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The Question for Another Day: \u3cem\u3eHooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections\u3c/em\u3e and Its Effect on the Vitality of Citizen Ballot Initiatives and Redistricting Reform in Illinois
Get PDFLike most states, Illinois is no stranger to political gerrymandering. Since 2010, redistricting reformers have made repeated efforts to change the way Illinois\u27s political maps are drawn, essentially by minimizing or eliminating the role lawmakers play in the process. Polls show the vast majority of Illinoisans support such a change. Reformers have chosen Illinois\u27s citizen ballot initiative as their vehicle to amend the redistricting process, but every proposed initiative has been struck down in court before reaching voters. Most recently, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a proposed initiative in Hooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections. This Note argues the court\u27s reasoning in Hooker is problematic and may serve as a death blow to redistricting reform via Illinois\u27s citizen ballot initiative. This Note also discusses the relevant players in Hooker as well as the relevant history of Illinois\u27s redistricting and the citizen ballot initiative
Will the Supreme Court Still “Seldom Stray Very Far”?: Regime Politics in a Polarized America
Get PDFThis Article examines the concept of a “minority Justice,” meaning a Supreme Court Justice appointed by a President who had failed to win the popular vote and confirmed with the support of a majority of senators who had garnered fewer votes in their most recent elections than their colleagues in opposition. Specifically, Neil Gorsuch was the first “minority Justice,” receiving the support of senators who had collected nearly 20 million fewer votes than those in opposition (54,098,387 to 73,425,062). From there, the Article considers the significance this development, first by examining some of the foundational work of the regime politics literature, and then by exploring the historical linkages between the presidential popular vote from 1824 to 2016 and the Senate’s consideration of Supreme Court nominees during that same time period. It concludes with a discussion of the democratic legitimacy of a minority Justice, considering the constitutional mandate allocating each state two senators and requiring the “advice and consent” of the Senate for a nominee to become a Supreme Court Justice
Are Internet-Implemented Applications of Block-Chain Technology Patent-Eligible in the United States?
Get PDFAmending Patent Claims
No full textPatent claims traditionally have been freely amendable to overcome a finding of unpatentability. For that reason, the Patent Office’s restrictive approach to amendments in new post-issuance review proceedings created by the America Invents Act provoked strident criticism; generated administrative, statutory, and constitutional challenges; and fractured the Federal Circuit. This Article supplies the comprehensive evaluation of the costs and benefits of patent claimamendments, both in examination and post-issuance, surprisingly missing in the literature.The results are mixed. Amendments in initial examination are less clearly warranted than commonly thought, with the costs – primarily problematic drafting incentives – often overlooked and the benefits often overstated given other tools to protect patentees’ legitimate claim scope. Conversely, post-issuance amendments are more justified than often thought, with competitors’ reliance interests overstated, patentees’ reliance interests understated, and strategic behavior possible on both sides. Resolving the ambiguity in the optimality of claim amendments depends on a normative view of where to place the risk of error – hindering protection and incentives for inventors when warranted amendments are denied or hindering competition and follow-on innovation when unwarranted amendments are allowed.This provides important policy insights. First, because claim amendments invoke the patent system’s basic trade-off between innovation and competition, they offer a promising, but underutilized, tool for Congress to adjust this balance. Second, given the ambiguity in the justifications for claim amendments, the long-standing liberality towards amendments, and the Patent Office’s historically-limited role, the Patent Office probably should not adopt an overly restrictive approach to post-issuance amendments without clearer direction from Congress, despite having the power to do so. Third, the best policy for post-issuance amendments may be a discretionary, case-by-case approach rather than a “one-size-fits-all” approach that is likely to generate significant errors
