Policy Documentation Center

Stratulat, Corina

Vurmo, Gjergji

The health of democracy in Albania is precarious. 
The country's electoral contests have so far failed on
each occasion since 1991 to meet high international
standards. A fierce rivalry between the two largest
Albanian parties and their leaders – the Democratic 
Party (DP) of Sali Berisha and the Socialist Party (SP)
headed by Edi Rama – has been wearing down 
hard-won democratic gains made by the country in 
the past two decades since the fall of communism, 
and has pushed Albania off the EU track and into an
ever-more damaging spiral. 
Recent bi-partisan efforts at reconciliation, 
culminating in the adoption of a national Action 
Plan by the government – with the active involvement 
of the parliament – on 21 March, are a welcome and 
promising development. With the next elections 
already distractingly looming, there is a narrow window
of opportunity to tap into this progress and make it 
last for the benefit of Albania's future, as well as for 
the prospects of stability and democracy in Europe. 
How can the EU help Albania to help itself at this 
critical juncture? 
The current political crisis in Albania dates back to 
the June 2009 general elections, when the Socialist
opposition contested the Democrats' victory and
embarked on a boycott of parliament that was to last
almost two years. The embittered political climate
subsequently degenerated into fatal violence at an 
anti-government rally in January 2011, while the 
Tirana mayoral elections in May 2011 were also 
marred by controversy and protests. 
In November 2011, under strong international 
pressure, Albania's two major political parties finally
agreed to resume political dialogue within the
parliamentary structures. However, by then, the
prolonged standoff had already triggered negative
repercussions. Given that a majority vote is required 
to pass many legislative acts, the much-needed reform
process in the country came to a virtual standstill during
the political deadlock – much to the dismay of the
European Union watching nervously from the sidelines. 
With little progress to show under its belt at the time 
of the Commission's 2010 or 2011 annual reviews 
of EU hopefuls, Albania was not recommended for
'candidate status'. Instead, in November 2010, the
Brussels' executive presented Albania with a 'to-do' 
list of 12 key priorities, including the need to ensure 
the proper functioning of parliament, appoint an
ombudsman, reform electoral law and the public
administration, strengthen the fight against organised
crime and corruption, and reinforce the protection 
of human and minority rights. Implementing these
provisions became a sine qua non condition for any
potential advance by Albania towards EU membership.
Opportunity knocks:
can the EU help Albania to help itself?
The King Baudouin Foundation and Compagnia di San Paolo are strategic partners of the European Policy Centre
BACKGROUND
Corina Stratulat and Gjergji Vurmo
POLICY BRIEF
22 March 2012
Despite these strict terms, Albania has moved along 
the list of priorities at a snail's pace. To date, the 
country has partially ticked off one of the 12 boxes: 
it appointed an ombudsman last December. The 
second part of this priority, which requires orderly
hearings and votes in parliament for appointments 
to the constitutional and high courts, remains to be
achieved – along with the other 11 items on the
Commission's roadmap.
To start making headway, the Action Plan adopted by 
the inter-ministerial Committee on European Integration 
STATE OF PLAY
in the Albanian government on 21 March specifies 
the measures, timeframes, resources and responsible
national institutions that will be used to address the
Commission's priorities. This could finally see Albania 
get serious about its reform agenda. However, since
Albania will soon hold presidential (in June 2012) 
and parliamentary (in June 2013) elections, most 
energy is in fact being spent on addressing demands 
for electoral reform rather than on any of the other 
12 points which, in comparison, may offer only 
medium to long-term returns.
Other policy debates related to the rule of law, the
judiciary or corruption issues are thus currently on 
hold until/if the Albanian parties manage to iron out 
their conflicting interests on the election priority: 
the two biggest parties are negotiating directly on 
a formula that maintains the self-serving status quo, 
while smaller parties are channelling through their
respective coalitions demands for changes to electoral
law that could boost their political influence. This 
may well be a common fact of political life in 
established democracies. But as a new and frail
democratic system, Albania cannot afford to tackle
priorities in inverse order, leaving restructuring and
consolidation till the end.
The few months before the publication of the
Commission's next Progress Report in autumn 
2012 represent a particularly opportune moment 
for Albania to reform and move closer to the EU. 
Failure to harness constructively this opportunity 
in order to deliver on the bulk of the 12-priority list 
could see Albania enter the campaign for the 2013
general elections and grow progressively indisposed 
to tackle reforms during the competition for power.
Similarly, any deferral of reforms will probably 
continue at least until the new government has 
settled into office in the second part of 2013, at 
which point the amount of 'catching up' for 
Albania to do is likely be considerably greater 
and the country's EU membership perspective even 
more distant.
By continuing to drag its feet on substantial reform,
Albania is effectively drifting away from the EU 
and ever closer to the 'stagnation zone' of the 
European integration process, that already harbours
countries like Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia).
Stagnation is bad news for Albania, not least because 
it can degenerate into a full-blown regression. It is 
equally bad news for the EU, which needs to maintain
the reform momentum in the Balkans and the credibility
of the region's membership perspectives after Croatia's
entry in 2013.
At present, of the six Balkan countries still aspiring 
to join the EU (that is, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
FYR Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia), 
only Serbia has moved ahead by receiving candidate 
status at the recent European Council in March.
Montenegro is expected to advance in June, when 
EU governments may decide on a date to open 
accession negotiations. Getting Albania firmly back 
on course towards the EU could thus start to balance 
the bloc's transformative record in the Balkans. The
chances of the EU successfully helping Albania to
overcome its crippling political gridlock are arguably
higher than in the cases of FYR Macedonia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina or Kosovo, where internal and external
complexities are far greater. 
PROSPECTS
Albania is the master of its own fate
The European Commission has been pushing Albania 
to reform but for the country to turn a new page, the
seriousness of the current situation must first hit home
among Albanian society and the political elite. The 
way forward requires those in power to take ownership 
of the reform agenda and to act responsibly, drafting 
and implementing policies that coincide with the needs
of the electorate. Likewise, it requires Albanian civil
society to hold their leaders accountable for specific
policy outcomes and to demand that they respect
formally-enacted democratic rights and standards.
In concrete terms, the challenge is twofold. First, 
the fierce power struggle between the two largest 
parties and their leaders, which has become a 
permanent fixture of political, social and economic 
life in Albania since the fall of communism in the 
early 1990s, represents a major stumbling block. This
never-ending cycle of demonisation between political
adversaries and also of independent institutions (such 
as the Prosecutor on the Supreme Court) has kept the
focus away from badly-needed reforms, discredited
democratic processes and institutions in the eyes of 
the Albanian public, and perpetuated a negative image 
of the country abroad.
While recent dialogue across party lines offers a 
glimmer of hope, it must now bear the right results. 
In the past, cooperation has primarily occurred 
whenever it served the best interests of both sides. 
For instance, the swift consensus on constitutional
amendments reached in 2008 between the DP and 
SP essentially gave the two biggest parties the upper 
hand over their smaller political allies and over the
choice of president.
Trade-offs are inevitable in political decision-making,
especially on electoral reform, but these specific 
changes were not the result of broad-based democratic
consultations with other domestic political parties 
or relevant stakeholders in society. In addition, the
ensuing modification of the threshold to elect the
president – from a qualified to a simple majority in 
the last two rounds of the parliamentary vote – gave 
rise to serious concerns about its potential impact on 
the independence of the judiciary in Albania, because 
the president can nominate judges, prosecutors and 
other key members of state institutions, such as the 
State Intelligence Chief.
To be constructive, the current DP-SP dialogue must
become an all-encompassing conversation with all
relevant Albanian political and societal forces. The
outcome should reflect national interest and not the 
will of (some of) the negotiating parties.
'Home-made' solutions agreed in a pluralistic 
governance format are likely to be more sensitive 
to the Albanian context and more acceptable to the
general public. In contrast, failure to internalise and 
apply the democratic principles of inclusiveness and
compromise, or to consider Albania's long-term 
interests, might one day turn Berisha and Rama into
captains of a sinking boat.
Second, bottom-up channels of social accountability 
and civic involvement in policymaking, which remain
severely underdeveloped in Albania, are another 
huge obstacle. A robust civil society, able to act as 
a watchdog and to contribute to formulating and
implementing decisions, can have a multiplier effect 
on the political system.
In Albania, although the civil society sector is fairly 
well-developed – numbering roughly 1,600 non-profit
organisations – there are still no formal mechanisms 
in place for consultations between civil society
organisations (CSOs) and the state, detailed rules
facilitating CSO participation at local level are 
lacking or poorly implemented, there is little public
awareness of civic rights such as access to information,
and financial support provided to CSOs remains
problematic.
Funding from the private and state budget continues 
to be scarce in Albania (amounting to sums that 
normally represent single-digit percentages of total
resources), meaning that CSOs in the country are 
largely dependent on assistance from foreign donors.
Chief among these is the European Union (with €4.5
million during 2010-2011), but the administrative
requirements of EU programmes are usually too
bureaucratic and difficult to access for all but a 
handful of organisations. Moreover, the structure of
external funding is such that most CSOs are driven 
by competition (not cooperation) to win projects for
which money is available, rather than building up 
their expertise and identity in the long run.
Civil society's sustainability and influence over 
political processes in Albania therefore remains 
feeble. To find their voice and make it count in the
policies and actions pursued by leaders, Albanian 
CSOs should try to build networks and cooperate
thematically with other CSOs at national and regional
level by pooling resources and sharing best practices.
They should also seek allies for their monitoring 
and advocacy functions among media actors and
parliamentarians within the country and across 
the Balkans.
However, such efforts will no doubt ultimately 
depend on the political will of Albanian political 
parties to develop an environment in which CSOs 
can operate (from a legal and financial point of view) 
and to accommodate them in practice. Consequently,
successfully addressing the electoral reform priority 
will not be enough if the DP and SP are to genuinely
create effective democracy.
The only real fix is for Albanian politicians to enforce 
the rule of law and resolve any pending issues that
prevent the civil society sector from contributing to
policymaking, including via more transparent and
generous support from the state budget and greater 
fiscal incentives for corporate and individual donations 
to CSOs.
The EU can help but is no substitute for 
domestic action
The European Union can be a pathfinder for Albania's
decision-makers but cannot take charge of the nation's
'rescue' mission. Ongoing concerns related, on the 
one hand, to the post-Lisbon development of the EU 
in an increasingly difficult economic context and, 
on the other hand, to the specific challenges faced 
by Albania, can occasionally hinder robust EU
engagement with the country. But making sure that
Albania consolidates its democracy is also in the 
EU's strategic interests, helping to stabilise and
irreversibly anchor the Balkans to Europe.
The volatile state of affairs in Albania raises the 
question of whether the EU should not have been 
more proactive by intervening more promptly at 
decisive moments, for instance, when the outcome 
of the 2009 vote was first disputed (including by 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights - OSCE/ODIHR), triggering the 
two-year parliamentary boycott. The cacophony 
of opinions among member states and of ideological
positions in the European Parliament, as well as the
Commission's desire to remain impartial when preparing
its avis on Albania's membership application, could 
help to explain why the EU has restricted itself to 
tacit diplomatic mediation efforts during the country's
political impasse.
European Policy Centre  Résidence Palace, 155 rue de la Loi, 1040 Brussels, Belgium 
Tel: +32 (0)2 231 03 40  Fax: +32 (0)2 231 07 04  Email: info@epc.eu  Website: www.epc.eu
With the support of the Europe for Citizens
Programme of the European Union.
For example, senior MEPs, such as Martin Schulz 
and Joseph Daul, convened in May 2010 a meeting 
in Luxembourg with Prime Minister Sali Berisha and
opposition leader Edi Rama to negotiate a solution 
to the political standoff. Similar attempts were also 
made by the EP's Delegation for South East Europe 
and the EU-Albania Parliamentary Committee. 
However, by the end of 2010 it had become clear 
that a strategy of 'reconciliation by stealth' would 
not reverse or prevent the gradual escalation of
Albania's political crisis.
Thus in early 2011, the EU started to be more assertive
and vocal about domestic political developments in
Albania. In response to violent demonstrations in 
Tirana, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton 
and Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Füle issued 
on 21 January 2011 a joint public statement urging
Albanian politicians "to engage in a constructive
dialogue to resolve without any further delays the 
long-standing political stalemate".
The following month, on 15 February 2011 in an
address to the EP in Strasbourg, Commissioner Füle
openly declared that "the two Albanian leaders are 
stuck in their own internal impasse", and called on 
them during a speech to the EU-Albania Stabilisation
and Association Council on 19 July 2011 "to put the
country's interest ahead of party agendas".
Another joint Ashton-Füle statement on 19 July 2011
raised expectations that all sides in Albania would 
make a serious effort to overcome the enduring
difficulties regarding the conduct of elections and 
to urgently address the 12 key priorities in an effective
and inclusive manner. 
All this open and constant pressure began to pay 
off, not least by finally persuading the DP and SP to 
return to the negotiating table in November 2011. 
This strategy must continue, and the EU should 
now cast its net wider, taking full advantage of the 
fact that its leverage is strongest at the pre-accession 
stage of the integration process. It should do so by
reacting more quickly and visibly to both negative 
and positive events in Albania, thereby reinforcing
domestic reformers' efforts. 
Equally importantly, it should focus greater attention 
on promoting and judging progress in Albania by
yardsticks related to substantive criteria of democracy,
such as the actual rule of law enforcement and civil
society's input into the policy process. 
The 12-point list is the first step in the right direction 
but there is room to be more specific via more detailed
requirements/benchmarks and to make an early start 
on issues that need time to address properly (for
instance, developing a well-functioning judiciary).
The EU should also embark on a medium-term 
strategy that helps to strengthen Albanian civil 
society in the pre-accession phase of integration. 
This could include, for example, more pressure on
Albania to adopt and implement a legal framework 
that specifies the role of civil society in policymaking
and implementation; to guarantee that CSOs' input 
is adequately reflected in the policies adopted; to
strengthen the parliament's oversight of the executive
and scrutiny of legislation; and to foster regional
cooperation in order to facilitate the fight against
organised crime, as well as training and best-practice
exchanges among parliamentarians, and members 
of the media and CSOs. 
While broader and deeper conditions are normally
reserved for countries that are more advanced on 
their path towards EU membership, a fine-tuning 
of the EU's approach to Albania could prove a 
win-win strategy. It could help to dissolve for good 
the spectre of political deadlock in Albania, quicken 
the pace of the integration process and consolidate 
the country's democracy.
In parallel, it could demonstrate that the EU is
committed to helping Albania join the 'club' at 
a time when the enlargement process is struggling 
to appear credible and effective, and that the EU 
is capable of developing pre-emptive policies – as
opposed to just reactive and belated responses. But 
for all that to happen, the moment to act is now.
Corina Stratulat is Policy Analyst at 
the European Policy Centre.
Gjergji Vurmo is Head of 
the Centre for European
& Security Affairs at the Institute for
Democracy and Mediation, Albania.


Opportunity knocks: can the EU help Albania to help itself?

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Parliament: to improve the Law for Prevention and Protection against Discrimination i.e. to incorporate  the 
ground of “sexual orientation” in the Article 3; to empower the  Commission for Protection against Discrimination 
(CAD) to deliver legally binding decisions; to clarify the level of competences and subordination between CAD and 
other bodies with anti-discrimination mandate; to provide sufficient resources for operation of CAD.
Commission for Protection against Discrimination: to study the experience of its international, incl. European 
counterparts; to organize annual consultations with civil society representatives; to initiate national/local  
promotional campaigns on an annual or biannual base; to continue advocating for its professionalization and  
capacity building including allocation of resources necessary for its operation.
Central government: to initiate changes of the legal framework  which will allow for documentation of different 
forms of discrimination;  to unify  the existent national legal provisions related to discriminatory actions; to deliver  
follow up specialized training to its administration; and to provide incentives for the established  gender equality 
points in every Ministry to take proactive roles in anti-discrimination issues.
Municipal Commissions for Equal Opportunities: to upgrade their capacities vis-à-vis anti-discrimination issues 
and to take active promotional measures for educating local communities on protective mechanisms. 
Judicial system: to improve the existing pattern for recording cases and to upgrade regularly its knowledge on 
the European and national legislation contents, enforcement mechanisms and court practices in the area of 
anti-discrimination.
Private sector and employers’ unions: to secure consistent human resources policies and visible internal corporate 
management self-regulation systems which are capable  to prevent cases of  discrimination in the work place; and to 
allow for documenting and evidence gathering of different forms of discrimination on the work place.
Civil society: to attract additional financial resources; to generate expertise and to build sustainable partnership 
coalitions so as to keep on effective registration of cases of discrimination on various grounds, to communicate 
those with CAD; to be able to provide legal, psychological, social and other re-integration support to  citizens 
affected by discriminatory actions; and to take active promotional measures for educating local communities on 
protective mechanisms.
Individual citizens: to get acquainted with the existent anti-discrimination national legislation and policies so as 
to avoid situations which might lead to their victimization, segregation and inequality.     
Media: to build its capacities on how to communicate discrimination cases without prejudice and to channel 
informed and consistent public messages related to discriminatory actions. 
Donors: to include the anti-discrimination issues in their funding portfolio and to support awareness, capacity, 
partnership building and networking initiatives which will educate the society and its institutions on the various 
policy, legal, social and human aspects of the anti-discrimination domain. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
These policy recommendations are developed by Center for Economic Development (CED), Sofia and Center for Research and Policy 
Making (CRPM), Skopje under the  project “Exchange of EU best practices in the area of anti-discrimination legislation enforcement” 
(January 2012 - January 2013). For more information, please refer to: www.ced.bg, www.crpm.org.mk
This project is funded by the European Union. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of CED/CRPM and can in 
no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.
 Center for Economic Development 
 46, Chervena Stena St., 1421 Sofia
 www.ced.bg; ced@ced.bg 
Center for Research and Policy Making
6-2/9, Cico Popovic St., 1000 Skopje
www.crpm.org.mk; crpm@crpm.org.mk   


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PEOPLE – HISTORY – POLITICS 
 RUSSIAN PERCEPTIONS 
OF POLAND AND GERMANY
KEY CONCLUSIONS
  
  
 
 
Grzegorz Gromadzki  
Jacek Kucharczyk  
Agnieszka Łada  
Cornelius Ochmann  
Yuriy Taran 
Łukasz Wenerski 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Warsaw 2012 
 
INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
European Programme 
 
 
The publication was prepared under the project: „Perception of Poland and 
Germany in Russia” implemented in cooperation with the Foundation for 
German-Polish Cooperation and with financial support of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Survey of the Institute of Public Affairs was carried out on 11-21 of November 
2011 by Levada Center on a representative group of 1591 adult Russian 
citizens  
 
Project coordinator: Łukasz Wenerski     
Proofreading: Elena Rozbicka 
Reviewers: dr Victoria Dunaeva, Boris Dubin 
 
© Copyright by Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Warszawa 2012 
 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this report may be printed or reproduced 
without the permission of the publisher or quoting the source 
 
 
 
Published by: 
Fundacja Instytut Spraw Publicznych 
00–031 Warszawa, ul. Szpitalna 5 
lok. 22 tel. (22) 55 64 260, faks (22) 
55 64 262 
e-mail: isp@isp.org.pl, www.isp.org.pl 
 
 
 
The Institute of Public Affairs is supported by the European 
Commission. This publication reflects the views only of the 
author, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any 
use which may be made of the information contained therein.    
 
KEY CONCLUSIONS
• The image of Poland and Poles in Russia is neutral or relatively 
positive. Negative opinions are expresseded by a minority of 
Russians. At the same time, the image of Germany and Germans is 
much better.
• While the Russians harbor established opinions about Germany, 
many of them do not have any such opinions about Poland. On 
average, around one third of the respondents have chosen the answer 
“hard to say” while responding to the Polish part of the questionnaire. 
As regards the questions on Germany, such responses were relatively 
infrequent. 
• The Russians’ knowledge about Poland comes mainly from school 
and textbooks (53%), followed by TV programs on Poland (39%) and 
press articles (26%). 
• The majority of the Russians’ associations with Poland are 
generalizations about the country and the Polish society (32%). 
A relatively smaller percentage of Russians’ associations with Poland 
concern politics (14%) or history (9%), followed by the economy (9%) 
and culture (5%). Most of these associations are positive.
• Germany and the Germans are mainly associated with history (36%). 
This is followed by the country and its society (29%) and politics (3%). 
As in the case of Poland, the majority of the Russians’ associations 
with Germany are positive.
• The majority of Russians (more than half of the respondents) neither 
like nor dislike the Poles (51%). Moreover, the number of respondents 
who declare that they like the Poles (36%) – is nearly three times larger 
than the group of respondents expressing dislike (13%). 
• The most commonly mentioned speciﬁ c Russian association with 
Poland is the airplane crash in Smolensk in 2010 (8,8%), while the 
main association with Germany is the attack of the Third Reich on 
the Soviet Union (18,5%).
• The Russians expressed much more fondness for the Germans than 
for the Poles. More than half of the respondents (55%) cited a positive 
Polska i Niemcy w oczach Rosjan_1   1 2012-06-27   09:25:46
2 PEOPLE– HISTORY – POLITICS
attitude towards the Germans, one third neither like nor dislike them 
(37%). Only 8% Russians claimed that they dislike the Germans.
• Most Russians are able to accept the Poles in different social 
roles – ﬁ rst of all as tourists visiting their country (89%), followed 
by neighbours (66%), colleagues at work (64%), close friends (61%), 
permanent Russian residents (56%). Nearly half of the respondents 
would not oppose having Polish in-laws (49%) nor Poles receiving 
Russian citizenship (47%). Having a Polish boss is the least popular 
option, but even here more Russians would accept than oppose such 
a situation. 
• The Russians’ acceptance of the Germans is higher than in the 
case of the Polish people. A large majority would not oppose the 
Germans visiting Russia as tourists and would accept a German as 
their neighbour or as co-worker. Slightly fewer Russians would accept 
a German friend (71%). Two-thirds of the Russians (67%) are open 
towards Germans living in Russia and more than a half of them (59%) 
would accept German in-laws, granting the Germans the Russian 
citizenship (58%) or working for a German boss (57%).
• The Russians have better opinions about Poland and Germany than 
about their own country. Their views of Germany are exceptionally 
positive – 92% of the respondents believe that the German state takes 
care of its citizens, 85% claim that the German economy is developing 
well, 63% are of the opinion that the German media can freely 
criticize the government, while half of them agree that the German 
administration is free from corruption.
• A signiﬁ cant number of Russians (between 30% and nearly 50%) have 
found it difﬁ cult to answer such questions concerning the state of 
Polish democracy and economy. Among the respondents who have 
given their answers, as much as 67% agreed that Poland takes care 
of its citizens and nearly half believed that the Polish economy is 
developing well (46%).
• The Russians do not have a consistent opinion on freedom in the 
Polish media – 43% of those having an opinion believe they are free, 
while 46% think they are only partly free. 
• Likewise, the Russian view on the level of corruption in Poland is 
ambiguous. Nearly half of the respondents (47%) declined to answer, 
while among those Russians who have an opinion, there are more 
Polska i Niemcy w oczach Rosjan_2   2 2012-06-27   09:25:46
3Russian perceptions of Poland and Germany
Russians who think that the Polish administration is rather corrupt 
then those who disagree with such a statement.
• The Russians are highly critical about the state of Russia. Nearly half 
of the respondents (46%) believe that the state does not care about 
the welfare of the citizens. The Russians also perceive corruption as a 
problem – more than four out of ﬁ ve (83%) claim that Russian ofﬁ cials 
are corrupt. More than a third (39%) disagree with the opinion that 
the Russian economy is developing well, while about a quarter (26%) 
remain optimistic about their country’s economic prospects. 
• In spite of the generally negative assessment of the state of Russia, 
the respondents are relatively positive as regards the freedom of 
the Russian media. As many as two-ﬁ fths (42%) claim the media in 
Russia are free to criticize the government. One third (32%) think they 
are only partly free, while one-fourth (26%) believe there is no media 
freedom in Russia. Possibly, the respondents take into account not 
only the traditional media (television and radio), but also the so-called 
new media – the Internet - where there is no censorship and criticism 
of the government is widespread.
• One ﬁ fth of the respondents declare that the information that 
a certain product has been made in Poland would encourage them 
to buy it. More than half of them (61%) feel neither encouraged nor 
discouraged.
• The Russians think that Poland neither supports nor impedes Russia’s 
relations with the European Union, the United States or Ukraine 
and other countries from the Commonwealth of Independent 
States. The opinion that Poland impedes Russia in its relations with 
these partners was expressed relatively infrequently. The Russians, 
however, perceive the Germans as much more supportive than the 
Poles.
• Most Russians believe that neither Poland (52%) nor Germany pose 
or will pose in the future a threat towards Russia. 
• As many as 81% of the respondents see Germany as playing an 
important role in Europe. In the case of Poland, the opinions are 
divided, with just 28% of the respondents agreeing that Poland plays 
an important role in Europe, two in ﬁ ve (38%) giving a neutral answer, 
and one third rejecting such a claim. 
Polska i Niemcy w oczach Rosjan_3   3 2012-06-27   09:25:46
4 PEOPLE– HISTORY – POLITICS
• The respondents perceive Russia’s role in Europe as less important 
than Germany’s, but more important than Poland’s. More than half 
(40%) are convinced of Russia’s importance in Europe, while 25% 
disagree.
• The respondents who see Poland or Germany as supportive of Russia’s 
building ties with the EU, the US or the CIS countries, also see these 
countries as having a relatively greater role in Europe.
• Russia’s relations with Germany are perceived as much better than 
relations with Poland. 66% of the respondents claim that German-
Russian relations are good. At the same time most Russians (63%) see 
the relations between Russia and Poland as neither good nor bad, 
while 21% perceive them to be positive. 
• Assessing the changes in Polish-Russian relations in the last three 
years, more than half of the respondents (54%) do not see any 
changes, while nearly one third of the respondents (31%) claim the 
relations have worsened. 
• Nearly half of Russians (42%) think the Smolensk catastrophe has 
damaged Polish-Russian relations, while one third (33%) do not see 
any inﬂ uence of the accident on the bilateral relations.
• Nearly half of the respondents believe there were events in the 
Polish-Russian history for which Poland should bear guilt towards 
Russia. At the same time, only one in four Russians (24%) believes that 
Russia has reasons to feel guilt vis-à-vis Poland, while 44%  say that 
Russia bears no guilt.
• The list of Russian complaints regarding Poland has remained fairly 
constant over the years. Accordingly, the Poles can be blamed for 
accusing Russian authorities for the Smolensk air disaster (30%), lack 
of gratitude for Poland’s liberation by the Red Army (22%), Poland’s 
political support of Georgia during the Russian-Georgian conﬂ ict 
in 2008 (20%), joining NATO (19%), hosting the Chechen Information 
Centres (19%) as well as lobbying for alternatives to Russian gas and 
oil supplies to Europe (15%).
• Most Russians (58%) declare that Polish-Russian relations should 
focus on the present rather than on the past.
• Almost half of the respondents (45%) think that improving Russian-
Polish relations depends on regular meetings of politicians and a joint 
discussion of the issues important for both countries. A third of the 
Polska i Niemcy w oczach Rosjan_4   4 2012-06-27   09:25:46
5Russian perceptions of Poland and Germany
Russians point to the need for more intensive cultural and scientiﬁ c 
cooperation between the two countries. One in four Russians think it 
would help if the Poles acknowledge the role of the Red Army in the 
liberation of Poland in 1945 (25%). Finally, just 7% of the respondents 
see more Russian investments in Poland and Polish investments in 
Russia as a way forward for improving of the relations between the 
two countries.
Polska i Niemcy w oczach Rosjan_5   5 2012-06-27   09:25:47


English

People \u2013 history \u2013 politics. Russian perceptions of Poland and Germany. Key conclusions

Hollo, Daniel

MNB Occasional Papers 105. A system-wide financial stress indicator for the Hungarian financial system