number of 45, and all of them are since 2010 under the umbrella of a 
federation. Moreover, Moldovan diaspora has its own paper in Italy: Gazeta Basarabiei (Bessarabia Gazette), 
which increases the level of cohesion of Moldovan migrants. Finally, such a large number of Moldovan migrants 
need an interlocutor and in this context one calls for more attention from authorities by creating a mechanism 
able to ensure permanent contact between the parties, but more importantly, to ensure solving the problems 
encountered by diaspora.
Actions of diplomatic mission in support of Moldovan immigrants and Government from Chis-
inau
Diplomatic mission cannot entirely resolve the difficulties of Moldovan citizens abroad without proper support 
of competent authorities from Moldova. Thus, a form of communication between diaspora and Government 
from Chisinau that is expected to be effective, are the Congresses of Moldovan diaspora. The Bureau of 
Interethnic Relations from the Republic of Moldova was the main organizer of four Congresses, which were 
held in 2004, 2006, 2008, the last being held in October 2010. Fourth edition of the Congress was honored by 
the presence of about 110 delegates from 31 countries, including: Italy, France, Germany, Portugal, Greece, 
Great Britain, Ireland, USA, Canada, CIS countries. Its purpose is to strengthen the partnership between the 
Government of Moldova and Moldovan migrants from abroad4.
It is necessary to organize these meetings, while they establish a bridge between the government and Moldovan 
diaspora. Normally, at these congresses, state authorities have to come up with a list of priorities and solutions 
that would improve the situation of our fellow citizens in countries of adoption. A sustainable state policy 
promoted in relation to Moldovans from abroad is necessary to strengthen the diaspora in the countries where 
they have immigrated. A strong diaspora, with a high level of national identification, may act as an important 
attorney for the country of origin in solving an important number of problems. For example, the European 
cause of the Republic of Moldova could be supported also by the diaspora in EU countries.
Unfortunately, Chisinau has not developed, for various reasons, a sustainable policy towards its citizens from 
abroad and the Bureau of Interethnic Relations does not fulfill its attributions of diaspora „coordinator”. Usually, 
diaspora represents an interest for authorities in the period of electoral campaigns. Here we can mention 
the fact that both during parliamentary elections of 19 July 2009 and those of November 2010 the state 
opened about 80 voting sections abroad. At the last parliamentary elections, participation of Moldovan citizens 
from abroad was so high that there were not enough ballots at some voting sections. In Italy participation 
3. Schwartz R., Analysis of connection between Moldovan communities abroad (CMH) and Moldova// IOM for Moldova, 2007, p. 14. 
http://www.iom.md/materials/9_diaspora_and_ocv_final_report_rom.pdf
4. Generlization of activities of IVth Congress of Moldovan diaspora,  http://www.diaspora.md/?pag=news&opa=view&id=164&tip
=congre se&start=&l=
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was very high, at the parliamentary elections in 2009 participated 17,544 (48.16% of those included in the 
lists)5, and at the parliamentary elections in November 2010 participated 64,201 (89.99 of those included 
in the lists). Moreover, remittances constitute almost ¼ of the GDP, which is an important support for the 
Republic of Moldova. In this context, one requires several conclusions. First of all one calls for greater attention 
on diaspora because it massively participates in Moldovan economy and in electoral and decision making 
processes, showing interest in influencing decisions in the country of origin. Thus, it is required to create a new 
division of a special Agency, either within MAEIE or in another government institution to strengthen contacts 
with diaspora and to streamline connection between homeland and diaspora.
Obviously, we cannot deny the importance of high-level meetings between Moldovan and Italian officials. The 
meeting of prime-minister Vlad Filat with his Italian counterpart Silvio Berlusconi, in Italy on 17-18 November 
2010, focused on discussing economic, social and political issues of the two states. They have also discussed 
about Moldovan citizens working in Italy, investment opportunities offered by Moldova, steps taken by Moldova 
towards European integration. Meetings between Moldovan officials and RM citizens from abroad are a good 
exercise that needs to be continued.
Relevance of the meeting Filat-Berlusconi has stimulated continuation of Moldovan-Italian dialog and 
culminated in signing on 5 July 2011 of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Moldova 
and Government of Republic of Italy on labor migration and its Implementation Protocol, by ministers of 
both countries: Ms. Valentina Buliga (RM) and Mr. Maurizio Sacconi (RI). Both Ministers have mentioned that 
this Agreement will only have a positive impact of the two states due to the fact that it regulates from legal 
point of view the staying in purposes of labor of Moldovan citizens in Italy. Expectations as a result of signing 
this agreement are high and provisions stipulated in it are promising. The agreement promises favoring of 
Moldovan citizens by offering a special entry quota in Italy, implementation of common initiatives designed 
for Moldovan citizens, and maybe the most important, art. 12 whereby citizens of a Contracting Party shall 
benefit of the same rights and protection as national workers of the employing country, abiding legislation of 
employing country on social security. Therefore, we hope that after ratification of the Agreement, Moldovan 
citizens will not encounter so many deficiencies in daily life and will have better working conditions.
Conclusions
Activity of Moldovan diplomatic mission in Italy manages, with large reserves, to bring positive results based 
on personnel capacity working within the Embassy and Consulate and with the support of Government in 
Chisinau. Frustrations felt by Moldovan diaspora towards authorities that should look after them are fully 
grounded, because at least a part of the immigrants ascertains the importance of money transfers to homeland 
for the economy of the Republic of Moldova, as well as the vote of confidence offered to actual government 
at the last parliamentary elections. In light of the last actions undertaken both by the Embassy and Filat 
Government, we maintain our confidence that interest in the fate of Moldovan citizens in peninsula is not just 
formal or declarative and that there will follow new beneficial activities, as it is normal, for the benefit of our 
citizens. In this regard, signing of the Agreement on social protection between Moldova and Italy is a priority, 
because its implementation will produce a greater support from Moldovan immigrants for the Government in 
Chisinau and diplomatic mission in Italy. Equally important is creating a division or agency designed exclusively 
to work with Moldovan diaspora that would harmonize the interaction with diaspora and would place the 
connections between RM and its citizens from abroad in a well-defined and efficient institutional framework.
5. Boțan I./Gurin C./Prohnițchi E., Voting abroad: International Practices and Recommendations for the Republic of Moldova”, 
ADEPT, Chisinau, June 2010
This publication was produced by IDIS “Viitorul” with the financial support 
of Soros Foundation Moldova and the National Endowment for Democracy. 
The opinions expressed in this publication reflect the author’s/authors’ 
position and don’t necessary represent the views of the donors.


How to support Moldovan diaspora in Italy? Tate\u2019s foreign policy

Golubeva, Maria

 
 
 
   1 
 
                                           
September 2011 
 
Time for Improvement: Obstacles to Political Participation of Immigrants 
in Estonia, Latvia and Poland  
 
Maria Golubeva, Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The European Union’s commitment to ensuring political rights for all EU residents is reflected in the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights1 and in The Common Basic Principles for immigrant integration 
policy in the EU2. The Common Basic Principles include the principle of political participation:  
 
The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of 
integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration. 
 
A study conducted by three think-tanks based in Estonia, Latvia and Poland3 concludes that in these 
                                               
1 Articles 11 and 12, regarding Freedom of expression, Freedom of assembly and association. 
2 Council conclusions, 2004. Page 19-24  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/82745.pdf  
3 M. Golubeva (2011). Political Participation of Third Country Nationals in Estonia, Latvia and Poland. 
http://www.providus.lv/upload_file/Publikacijas/2011/Political%20Participation%20of%20Third%20Country%20Nation
als%20in%20Estonia,%20Latvia%20and%20Poland_new.pdf last accessed on 01.08.2011. The study included analysis of 
the data regarding Political Participation from Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) III by Migration Policy Group 
(2011), interviews with immigrant organisations’ representatives, civil servants responsible for the programmes of the 
European Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals and government coalition politicians in the three 
countries. The study also included an in-depth assessment of the multi-annual and annual programmes of the European 
Fund in Estonia, Latvia and Poland. 
 
This policy brief is based on a study of legal frameworks and government policies related to political 
participation of third country nationals (TCN) in three EU countries - Estonia, Latvia and Poland. The 
study was conducted by three think tanks - Institute of Baltic Studies in Estonia, Centre for Public Policy 
PROVIDUS in Latvia and Institute of Public Affairs in Poland. 
 
This publication forms part of the project, Political participation of third country nationals on national 
and local level in selected EU countries, supported by PASOS (Policy Association for an Open Society) 
through an initial grant by the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI) of Open 
Society Foundations. 
 
 
 
   2 
three EU countries, political liberties of immigrants (non-citizens and third-country nationals) are 
limited, and only Estonia has voting rights in local elections for permanent residents. Also there are 
no adequate consultative bodies involving immigrant organisations and communities. Politicians 
from ruling coalition parties tend to regard political participation of immigrants as unimportant or 
potentially suspect, and are not open towards improving the involvement of permanent residents 
and non-citizens in decision-making processes even at the local level.  
 
The percentage of non-citizens and third country nationals among the population is especially high 
in Estonia and Latvia: in Estonia, approximately 16% of the population are either stateless (non-
citizens) or have the citizenship of a non-EU country, in most cases Russia. Latvia has 14.5% non-
citizens and about 2% of the population are third country nationals. In Poland, only about 0.1% of 
the population in 2009 were third country nationals. 
 
Obstacles to political participation of immigrants in Latvia, Estonia and Poland 
 
The opening of local elections to permanent residents of foreign nationality is 
one of the central ways of strengthening democracy recommended by the 
Council of Europe.4 Latvia and Poland so far have not granted voting rights in 
local elections to third country nationals - unlike Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia that allow permanent residents to vote in local elections 
(in Lithuania, permanent residents can also stand for election in local councils). 
None of the three countries has signed the European Convention on the 
participation of foreigners in public life at the local level. 
 
Political liberties of immigrants are limited in all three countries. In Estonia, third 
country nationals do not have the right to be members of political parties and to 
form them. In Latvia, persons with the legal status of Latvia’s non-citizens 
(Latvian non-citizen passport holders) are allowed to be members of political 
parties, but this right is denied to third country nationals. Only Latvian citizens, 
Latvian non-citizens and permanent residents are allowed to organise and lead 
public meetings, marches and protests. In Poland, third country nationals are 
not allowed to be members of political parties or to form political associations. 
 
So far neither Estonia, nor Latvia, nor Poland has created effective government-
level consultative bodies to ensure transparent and objective consultation 
processes in which immigrants and their associations can fully participate in the 
dialogue about policies that affect them.  
 
Consultative bodies in countries that follow best practice in this respect are permanent structures, 
sometimes composed exclusively of residents of foreign nationality, their members elected through 
                                               
4 State of democracy in Europe. Measures to improve the democratic participation of migrants. Report. Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, 2008. 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc08/EDOC11625.htm last accessed on 
17.05.2011. 
Lack of voting 
rights in local 
elections for 
permanent 
residents in 
Latvia and 
Poland 
Lack of 
effective 
consultative 
bodies 
Limited 
political 
liberties 
 
 
 
   3 
municipalities or through councils of NGOs and umbrella organizations representing immigrant 
communities. Where they include representatives of government ministries, consultative bodies 
are seen as a way to ensure the mainstreaming of immigrant integration issues through various 
policy areas, sometimes through inter-ministerial committees.5 
 
None of these criteria – stakeholder representation or broad constituency among immigrants and 
minorities, inter-ministerial coordination and mainstreaming of immigrant policies - have been met 
by any of the consultative bodies that have existed in the past in Estonia, Latvia and Poland. 
 
The absence of strong and accountable umbrella organisations representing 
immigrants as a constituency, with internal democracy and legitimacy to 
represent the voice of the immigrant community in policy dialogue, is a 
significant obstacle to meaningful political participation of immigrants in all 
three countries. 
 
Politicians in all three countries continue linking all forms of political 
participation to nationality and persist in seeing naturalisation as the one true 
venue for access to political participation. At the same time, the politicians’ 
argument that access to political participation is open through access to 
nationality is made weaker by the relatively low scores of Estonia and Latvia in 
the area of Access to Nationality according to MIPEX III. Some important steps – 
such as limiting administrative discretion regarding who should and who should 
not be entitled to nationality – still need to be taken in order to make citizenship 
truly accessible to immigrants.  
 
While expressing support for civil society engagement of immigrants in principle, politicians are not 
aware that some civil liberties necessary for such engagement - such as the right to call a protest 
meeting (not allowed to temporary residents in Latvia) or to form a political association - are 
lacking for third country nationals. Moreover, in some cases in Estonia and Latvia prominent 
members of governing parties believe that it is wrong for immigrants to form associations 
representing their own specific interests. 
 
European Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals 
 
The European Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals (EIF) is the 
main source of public funding for the integration of immigrants in all three 
countries. The multi-annual and annual programmes of EIF in Estonia, Latvia and 
Poland in 2007-2010 have not explicitly supported the enhancement of civic and 
political participation of immigrants (especially of the kind addressing policy and 
decision making processes). Very few projects supported by EIF have in fact 
promoted political participation of immigrants in Estonia, Latvia and Poland. 
                                               
5 T. Huddleston (2010). Consulting immigrants to improve national policies. European Economic and Social Committee. 
 
Obstacles: civil 
society 
Lack of 
commitment to 
participation 
Obstacles: 
politicians’ 
reluctance to 
support 
immigrants’ 
political 
participation 
 
 
 
   4 
When they did, the forms of participation supported were dialogue platforms 
and dissemination of information about local authorities and public services 
available from them. Sometimes the projects supported by the Fund raised the 
administrative capacity of immigrants’ organisations and organisations seeing 
immigrants as their constituency.  
 
Support for the establishment of platforms such as the National Platform for 
Cooperation for Integration (Poland) and “Round Table of Nationalities” 
(Estonia), enabling immigrants, including third country nationals, to take part in 
policy dialogue with government and other civil society organizations, has been 
the most tangible contribution of EIF towards improving political participation of 
third-country nationals in the countries in question. The establishment of such 
platforms is a step in the direction of political participation. In this regard, Latvia 
currently lags behind Estonia and Poland, with no such platform for policy 
dialogue established. 
 
It is important to remember, however, that civil society initiatives such as “Round Table of 
Nationalities” cannot substitute for a permanent and legitimate consultation mechanism in which 
immigrant civil society would appoint its own elected representatives to enhance the policy 
dialogue with government and local authorities.  
 
Policy recommendations 
 
Removing unjustified limits to basic political liberties 
Estonia, Latvia and Poland should follow the example of Hungary and allow third country nationals 
to be members of and to form political associations. Latvia should also remove the legal barriers to 
foreigners (including persons with temporary residence permits) to be the organizers, leaders, 
leader assistants and guardians of meetings, marches and protests. 
 
Right to vote and stand in local elections 
As long as elections remain the central form of participation in representative democracy, the 
absence or presence of the right to vote and stand in elections remains the litmus test of a 
country’s commitment to ensure political participation of various groups of residents. Latvia and 
Poland should follow the majority of EU countries in granting permanent residents of any 
nationality the right to vote in local elections. Given the importance of participation of foreigners in 
public life at the local level, it also makes sense for all three countries to follow the example of 
Lithuania in allowing third country nationals and non-citizens to stand as candidates in local 
elections. 
 
Creating adequate consultative bodies  
Estonia, Latvia and Poland should create effective government-level consultative bodies to ensure 
transparent and objective consultation processes in which immigrants and their associations can 
fully participate in the dialogue about policies that affect them. The representatives of immigrant 
Support for 
dialogue 
platforms 
 
 
 
   5 
population in these bodies should be elected through councils of NGOs and umbrella organizations 
representing immigrant communities or through municipalities.  
 
Support for political participation of immigrants through the programmes of EIF 
Because the European Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals in Estonia, Latvia and 
Poland is the main and sometimes the only source of public funding for the integration of 
immigrants in these countries, the next programmes of EIF should include as one of their main 
goals direct support for measures for the enhancement of civic and political participation of 
immigrants (especially of the kind addressing policy and decision making processes). The 
programmes should assist governments in forming effective and transparent permanent 
consultative bodies. In order to arrive at that level of stakeholder representation and to establish 
permanent and transparent policy consultation mechanisms, EIF would have to give more targeted 
support to immigrant civil society, thus helping to raise the policy capacity of organisations 
representing the interests of immigrants. This support should enable immigrant civil society to form 
strong and accountable umbrella organisations representing immigrants as a constituency, with 
internal democracy and legitimacy to represent the voice of the immigrant community in policy 
dialogue. The European Commission can help this process by recommending member states that 
the future programmes of EIF accord greater role to projects promoting political participation of 
third-country nationals and ensure methodological support to immigrant NGOs to form policy-
oriented coalitions. 
 


English

Time for Improvement: Obstacles to Political Participation of Immigrants in Estonia, Latvia and Poland

Paving the Road towards Visa-free Travel between the Eastern Partnership countries and the EU; a Case of Azerbaijan

Bo\u21ban, Igor

Prohni\u21bchi, Valeriu

Prohni\u21bchi, Elena

Oprunenco, Alex

Popa, Ana

Culiuc, Elena

Euromonitor, no.19

Problems and Tendencies in Active Disclosure of Information (2011)

Ditrych, Ondrej

Hynek, Nikola

Ondřej Ditrych and Nik Hynek
Future Perspectives of
U.S.-Czech Relations
RECOMMENDATIONS
In the area of security, the Czech Republic and the U.S. should build clos-
er cooperation around President Obama’s Prague Agenda, NATO Ballistic
Missile Defence project and in the field of post-conflict reconstruction
while working together to mitigate obstacles to constructive NATO-EU re-
lations
In economic relations, they should enhance cooperation taking full ad-
vantage of the Strategic Dialogue framework both in terms of discussing
global and transatlantic trade issues, and in boosting bilateral commerce
Regarding values, they should cooperate more on democratic transition in
Eastern Europe, including through the framework of Eastern Partnership
in which the U.S. should become involved
Institute of International Relations., Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1 www.iir.cz
Institute of International Relations March 2011 Policy Paper
Centre for Internat ional Secur i t y
The United States and the Czech Republic are bound together by shared values, history,
and global political, security and economic interests. In the words of Ambassador Eisen
at Institute of International Relations, they are bound in a “permanent friendship”. The
Czech Republic has seen the U.S. as a liberal power and the key contributor to security
in the Euratlantic area. The United States could rely on Czech contribution towards pro-
motion of human rights and freedoms and responding to the serious threats the Tran-
satlantic community has faced in the recent past.
Following the Velvet Revolution, there has been a tendency to see the mutual relation
as one of “special relationship” on the Czech Republic’s part. The indisputable excellent
nature of the relations notwi-
thstanding, this view has clouded
a realistic perspective of the U.S.
global concerns, and particularly
in recent years it has lead to un-
reasonable expectations followed
by inevitable disenchantment.
However, the dominant view among relevant actors presently seems to be that new ve-
nues of cooperation need to be pragmatically explored. Ambassador Eisen’s call for dee-
pened cooperation is therefore likely to fall on fertile ground.
IIR’s suggestions for such deepened cooperation, organized around the three pillars of
security, economy and values he established during his speech and followed by more
specific recommendations, are following:
Security
To build closer cooperation around President Obama’s Prague
Agenda.
The historic city of Prague has hosted two major international security events in recent
years. First, the President Obama arrived to Prague in April 2009 to announce his bold
nuclear disarmament vision. Subsequently, Prague was chosen to host the summit of bi-
lateral U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control talks in April 2010 resulting in the signature of
the New START Treaty. The choice of Prague has created a unique opportunity to link
the following related issue areas: bilateral strategic arms control (especially further cuts in
U.S. and Russia’s nuclear arsenals); multilateral activities in the direction of future nuclear
disarmament (including the reinvigoration of the non-proliferation regime); and the ci-
vilian nuclear agenda (comprising both improvements in nuclear safety as well as in ci-
vilian preparedness and resilience).
Institute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1www.iir.cz
2
…the dominant view among
relevant actors presently seems
to be that new venues of
cooperation need to be
pragmatically explored.
There is a growing sense of ownership of the Prague agenda on the part of Czech di-
plomacy, attested by the forthcoming conference held at Czech MFA on April 12, 2011.
A closer cooperation in this issue area would expand the value bond between the two
countries. The Czech Republic, a small and to some extent cosmopolitan State once at
the frontline of Cold War competition, could lend a powerful moral voice to promote
the agenda.
The Czech government should strongly promote the further integration of arms-con-
trol agenda, disarmament agenda, and missile defense agenda, as this is the only possi-
bility to achieve progress on these fronts and simultaneously maintain international le-
gitimacy of the actions.
To enhance cooperation in NATO Ballistic Missile Defence
(BMD).
Ballistic missile defence in Europe has been the Czech Republic’s priority – demon-
strated, among other, in the willingness to host elements of the U.S. system – for years.
Despite the major progress achieved at the NATO Lisbon Summit, a number of issues
– Russia’s participation, effective multilateralization of the system (the limits of secu-
rity cooperation without broader European consensus being exposed by the late plan
of the “Third Site”), NATO’s nuclear posture or burden-sharing and command and
control architecture – remain un-
resolved. Similarly minded in
those areas, the United States and
the Czech Republic could benefit
from enhanced consultation and
cooperation in those areas, which
will demand effective diplomatic
action. In particular, both States have the opportunity to jointly lead the allied efforts
concerning the multilateralization of Europe’s involvement in BMD, specifically in
the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). This leadership should not be re-
stricted to hosting elements of the system but should also feature strong diplomatic
action supporting the rationale of the system and its external legitimacy (Russia, Chi-
na).
The Czech government should promote bilateral research and technological cooperati-
on which would draw on the 2008 U.S.-Czech cooperation framework agreement. In ad-
dition, Czech industrial base should be offered for co-development and co-production
of military technologies needed for EPAA. This would ultimately serve not only securi-
ty, but also political and economic interests of the Czech Republic. Finally, the Czech
Republic should facilitate the technological communication between the EU (European
Defense Agency) and the U.S.
www.iir.czInstitute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1
3
Despite the major progress
achieved at the NATO Lisbon
Summit, a number of issues
related to NATO missile defence
remain unresolved.
To further support cooperation in post-conflict reconstruction
and work together on overcoming obstacles to efficient NATO-
EU cooperation
The same is true of the strained NATO and the EU’s relations, where progress promises
to yield fruit mainly at the level of crisis management operations. The Czech Republic
has proved to be a responsible partner on which the U.S. could rely in the post-conflict
reconstruction of Afghanistan. Due to its contribution, the Czech Republic can be one
of the decisive partners to help overcome the NATO-EU current strains.
At the level of the NATO-EU strategic dialogue, both States should work together at a
two-track diplomatic action to overcome challenges to more efficient cooperation as a
consequence to the Cyprus issue while fully exploring the potential, pending the final
resolution of the conflict, for practical informal cooperation. It should also be a strong
element of the Czech Republic’s Eastern / EU integration policy to promote enhanced
involvement of the candidate countries which are members of NATO or Partnership for
Peace in CSDP activities.
As the life cycle of the PRT model as applied by NATO ISAF coalition to Afghanistan’s
territory gradually reaches its end, the Czech Republic can play a decisive role in the
transition process in Afghanistan.
In the post-2012 period, the Czech
Republic will support the U.S. acti-
vities by refocusing on training
and mentoring role as its current-
ly prepared plans to be one of the
lead nations in the new Afghanis-
tan National Police Training Cen-
ter in the Wardak Province. Thus,
it can help to facilitate the deeper
cooperation between NATO and the EU to the benefits of all allies, most importantly
the United States.
Informally, the Czech government has been considering withdrawal of the Czech PRT
from the Lógar Province after the current mandate expires in 2012. It would be a mis-
take to do so as the most productive way to further the Czech work and use the count-
ry’s experience is to form a bi-national PRT in the Lógar Province. The civilian part
would be provided by the Czech Republic and the military side by the United States
(Shank Base). Since the U.S. Government has been greatly interested in the Czech civi-
lian expertise in Afghanistan, this is seen as the most productive way for the post-2012
transition period.
Institute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1www.iir.cz
4
As the life cycle of the PRT model
as applied by NATO ISAF
coalition to Afghanistan’s
territory gradually reaches its
end, the Czech Republic can play
a decisive role in the transition
process in Afghanistan.
Economy
To enhance cooperation taking full advantage of the Strategic
Dialogue framework
In exploring the possibilities for deeper cooperation in this area, the strategic dialogue,
so far more or less limited to security issues, promises to offer a useful framework. The
United States and the Czech Republic share preference for liberalization of trade both at
the global level (Doha Round) and in the Transatlantic commerce. While currently ac-
counting for 1/3 of global trade and more than 1/2 of the world’s GDP the latter conti-
nues to be impeded by excessive
regulatory barriers. Inasmuch as
most of the pending issues are
technical rather than strategic and
therefore fall the purview of the
Commission (i.e. Transatlantic
Economic Council), the Czech Re-
public should be active in advancing its strategic priorities at the intergovernmental le-
vel, while the United States should take full advantage from having a similarly minded
partner in the Council.
In bilateral relations, there has been an interest by the Czech Republic to expand the
scope of the Strategic Dialogue to include economic agenda. Promising steps have been
taken in the field of civil nuclear energy. But the strategic dialogue proposes also a fra-
mework to boost bilateral trade relations, scathed in recent years by the decline of total
revenue both in absolute terms (due to the global stagnation) and compared to other EU
States. The Czech Republic would also welcome extended support by the United States
to the Southern Corridor where, given Azerbaijan’s duplicitious dealing with the EU,
the construction of the Nabucco
gas pipeline is all but secured. At
the same time, it has been explo-
ring other options to increase its
energy security by taking advanta-
ge of the expanding global LNG
market, and may in time, should the construction continue to be delayed, come to re-
gard the Nabucco project as less of a priority than it has done in the recent past.
For the Czech government, it is imperative that Temelin tender does not overlay in the
political debate other agenda of bilateral relations, as was once almost the case with the
BMD. Instead, the potential use this issue area to form more permanent venues of futu-
re cooperation should continue to be explored. It should be remembered that origins of
www.iir.czInstitute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1
5
Strategic dialogue, so far more
or less limited to security issues,
promises to offer a useful
framework for economic
cooperation.
It is imperative that Temelin
does not overlay in the political
debate other agenda of bilateral
relations.
both the strategic dialogue and research cooperation agreements, now fundamental
framworks for future cooperation, can be traced to the radar negotiations. This call is to
become ever more urgent with the progressive politicization, and possibly securitizati-
on, of the tender that can be expected in near future.
The U.S. government should fully support extension of the Strategic Dialogue, valued
by the Czech Republic as a framework for ever deeper relations, to economic areas. This
may entail consultations on global and Transatlantic trade issues (where the Czech Re-
public’s voice is not among the strongest, but can still be important in the Council’s ne-
gotiations), but also exploring possibilities for boosting bilateral commerce.
Values
To cooperate more on democratic transition in Eastern Europe.
The cooperation in the area of human rights and civic freedoms, both at the interna-
tional fora and on the ground, has been a backbone of the mutual relations for decades
now. Enhanced cooperation in this field is desirable in Eastern Europe. Outlined by Vi-
ce-President Biden’s Bucharest Speech, it could be facilitated by involvement of the Uni-
ted States in the EU’s Eastern Partnership. The Czech Republic has been one of the chi-
ef advocates of the initiative, which currently needs reinvigorating, given the recent pre-
ssure by some EU’s States to refocus ENP on its Southern dimension or more lasting
challenges such as Russia’s re-
sponses to the EU’s role in its near
neighbourhood and less than en-
thusiastic participation of some
Partner States in absence of clear
promise of EU’s accession. It is al-
so to the benefit of the United Sta-
tes to continue its support – and if
possible, to expand it – to unfor-
malized cooperation in develop-
ment projects aimed at promotion of good local governance and civil society in Eastern
Europe by means of co-financing projects of well-placed Czech NGOs (such as is cur-
rently done by National Endownment for Development).
The U.S. government should continue its interest in the Eastern Partnership as a mea-
ningful instrument to bring about more intensified cooperation with the EU in de-
mocratization of the Eastern Europe. The Eastern dimension of ENP, in which gover-
nance and civil society play important part alongside market reforms, is nowmore than
Institute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1www.iir.cz
6
The Eastern dimension of ENP,
in which governance and civil
society play important part
alongside market reforms, is
now more than ever in need of
political reinvigoration that the
United States can contribute to.
ever in need of political reinvigoration that the United States can contribute to. Both Po-
land and the Czech Republic are natural partners for the United States in fostering coo-
peration with the EU in this region.
Besides the continued advocacy of Eastern Partnership, where its interests coincide with
those of the United States, the Czech government should take active interest in the cur-
rently undertaken preparation of the U.S.-EU aid working programme in order to ensu-
re that the final outcome reflects its priorities. Consultations with the United States, gi-
ven shared preferences and past record of cooperation, would be desirable to facilitate
such outcome.
www.iir.czInstitute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1
7


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