Policy Documentation Center

Ditrych, Ondrej

Ondřej Ditrych
To Catch a Fogle
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Putin regime seems to have chosen to publicly expose Ryan Fogle not
simply as a “tit-for-tat” for the embarrasing release of footage by the FBI
of the meetings of “illegals” detained in the U.S. (2010) with Russian
diplomats, but to gesture toward domestic audiences and to humiliate
the U.S. in order to weaken its position in mutual negotiations, knowing
that Washington may not be in the position to retaliate.
For the EU, the episode is a reminder that even in the age of cyber threats
the conventional spy war is far from over.
Institute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1 www.iir.cz
Institute of International Relations May 2013 Policy Paper
The scene was reminiscent of the Cold War, and the script – for indeed there was a script
– could have come straight from one of John Le Carré’s novels. Only now, the part of
the poor Jim Pridaux, lured into a trap in the woods of Communist Czechoslovakia
where he had been led to believe he would learn the identity of the MI6 “mole” from a
defecting general in Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy (1974), was assumed by Ryan Fogle, a
U.S. diplomat at the Moscow embassy presumably on the CIA payroll.
The time was midnight, the place Akademik Pilyugin Street. Fogle was out to meet a
Russian counter-terrorism officer specialising in the North Caucasus. He had made
some effort to lose any tail there could have been at leaving the embassy. In the end, it
was futile – it appears to have been his very contact who struck him to the ground as the
Institute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1www.iir.cz
2
FSB (Russia’s internal security agency) officers swarmed around. The rest is video
footage, circulated and endlessly rebroadcast on state television networks: the transport
to Lubyanka, detailed shots of Fogle’s periphernalia (including improbable ones like
compass or a letter that reads, as some have pointed out, like a Nigerian email scam),
and the visit at the notorious FSB headquarters by three other embassy staffers, filmed
silently listening while a Russian official reviews Fogle’s alleged actions.
When a recruitment operation by foreign intelligence is compromised, the targeted
government generally has three options. First, it can unceremoniously return the agent
to the country of origin, declaring him a persona non grata. A U.S. diplomat posted to
in Russia identified by the FSB as “Benjamin Dillon” may have suffered such fate as re-
cently as January. Second, it can try to convince the agent that (s)he has succeeded. This
way it can pocket the money, gain insight into the foreign service’s knowledge and op-
erational procedures, and possibly even feed it disinformation. Third, it can opt for a
public exposure.
What could have been the Kremlin’s motivations for choosing the last option? Having
limited insight into the background and relying on open sources alone, there is no
knowing for sure. That said, a contextual analysis may go some way in suggesting pos-
sible explanations predicated on the assumption that since the decision was made by
the top brass (as commentators seem to agree), it was based on President Putin’s regime
rational calculation of what best serves its interests.
The first context to consider is domestic. The spectacularity of the event and the mass
reproduction of the released material (the footage and two intercepted phone calls
placed by Fogle before his arrest) suggest that at least at one level this was a rhetorical
gesture directed at domestic audiences. At the time when Putin seems to find it more
and more difficult to hold to his unchallenged status vis-ą-vis the society but increas-
ingly, given the former’s pacification in the aftermath of the last year’s protests, also the
greedy political class, such gesture, aiming at disciplining those key constituencies,
mimics the familiar: unveiling foreign enemies sewing discontent in Russian society,
the stability of which only Putin can now guarantee. It is not implausible that the un-
likely props were thrown in to make sure the spectacle was more easily intelligible,
while at the same time ridiculing the U.S. by suggesting its tradecraft was primitive (the
clownish appearance of the story’s protagonist, courtesy of the shaggy blond wig, also
did its part).
Second, the link to the North Caucasus deserves mentioning. It is reasonable to believe
that the recent Boston attacks were behind the recruitment attempt – despite the fact
that the Tsarnayev brothers’ radicalisation most likely had nothing to do with their fam-
ily roots in the region or Tamerlan’s visit there in 2012. (Neither in their choice of tar-
get nor rationalisation for their terrorist act Tsarnayevs appear to have subscribed to the
Caucasian emirate’s regional cause. And given Tamerlan’s unfamiliarity with the local
www.iir.czInstitute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1
3
social environment, he was extremely unlikely to get access to the “globalist” Salafi ja-
maats.) That would suggest that Washington has been less than satisfied with the assis-
tance received from Moscow following the bombings. But it might also be concerned
about the safety of U.S. athletes at the Sochi Olympics (2014) the budget for which has
been plundered by local “businessmen”. Moscow, in its turn, could adorn the public rit-
ual condemning of the fact that someone could be even thinking of spying in Moscow
by “hurt feelings” that this happened just as it had lent hand with Boston attacks in-
vestigations, thus reinforcing the message of Washington’s duplicity. Moreover, while
deciding how to handle the situation the subject of Fogle’s interest reduced the benefits
of proceeding according to the second scenario (simulating operational success): had he
been interested in Russian new weapons technologies, the stakes would have been dif-
ferent.
Why would the Kremlin humiliate Washington just at the time when it may make the
latter endorse with much more ease the (dubious) narrative of the North Caucasus as a
a battlefield in the global war on terror it had been promoting for years, and perhaps
even assist in the crackdown on the North Caucasus insurgents’ financing from diaspo-
ras around the world? Perhaps because it feels it can.
The Kremlin may see itself as playing upper hand in the mutural relations lately, inter-
preting Washington’s policy (rational and composed, but perhaps somewhat lacking in
strategic vision) as one of appeasement and desperate seeking of mutual cooperation.
President Obama’s “reset” can finally be proclaimed dead without ever producing sig-
nificant results. Washington has recently reviewed the missile defence plans (EPAA) in
a way that can make Moscow pleased (i.e., scrapping the project’s fourth and final phase
aimed at deploying capabilities to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles). Most im-
portantly, the U.S. administration is increasingly keen on enlisting assistance of Russia
(which has been lending diplomatic and military support to the Assad regime) in re-
solving its conundrum of how to end the civil war in Syria without empowering rebels
linked to Al-Qaeda or merely preparing grounds for future conflict of various violence
enterpreneurs among the resistance (witness the international conference to be con-
vened based on agreement between Foreign Ministers Kerry and Lavrov during the for-
mer’s recent visit to Moscow).
For the Kremlin, the “Foglegate” may be thus well be a part of the psychological game
it plays with Washington (another being its calculated ambivalent position on whether
it will provide sophisticated S-300 air defense systems to the Assad regime). In other
words, seizing on the opportunity created by perhaps a too aggressive case officer, and
with limited benefit in pretending that the recruitment has been successful, the Putin
regime may have chosen the public exposure not simply as a “tit-for-tat” for the em-
barrasing release of footage by the FBI of the meetings of “illegals” detained in the U.S.
(2010) with Russian diplomats, but to 1) gesture toward domestic audiences and 2) hu-
Institute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1www.iir.cz
4
miliate the U.S. in order to weaken its position in mutual negotiations, knowing that
Washington may not be in the position to retaliate.
In the days following Fogle’s detention, the ambassador Michael McFaul was sum-
moned to the Foreign Ministry (which issued an official statement mentioning
‘provocative actions’). However, senior Russian officials including Foreign Minister
Lavrov or Putin’s foreign policy adviser Yuri Ushakov later underplayed the affair. For its
part, Washington does indeed remain silent and apparently still, even as a FSB officer
interviewed on Russian television (“inadvertently”) revealed the name of the CIA sec-
tion chief – an unprecedented breach in the mutual relations of the established infor-
mal rules of espionage. (In words of the U.S. State Department, “we still feel that we
have a very strong positive relationship…”). So it seems that – unless some other, en-
tirely obscured games are being played in the shadows – the Putin regime scored a tac-
tical victory, demonstrating that while he may feel less secure domestically, the regime
can certainly act confidently in great power politics. But the relations will soon return
to the business as usual.
For the EU, which is stepping up efforts to protect itself from cyber threats that today in-
clude malicious cyberespionage networks such as the recently detected “Red October”
targeting government agencies as well as corporate and research entities, the episode is
a reminder that the conventional spy war is far from over. After all, only a few months
ago the chief of Belgian internal security agency (VSSE) Alan Winants told the press that
in Brussels espionage by Russian or Chinese intelligence services is “at the same level as
[during] the Cold War.”
www.iir.czInstitute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1
5


To Catch a Fogle

Golias, Peter

The shadow economy and how to fight against it (with focus on Moldova and the best Slovak experience)

2014 development cooperation plan

Kalan, Dariusz

\u201cA beautiful future for Central Europe:\u201d Hungary\u2019s regional policy in the Period 2010\u20132013

Lazur, Dumitru

Assessing the Opening of Public Government Data in 2012

Radziejowska, Maria

Awaiting justice: prospects for prosecuting war crimes in Syria

Antic, Dinka

Multi-level fiscal system in Bosnia and Herzegovina: evolution and coping with economic crisis

Selic, Ana

Mapping study: Implementation of Open Government Partnership in Montenegro

Kosovar Civil Society Foundation

1 
 
 
Civil Society Contribution to EC Progress Report for KOSOVO 2013  
 
Name of organisation: Kosovar Civil Society Foundation (KCSF), Prishtina, Kosovo 
Contribution to:  
2.1 Democracy and the rule of law, Government, Public Administration 
2.2. Human Rights and the protection of minorities, Civil and political rights 
2.3 Regional issues and international obligations 
 
Kosovar Civil Society Foundation (KCSF) provides its input to the EC Progress Reports on 
the field of civil society development, as well as on main issues on Relations between the 
EU and Kosovo, including regional cooperation. KCSF input will cover only the 
developments for the reporting period beginning of October 2012 – end of July 2013.  
 
2.1 Democracy and the rule of law, Government / Public Administration 
Administrative structures established to run EU integration process in Kosovo 
 
Major developments 
 
The National Council for European Integration (NCEI) established last year by the 
President of Kosovo also includes representatives of civil society. The regular members 
from the sector in the Council are representatives of CIVIKOS Platform, Kosovar Civil 
Society Foundation (KCSF), Kosovo Chamber of Commerce (OEK) and Association of 
Kosovo Municipalities (AKK). Since its establishment, the Council has met four (4) times. 
 
By mandate given from NCEI, the Ministry of European Integration launched the process 
of drafting the National Strategy for European Integration. This task is led by the Task 
Force for European Integration (TFEI), established specifically for this purpose. The TFEI 
within its seven (7) thematic round tables invited civil society representatives for 
consultations and contributions during diagnosis phase, whereby some of the thematic 
tables are chaired by prominent civil society representatives.  
 
EU has decided to start SAA negotiations with Kosovo. The government of Kosovo has 
established a negotiating structure for SAA leaving possibility to invite experts and civil 
society members to negotiating groups upon need. 
 
Main challenges 
Despite few positive developments, this reporting period has been marked by a number 
of challenges which can be summarized as the following: 
• National Council for European Integration (NCEI) has been established in order to 
ensure broad national consensus and increase transparency and communication with 
the public in the EU integration process. The Council has failed to gather all the actors 
of the opposition. Whereas during council meetings the issues and policies of major 
public interests have been also kept out of public debate and closed for the media. 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
DIRECTORATE GENERALE FOR ENLARGEMENT 
                                        
2 
 
• The Council meetings lack sufficient preparations and follow up. Meetings are 
scheduled in short notice and lack consistence and rather serve daily politics. This 
results into general discussions and far from obligations vis-à-vis EU reforms. This 
practice of work does not provide a fruitful ground for civil society contribution, 
involvement and monitoring of the EU integration process for Kosovo. 
 
• The draft National Strategy for European Integration has been finalized in June 2013, 
however the draft strategy has not been sent yet for discussion and approval to NCEI, 
neither has it undergone a public consultation process in accordance with the legal 
provisions in force. 
 
• Inclusion of all stakeholders into SAA negotiations as per adopted Rules of Procedure 
is not mandatory. The experience of other countries of the region which have 
undergone SAA negotiations in the past years shows that, having all stakeholders on 
board including civil society, academia, trade unions and individual experts within SAA 
negotiation rounds ensures inclusive and participatory approach and secures 
additional sources of needed expertise.  
 
 
2.2. Human Rights and the protection of minorities, Civil and political rights 
The current state of play in civil society development and civil dialogue 
 
Major developments 
 
Civil society has been successful in engaging government to support its initiatives for 
establishing a structured cooperation between two sectors. 
 
A governmental strategy for cooperation with civil society has been initiated in late 2011 
and has been adopted on 5th
 
 of July 2013. The 2013-2017 Strategy provides the main 
directions for government policies and mechanisms with regards to civil society 
participation in policy-making, service provision from CSOs and public funds for civil 
society. The drafting process was inclusive and numerous CSOs led the process and 
contributed to the document.  
In early 2013, drafting of the Administrative Instructions deriving from the Law on 
Freedom of Association in NGOs has been initiated, in close cooperation with civil society 
organizations.  
 
Based on the obligation for public consultations deriving from the Rules of Procedures of 
the Government, many Ministries have invited CSOs to provide their written contributions 
to the draft-laws and other documents. During 2012, more than 80 draft-documents have 
been published for public consultations,  
 
The Constitutional Court declared non-compatible with the Constitution a number of 
provisions of the Law on Banks, Microfinance Institutions and Non-bank Financial 
Institutions, thus preventing the transformation of Microfinance NGOs into joint stock 
companies. This Law was adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo on 12th of April 2012, 
without any formal involvement of civil society, which expressed serious concerns on 
3 
 
transformation of non-for-profit capital to private capital. Following an intensive advocacy 
and public campaign in opposing the transformation, and after exhaustion of all legal 
remedies, a number of NGOs used the institution of the Ombudsman to file a request to 
the Constitutional Court.  
Main challenges 
 
Despite few positive developments, this reporting period has been marked by a number 
of challenges, which hamper development of civil society. Most of the challenges derive 
from the lack of political willingness to constructively engage with civil society, causing 
serious deficiencies of transparency and accountability, and poor implementation of 
existing legislation. Yet, one of the most important consequences is the lack of capacities 
of institutions responsible for cooperation with civil society. Moreover, government and 
other public institutions have been unwilling to address the issue of human and financial 
capacities for many years now. The outcome of these deficiencies directly impacts the 
following: 
 
The Governmental strategy for cooperation with civil society adoption was shadowed by 
of the proceedings of the Government with regards to the Law on Amnesty that was 
happening in the same period – the breach of consultation for such an important law 
immediately endangered the implementation of the main component of the Strategy, 
which aims to promote participation of civil society in drafting and implementation of 
public policies and laws. 
 
• A lack of ownership on the adopted documents and difficulties in implementation 
are evident, since most of the progress achieved was based on the civil society 
input solely. This was the case on the requirements for public consultation, 
governmental strategy for cooperation with civil society, administrative 
instructions of the NGO Law, etc.  Since the Governmental Strategy for 
cooperation with civil society includes most of the necessary measures for 
improving the environment for civil society in Kosovo, its timely and full 
implementation is of crucial importance. Only with a substantial change of the 
political willingness and increase of capacities of responsible institutions such an 
implementation can be expected. 
 
• The level of implementation of the Law on Access to Public Documents is low, 
making the access to public documents difficult for all interested parties. 
Currently, the provision of information from public institutions is selective without 
any standard or criteria, in particular with regards to issues considered of high 
political and economic interest. In addition, the issue of Classified Documents, 
although regulated by law, is often misused by civil servants and politicians who 
are unwilling to provide specific information or unjustifiably delaying timely 
provision of information to the public. 
 
• Only few of public consultations conducted by the Government have respected 
the legal requirements of timely and adequate information, period for 
contribution, institutional setup and feedback on the results of consultations. 
Furthermore, the breach of Rules of Procedures of the Government and Assembly 
in passing the Law on Amnesty with regard to the requirements for public 
4 
 
consultations (see attached open letter by KCSF on that matter) has sent an 
extremely negative signal as per the real political will to participatory policy 
making including in the areas of high importance such as laws pertaining to the 
constitutional category. 
 
 
• Public consultation is not only a legal requirement, but it is a basic and necessary 
tool for reflecting the interests of citizens in policies and laws drafted by their 
elected representatives. Absence of proper consultation has often resulted with 
poor quality legislation and harmed its implementation. In Kosovo, laws and 
policies of major political and economic interests are often kept out of the public 
debate and scrutiny, due to the lack of mechanisms of implementation, monitoring 
and evaluation for the process of public consultations at central level. The Law on 
Banks, the Law on Amnesty and the entire package of Laws for Visa Liberalization 
process are only some of many examples of non-transparent and non-inclusive 
decision-making on important legislation, despite the legal requirements to 
conduct public consultations. 
 
 
• The financial reporting for NGOs remains identical to private businesses. This is 
due to the low understanding of specific nature of the non-for-profit sector on the 
side of Tax Administration and decision-makers, exposing NGOs to difficulties in 
their daily operation with regards to taxes and reporting. The financial reporting 
requirements need to be amended so to take into account the specific nature of 
the NGOs and be proportionate to the size of the organization and its type/scope 
of activities. 
 
• The benefits of CSOs with public benefit status are not specified in the Law on 
Freedom of Association in NGOs, and concrete tax exemptions have to be clearly 
provided in respective tax and custom laws. In the respective tax laws, the few 
existing benefits are quite ambiguous, making the tax deductions for individual 
and corporate donations to CSOs almost inexistent and subject to interpretation of 
officials. 
 
• Kosovo institutions officially do not have any state or public funding for civil 
society. However, recent studies show that around 8% of civil society funds come 
from governmental sources1
 
, while no criteria and procedures on disbursing and 
using these funds exist. Law on Freedom of Association in NGOs requires all public 
institutions that cooperate and financially support civil society to have pre-
determined and transparent criteria for this support. So far, this requirement has 
produced no effects in practice, neither in developing legal instruments, nor in 
developing administrative and human capacities. Thus, a specific framework for 
principles and standards of public funding for civil society needs to be initiated, 
based on a wide debate and contribution from all parties involved. 
 
                                            
1 http://kcsfoundation.org/repository/docs/KCSF_CIVICUS_CSI_Analytical_Country_Report_Kosovo.pdf  
5 
 
 
 
2.3 Regional issues and international obligations 
  Major developments and challenges with regards to regional participation 
 
Major developments 
 
Kosovo’s main achievement on the regional cooperation fora is the decision of the 
Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) Board to amend the statute and the list of 
participants of the organization, reflecting the results of the EU-mediated dialogue 
between Belgrade and Prishtina. Hence, Kosovo becoming one of the 27 participants of 
the RCC Board, on February 28, 2013.  
Main challenges 
 
• Regional cooperation momentum built up lately for Kosovo is not being advanced 
effectively by the government for Kosovo’s participation/membership and 
ultimately benefit from other regional initiatives and task forces. Kosovo’s RCC 
participation risks being an open-ended objective in itself without a proper follow-
up for membership in other regional structures and activities.  
• The government of Kosovo should devote administrative resources and most 
importantly appoint a National Coordinator for RCC, who will be able to actively 
contribute as well as make the appropriate link between Kosovo and RCC, in order 
to benefit from structures and projects of RCC and its regional initiatives.   


Civil Society Contribution to EC Progress Report for KOSOVO 2013

Segnarbieux, Fabien

Enhancing Media Privilege in Montenegro. A comparative analysis of laws from France, Belgium and Sweden with Montenegrin legislation