Policy Documentation Center

Sintov, Ruslan

Bivol, Stela

Tuberculosis in Moldova: Knowledge, Attitude and Practice in General Population

Bajrektarevic, Anis H.

  
 
1 
The International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in 
Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses events in the Middle East and the Balkans. 
Dr. Anis H. Bajrektarević, member of the IFIMES International Institute, 
professor and chairperson Intl. Law & Global Pol. Studies at the Austrian IMC 
University, has closely followed the on-going frictions in Asia-Pacific. Warning that a 
‘dangerous game of the reinvigorated nationalistic rhetoric, could easily hijack the 
next Asian decade’, prof. Bajrektarević reaffirms his well-known thesis that ‘no Asian 
century will emerge without creation of the pan-Asian institution’. The most 
interesting sections from his recent policy paper “ASIA NEEDS ASEAN-IZATION 
NOT A PAKISTANIZATION OF ITS CONTINENT” are published below. 
 
 
Dr. Anis H. Bajrektarević 
● Professor and chairperson Intl. Law & Global Pol. Studies 
    at the IMC University of Applied Sciences, Krems, Austria 
● Member of the IFIMES International Institute 
 
Speculations over the alleged bipolar world of tomorrow (the so-called G-2, China vs. 
the US), should not be an Asian dilemma. It is primarily a concern of the West that, 
after all, overheated China in the first place with its (outsourcing) investments. 
ASIA NEEDS ASEAN-IZATION NOT A 
PAKISTANIZATION OF ITS CONTINENT  
 
(Gunboat diplomacy in the South and East China Sea – China’s strategic 
mistake) 
 
As the recent maritime contests in both the South and the East China Sea has shown, 
Beijing underestimated an emotional charge that the territorial disputes carry along, 
as well as the convenience given to the neighbors to escalate these frictions in order to 
divert public attention from their own pressing domestic socio-economic and political 
issues. A costly, spiral and dangerous game of the reinvigorated nationalistic rhetoric, 
it presently instigate a climate that could easily hijack the next Asian decade as a 
whole. 
 
  
 
2 
Hence, despite a (cacophony of voices, actually of a) distortive noise about the 
possible future G-2 world, the central security problem of Asia remains the same: an 
absence of any pan-continental multilateral setting on the world’s largest continent. 
 
* * * * 
 
On the eastern, ascendant flank of the Eurasian continent, the Chinese vertigo 
economy is overheated and too-well integrated in the petrodollar system. Beijing, 
presently, cannot contemplate or afford to allocate any resources in a search for an 
alternative. (The Sino economy is a low-wage- and labor intensive- centered one. 
Chinese revenues are heavily dependent on exports and Chinese reserves are 
predominantly a mix of the USD and US Treasury bonds.) To sustain itself as a single 
socio-political and formidably performing economic entity, the People’s Republic 
requires more energy and less external dependency.1 Domestically, the demographic-
migratory pressures are huge, regional demands are high, and expectations are 
brewing.2   Considering its best external energy dependency equalizer (and inner 
cohesion solidifier), China seems to be turning to its military upgrade rather than 
towards the resolute alternative energy/Green Tech investments – as it has no time, 
plan or resources to do both at once. Inattentive of the broader picture, Beijing 
(probably falsely) believes that a lasting containment, especially in the South China 
Sea, is unbearable, and that –at the same time– fossil-fuels are available (e.g., in 
Africa and the Gulf), and even cheaper with the help of battleships.3
In effect, the forthcoming Chinese military buildup will only strengthen the existing, 
and open up new, bilateral security deals
  
 
4
                                                          
1 Most of China’s economic growth is attributed to outsourced manufacturing. The US, the EU, Japan, 
Taiwan, Korea, Singapore and other Asian and non-Asian OECD countries predominantly take 
advantage of China’s coastal areas as their own industrial suburbia. It remains an open question how 
much this externally dictated growth of China has a destabilizing effect on the inner compact of the 
Sino nation.   
2 The geopolitical event of the year is ahead of us. The forthcoming 18th Congress of the China’s 
Communist Party should soon decide on its leadership for the next 10 years. In the secretive, opaque 
world of CPC decision making, the ongoing contest between taizi dang (children of senior Party figures 
and heroes of the Revolution) and tuanpai (party members of a modest social background who 
successfully played their careers in the Communist Youth League) is an important although not the 
only ideological and socio-political power-struggle puzzling the future of China.   
3 Since the glorious Treasury Fleets of Admiral Zhèng Hé have been dismantled by the order of the 
Mandarin bureaucracy in 1433, China has never recovered its pivotal naval status in the Asia-Pacific.       
4 More bilateralism (triggered by unilateralism) is not only less multilateralism– essentially, it is a 
setback for any eventual emancipation of the continent.       
 of neighboring countries, primarily with 
the US – as nowadays in Asia, no one wants to be a passive downloader. 
Ultimately, it may create a politico-military isolation (and financial burden) for China 
that would consequently justify and (politically and financially) cheapen the bolder 
reinforced American military presence in the Asia-Pacific, especially in the South and  
  
 
3 
the East China Sea. It perfectly adds up to the intensified demonization of China in 
parts of influential Western media.5
A real challenge is always to optimize the (moral, political and financial) costs in 
meeting the national strategic objectives. In this case, it would be a resolute turn of 
China towards green technology, coupled with the firm buildup of the Asian 
multilateralism. Without a grand rapprochement to the champions of multilateralism 
in Asia, which are Indonesia, India and Japan, there is no environment for China to 
seriously evolve and emerge as a formidable, lasting and trusted global leader.
   
 
Hence, the Chinese grab for fossil fuels or its military competition for naval control is 
not a challenge but rather a boost for the US Asia-Pacific –even an overall– posture. 
Calibrating the contraction of its overseas projection and commitments – some would 
call it managing the decline of an empire – the US does not fail to note that nowadays 
half of the world’s merchant tonnage passes though the South China Sea. Therefore, 
the US will exploit any regional territorial dispute and other frictions to its own 
security benefit, including the costs sharing of its military presence with the local 
partners, as to maintain pivotal on the maritime edge of Asia that arches from the 
Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean, Malacca, the South and East China Sea up to the 
northwest–central Pacific. 
 
Is China currently acting as a de facto fundraiser for the US?  
 
6 
Consequently, what China needs in Asia is not a naval race of 1908, but 
the Helsinki process of 1975. In return, what Asia needs (from China and 
Japan) is an ASEAN-ization, not a Pakistanization of its continent.7
                                                          
5 In late September 2012, China put its first aircraft carrier (the Liaoning) into service with a lot of 
parade domestically and huge anxiety in its neighborhood. What media underreported are the three 
important details: (i) this Soviet-constructed vessel is over 20 years old (bought from Ukraine in 
1998); (ii) its runway deck cannot support any aircraft landing; (iii) China’s best tactical jetfighter J-8 
(a copycat of the Soviet MIG 23s, 30-year-old technology) is not designed for landing on any aircraft 
carrier. From the point of view of military technology, China is still well-behind were e.g. the Imperial 
Japan was some 80 years ago – as the Liaoning carrier is neither home-made nor of any practical use 
for either the Sino Navy or its Air Force.       
6 More on the pan-Asian security architectures and preventive diplomacy in: Bajrektarevic, A. (2011) 
No Asian century without the pan-Asian Institution, GHIR (Geopolitics, History, and Intl. Relations) 
3 (2) 2011, Addleton Publishers NY 
7 An ASEAN summit in June 2012 failed to issue a joint communiqué for the first time in its 45-year 
history after an open disagreement over the wording of a section on the South China Sea territorial 
claims. Cambodia, the current ASEAN chair, was seen by several member states of stonewalling in 
support of its ally, China. Quickly absorbing the shock, the ASEAN diplomatic offensive has started, 
primarily shuttled by the Indonesian Foreign Office. One of the chief negotiators recently told me in 
Jakarta: “The biggest threats (related to the South China Sea territorial disputes, rem. a.) to ASEAN’s 
centrality are the gnawing moves that ultimately pit its 10 members against each other.” The views 
I’ve heard while in Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok this fall, well-corresponded with the concerns 
expressed in Jakarta: “What will be rejected is the seeming habit of major powers – be they China or 
the US – to define countries as allies or adversaries…and so, riling ASEAN’s divisions.”     
   
 
  
 
4 
 
Opting for either strategic choice will reverberate in the dynamic Asia–Pacific 
theatre.8
                                                          
8 Historically, both Europe and Asia had a weak centre with the continent’s peripheries traditionally 
pressing on a soft centre. With a growth on strength of 19th century Germany (Bismarck’s Greater 
Prussia), and of late 20th century’s Deng’s China, the centre started pressing on its peripheries for the 
first time in modern history. One of the central security dilemmas between Bismarck and Helsinki 
times was ‘how many Germanys’ Europe should have to preserve its inner balance and peace. Europe 
and the world have paid an enormous price in two world wars to figure it out. With the bitter 
memories of Nazism still residing in the body and soul of the continent, the recent unification of 
Germany was only possible within the Helsinki’ tranquilized Europe.     
 However, the messages are diametrical: An assertive military – 
alienates, new technology – attracts neighbors. Finally, armies conquer (and 
spend) while technology builds (and accumulates)!  
 
At this point, any eventual accelerated armament in the Asia-Pacific theatre would 
only strengthen the hydrocarbon status quo, and would implicitly further help a well-
orchestrated global silencing of consumers’ sensitivity over the record-high oil price.  
 
With its present configuration, it is hard to imagine that anybody can outplay the US 
in the petro-security, petro-financial and petro-military global playground in the 
decades to come. Given the planetary petro-financial-media-tech-military causal 
constellations, this type of confrontation is so well mastered by and would further 
only benefit the US and the closest of its allies.  
 
China’s defense complex is over-ideologized, under-capitalized, technologically 
outdated and innovation-inert, while the US’ is largely privatized, highly efficient, 
deployable and prime innovative. Thus, even in security domain, the main China’s 
problem is not a naval or overall military parity, but the disproportionate 
technological gap. After all, China’s army was not meant (by Mao) and maintained 
(by Deng and his successors) to serve the external projection purpose. It was and still 
remains an ideological enterprise of cohesion, an essential centrifugal force to 
preserve territorial integrity of this land-colossus.      
                                             
Within the OECD/IEA grouping, or closely: the G-8 (the states with resources, 
infrastructure, tradition of and know-how to advance the fundamental technological 
breakthroughs), it is only Japan that may seriously consider a Green/Renewable-tech 
U-turn. Tokyo’s external energy dependencies are stark and long-lasting. Past the 
recent nuclear trauma, Japan will need a few years to (psychologically and 
economically) absorb the shock – but it will learn a lesson. For such an impresive 
economy and considerable demography, situated on a small land-mass which is 
repeatedly brutalized by devastating natural catastrophes (and dependent on yet 
another disruptive external influence – Arab oil), it might be that a decisive shift 
towards green energy is the only way to survive, revive, and eventually to emancipate.  
 
  
 
5 
 
An important part of the US–Japan security treaty is the US energy supply lines 
security guaranty, given to (the post-WWII demilitarized) Tokyo. After the recent 
earthquake-tsunami-radiation armageddon, as well as witnessing the current Chinese 
military/naval noise, (the cabinet of the recently reconfirmed PM Noda and any other 
subsequent government of) Japan will inevitably rethink and revisit its energy policy, 
as well as the composition of its primary energy mix.  
 
Tokyo is well aware that the Asian geostrategic myopias are strong and lasting, as 
many Asian states are either locked up in their narrow regionalisms or/and 
entrenched in their economic egoisms. Finally, Japan is the only Asian country that 
has clearly learned from its own modern history, all about the limits of hard power 
projection and the strong repulsive forces that come in aftermath from the neighbors. 
Their own pre-modern and modern history does not offer a similar experience to 
other two Asian heavyweights, China and India. This indicates the Far East as a 
probable zone of the Green-tech excellence (as much as ASEAN might be the gravity 
center of the consolidated diplomatic and socio-political action) and a place of 
attraction for many Asians in the decade to come.  
 
* Present text is an addendum to the previous policy paper: What China wants in Asia: 
1975 or 1908?
                Bakhtyar Aljaf                                                               
                Zijad Bećirović                                                                              
 (Gunboat diplomacy in the South China Sea – Chinese strategic mistake), 
first published by the China Daily Mail (20 May 2012), available also on the IFIMES site.  
 
 
Ljubljana, October 14, 2012                       
                
                                                                      International Institute for Middle-East and     
                                                                      Balkan Studies (IFIMES) – Ljubljana                                                               
                                                                      Directors: 
                                                                                                                  
                       


English

Asia needs ASEAN-ization not a Pakistanization of its continent

Bronic, Mihaela

 1          PRESS RELEASE     l     No. 42     l     Institute of Public Finance     l     ISSN: 1848-4085     l     doi: 10.3326/pr.2012.41 
Personal income tax sharing among the 
central government, counties, cities and 
municipalities 
 
 
MIHAELA BRONIĆ, PHD, Institute of Public Finance, Zagreb 
 
 
There has been a lot of discussion and writing lately about the sharing of personal income tax 
revenues among the central government and the City of Zagreb.1 The purpose of this article is not to 
comment on the situation in the City of Zagreb (a solution to this problem should be worked out 
jointly by the Ministry of Finance and the City of Zagreb), but to provide a brief and as simple as 
possible clarification of the statutory sharing of the personal income tax revenues.2 
 
The personal income tax is a shared tax, which means that the revenues from this tax are split among 
the municipality or city of a taxpayer's permanent or temporary residence, the county in which that 
municipality or city is located and the central government. There are a standard and two specific types 
of personal income tax sharing (Table 1)3. For the sake of simplicity, this article only deals with the 
standard personal income tax sharing, even though the two specific types are also shown in the Table. 
 
The personal income tax sharing rules are defined in the: 
˗ Act on the Financing of Units of Local and Regional Self-government (Articles 45 and 45a-45b)4;  
˗ regulations governing the method of calculating the amount of equalisation grants for 
decentralised functions of units of local and regional self-government; and 
˗ decisions on the minimum financial standards for each decentralised function. 
The above mentioned regulations and decisions are issued for each year. 
 
The personal income tax sharing rules have changed over time, so that, pursuant to amendments to 
the Act5 of March 1, 2012, the county receives 16%, and cities/municipalities 56.5% of the total. As the 
City of Zagreb performs activities falling within the competence of both a city and a county, it 
participates in the personal income tax revenues with 72.5% (16% + 56.5%). The 
cities/municipalities/counties may use the received revenues to finance any of their expenditures. 
                                                          
1 For further information, see the Ministry of Finance's website at: http://www.mfin.hr/hr/novosti/informacija-za-medije-o-
gradu-zagrebu-2012-10-12-16-22-16 
2 Surtax on personal income tax is not included in this analysis, because it completely belongs to the city or municipality of the 
taxpayer's permanent of temporary residence. 
3 The specific personal income tax sharing rules are applied to municipalities/cities/counties in areas of special national 
concern (ASNC) and in hill and mountain areas (HMA) or on islands that have entered into agreements on the joint financing of 
investment projects that are of interest for the development of the islands. For further information on the standard tax sharing 
rules, see Bronić (2007) - Newsletter No. 27., Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance. Available at: 
http://www.ijf.hr/eng/newsletter/27.pdf 
4 Official Gazette 117/93, 33/00, 73/00, 59/01, 107/01, 117/01-correction, 150/02, 147/03, 132/06, 73/08 and 25/12. A Decision 
of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, Official Gazette 26/07. 
5 Act on Amendments to the Act on the Financing of Units of Local and Regional Self-government, Official Gazette 25/12. 
No. 41 Zagreb November 6, 2012 
 11          PRESS RELEASE     l     No. 41     l     Institute of Public Finance 
Since 2001, some municipalities/cities/counties have assumed the obligation to finance one or 
several decentralised functions (education, social welfare, health care and/or fire fighting) from the 
personal income tax revenues6 collected. These public services were previously financed by the 
central government. Each year, the Government prescribes minimum financial standards, that is, the 
amount that each municipality/city/county should spend for the financing of each assumed 
decentralised function. The central government gives up a maximum of 12% of its personal income tax 
revenues to the municipalities/cities/counties to finance the said decentralised functions (1.3% for 
fire fighting and 10.7% for other decentralised functions: primary education (3.1%), high-school 
education (2.2%), social welfare (2.2%) and health care (3.2%). Where municipalities/cities/counties 
have not assumed decentralised functions, they are to be financed by the central government, in 
which case the additional share in the personal income tax allocated for these functions also belongs 
to the central government. 
 
The remaining 15.5% of the personal income tax revenues collected in the territory of 
municipalities/cities is paid into the equalisation fund for the financing of decentralised functions7. 
Funds from this source are only allocated to those municipalities/cities/counties that have assumed 
decentralised functions but still do not have enough funds from the additional share in the personal 
income tax collected in their respective territories to meet the minimum financial standards for these 
functions. 
 
Municipalities/cities/counties that have collected more funds from the additional share in the 
personal income tax earmarked for the financing of decentralised functions than prescribed by the 
minimum financial standards are obliged to return the surplus funds to the central budget8.  
 
Table 1. Personal income tax sharing from March 1, 2012, according to the Act on Amendments to 
the Act on the Financing of Units of Local and Regional Self-government (in %) 
Type of tax 
sharing 
County 
- basic 
share 
Municipality 
or city - 
basic share 
Public fire 
brigades - 
decentralised 
function * 
Other 
decentralised 
functions** 
Equalisation 
fund for 
decentralised 
functions*** 
Share for 
joint 
financing 
of capital 
investmen
t projects 
Standard 16.0 56.5 1.3 10.7 15.5 -- 
Standard - for the 
C. of Zagreb -- 72.5 1.3 10.7 15.5 -- 
Specific - for 
ASNC and HMA 10.0 90.0 -- -- -- -- 
Specific– for 
islands (the joint 
financing of 
capital inv. 
projects that are 
of interest for the 
development of 
the islands 
16.0 56.5 1.3 10.7 -- 15.5 
* Goes to a municipality/city that owns and finances the regular activities of public fire brigades; otherwise it goes to the 
central budget. 
** Goes to a municipality/city/county that finances its decentralised functions; otherwise it goes to the central budget.  
*** A fund from which transfers are made to municipalities/cities/counties that are unable to finance their respective 
decentralised functions up to the level of the minimum standard from the additional share in the personal income tax. 
Source: Act on Amendments to the Act on the Financing of Units of Local and Regional Self-government (Official Gazette 25/12). 
                                                          
6 Act on Amendments to the Act on the Financing of Units of Local and Regional Self-government, Official Gazette 59/01. 
7 The equalisation fund is fed by all municipalities/cities, except for those located in the ASNC and HMA or on islands that have 
entered into agreements on the joint financing of capital investment projects that are of interest for the development of the islands.  
8 Act on Amendments to the Act on the Financing of Units of Local and Regional Self-government, Article 45a, paragraph (3) 
(Official Gazette 25/12). The same was prescribed by the annual Regulations on the Method of Calculating the Amount of 
Equalisation Grants for Decentralised Functions of Units of Local and Regional Self-government for the period 2007-2012, and 
almost identical provisions can be found in the annual Regulations on the Method of Calculating the Amount of Equalisation 
Grants for Decentralised Functions of Units of Local and Regional Self-government for the period 2004-2007. 


Press release no. 41. Personal income tax sharing among the central government, counties, cities and municipalities

Center for Economic Development, Bulgaria

Impact of the economic crisis on the national system of industrial relations in Bulgaria: policies as a key instrument for recovery

Endresz, Mariann

Gyongyosi, Gyozo

Harasztosi, Peter

MNB Working Papers 8. Currency mismatch and the sub-prime crisis: firm-level stylised facts from Hungary

Hungarian Civil, Liberties Union

Mapping Exclusion

Kronberga, Ilona

Zermatten, Jean

Child-friendly justice in Latvia: focusing on crime prevention

The Economy of Bulgaria - January 2012

Fox, Jon

Vidra, Zsuzsanna

  
Issue 9/2012 
The rise of the extreme right in Hungary and 
the Roma question 
The Radicalisation of the Media Discourse 
Zsuzsanna Vidra and Jon Fox  
 
In Hungary the success of the far right is to a large extent due to 
their effective exploitation of Roma issues. The first electoral success for 
Jobbik (Hungary’s main far right party) came in the European elections in 
2009; a year later they captured 16% of the vote in parliamentary elections in 
Hungary. At the same time a growing number of extra-parliamentary and 
sometimes paramilitary groups have also become active, some with close 
links to Jobbik. Support for the radical right doubled between 2002 and 
2009. There are numerous factors behind the rapid rise and success of the 
far right in Hungary: mistrust toward democratic institutions, the state, and  
politics in general. Xenophobic attitudes rooted in the dominant definition of 
the Hungarian nation as mono-cultural and mono-ethnic can also be viewed 
as a determinant (but also as an effect) of the rise of the extreme right. More 
generally, economic decline, poor governance, interethnic tensions and the 
media’s handling of the issue have contributed to  strengthening the radical 
right. The mainstream political actors and the media have responded to 
Jobbik discourses on Roma, but often in ways that fail to challenge 
some of the fundamental assumptions about the Roma. 
Two murders in two villages in Hungary have come to encapsulate the 
problems surrounding the media’s coverage of the Roma. In the first village, 
Olaszliszka, the Roma were behind the murder of a non-Roma man;  in the 
second village, Tatárszentgyörgy, a Roma man and his son were killed by 
non-Roma. These cases were watershed events that gave new currency to 
the notion of ‘Gypsy crime’.   
The media responded to them by promising to ‘break the taboos’ of 
political correctness and make ‘Gypsy criminality’ a widely accepted 
concept. Our study aimed at illustrating how far right discourses on Roma  
have spread into mainstream public discourses and how different media in 
Hungary have responded to the rise of radical and racist discourse. We compared media coverage of 
these two murder incidents in sources with different political orientations. We analysed the radical 
web-site kuruc.info.hu, the conservative daily Magyar Nemzet and the left wing daily 
Népszabadság. We also analysed public debate on the question of ‘Roma integration’ that 
What accounts for the 
radicalisation of the 
public discourses? How 
‘Gypsy crime’, ‘born 
criminals’, ‘Gypsies 
terrorising the 
majority’, etc. become 
so widely accepted? 
  
 
 
 
It began with 
prejudiced talk about 
‘being Gypsies’ 
(‘cigányozás’), and 
became more 
widespread, penetrating 
public and everyday talk 
as well.  
Issue 9/2012_ p. 2 of 10 
                        
 
 
followed the Olaszliszka incident. This third case saw a mainstream and liberal economic-political 
weekly (HVG) joining in the ‘breaking of taboos’ and abandoning politically correct language.  
 Our analysis of media and public debate discourses revealed important and interrelated 
developments: 
- racist language was incresingly unchallenged,  
- voices of tolerance have been increasingly marginalized.  
 
Evidence & Analysis (Key Findings) 
Case no. 1:  The murder in Olaszliszka 
 
Following the incident the Roma were characterised in the media as ‘wild and barbarian’, having 
‘blind family attachments’, an ‘inclination to vigilantism’, whilst exhibiting ‘uncontrolled aggression’ and 
‘different norms of behaviour from that of the majority’.  
For the far right website, kuruc.info.hu, ‘Gypsy crime’ was a fact: deficient Roma attributes 
explained their criminal behaviour, and this in turn justified their continued exclusion: 
 
The Gypsy mob lynched a teacher to death. Another victim of Gypsy terrorism: It is a shame 
that the Gypsies, after having fucked over the possibility for peaceful coexistence, are still 
free and attacking us. Us, peaceful Hungarians. (http://kuruc.info/r/2/6487/)  
 
The incident: in October 2006 a middle aged teacher was driving through a small village with his 
two daughters when he accidentally hit a girl crossing the road. As the man got out of his car 
to help the girl, a group of local people gathered around, concerned for the girl’s wellbeing. The 
driver was brutally attacked, and died on the spot as a result of his injuries. His two daughters 
witnessed their father being killed from where they sat in the car. The attackers were Roma. 
The girl, who had been hit by the car, had not been injured. Within two days, the police had 
arrested the perpetrators. 
Issue 9/2012_ p. 3 of 10 
                        
 
 
However, the mainstream conservative right wing newspaper Magyar Nemzet, also adopted a 
similar type of rhetoric (though somewhat less vitriolic): they also presented the murder as an 
example of ‘Gypsy crime’:   
 
The mainsream left-wing newspaper Népszabadság applied different strategies in its reporting 
on Olaszliszka. ‘Gypsy crime’ is used as a negation, with the claim that no such phenomenon exists:  
 
To sum up, the Olaszliszka incident thus opened the door to a new discourse on ‘Gypsy crime’, a 
door that some of the mainstream media also stepped through. 
Case no. 2:  The murders in Tatárszentgyörgy 
 
The radical web-site, kuruc.info.hu, reported on this event by portraying majority Hungarians 
as the victims, targets of anti-Hungarian attacks and humiliation.  
We need to recognise the existence of Gypsy crime. The majority society must be informed 
about Roma issues without hiding the facts and the Gypsy society must be made to realise that 
in Hungary they also have to obey the laws. (http://mno.hu/migr/jobbik-olaszliszka-utan-uj-
romapolitika-kell-473660, 16.10.2006) 
This is not a Gypsy issue, but a criminal case. (http://nol.hu/archivum/archiv-421067) 
Hungarian humiliation in the Sunday Times. The sinful nation committed a murder against poor, 
honest, hard working Gypsies. (…) We know that we Hungarians shot, stabbed, raped, 
threatened our dark skinned friends on a daily basis. Not the other way around, that’s for 
certain. (http://kuruc.info/r/20/36261/).  
The incident: A series of murderous attacks against the Roma that began in 2008 were later 
revealed to be racially motivated. The victims all lived in houses situated on the edges of small 
villages, and the villages were all close to major roads that helped facilitate the gunmen’s 
escape. The gunmen prepared meticulously for their attacks, choosing the village, street and 
houses carefully. Each attack took place in the middle of the night or at dawn. The actual 
victims, however, were chosen randomly. This sent the message that Roma people do not 
deserve recognition as individuals, but rather share collective guilt for their ‘Gypsy crime’. In 
August 2009 four men were arrested by the police on suspicion of murder. The police found 
neo-Nazi symbols in the suspects’ houses, establishing the racial motivations of the crimes.  
Issue 9/2012_ p. 4 of 10 
                        
 
 
In the two mainstream papers, the murder was framed as one of two possible but competing 
interpretations, either ‘a racial hate crime’ or ‘a non-racial hate crime’. Magyar Nemzet consistently 
argued that it was  ‘not a hate crime’:  
 
The left-wing newspaper Népszabadság in contrast supported the argument that the murders in 
Tatárszentgyörgy  were a ‘hate crime’. Expert opinions were published in the newspaper to support 
this view: 
  
 
Case no 3:  Down with political correctness!   
Together the two incidents generated important public debate. The mainstream economic-political 
weekly, HVG, hosted one of these debates on the theme of “Roma integration” by giving the floor to 
various mainstream public intellectuals from both left and right.   
The main themes in the debate, however, resonated very closely with the themes that had 
already emerged in earlier reporting: one called for the ‘end of political correctness’ and the other 
focused on the ‘peculiar Roma civilisation/culture’. Those calling for the ‘end of political correctness’ 
argued that political correctness was an impediment to talk about real problems:   
 
Is it out of the question that racists committed the murder in Tatárszentgyörgy? No, this 
cannot be excluded, but it is the least likely scenario. Racist attacks everywhere in the 
world are committed by terrorists who are proud of their deeds and they want their 
victims to be afraid of them. They make their voice heard somehow, they want publicity. 
(MN 25.04.2009). 
It is possible that the family in Tatárszentgyörgy was attacked as a result of a previous 
conflict, but it is also possible that racism was behind the killing. According to Németh [the 
chief police investigator], the murderers believed that they were omnipotent and that they 
knew the truth about everything. It is likely that they have families and jobs and that they 
are not from underground criminal groups.(NSZ 23.02.2009). 
From the very beginning, intellectuals acting in the name of “political correctness” have tried 
to suppress debate about real problems. With the anti-liberal revolution there’s no longer any 
obstacle getting in the way the Gypsy question for the social and political centre (Németh: 
http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091029_ciganyvita_felzarkozas_integracio_akadaly). 
Issue 9/2012_ p. 5 of 10 
                        
 
 
The second strain focused on the Roma’s ‘peculiar civilization’. This debate in the mainstream, 
moderate, and even left oriented media featured a new approach on the Roma that gave increasing 
legitimacy to the idea that Roma culture is derived from nomadism. From this view, the Roma’s 
intentional self-exclusion can be seen as a feature that explains the Roma’s current condition.  In so 
doing, discourses like these both drew on and reinforced widespread stereotypes that the Roma still 
want to be outsiders because it is their culture’s essence not to want to integrate. 
 
In sum, our analysis of the two murders and the more general ‘Roma integration’ debate that 
followed highlighted a number of related discursive tropes: ‘Gypsy crime’, ‘hate crime’, ‘the end of 
political correctness’ and ‘the peculiar Roma civilisation’. While Magyar Nemzet considered it important 
to write openly about ‘Gypsy crime’ in order to break taboos, kuruc.info.hu treated ‘Gypsy crime’ as 
self-evident and therefore not requiring further elaboration or justification. In the integration debate in 
HVG we found similar strategies be employed, albeit with less vitriol: the ‘end of political correctness’ is 
used to break taboos of not talking about the true nature of ‘Gypsy difference’. But whilst 
kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet invoked biological and genetic differences, these differences 
featured in the integration debate as cultural differences.  
For both kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet, the Roma were consistently depicted in adverserial 
terms. They were not alone, however: left-liberals, the liberal media, and civil rights activists were also 
part of a larger leftwing conspiracy to cover up the truth about the Roma. And in the integration 
debate, social scientists joined this growing list of adverseries for their complicity with the liberals to 
hide the truth. In Népszabadság, in contrast, it was the Hungarian Guard, the rightwing media and the 
institutions responsible for not putting an end to discrimination that were consistently evaluated 
negatively.  
Victims also featured in the reporting as well. For kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet the 
Hungarians were the victims; in Népszabadság, it was the Roma.  
 
 
 
 
The Roma constitute not only a distinct ethnic group, but also a peculiar and particular 
civilisation that evolved during the long centuries of nomadism; this is a culture of 
“deliberate outsiders”. This culture included a very thrifty life style that provided very 
low and modest living conditions that would have been unimaginable for the majority 
society. At the same time, it also offered security for the community, united as they 
were in poverty by solidarity.  
(Romano Rácz: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091014_roma_cigany_integracio)  
Issue 9/2012_ p. 6 of 10 
                        
 
 
Key Findings 
 
• There is a growing tendency of non-tolerant public discourse in Hungary spreading 
to almost all types of media;   
• The rise of radical racist language is linked to the political success of the far right 
party, Jobbik;  
• Jobbik has been setting the political and media agenda by thematising the ‘Roma 
question’;  
• Mainstream media from both the left and right fail to offer a viable alternative to the 
radical right version of events;  
• Mainstream media agreeing to acting as partners in ‘breaking taboos’, thus becoming 
complicit in legitimating non-tolerant discourses;  
• Cultural difference is ‘recognised’ in these media discourses but as a basis for 
justifying exclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Issue 9/2012_ p. 7 of 10 
                        
 
 
Key Messages for  Policy Makers 
 
 
One of the most important conclusions of our study is that the rise of the radical 
right is linked to the media coverage of these events. In Hungary the media as well 
as the political elite have become complicit in this spread of intolerant 
discourses. This complicitly takes the form of silence and indifference (not 
condeming racist or intolerant discourses) and collusion (appropriating, typically in 
only superficially reworked version, the intolerant discourses of the radical right).  
To date, Jobbik and the media outlets associated with it have effectively set the 
agenda on the ‘Roma question’. This needs to end. To challenge the rise of racist 
and intolerant language and derail Jobbik on the ‘Roma question’, mainstream 
political parties must join forces to mount a sustained anti-racism campaign:    
 
 A more robust stance against racism must be taken by all mainstream 
political actors. Not only must these politicians of parties refrain from adopting 
intolerant discourses on the Roma, they must speak out clearly and 
collectively against all instances of intolerance vis-à-vis the Roma.   
 
 Enforcement of hate speech offences in the media and public life more generally 
is crucially needed.  
 
 The media authority (the Hungarian Media Council) should punish 
stereotyped and biased representation of Roma (and other minorities) based 
the regulation on balanced and objective media coverage.  
 
 Besides the need of the more active involvement of the Media Council in punishing 
biased representations of minorities, the media need to adhere to their code of 
ethics and monitor their own reporting on Roma issues. The code of ethics is 
prepared by the media outlet itself and it is in the competence of each newspaper, 
television or radio channel to implement it during their daily work. 
 
Issue 9/2012_ p. 8 of 10 
                        
 
 
Methodology 
 
Four Hungarian media sources were analyzed three of which served as a basis 
for case 1. and case 2., and the fourth for case 3. For the first two cases we included 
the following media: kuruc.info.hu, one of the most important radical right-wing 
internet web-sites in Hungary, the left-wing but mainstream Népszabadság, and the 
right-wing (also mainstream) Magyar Nemzet. For our third case we compiled a 
database by choosing one particular debate published in a weekly political and 
economic magazine, Heti Világgazdaság (HVG). 
Kuruc.info.hu is one of the leading ineternet web-sites of the radical right. Its 
editors use pseudonyms and it is operated from an American server. It is openly 
racist against all minorities. The site is constantly in the focus of debates on hate 
speech and efforts have been made to ban it.  
Népszabadság is the largest national daily with left wing orientation. It used to 
be the Communist Party’s official paper. Since 1989 it has enjoyed  the continued 
support of the Sociality Party. 
Magyar Nemzet was founded in 1938 and has always been a conservative 
paper. After 1989, the newspaper emerged as an independent and 
moderate/conservative paper. In 2000 the paper was merged with a more extremist 
right wing paper. Although it is still considered mainstream, since the merger it has 
adapted a rather radical voice. 
www.hvg.hu: According to the self defintion of the magazine, HVG is a liberal 
minded, economic-political weekly not linked to any political parities. It publishes 
articles regardless of political party interests.   
For case 1. and 2. we conducted keyword searches – looking for the name of 
Olaszliszka and Tatárszentgyörgy – in both papers and the website to compile a 
dataset containing all relevant articles published since the incidents occurred. 
For case 3, we used all articles of one particular debate launched by the editors of 
hvg.hu entitled: Why don’t Hungarian Roma integrate? From the dataset we selected 
opinion articles and analyzed discursive strategies such as construction of 
enemies, attributions of negative and positive traits, arguments of justification, and 
racist, anti-Semitic, nationalist or ethnicist utterances.  
Issue 9/2012_ p. 9 of 10 
                        
 
 
Project Identity 
 
Acronym: ACCEPT PLURALISM 
Title: Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges 
of the 21st Century in Europe 
 
Short Description: ACCEPT PLURALISM questions how much cultural diversity can be 
accommodated within liberal and secular democracies in Europe. The 
notions of tolerance, acceptance, respect and recognition are central to the 
project. ACCEPT PLURALISM looks at both native and immigrant minority 
groups. 
Through comparative, theoretical and empirical analysis the project studies 
individuals, groups or practices for whom tolerance is sought but which we 
should not tolerate; of which we disapprove but which should be tolerated; 
and for which we ask to go beyond toleration and achieve respect and 
recognition. 
In particular, we investigate when, what and who is being not tolerated / 
tolerated / respected in 15 European countries; why this is happening in 
each case; the reasons that different social actors put forward for not 
tolerating / tolerating / respecting specific minority groups/individuals and 
specific practices. 
The project analyses practices, policies and institutions, and produces key 
messages for policy makers with a view to making European societies 
more respectful towards diversity. 
 
Website: www.accept-pluralism.eu   
Duration: March 2010-May 2013 (39 months) 
Funding Scheme: Small and medium-scale collaborative project 
EU contribution: 2,600,230 Euro 
Consortium: 17 partners (15 countries) 
Coordinator: European University Institute (Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies) 
 
Person Responsible: Prof. Anna Triandafyllidou 
EC officer:  Ms Louisa Anastopoulou, Project Officer 
 
Issue 9/2012_ p. 10 of 10 
                        
 
 
  


The Rise of the Extreme Right in Hungary and the Roma Question: The Radicalization of Media Discourse

Prohnitchi, Valeriu

Strategic comparison of Moldova\u2019s integration options: Deep and comprehensive economic integration with the EU versus the accession to the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union