Policy Documentation Center

Profant, Tomas

Toporowski, Patryk

Potential for cooperation: Polish and Czech standpoints on the Banking Union

World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development

Euromonitor: Synthesis of Main Developments (January- December 2014)

Armenia 2013. A year of expectations and surprises

Ditrych, Ondrej

Ondrej Ditrych
Karabakh’s Twenty Years
Crisis: The EU Should
Do More
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Twenty years have passed since an armistice in the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict was concluded. EU can and should do more to facilitate its reso-
lution.
The Union’s security interests are at stake (energy), and it can use the
hitherto neglected conflict to boost credibility of its foreign and security
policy (CFSP) in the context of the Ukraine crisis which additionally makes
the conflict parties (Armenia, Azerbaijan) uneasy of Russia’s intentions, a
fact that the EU can use to its advantage.
The EU can notably mobilize its comprehensive approach to address the
conflict, promote a conciliatory narrative of history and future of peaceful
coexistence, and declare readiness to assume peacekeeping tasks under
the CSDP.
Institute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1 www.iir.cz
Institute of International Relations May 2014 Policy Paper
Twenty years ago, on 12 May 1994, a ceasefire came into effect that ended the war in
Nagorno Karabakh. Ever since, uneasy truce exists between parties Azerbaijan and Ar-
menia, parties to the conflict. Inflammatory rhetoric has proliferated; and periodical
skirmishes along the line of contact have cost more than 3,000 lives. The EU, while de-
signing an ambitious agenda to create a ring of peaceful and prosperous states in its
neighbourhood, has so far eschewed more direct engagement. This policy paper argues
that it should eschew it no longer, and outlines how it can do so without excessive com-
mitment on its part.
The Conflict
When the ethnic conflict broke once again between Azerbaijani and Armenians in the
late 1980s – it was the third time that century – the result was a bloody war. The
(Moscow) centre ‘could not hold’, and two of the newly independent republics of the
South Caucasus wrestled over a piece of mountainous land which is poor on resources
but plays a crucial role in the ethnosymbolic narratives from which their modern na-
tional identities had been performatively constituted in the Soviet times – Nagorno
Karabakh (1992–1994). By the time the Bishkek ceasefire agreement was concluded, Ar-
menia had taken control not only of 92.5% of the former autonomous oblast which ad-
ministratively had once been part of the Azerbaijani SSR (a quasistate Nagorno
Karabakh Republic was declared in 1992), but also of seven neighbouring raions, carv-
ing a cordon sanitaire twice the size of the Nagorno Karabakh into Azerbaijan that Ar-
menians have held ever since.
A new geopolitical reality was thus created. The 250km-long ‘line of control’ now sepa-
rates the two hostile nations, protected by 20,000 soldiers on each side; 1.5 million peo-
ple were forced from their homes as a result of the broader ethnic conflict (some 500,000
Azerbaijani fled Nagorno Karabakh and particularly the neighbouring raions); and the
state border between Armenia and Turkey (Azerbaijani ally) has been closed since 1993,
causing Yerevan to incur substantial opportunity costs and increasing its sense of encir-
clement. (Protocols were signed on reopening of the border during a brief period of rap-
prochement in 2009, but the process of their ratification remains stalled.) After two
decades of mediation by OSCE Minsk Group, represented by the Troika of U.S., France
and Russia (which in the past few years all but dominated the process, while it inciden-
tally also has been arming both parties of the conflict), the peace process is no closer to
the conclusion. For the time being, therefore, this geopolitical reality continues to de-
fine this part of European neighbourhood, all but preventing regional cooperation and
always threatening a ‘from ancient grudge break to a new mutiny’ scenario. Such sce-
nario would most likely feature an initial conflagration by accident which could howev-
er likely move up the escalation ladder due to different perceptions of the parties re-
Institute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1www.iir.cz
2
garding the conflict outcomes, having as a consequence broader instability in the region
due to a possible involvement by Russia and/or Turkey, and resulting, among other, in
disruption of energy flows to the European markets through the ‘Southern Corridor’.
The EU Should Do More… and It Can
A decade ago, the EU set as its objective a creation of secure and prosperous neighbour-
hood. In the Eastern neighbourhood, it has offered funds and better access to the single
market on the condition that partner countries reform politically and economically.
Without the membership perspective, however, the offer under the heading of Euro-
pean Neigbourhood Policy (ENP) never seemed to be good enough to make the local po-
litical elites bear the substantial costs of transition. Moreover, Russia has weighed in,
striving to reclaim its near abroad and prevent its gravitation to the West.
While it has become engaged in the other unresolved ethnopolitical conflicts in the
South Caucasus (Abkhazia, South Ossetia), the EU has played only a limited role in the
Nagorno Karabakh peace process. True, it has not ignored the conflict entirely. But safe
for a few declarations by the Council and the European Parliament, EEAS’ floating an
idea of ‘region without conflicts’ as a platform for dialogue, or the support from the
EU’s Instrument for Stability of the European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of
the Conflict over Nagorno Karabakh (EPNK), a civil society initiative bringing together
five NGOs led by International Alert and organising events focused on the youth and
journalists in both countries, it has done little to date to bring about its resolution.
It should. Given the likelihood and negative consequences of the new escalation for its
own security in terms of regional instability and interrupted flows of energy), from the
EU’s perspective more involvement is a small investment that promises to yield a con-
siderable dividend. Moreover, the Karabakh conflict is an opportunity for the EU to
show resolve in its foreign policy at a moment of crisis brought about by the develop-
ment in the Ukraine and start redesigning its approach toward the region where Russia’s
neighbours once lured by the unresistable temptations of the Eurasian Union (Armenia)
or boasting of its independence from one and all (Azerbaijan) may increasingly have
second thoughts.
The EU cannot resolve the conflict single-handedly. It cannot make the parties an ‘offer
they can’t refuse’. But it can contribute to the peace process in three practicable ways:
• integrating the issue into its comprehensive approach vis-à-vis the conflict parties;
• promoting of what Tom de Waal called the ‘third narrative’ of the both nations’ in-
tertwined histories (and futures);
• and declaring readiness to assume future peacekeeping tasks under the CSDP.
www.iir.czInstitute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1
3
Mobilising EU’s Comprehensive Approach
The influence of the EU vis-à-vis the parties of the conflict appears to have suffered re-
cently. Armenia was gravitating closer to the EU as a new association agreement and a
deep and comprehensive free trade agreement (DCFTA) were foreseen to be initialled at
the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius last November; but it was forced to change
its mind. However, Yerevan has no intention to be swallowed by the increasingly impe-
rialist and revanchist Russia, and could now more than ever be willing to reconsider the
benefits of a more open approach on the Karabakh conflict. The EU should do its best
to support such possible development.
Regarding Azerbaijan, energy relations are becoming ever tighter. But the EU should rec-
ognize that this indeed increases the mutual dependence between the two, but in an
asymmetrical way favourable to the EU rather than the other way around, despite the
public affairs companies hired by Baku’s convincing.
The EU could make better use of the leverage it has to stimulate positive steps by the par-
ties by combining carrots and sticks in its ‘comprehensive approach’ arsenal. These
steps include, above all:
• ensuring unimpeded access of the EU representatives to Nagorno Karabakh;
• putting in place much needed CBMs on the line of control (like incident investigation
mechanisms, in principle agreed by the parties);
• tempering the belligerent rhetoric on both sides and actions increasing the tension
on the part of Azerbaijan (e.g. statements on restoring territorial integrity immedi-
ately followed by military exercises near Nagorno Karabakh);
• conciliatory measures on the part of Armenia that would make Baku agree with the
‘interim status’ for Nagorno Karabakh and allow progress on the implementation of
other basic ‘Madrid Principles’ for the conflict resolution (unilateral removal of
snipers from the line of control, and even giving up of a few raions along the Araxes
river, which in turn could be reciprocated by opening of the borders with Turkey, ru-
moured to make such quid pro quo proposition to Armenia in 2012);
• continuing detailed discussion of the Madrid Principles (made public at the G8
L’Aquila summit in 2009 and elaborated since) in general, which besides the interim
status include Armenian gradual withdrawal from the raions surrounding Nagorno
Karabakh, maintaining land communication between the territory and Armenia
through the Lachin corridor, decision on the final status, return of the displaced per-
sons, and international guarantees, including deployment of international peace-
keeping force.
Institute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1www.iir.cz
4
Promoting a Narrative of Peace
The comprehensive approach can be mobilised not only to change the expected utility
of the governmental actors. It can also be used to root a new narrative of peace in the
two societies. The assumption here is that ‘conflict transformation’ (conceptually dif-
ferent from ‘conflict resolution’ in the understanding of the need of broad societal en-
gagement to achieve peaceful outcomes) is necessary to remove one of the main obsta-
cles of the peace process: the societies’ ‘ontological insecurity’, their trench mentality
and effective routinisation of the conflict as known experience (contrasted to the peace
as an unknown condition for more and more people on each side).
To promote trust, routine intersocietal interactions and emergence of compatible (col-
lective) life narratives, the EU may build on its previous activities (ENPK), but it should
provide more generous funding for platforms where people shaping these narratives
can meet and interact. The success of such endeavour is premised on both governments’
acceptance of the increased openness. The combination of incentives (boosting effica-
cy of state agencies to deliver public goods, and promising to substitute the ‘national se-
curity state’ as a source of the regimes’ legitimacy) and pressure could be used to ensure
their cooperation. Second, the EU should act as to enable emergence of, rather than dic-
tate the ‘third narrative’, which in very general contours should – instead of emphasis-
ing past grievances and perceived injustices – include references to the historical peri-
ods of peaceful and prosperous cohabitation of both ethnicities in Karabakh (e.g. in the
Karabakh Khanate), but mainly advance the vision of future defined more by peace and
security than certain political boundaries.
EU** Karabakh
The idea of a peacekeeping mission in Nagorno Karabakh dates back to the days of the
Bishkek ceasefire agreement. When the late Azerbaijani President Haydar Aliyev refused
Moscow’s proposal for a CIS operation, the CSCE/OSCE peacekeeping mandate was
agreed instead. But while the OSCE has developed some institutional capacity to engage
with conflicts at different stages, it has not yet conducted a single peacekeeping opera-
tion and its mandate now seems all but expired. Instead, the idea of a CSDP operation
in support of the implementation of the peace deal (once reached) in Karabakh has ap-
peared in several EU’s statements in recent years, notably declarations issued by the Eu-
ropean Parliament.
Many possible geometries of a future CSDP mission (or missions) can be envisioned.
Based on the premise that the CSDP capacities should be deployed in support of the im-
plementation of the Madrid Principles – the basic template for conflict resolution on
the table – the following tasks for the peacekeeping force can be identified:
www.iir.czInstitute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1
5
• monitoring the withdrawal of Armenian / NKR forces from a) the first five raions and
some villages in Lachin, and later b) the rest of Lachin and Kelbajar and these territo-
ries’ demilitarisation (this is conditioned on Armenia giving up these lands which
were initially conceived of only as a ‘security zone’, but over the years have become
increasingly depicted as ‘liberated territories’ forming part of the historical province
of Artsakh in general discourse);
• overseeing the return of displaced persons and facilitating their (re)integration in
Nagorno Karabakh (tensions can be expected due to unequal access to post-conflict
development resources) and the territory’s demilitarisation (according to the Inter-
national Crisis Group, it is currently one of the most militarised societies in the
world), while also ensuring the protection of Armenian population in Lachin and
Kelbajar;
• providing security in the Lachin corridor (after the Lachin raion is handed back by Ar-
menia) which is the most important land connection between Armenia and Nagorno
Karabakh (but also, in case of reopening of the Agdam road, providing Azerbaijani
with the fastest connection to the Nakhchivan exclave).
These variable tasks could be performed partly in parallel and partly in sequence over a
longer period of time by a) one CSDP mission with multidimensional mandate, b) sev-
eral successive (‘specialised’) missions or c) by several specialised missions with only
partial EU’s participation. In the last case, the CSDP mission(s) could complement oth-
er missions either by the UN or OSCE. All these configurations moreover allow for the
possibility of a hybrid mission (combining civilian and military components), as well
as the involvement of other interested parties, not ruling out even Russia (which has
previously participated in CSDP either through providing a contingent for EUFOR
Chad, or seconding personnel to EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina).
The EU should arrive at a consensus that deploying CSDP capacities in Karabakh in the
future is desirable. It should also engage in the discussion about practicality of different
geometries and develop a set of feasible scenarios for future engagement that could be
communicated to the conflict parties as a basis for further negotiations. Finally, it
should aim at making the peacekeeping process as inclusive as possible. (In case of one
of the ‘non-participatory’ geometries, this could be achieved through presence of Russ-
ian and Turkish liaison officers).
In other words, the EU should not postpone the preliminary deliberation on a possible
future CSDP mission until a breakthrough in the peace process takes place, since by
demonstrating that it is ready to assume an active role in the post-conflict phase it could
actually bring the deal closer.
Ondrej Ditrych is a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations Prague.
Institute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1www.iir.cz
6


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Political Capital Policy Research and Consulting Institute
H-1082  Budapest, Futó utca 47-53.
Phone: +36 1 430 66 99                     Email: info@politicalcapital.hu
www.politicalcapital.hu                     www.valasztasirendszer.hu1
May 27, 2014flash report: The EU will survive
The EU will survive
analysis on the outcomes of the European Parliamentary elections
Key findings
 • The strengthening of extremism is an important signal, but the EU-committed 
“mainstream” remains strong. If the notion of the crisis becomes stronger within the 
EU, the prediction of “Europe will fall” can fulfill itself.
 • Since the Eurosceptic parties often admit their Russian commitment, it is an open 
secret that their larger proportion of mandates can definitely strengthen Russian 
influence in Europe. Besides the Russian world power and regional issues, these 
parties are staunch proponents of key Russian energy industry interests too.
 • The votes of the 12 Fidesz MEPs can be decisive in certain cases not only in the 
election of the EC President. Fidesz can use the narrow majority of the EPP for political 
blackmailing in the future too.
 • Despite the result of Együtt-PM and DK, which is better than expected, there is no 
significant realignment in the Hungarian right-left dichotomy. Fidesz still faces no 
challenger.
 • The second place of Jobbik is only a big success at one glance: it did manage to 
overtake MSZP, but the reason is that although the supporters of the left are a bigger 
group, their votes were distributed among three parties.
 • The race for the leading position on the left has inevitably started. It will greatly 
make the preparation for the municipal elections harder, because on several levels 
the only chance for them is to cooperate in order to win.
Political Capital Policy Research and Consulting Institute
H-1082  Budapest, Futó utca 47-53.
Phone: +36 1 430 66 99                     Email: info@politicalcapital.hu
www.politicalcapital.hu                     www.valasztasirendszer.hu2
May 27, 2014flash report: The EU will survive
European Union
1) It is not the end of the world – the EU will survive
Although mistrust towards the integration has grown, and based on this, anti-EU forces are 
gaining strength, according to the Eurobarometer research, the majority of EU citizens are still 
committed to the basic values of the Union (peace, liberty, democracy, human rights). Only the 
citizens of the United Kingdom and Cyprus are giving a definite yes to seceding from the Union. 
The strengthening of extremism is an important signal, but at the same time, its extent should not 
be overvalued: the EU-committed “mainstream” remains strong. If the notion of the crisis and the 
apocalyptic mood becomes stronger within the EU, and thus strengthens the extremes that build 
on these notions, this way the prediction of “Europe will fall” can fulfill itself.
Due to the heterogeneous anti-EU/Eurosceptic supply, it is now uncertain how many groups they 
can form. Despite the differences in values and interests, unlike the earlier extreme right factions, 
the present processes seem to be more organized and self-conscious, so the factions can live 
longer, as well. The extreme right, while it is fighting with globalization and the EU, is becoming 
spectacularly more and more “pan-European”. Although the parties of Eastern-Europe are not part 
of the forces involved in the cooperation, the willingness to cooperate on the European level, at 
least in the West, is stronger than before. However, since the conditions are hard (in order to create 
a Group, 25 MEPs of 7 member states have to come to an agreement), it is not so certain that both 
Nigel Farage and Marine Le Pen will be able to form a faction. 
ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists), spearheaded by David Cameron, will practically be 
reestablished, but the fate of EFD (European Freedom and Democracy) is somewhat more unsure. 
The success of the EAF (European Alliance for Freedom), which is to be organized by Marine Le 
Pen, depends primarily on whether or not the potential partners will choose EFD instead of EAF.
Most formations have the tendency to move towards the more moderate groups, so whoever will 
be welcome by Cameron’s ECR, will happily find a home. The next option for most formations is the 
EFD, and then comes helping out Le Pen as an option. Besides EAF, the UKIP led EFD will struggle 
to retain the group, as right now they can rely on the members of five different countries: from the 
far-right, the Danish People’s Party, the Finnish Party and the Lithuanian Order and Justice Party; 
and also the Christian fundamentalist, Protestant Dutch Reformed Political Party, and of course 
the pro-independence British UKIP.
This basic rule can be overshadowed by the seeming commitment towards Le Pen by such players 
as the Italian North League and the Belgian Flemish Interest, who have been sitting in Farage’s 
group so far. The future of the EAF Group led by Le Pen has become doubtful as the Slovakian 
National Party  has dropped out and thus it has only 6 of the 7 countries it needs for certain. On 
the other side, the resetting of the leftist Eurosceptic formation (GUE/NGL) is sure. 
Political Capital Policy Research and Consulting Institute
H-1082  Budapest, Futó utca 47-53.
Phone: +36 1 430 66 99                     Email: info@politicalcapital.hu
www.politicalcapital.hu                     www.valasztasirendszer.hu3
May 27, 2014flash report: The EU will survive
Besides the mentioned parties, there are nine old-new Eurosceptic formations that do not belong 
to a faction. Some of them are rather conservative or leftist, slightly far-right, and also there are 
some that even Le Pen finds racist. Of the latter “pariah” group, one can mention the Greek Golden 
Dawn, the Hungarian Jobbik and the German NPD. Consequently, the majority of the Eurosceptic 
parties with a “free valent”, including the anti-Europe Alternative Germany which has the most 
influence in Parliament and the Italian leftist Five Star Movement, will first want to join the ECR or 
EFD which are closer to the political center. Besides the “pariahs”, EAF and EFD can most probably 
count on the nationalist Polish Congress of the New Right (KNP) or the Independent Greeks 
(Anexartitoi Ellines) who oppose migration and multiculturalism. 
The approximately 27% anti-EU/Eurosceptic block can seem to be frightening, but if we turn the 
figure around, we can see that 73% of the EP mandates are dominantly pro-EU: the People’s Party, 
the Social Democrats, the Liberals and the Greens and a few independents. 
2) Russia is closer
Although it is not clear how many groups that are more or less critical with the EU can be 
formed, but since these parties often admit their Russian commitment (like Marine Le Pen who 
has recently visited Moscow), it is an open secret that their larger proportion of mandates can 
definitely strengthen Russian influence in Europe. Besides the Russian world power and regional 
issues, these parties are staunch proponents of key Russian energy industry interests too. The 
strengthening of the extreme parties will also make it hard for the European endeavors to resolve 
the Ukrainian crisis. Parties that are attracted by EAF, GUE-NGL and EFD have already voted in the 
European Parliament against the proposition to condemn Russia because of the aggression in the 
Crimea.
See our earlier analysis titled The Russian Connection:  http://www.riskandforecast.com/useruploads/
files/pc_flash_report_russian_connection.pdf 
Political Capital Policy Research and Consulting Institute
H-1082  Budapest, Futó utca 47-53.
Phone: +36 1 430 66 99                     Email: info@politicalcapital.hu
www.politicalcapital.hu                     www.valasztasirendszer.hu4
May 27, 2014flash report: The EU will survive
3) Europe has become “politicized” – the fall in the turnout has stopped
For the first time since 1979, the turnout was not lower than 5 years earlier. Even if it is a small 
margin (from 43% to 43.11%), but proportionally more people went to the polls than in 2009. This 
minimal increase in the turnout is mainly due to the fact that despite the commonplace, which 
states that the EP election is never about Europe, this election was in fact about Europe. 
It is not obvious though who could profit from the higher turnout. It is an unfavorable sign 
that where the turnout was higher (France, UK), anti-Europe parties did considerably well. 
If we look at the whole pattern of the EU states, then similarly to 2009, it is true for this election as 
well that there is no strong correlation between turnout and trust towards the EU. Not counting 
the countries where voting is compulsory (BE, CY, EL, LU) and the especially high turnout in Malta, 
there is a 0.3 negative correlation between the turnout and those trusting the EU. So the lower 
the turnout, the higher the trust is towards the EU, although this correlation is not strong. Based 
on this, is seems that it is a pity to expect the strengthening of the legitimacy of the EU only 
due to the turnout. 
Political Capital Policy Research and Consulting Institute
H-1082  Budapest, Futó utca 47-53.
Phone: +36 1 430 66 99                     Email: info@politicalcapital.hu
www.politicalcapital.hu                     www.valasztasirendszer.hu5
May 27, 2014flash report: The EU will survive
4) It can lead to a democratic deficit if the top candidate of the EPP is not elected the 
President of the European Commission
Although many people have made it clear that the next President will not necessarily be selected 
from the top candidates of the party families, it would discredit the first personalized debate and 
the whole EP if a sixth candidate was chosen – as wished by Viktor Orbán and David Cameron 
among others. This would provide a stronger ground to the charge against the EU claiming its 
“democratic deficit”, and in the future, it can bring about scepticism in connection with forward-
pointing actions. It can also fire up anti-Europe voices who can rightly say that the EU was only 
“fooling” with the voters when it made them believe that the leader of the Commission can come 
from the top candidates. 
5) In Europe, in the future big coalitions can operate
Although the party groups sharply criticized each other throughout the campaign, it is expected 
in the European Parliament, even more than before, that decisions in the European Parliament will 
be made along big coalition lines (mainly People’s Party-Social Democrat-Liberal). The socialist, 
the liberal and the green Groups even together are far from the majority, and the EPP will not be 
able to make a lasting majority that could govern. With the growing of the EU-sceptic formations, 
pro-Europe groups will have to depend on each other more than ever. 
Hungary
1) Despite the result of Együtt-PM and DK, which is better than expected, there is no 
significant realignment in the right-left dichotomy. 
Fidesz has lost 5 percent, while Jobbik, having gained a lot of strength in the past five years, has 
almost dropped back to its performance in 2009. Leftist formations have gained five percent more 
than five years ago. 
Regarding the left vs. right power struggle, the results show no real difference compared to the 
elections in April. The parties of the then called “Összefogás” have gained 28% instead 26 in April 
and the (domestic) proportion of votes of Fidesz and Jobbik together was 64% in April and 66% 
now. It refers to the fact that although there was some realignment within the left and the right, 
there has been little movement between the two big groups. 
Political Capital Policy Research and Consulting Institute
H-1082  Budapest, Futó utca 47-53.
Phone: +36 1 430 66 99                     Email: info@politicalcapital.hu
www.politicalcapital.hu                     www.valasztasirendszer.hu6
May 27, 2014flash report: The EU will survive
2) Fidesz will use its power in the European scene too 
Fidesz still faces no challenger. As it has received 51.5%, it can claim to have the support of 
the majority of voters. Because of the low turnout, obviously this interpretation is also rather 
questionable, but while the party could not get over 50% at the parliamentary elections, this 
time they managed to do it. Looking at the whole of Europe, Fidesz received the second biggest 
proportion of votes (after the Maltese Labour Party’s 53%), which is a big feat of arms both in 
Budapest and Brussels. Fidesz will use this power in the European scene as well, the first sign of it 
is that Viktor Orbán has openly declared that the party would not support the nomination of the 
Jean-Claude Juncker (the party and political ally of Viviane Reding) by the European People’s Party 
(EPP) to head the European Commission. The votes of the 12 Fidesz MEPs can be decisive in certain 
cases not only in the election of the EC President. Fidesz can use the narrow majority of the EPP for 
political blackmailing in the future too. 
3) The winning streak of Jobbik has been broken, but party has not snapped. 
Fidesz managed to take 56% of its voters to go to the polls, the leftist parties took 50% of theirs, 
LMP had 43% of its voters. At the same time, Jobbik performed much worse: it managed to 
mobilize only one third of its voter base. The second place of Jobbik is only a big success at one 
glance: it did manage to overtake MSZP, but the reason is that although the supporters of the left 
are a bigger group, their votes were distributed among three parties. The only chance for Jobbik 
to become the challenger of the governing party is if the left breaks up into smaller pieces due to 
its inner struggles. 
The Béla Kovács case could also play a role in the bad performance of the party, and besides 
the lower turnout, Jobbik has a hard time mobilizing its ‘attenuated’ voter base. Plus the more 
moderate line and the debates taken up by the leftist opponents also make it hard to mobilize the 
core voters. 
National election results (April 6, 2014, parliamentary elections, May 25, 2014 European 
Parliament election [without the votes from the consulates and embassies]) and the rate of 
mobilization 
Political Capital Policy Research and Consulting Institute
H-1082  Budapest, Futó utca 47-53.
Phone: +36 1 430 66 99                     Email: info@politicalcapital.hu
www.politicalcapital.hu                     www.valasztasirendszer.hu7
May 27, 2014flash report: The EU will survive
4) The realignment of the left is irreversible
The race for the leading position on the left has inevitably started. It will greatly make the 
preparation for the municipal elections harder, because on several levels (mayors, lord mayor) the 
only chance for them is to cooperate in order to win.
Results in Budapest (April 6, 2014, parliamentary elections, May 25, 2014 European Parliament 
election [without the votes from the consulates and embassies]) and the rate of mobilization 
Especially in the capital can we expect a significant realignment, where MSZP came in fourth after 
DK and Együtt-PM which came in neck-and-neck. It is interesting that in the capital, the three 
groups seem to be at farther from Fidesz than in April, which is mainly the result of the different 
mobilizing potential of the parties. 
However, it is seen that the limit to this realignment on the left is the common nomination of the 
lord mayor. If they manage to nominate a consensual candidate, still there is no guarantee for 
success as they still cannot expect to have the support of LMP.
Ferenc Gyurcsány is ineludible again on the left, and he is very likely to become the engine of the 
realignment. He will soon find himself in a conflict of interests with Együtt-PM which declares a 
new era in politics, and which came in second in 11 Budapest constituencies (DK has 9, MSZP 2 
and Jobbik 1 second place). 


The EU will survive