University of Idaho College of Law

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8-18-2021 
State v. Howell Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48459 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
KADEN A. HOWELL, 
 
 Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
)
) 
 
No. 48459-2020 
 
Bingham County Case No.  
CR06-19-4544 
________________________ 
 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
________________________ 
 
HONORABLE DARREN B. SIMPSON 
District Judge 
________________________ 
 
 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KACEY L. JONES 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
322 E. Front St., Ste. 570 
Boise, Idaho  83702 
(208) 334-2712 
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
Electronically Filed
8/18/2021 12:52 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................................1 
 
 Nature Of The Case..............................................................................................................1 
 
 Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ...................................................1 
 
ISSUE ..............................................................................................................................................3 
 
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................4 
 
 Howell Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused 
 Its Discretion When It Granted The State’s Amended Motion 
 For Restitution .....................................................................................................................4 
 
 A. Introduction ..............................................................................................................4 
 
 B. Standard Of Review .................................................................................................4 
 
 C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When 
  It Granted The State’s Amended Motion For Restitution 
  And Ordered Total Restitution On Both Claims In The 
  Amount Of $29,583.63 ............................................................................................5 
 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................7 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................................................7 
 
 
 
 ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 448 P.3d 1005 (2019) ............................................................ 5 
State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, 462 P.3d 1125 (2020) ................................................................... 5 
State v. Houser, 155 Idaho 521, 314 P.3d 203 (Ct. App. 2013) ..................................................... 4 
State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 242 P.3d 189 (Ct. App. 2010) .................................................. 4 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 19-5304 ............................................................................................................................. 4, 5 
 
 
 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Kaden A. Howell appeals from the district court’s order of restitution.  
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 After responding to a trespassing call, law enforcement made contact with and detained 
Howell, placing him in handcuffs.  (R., p.11.)  When officers removed the handcuffs, Howell 
became violent towards the officers.  (R., p.11.)  In the struggle to restrain Howell, Officers 
Mohler and Hintze were injured.  (Conf. Doc., p.5; R., p.11.)  The state charged Howell with 
felony battery upon certain personnel and misdemeanor resisting or obstructing officers.  (R., 
pp.22-23.)   
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Howell pleaded guilty to both counts.  (R., pp.57-69.)  As a 
term of his plea agreement, Howell agreed to pay restitution to the Idaho State Insurance Fund 
(ISIF)1 on two claim numbers: (1) claim number 201912643 (hereinafter referred to as the 
“Mohler claim”) in the stipulated amount of $752.03; and (2) claim number 201912635 
(hereinafter referred to as the “Hintze claim”) in an amount to be determined but estimated at 
$2,500.  (R., p.67.)  The state initially moved for restitution in the amount of $21,447.02.  (R., 
p.78.)   
 The district court sentenced Howell to five years with two years fixed and retained 
jurisdiction.  (R., pp.102-04.)  At that time, the district court ordered Howell to pay restitution in 
the amount of $752.03 and noted that further restitution would be determined at a restitution
                                            
1 References to the ISIF refer interchangeably to the Idaho State Insurance Fund and the Idaho 
Worker’s Compensation Fund. 
 
 2 
hearing.  (R., p.103.)  Thereafter, the state filed an amended motion for restitution, seeking total 
restitution to the ISIF on both claims in the amount of $29,583.63.  (R., pp.109-16.)  Specifically, 
the state sought $752.03, which had stipulated to and initially been awarded in the judgment of 
conviction, for the Mohler claim and $28,831.60 for the Hintze claim.  (R., pp.109-16.) 
 The district court held a hearing on the state’s restitution request.  (See generally Tr.)  
Because the amount of the Mohler claim had already been determined, only the Hintze claim was 
at issue.  At the hearing, Mary Catherine McCoy, a claims supervisor, testified that the ISIF had 
paid out a total of $29,035.60 on the Hintze claim.  (Tr., p.6, L.24 – p.7, L.1; p.8, Ls.1-4.)  
Officer Hintze testified regarding his injuries, medical treatment he received, and work he missed 
as a result of Howell’s conduct.  (See generally Tr., p.11, L.9 – p.24, L.19.)  Additionally, the 
district court took judicial notice of “the plea agreement and other pleadings filed in this matter.”  
(Tr., p.26, Ls.6-7.)   
Orally, the district court pronounced that it found, based on McCoy’s testimony, that the 
ISIF paid out $29,035.60 on the Hintze claim; therefore, the court concluded “that amount of 
restitution is appropriate” and it would “so order.”  (Tr., p.28, Ls.5-11.)  Thereafter, the district 
court granted the state’s amended motion and ordered total restitution to the ISIF in the amount 
of $29,583.63, as requested in the state’s amended motion.  (R., p.119.)  Howell filed a notice of 
appeal timely from the district court’s restitution order.  (R., pp.125-26.) 
   
 
 3 
ISSUE 
 
Howell states the issue on appeal as: 
 
 Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered Mr. Howell to pay $29,583.63 
in restitution? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.3.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Howell failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it granted the 
state’s amended motion for restitution?  
 
 
 4 
ARGUMENT 
 
Howell Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Granted The 
State’s Amended Motion For Restitution 
 
A. Introduction 
 Howell argues that the district court abused its discretion when it granted the state’s 
amended motion for restitution and ordered restitution in the amount of $29,583.63, despite 
orally pronouncing at the restitution hearing that it would order $29,035.60.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.4-7.)  However, the district court’s oral pronouncement related to only one of the two claims 
for which Howell agreed to pay restitution; the district court’s written order encompassed the 
total restitution owed on both claims.  The state’s amended motion sought total restitution for 
both the Hintze and Mohler claims.  By granting the state’s amended motion, the district court 
ordered total restitution to the ISIF in the amount of $29,583.63—$752.03 for the Mohler claim 
and $28,831.60 for the Hintze claim.  Howell has failed to show that the district court abused its 
discretion when it ordered total restitution in the amount sought in the state’s amended motion, 
where Howell stipulated to the amount of the Mohler claim and the evidence presented at the 
restitution hearing demonstrated the amount of the Hintze claim actually exceeded the amount 
sought by the state and ultimately awarded by the court.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The decision whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the discretion of 
the trial court, guided by consideration of the factors set forth in I.C. § 19-5304 and the policy 
favoring full compensation to crime victims who suffer economic loss.  State v. Lombard, 149 
Idaho 819, 822, 242 P.3d 189, 192 (Ct. App. 2010); see also State v. Houser, 155 Idaho 521, 524, 
314 P.3d 203, 206 (Ct. App. 2013) (“The sentencing court has discretion to determine whether 
-- --- ----------
 
 5 
restitution is appropriate and, if so, to set the amount.”).  When reviewing a district court’s order 
of restitution for abuse of discretion, this Court “examin[es] whether the trial court ‘(1) correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; 
(3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; 
and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.’”  State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, 681, 462 
P.3d 1125, 1145 (2020) (quoting State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 591, 448 P.3d 1005, 1019 
(2019)).   
 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Granted The State’s Amended 
Motion For Restitution And Ordered Total Restitution On Both Claims In The Amount 
Of $29,583.63 
 
 Pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5304(2), a trial court shall order restitution when the 
defendant is found guilty of any crime which results in economic loss to the victim, unless the 
court determines restitution is inappropriate or undesirable.  Economic loss must be based upon a 
preponderance of the evidence submitted to the court.  I.C. § 19-5304(6).  The court may order 
restitution in the judgment of conviction, a separate restitution order, or both.  I.C. § 19-5304(2). 
 Here, the district court initially ordered restitution in the judgment of conviction in the 
amount of $752.03 and then later entered a separate order of restitution, which ordered that the 
total restitution owed to the ISIF was $29,583.63.  (R., pp.103, 119.)  The district court did not 
abuse its discretion in doing so, because the total amount of restitution ordered was supported by 
the preponderance of the evidence.  Per the plea agreement, Howell agreed to pay restitution on 
both the Mohler and Hintze claims.  (R., p.67.)  The state moved for total restitution on both of 
those claims in the amount of $29,583.63.  (R., pp.109-16.)  It is undisputed that the Mohler 
claim amounted to $752.03, and the state attached documentation supporting that amount.  (R., 
 
 6 
pp.67, 116.)  Additionally, the state attached documentation supporting that the amount of the 
Hintze claim was $28,831.60, although at the restitution hearing, the state presented evidence 
that the amount of that claim was $29,035.60—$204 more than it sought in its motion.  (R., 
pp.111-15; Tr., p.6, L.24 – p.7, L.1; p.8, Ls.1-4.)  The district court orally pronounced that it 
found the amount of the Hintze claim to be the higher amount.  (Tr., p.28, Ls.5-11.)  It thereafter 
granted the state’s amended motion for restitution and ordered total restitution to the ISIF in the 
amount of $29,583.63—$752.03 of which was the stipulated amount of the Mohler claim and 
$28,831.60 of which was the lower value sought by the state on the Hintze claim.  (R., p.119.)  
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered restitution in the amount sought by 
the state, after finding that the preponderance of the evidence supported at least that amount. 
 Howell argues that “the district court abused its discretion by filing a written order 
requiring Mr. Howell to pay $29,583.63, where, at the restitution hearing, the district court found 
$29,035.63 to be due and owed as restitution.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.4.)  Specifically, Howell 
argues that the $29,583.63 amount ordered is not supported by the evidence.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.6-7.)  Howell appears to overlook the fact that the district court’s written restitution order 
encompassed the total restitution owed to the ISIF in this case, for both the Mohler and the 
Hintze claims, whereas the amount of restitution discussed at the hearing related only to the 
previously-undetermined Hintze claim.  Howell stipulated below to pay $752.03 on the Mohler 
claim, and on appeal he recognizes that the evidence presented at the restitution hearing supports 
an award of $29,035.60 for the Hintze claim.  (R., p.67; Appellant’s brief, pp.5-7.)  Therefore, 
Howell necessarily acknowledges that the district court could have properly ordered a combined 
total restitution to the ISIF on both claims in the amount of $29,787.63.  However, the court 
 
 7 
limited its award to the amount sought by the state in its amended motion—$29,583.63.  Howell 
has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it did so.2   
 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 18th day of August, 2021. 
 
 
        
   /s/  Kacey L. Jones 
 KACEY L. JONES 
 Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 18th day of August, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
 SALLY J. COOLEY 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
   /s/  Kacey L. Jones  
      KACEY L. JONES 
Deputy Attorney General 
KLJ/dd 
                                            
2 It appears from the Register of Actions that the district court clerk has combined the restitution 
ordered in the judgment of conviction with that ordered in the later restitution order.  (See R., 
pp.6-7.)  The state acknowledges that the total restitution ordered by the district court is 
$29,583.63.  (R., p. 119.)  Howell can move to correct any error by the clerk if that is necessary. 


English

State v. Howell Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48459

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UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
3-26-2021 
State v. Gutierrez Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48507 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Gutierrez Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48507" (2021). Not Reported. 7171. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7171 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
KILEY A. HEFFNER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #10999
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO. 48507-2020
)
v. ) CASSIA COUNTY NO. CR-2014-2820
)
MYRA GUTIERREZ, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
____________________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Myra Gutierrez pled guilty to burglary, the district court sentenced her to six years,
with three years fixed, suspended the sentence, and put her on probation for two years.
Ms. Gutierrez later admitted to violating her probation. The district court revoked her probation
and executed her underlying sentence of six years. On appeal, Ms. Gutierrez argues that the
district court abused its discretion when it revoked her probation.
Electronically Filed
3/26/2021 9:53 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
According to the presentence investigation report (“PSI”), in an attempt to get back at her
ex-boyfriend for cheating on her, Ms. Gutierrez entered his vehicle, doused it with lighter fluid,
and lit it on fire. (PSI, pp.4, 17-18.)
The State filed a complaint against Ms. Gutierrez for third-degree arson in June 2014.
(R., pp.11-12.) The State eventually proceeded with an amended complaint, charging her with
both third-degree arson and burglary. (R., pp.15-17.) After Ms. Gutierrez waived her preliminary
hearing, she was bound over to district court, and charged by information with third-degree arson
and burglary. (R., pp.21-24.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Gutierrez pled guilty to burglary,
and the State dismissed the arson charge. (R., pp.42-43, 47-48.) At the sentencing hearing in
October 2014, the district court sentenced her to six years, with three years fixed, suspended the
sentence, and put her on probation for two years. (R., pp.63, 64-71.)
In March 2015, the State filed a motion for a bench warrant, alleging eight probation
violations. (R., pp.74-80.) A joint admit/deny hearing and disposition hearing was held in
November 2020. (See Tr.) At that hearing, Ms. Gutierrez admitted to violating probation by
changing her residence without permission, and the State dismissed the remaining allegations.
(Tr., p.7, L.20 – p.9, L.13.) The State recommended that the district court execute her underlying
sentence of six years. (Tr., p.10, Ls.6-17.) Defense counsel recommended that the district court
reinstate her probation, or in the alternative, retain jurisdiction (“a rider”). (Tr., p.11, L.24 – p.12,
L.18.) The district court revoked her probation and executed her underlying sentence of six
years. (Tr., p.15, Ls.4-7; R., pp.91-93.)
Ms. Gutierrez filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, requesting that the district court
retain jurisdiction, or alternatively, reduce the fixed portion of her sentence. (R., pp.88-89.) The
3
district court denied this motion.1 (R., pp.91-94.) Ms. Gutierrez timely appealed from the district
court’s order revoking probation. (R., pp.95-96.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Gutierrez’s probation and
executed her underlying sentence?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Ms. Gutierrez’s Probation And
Executed Her Underlying Sentence
Idaho’s appellate courts use a two-step analysis to review a district court’s decision to
revoke probation. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). First, this Court must determine
“whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation.” Id. Second, “[i]f it is determined that
the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation,” the Court examines “what should
be the consequences of that violation.” Id. The determination of a probation violation and the
determination of the consequences, if any, are separate analyses. Id.
Here, Ms. Gutierrez does not challenge her admissions to violating her probation.
(Tr., p.7, L.20 – p.9, L.9.) “[W]hen a probationer admits to a direct violation of his probation
agreement, no further inquiry into the question is required.” State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 50
(Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted). Rather, she argues that the district court abused its discretion
by revoking her probation and executing her underlying sentence.
After a probation violation has been proven, “[a] district court’s decision to revoke
probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion.”
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). “When reviewing a lower court’s decision for an
1 Ms. Gutierrez does not challenge the denial of her Rule 35 motion on appeal.
4
abuse of discretion, this Court must analyze ‘whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4)
reached its decision by the exercise of reason.’” State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 591 (2019)
(quoting Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018)).
“The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an opportunity to be rehabilitated
under proper control and supervision.” State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 454 (1977). “In
determining whether to revoke probation a court must consider whether probation is meeting the
objective of rehabilitation while also providing adequate protection for society.” State v. Upton,
127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995). The court may consider the defendant’s conduct before and
during probation. State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987.)
In this case, Ms. Gutierrez submits the district court abused its discretion in revoking her
probation. She asserts that reinstating probation, or alternatively, a retained jurisdiction program,
will allow her to obtain her GED and participate in necessary programming, and also provide
adequate protection for society.
 Ms. Gutierrez was born in California, and moved to Idaho at
 to live with her sister after her mother passed away. (PSI, p.8.) She dropped out of high
school during the twelfth grade in order to work, but indicated that she hopes to obtain her GED.
(PSI, pp.9-10.) The burglary charge is Ms. Gutierrez’s first and only felony conviction. (PSI,
pp.5-7.) She has never been convicted of a violent crime, and the majority of her misdemeanor
convictions involve minor driver’s license violations. (See PSI, pp.5-7.) In this case, her
probation violation was not due to her committing additional offenses. (See Tr., p.7, L.20 – p.9,
L.9.) Although she absconded, there is no evidence that she was engaging in criminal behavior or
5
committing new offenses during that time. At the probation violation admission and disposition
hearing, her defense counsel explained that Ms. Gutierrez left Idaho for California to help take
care of her ailing father, and not merely to avoid supervision. (Tr., p.11, Ls.18-23.) Furthermore,
Ms. Gutierrez has no history of substance abuse or mental health issues. (PSI, pp.14, 20, 24, 26.)
Upon her release, she would be able to live with her sister, and stated that she also has a job
opportunity at the dairy farms in the Burley area. (Tr., p.13, Ls.6-12.)
Based on her minimal criminal history and lack of substance abuse and mental health
issues, it is likely that Ms. Gutierrez would be successful on probation or on a rider. The pre-
sentence investigator recommended that Ms. Gutierrez complete a cognitive based programming
class, as well as attempt to earn her GED. (PSI, pp.13, 14, 24.) Reinstatement, or alternatively, a
retained jurisdiction program, would provide her with an opportunity to participate in necessary
programming and obtain her GED, and also provide adequate protection for society. In light of
these facts, Ms. Gutierrez asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked her
probation and executed her sentence of six years.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Gutierrez respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order
revoking her probation and remand this case to the district court for an order reinstating her
probation. Alternatively, she requests that her case be remanded to the district court for an order
retaining jurisdiction.
DATED this 26th day of March, 2021.
/s/ Kiley A. Heffner
KILEY A. HEFFNER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of March, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
 KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
  /s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
KAH/eas


State v. Gutierrez Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48507

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/8171/thumbnail.jp

UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
6-10-2021 
State v. Gutierrez Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48507 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Gutierrez Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48507" (2021). Not Reported. 7172. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7172 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
BRIAN P. KANE 
Chief Deputy Attorney General 
 
JUSTIN R. PORTER 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
MYRA O. GUTIERREZ, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48507-2020 
 
Cassia County Case No.  
CR-2014-2820 
 
           
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Myra Gutierrez failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it 
revoked her probation and executed the underlying sentence? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Gutierrez Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 Gutierrez admitted that she doused her ex-boyfriend’s car in lighter fluid and then lit it on 
fire.  (PSI, pp.4-5.)  The state charged Gutierrez with one count of third-degree arson and one count 
of burglary.  (R., pp.22-23.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Gutierrez pled guilty to burglary.  (R., 
Electronically Filed
6/10/2021 10:37 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
pp.42-43, 47-49.)  In exchange for her guilty plea, the state dismissed the arson charge.  (R., pp.47, 
72-73.)   
On October 21, 2014, the district court imposed a unified sentence of six years, with three 
years fixed.  (R., pp.63-66.)  The court suspended Gutierrez’s sentence and placed her on probation 
for two years.  (R., p.65.)  Approximately six months later, the state filed a motion for bench 
warrant, alleging eight probation violations.  (R., pp.74-80.)  Gutierrez absconded from 
supervision before the alleged violations were adjudicated.  (See Tr., p.3, Ls.6-22.)   
Nearly six years later, on November 9, 2020, Gutierrez admitted that she absconded 
probation in February of 2015 and that she had violated her the terms and conditions of her 
probation by moving without first obtaining permission.  (Tr., p.7, L.20 – p.9, L.9; see R., p.78.)  
The state then agreed to withdraw the remaining allegations.  (Tr., p.8, Ls.10-14.)  The district 
court revoked Gutierrez’s probation and executed the underlying sentence.  (Tr., p.15, Ls.4-7; R., 
pp.83-87.)  Gutierrez timely appealed.  (Tr., pp.95-96.)   
On appeal, Gutierrez asserts the district court abused its discretion when it revoked her 
probation and imposed the underlying sentence.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.)  Review of the record 
and proper application of the relevant legal standards shows no abuse of discretion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
  
“The trial court’s decision to revoke probation will not be disturbed on appeal absent an 
abuse of discretion.”  State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312, 1 P.3d 809, 813 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(citations omitted).  The Court “reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by determining whether the 
trial court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
 3 
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”  State v. 
Smith, 168 Idaho 463, ___, 483 P.3d 149, 1006, 1019 (2021) (internal quotation omitted).  
 
C. Gutierrez Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
  
“The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an opportunity to be rehabilitated under 
proper control and supervision” while also providing adequate protection for society.  State v. 
Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 454, 566 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1977); State v. Kerr, 115 Idaho 725, 726, 769 
P.2d 602, 603 (Ct. App. 1989).  “In determining whether to revoke probation a court must consider 
whether probation is meeting the objective of rehabilitation while also providing adequate 
protection for society.”  State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995).  
“If the trial judge reasonably concludes from the defendant’s conduct that probation is not 
achieving its rehabilitative purpose, probation may be revoked.”  State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 
50-51, 844 P.2d 31, 32-33 (Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted); see Idaho Code § 20-222 
(authorizing the revocation of probation at any time if the probationer violates any condition of 
the probation).  Probation is not meeting the objective of rehabilitation and is not providing 
adequate protection for society where the defendant absconds from probation.  See Chavez, 134 
Idaho at 312-13, 1 P.3d at 813-14 (holding the district court acted within its discretion when it 
revoked probation because the probationer absconded probation).    
In determining whether the trial court properly revoked probation, the Court “examines all 
the circumstances bearing upon the decision to revoke probation and require execution of the 
sentence, including events that occurred between the original pronouncement of the sentence and 
the revocation of probation.”  State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 672, 962 P.2d 1054, 1056 (Ct. App. 
1998).  The “focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court’s decision to revoke 
probation.”  State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012).    
 4 
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Gutierrez’s probation and 
executed the underlying sentence.  The district court found that Gutierrez absconded probation for 
over five years.  (See Tr., p.13, Ls.22-24; p.14, Ls.18-21.)  During those five years, Gutierrez lived 
completely unsupervised.  Her probation officers – and by extension the court – had no way of 
determining whether she was abiding by the terms and conditions of her probation, engaging in 
further criminal conduct, or making rehabilitative progress.  (See Tr., p.14, L.22 – p.15, L.3.)  
Because Gutierrez had failed “to comply with any probation in any meaningful way,” the court 
concluded that probation had not achieved the goal of rehabilitation, that reinstating probation was 
not consistent with the goal of protecting society, and thus that she was not a viable candidate for 
probation.  (Tr., p.13, L.24 – p.14, L.7; p.15, Ls.4-7.)  The district court’s comments demonstrate 
that it recognized the issue of revocation as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of its 
discretion, acted consistently with the applicable legal standards, and reached its decision to revoke 
Gutierrez’s probation by an exercise of reason.  Therefore, the court’s decision to revoke 
Gutierrez’s probation and execute the underlying sentence was not an abuse of discretion.   
Gutierrez concedes that she absconded probation.  (Appellant’s brief, p.4.)  Nonetheless, 
she asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked her probation and executed 
the underlying sentence.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.)  Gutierrez argues that certain mitigating 
information (such as her age, minimal criminal history, and the fact that she has no history of 
substance abuse or mental health issues) weigh in favor of reinstating her probation or placing her 
on a period of retained jurisdiction.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.)   Her argument lacks merit. 
The district court adequately considered mitigating information in determining whether to 
impose the underlying sentence or retain jurisdiction.  The district court expressly stated that it had 
reviewed the PSI, which contained relevant information regarding Gutierrez’s age, criminal 
 5 
history, lack of substance abuse issues, and lack of mental health issues.  (Tr., p.13, Ls.16-17; PSI, 
pp.10-13, 19-27.)  The court weighed this information against the fact that Gutierrez absconded 
probation for more than five years as well as other factors such as the need for general and specific 
deterrence.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.8-17.)  The court reasonably determined that absconding probation 
merited “some pretty serious consequences” in order to satisfy the need for deterrence, even in 
light of the mitigating information contained in the PSI.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.11-21.)  Given Gutierrez’s 
decision to abscond probation for five years and thereby escape accountability for her actions while 
she was supposed to be under the close supervision of a probation officer, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion when it revoked Gutierrez’s probation and executed the underlying sentence 
even in light of any mitigating information.  Gutierrez has failed to show otherwise. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 10th day of June, 2021. 
 
 
        /s/ Justin R. Porter  
      JUSTIN R. PORTER 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
  
 6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 10th day of June, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
KILEY A. HEFFNER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/ Justin R. Porter  
      JUSTIN R. PORTER 
      Deputy Attorney General 
JRP/dd 
 


State v. Gutierrez Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48507

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UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
8-31-2021 
State v. West-Doney Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48544 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
 
JESSICA JO WEST-DONEY, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NOS. 48544-2021, 48545-2021 & 
48546-2021 
 
 
Ada County Case Nos. CR01-17-7437, 
CR01-20-14901 & CR01-20-26633 
 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Jessica Jo West-Doney failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
declining to retain jurisdiction in all three cases? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
West-Doney Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
In March of 2017, Jessica Jo West-Doney broke into four storage units and stole a bicycle.  
(48544 PSI, pp. 3-4.)  West-Doney rode the bicycle to a friend’s house, and took her friend’s truck 
without his permission.  (48544 PSI, p. 4.)  When authorities contacted her about the thefts she 
Electronically Filed
8/31/2021 4:56 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
identified herself as Jessica Fain two times, but her ID later revealed true identity.  (48544 PSI, pp. 
3-4.)  Authorities conducted a search of the vehicle and found a black case inside West-Doney’s 
purse, which contained two needles, a spoon, scissors, a white bottle and a clear bag with 0.8 grams 
of methamphetamine.  (48544 PSI, p. 3.) 
Under case number CR01-17-7437, the state charged West-Doney with one count of 
burglary, one count of possession of a controlled substance, one count of petit theft, one count of 
possession of drug paraphernalia, and one count of providing false information to law enforcement.  
(48544 R., pp. 30-31.)  West-Doney pleaded guilty to one count of burglary, and the state agreed 
to dismiss the remaining charges and a separate criminal case.  (48544 R., pp. 34, 36-42.)  The 
district court sentenced West-Doney to five years, with two years determinate and retained 
jurisdiction.  (48544 R., pp. 49-51.)  Following a period of retained jurisdiction, the district court 
placed West-Doney on probation for a period of five years.  (48544 R., pp. 55-58.)   
In January of 2020, West-Doney broke into a residence belonging to Craig Hamlin’s 
deceased mother, and filled a boat with property from inside the house.  (48546 PSI, pp. 91-92.)  
West-Doney connected the boat to the vehicle she was driving, but the boat disconnected from the 
ball hitch and damaged the garage door of the house she had broken into, and the boat.  (48546 
PSI, pp. 91-92.)  West-Doney then loaded a golf cart that was in the residence with photos and 
paintings, and drove the golf cart until the battery died.  (48546 PSI, p. 92.)  West-Doney left the 
golf cart at a school, and took the photos and paintings with her, as Johnny Allen picked her up in 
his truck.  (48546 PSI, p. 92.)   
In March of 2020, the state filed a motion for probation violation, as West-Doney had been 
charged with numerous crimes in CR01-20-12097 and CR01-19-45142.  (48544 R., pp. 70-72.)  
The district court released West-Doney on her own recognizance, and on April 1, 2020, West-
 3 
Doney stole Iva Harris’ green 2006 Kia Sportage, which contained Iva’s purse, driver’s license 
and $160.  (48544 R., p. 101; 48546 PSI, pp. 239, 248.)  West Doney destroyed the ignition and 
spray painted half of the vehicle red.  (48546 PSI, p. 248.)  On April 3, 2020, West-Doney stole a 
1997 Dodge pickup from Chris Atkinson’s business.  (48546 PSI, pp. 205-206, 271.)  West-Doney 
drove the truck through the company’s parking lot gate, damaging the vehicle and the fence.  
(48546 PSI, pp. 206, 271.)  West-Doney drove the Dodge truck up to Table Rock until the vehicle 
got stuck.  (48546 PSI, p. 206.)  West-Doney then walked down from Table Rock and stole a white 
2003 Toyota Tacoma from Jill Kronberg.  (48546 PSI, p. 206.)   
On April 5, 2020, West-Doney broke into James and Timothy Howell’s residence and 
pickup truck.  (48545 PSI, p. 7.)  James woke up to West-Doney in his bedroom, and she threw 
change at him and ran out of the house.  (48545 PSI, p. 7.)  James and Timothy found tools that 
had been moved to the front door, and advised that West-Doney had gone through their truck and 
tried to take food and laundry detergent.  (48545 PSI, p. 7.)  Authorities accompanied James and 
Timothy outside to the front yard where an officer used a flashlight to find West-Doney hiding 
under a truck.  (48545 R., p. 7.)   
Under case number CR01-20-14901, the state charged West-Doney with two counts of 
burglary for entering the Howell residence and vehicle.  (48545 R., pp. 19-20.)  Under case number 
CR01-20-26633, the state charged West-Doney with one count of attempted grand theft, one count 
of grand theft, and one count of burglary for the crimes committed at Craig Hamlin’s deceased 
mother’s house.  (48546 R., pp. 31-33.)  The state also charged West-Doney with one count of 
grand theft for stealing Iva Harris’ Kia Sportage, purse, ID and cash, one count of grand theft for 
stealing Jill Kronberg’s truck, one count of grand theft for stealing Christopher Atkinson’s truck, 
 4 
and malicious injury to property for driving Christopher Atkinson’s truck through his company’s 
fence.  (48546 R., pp. 31-33.)   
In CR01-17-7437, the state filed an amended motion for probation violation, including the 
new offenses in CR01-20-14901 and CR01-20-26633.  (48544 R., pp. 127-129.)  West-Doney 
admitted to violating her probation, and the district court executed the underlying sentence of five 
years, with two years determinate and credit for 615 days served.  (48544 R., pp. 133, 142-144.)  
The district court ordered that the sentence run concurrent with the sentences imposed in CR01-
20-26633, and consecutive to the sentence imposed in CR01-20-14901.  (48544 R., p. 143.)   
In CR01-20-14901, West-Doney pleaded guilty to one count of burglary, and the district 
court sentenced her to six years, with one year determinate and credit for two days served.  (48545 
R., pp. 34, 40-42.)  The district court ordered that the sentence run consecutive to those imposed 
in CR01-17-7437 and CR01-20-26633.  (48545 R., pp. 40-42.)  In CR01-20-26633, West-Doney 
pleaded guilty to one count of grand theft, one count of burglary, and one count of malicious injury 
to property.  (48546 R., pp. 46-49.)  The district court sentenced her to fourteen years, with six 
years determinate for grand theft, ten years, with six years determinate for burglary, and five years 
determinate for malicious injury to property.  (48546 R., pp. 55-58.)  The district court credited 
West-Doney for 156 days served, and ordered that the sentences in CR01-20-26633 run concurrent 
to that imposed in CR01-17-7437, and that the sentence in CR01-20-14901 run consecutively.  
(48546 R., pp. 55-58.)  As part of the global plea agreement, the state dismissed the remaining 
charges in CR01-20-14901 and CR01-20-26633, and the entirety of CR01-20-12097.  (48545 R., 
pp. 31-33; 48546 R., pp. 48-49.)  West-Doney then filed timely appeals in all three cases.  (48544 
R., pp. 146-148; 48545 R., pp. 44-46; 48546 R., pp. 60-62.)   
 5 
On appeal, West-Doney argues that “the district court abused its discretion by failing to 
retain jurisdiction in her three cases.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 1.)  West-Doney has failed to show 
that the district court abused its discretion by declining to retain jurisdiction in all three cases. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to retain jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion of the 
district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.  State v. Lee, 
117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990).  The primary purpose of a district 
court retaining jurisdiction is to enable the court to obtain additional information regarding whether 
the defendant has sufficient rehabilitative potential and is suitable for probation.  State v. Jones, 
141 Idaho 673, 677, 115 P.3d 764, 768 (Ct. App. 2005).  Probation is the ultimate goal of retained 
jurisdiction.  Id.  There can be no abuse of discretion if the district court has sufficient evidence 
before it to conclude that the defendant is not a suitable candidate for probation.  Id. 
In evaluating whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a 
four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the 
exercise of reason.”  State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citing 
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). 
 
C. West-Doney Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
The record shows the district court perceived its discretion, employed the correct legal 
standards to the issue before it, and acted reasonably and within the scope of its discretion.   
 6 
At the disposition and sentencing hearing, the district court considered “four factors at 
[West-Doney’s] sentencing a disposition: protection of society, deterrence of crime, rehabilitation 
and punishment.”  (12/16/2020 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 9-12.)  The district court stated that this “is a drug 
issue and a criminal issue.  The criminal issue is the willingness to put people and their property 
at risk.”  (12/16/2020 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 15-18.)  The district court noted that West-Doney “already 
had a Rider, though it hasn’t been recent,” and “the conduct here is deep and deserves imposition.”  
(12/16/2020 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 22-24.)   
West-Doney argues that the mitigating factors—difficult childhood, substance abuse 
issues, mental health issues, willingness to overcome addiction, previous completion of a rider, 
enrollment in community college, and her landscaping business—show an abuse of discretion.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-9.)  West-Doney’s argument does not show an abuse of discretion.  Her 
2017 LSI score was thirty at her initial sentencing, placing her in the moderate risk to reoffend 
category.  (48544 PSI, p. 17.)  West-Doney’s criminal history now consists of numerous felonies, 
two periods on probation, and a period of retained jurisdiction.  (48544 PSI, pp. 5-6.)  Her criminal 
conduct caused significant damage and loss of property to numerous people.  (48544 PSI, pp. 85-
103; 48545 PSI, pp. 11-14; 48546 PSI, pp. 16-20, 30-61, 212-213, 250-252, 285-294.)  While on 
her previous rider, West-Doney received four verbal warnings and one written warning.  (48544 
PSI, p. 137.)  She received alternative sanction for sleeping, and eventually received an infraction 
for the same behavior.  (48544 PSI, pp. 137.)   
West-Doney’s criminal conduct on probation shows that she is not amenable to community 
supervision, and that probation is failing to reform her criminal thinking.  West-Doney presents a 
significant risk to the community, and execution of the sentences imposed provides appropriate 
protection to society.  West-Doney’s conduct on probation shows that there is an undue risk that 
 7 
she will reoffend if not sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The district court properly concluded 
it did not need more information from a rider to determine West-Doney was not a suitable 
candidate for probation.  West-Doney has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion 
by declining to retain jurisdiction in all three cases.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 31st day of August, 2021. 
 
 
        /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen  
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      ZACHARI S. HALLETT 
      Paralegal 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
            I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 31st day of August, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
KILEY A. HEFFNER  
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
                                                                          /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen  
                                                                        KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
                                                                        Deputy Attorney General 
 


State v. West-Doney Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48544

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UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
7-13-2021 
State v. Martinez Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48571 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
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https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7195 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JOSHUA DON MARTINEZ, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48571-2021 & 48584-2021 
 
Cassia County Case Nos. CR16-18-940 
& CR16-20-4236 
 
 
           
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Joshua Don Martinez failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion when it imposed concurrent sentences of 10 years with four years determinate for 
possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, imposed after a probation violation, and 
five years with one year determinate for possession of methamphetamine? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Martinez Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 After a traffic stop, officers executed an arrest warrant on Martinez.  (48571 R., pp. 18-19.)  
A subsequent search of the car revealed over ten grams of methamphetamine in two bags.  (48571 
Electronically Filed
7/13/2021 1:56 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
R., p. 19.)  The state charged Martinez with possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver 
and driving without privileges.  (48571 R., pp. 28-29.)  Martinez pled guilty to possession of 
methamphetamine with intent to deliver.  (48571 R., pp. 52-56.)  The district court imposed a 
sentence of 10 years with four years determinate, suspended the sentence, and placed Martinez on 
probation.  (48571 R., pp. 102-04.)   
 About two months later the state alleged a probation violation for absconding supervision.  
(48571 R., pp. 114-18.)  Martinez admitted violating his probation and the district court executed 
the sentence and retained jurisdiction.  (48571 R., pp. 124-27.)  After the period of retained 
jurisdiction the district court ordered the sentence suspended and placed Martinez on probation.  
(48571 R., pp. 130-36.)   
 About three months later the state alleged Martinez had violated his probation by 
committing the new crimes of malicious injury to property, battery, possession of a controlled 
substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia; by associating with a parolees; and by using 
methamphetamine.  (48571 R., pp. 140-45.)  The state criminally charged Martinez with 
possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia.  (48584 R., pp. 16-17.)  
Martinez admitted violating his probation and pled guilty to the new charge of possession of 
methamphetamine.  (48571 R., pp. 159-62; 48584 R., pp. 23-25, 44-47.)  The district court revoked 
probation on the possession with intent to deliver conviction and imposed a concurrent sentence 
of five years with one year determinate on the possession conviction.  (48571 R., pp. 182-83; 
48584 R., pp. 63-65.)   
 Within 14 days of entry of judgment Martinez moved for reconsideration of the sentences.  
(48571 R., pp. 188-89; 48584 R., pp. 79-80.)  The district court denied the motions.  (48571 R., 
 3 
pp. 191-93; 48584 R., pp. 82-84.)  Martinez filed timely notices of appeal.  (48571 R., pp. 195-96; 
48584 R., pp. 86-87.)   
 On appeal Martinez contends the district court erred by not placing him on probation in 
both cases, and that his sentence for possession of methamphetamine is excessive.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp. 4-9.)  Martinez’s argument is not supported by application of the law to the record in this 
case. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “Once a probation violation has been proven, the decision of whether to revoke probation 
is within the sound discretion of the court.”  State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 113, 426 P.3d 461, 
464 (2018) (quotation marks omitted). 
 The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the 
defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing 
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 
159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s 
probable term of confinement.  Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).  
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it 
is a clear abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing 
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  In evaluating whether a lower court abused 
its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: 
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”  State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 
 4 
261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 
P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). 
 
C. Martinez Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
 
 To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish 
that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive.  State v. Farwell, 144 
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).  In determining whether the appellant met this burden, 
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release the defendant on parole 
is exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be 
the period of actual incarceration.  State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) 
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391).  To establish that the sentence was excessive, 
the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was 
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, 
and retribution.  Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401.  A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears 
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of 
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’”  Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895-96, 392 
P.3d at 1236-37 (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)). 
 In determining whether to revoke probation, “the court examines whether the probation is 
achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society.”  State v. 
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992). 
 The district court applied the correct legal standards to the issues before it.  (12/7/20 Tr., 
p. 14, L. 18 – p. 15, L. 5.)  The district court found that the most recent felony was committed 
while on probation for the prior felony, and that this was Martinez’s “fourth adult felony” in 
addition to “a significant juvenile record.”  (12/7/20 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 10-14.)  Martinez had “a long 
 5 
history of substance abuse” and had been rejected for drug court.  (12/7/20 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 15-21.)  
The district court concluded Martinez was not “an appropriate candidate for probation” based on 
his history.  (12/7/20 Tr., p. 15, L. 22 – p. 16, L. 1.)  Martinez did not have a good disciplinary 
record in custody.  (12/7/20 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 2-6.)  The district court found Martinez was “an undue 
risk” if put on probation immediately and continuing probation would “depreciate the seriousness” 
not only of the new offense but of Martinez’s overall history.  (12/7/20 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 12-20.)  “I 
don’t think the defendant is a viable candidate to be supervised in the community and needs to be 
held accountable.”  (12/7/20 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 11-13.)   
 The record supports the district court’s analysis.  Martinez does have a substantial juvenile 
and adult criminal record, including two felony convictions before the first one in these cases.  
(9/26/18 PSI, pp. 4-8; 11/20/20 PSI, pp. 2-3, 7-9.)  He committed the possession of 
methamphetamine crime while on probation for possession of methamphetamine with intent to 
deliver.  He has been on probation, and has violated probation, several times.  (9/26/18 PSI, p. 9; 
48571 R., pp. 124-27, 182-83; 11/20/20 PSI, pp. 9-11.)  Martinez was rated a high risk of re-
offense.  (11/20/20 PSI, pp. 2, 11.)  He had several disciplinary reports in the jail.  (11/20/20 PSI, 
p. 3.)  This record shows that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded 
Martinez was not a viable candidate for probation and imposed the sentence it did. 
 In arguing that the district court abused its discretion by revoking probation, Martinez 
asserts he was “progressing and probation was serving its purpose” and “[s]ociety was also 
adequately protected.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6.)   However, this argument is directly contrary 
to the district court’s factual finding that Martinez was not “an appropriate candidate for 
probation.”  (12/7/20 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 22-24.)  As set forth above, the record supports the district 
court’s finding that Martinez was not a viable candidate for probation.  Rather, he was a significant 
 6 
risk for continued criminal activity if placed on probation.  Given Martinez’s repeated violations 
of his probation, his counter-factual argument is without merit. 
 Martinez next contends the district court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing a 
sentence of five years with one year determinate for possession of methamphetamine, citing a 
“combination of mitigating factors.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-9.)  Those factors are his claimed 
acceptance of responsibility, acknowledgement of his addiction, recognition of his desire to 
change, “tumultuous childhood,” and “severe addiction.”  (Id.)  His argument hinges upon the 
district court accepting Martinez’s assertions that despite prior failures to rehabilitate Martinez 
was committed to his rehabilitation, this time.  (12/7/20 Tr., p. 9, L. 17 – p. 12, L. 19 (trial counsel 
arguing that Martinez should be given the opportunity to utilize his probation plan).)  Of course 
the district court specifically rejected that argument.  (12/7/20 Tr., p. 15, L. 2 – p. 17, L. 23.) 
 The district court put its analysis on the record.  It found Martinez was not “a viable 
candidate to be supervised in the community and needs to be held accountable,” but that Martinez 
was not “so far gone” that rehabilitation in the future was hopeless.  (12/7/20 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 11-16; 
see also p. 15, Ls. 22-24; p. 16, Ls. 14-20.)  After considering the credit for time served (566 days), 
Martinez would be parole eligible about two and one-half years after sentencing.   (48571 R., p. 
185.)  The district court reasonably concluded that two and one-half years’ incarceration, before 
controlled release into the community, would facilitate Martinez’s rehabilitation and protect the 
community.  
 
  
-----
 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 13th day of July, 2021. 
 
 
  /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of July, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
EMILY M. JOYCE 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
 


State v. Martinez  Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48571

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State v. Bonning Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48574 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
EMILY M. JOYCE
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #10410
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 48574-2021
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-20-22541
v. )
)
AMY ROSE BONNING ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
AKA INGRAM, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
______________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Amy Bonning appeals from her judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute. After Ms. Bonning pleaded guilty to that charge, the district
court imposed a sentence of six years, with two years determinate. Ms. Bonning filed an Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 motion, which the district court denied. Ms. Bonning now appeals. On appeal,
she argues the district court abused its discretion twice: when it imposed an excessive sentence
and when it denied her Rule 35 motion.
Electronically Filed
7/1/2021 1:55 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Ms. Bonning was on probation when officers came to her home in response to reports of
vandalism. (Sent. Tr., p.13, Ls.2-10.) Officers conducted a search of her home and found a
baggie containing methamphetamine and various drug paraphernalia. (Sent. Tr., p.13, L.22 –
p.14, L.13.) Ms. Bonning was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.8, 19.)1 Pursuant
to a plea agreement, Ms. Bonning entered an Alford2 plea to the felony (Plea Tr., p.15, Ls.9-11)
and the State dismissed the misdemeanor. (R., p.32) At the sentencing hearing, the State
recommended a sentence of ten years, with three years determinate, and retained jurisdiction.
(Sent. Tr., p. 20, Ls.14-17.) Ms. Bonning requested a suspended sentence of five years, with two
years determinate. (Sent. Tr., p 25, Ls.7-10.) The district court imposed a sentence of six years,
with two years determinate, and did not retain jurisdiction. (Sent. Tr., p.31, Ls.7-12.)
Ms. Bonning filed a Rule 35 motion, requesting the court reconsider her sentence and
reduce it to five years, with two years determinate and retain jurisdiction. (R., p.76; Aug.
R.3, pp.1-14.) The district court denied Ms. Bonning’s motion. (Aug. R., pp.15-16.) Ms. Bonning
timely filed a notice of appeal from both the judgment of conviction and the order denying her
Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.65-67, 71-72; Aug. R., pp.15-16.)
ISSUES
I. Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence of six years, with
two years determinate, upon Ms. Bonning following her plea of guilty.
1 An Amended Complaint was filed; however, the only change was the addition of her alias.
(Compare R., p.8 with R. p.19.)
2 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
3 A Motion to Augment Record has been filed contemporaneously with this brief along with Ms.
Bonning’s “Supplement to Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence” and the district
court’s “Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence.”
3
II. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Bonning’s Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a reduction of sentence.
ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Excessive Sentence Upon
Ms. Bonning Following Her Plea Of Guilty To Felony Possession Of A Controlled Substance
With Intent To Deliver
Ms. Bonning asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentence of six years,
with two years determinate, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court
imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
of the record and consider the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982).
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). In determining if an abuse of discretion occurred, appellate
review centers on whether the trial court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise of reason.” State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 591 (2019).
Here, Ms. Bonning’s sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 37-
2732(a)(1)(A) (maximum life sentence). Accordingly, to show the sentence imposed was
unreasonable, Ms. Bonning “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
4
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
Ms. Bonning asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentence of six years,
with two years determinate, is excessive. The district court did not exercise reason and therefore
abused its discretion because the mitigating factors show that Ms. Bonning’s sentence was
objectively unreasonable.
Ms. Bonning’s childhood was immersed in trauma. The Court of Appeals has recognized
that a defendant’s “extremely troubled childhood is a factor that bears consideration at
sentencing.” State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001). Ms. Bonning grew up in the
presence of substance abuse, witnessed physical and emotional abuse, often spending her
summers homeless when the weather was conducive to outdoor camping because the family
could not afford utilities. (Conf. Ex. R., pp.60-61, 84-86.) At a young age, she acted as the
parent, raising her younger siblings and cousins. (Conf. Ex. R., pp.60-61.) Ms. Bonning—
practically a child herself—had her first two children before she was  (Conf.
Ex. R., p.87.)
5
Ms. Bonning suffered adult trauma as well. As an adult, Ms. Bonning was in a physically
abusive relationship, resulting in head injuries (Conf. Ex. R., p.61) and scored very high on the
generalized victimization scale. (Conf. Ex. R., p.29.) She also suffered further head trauma from
an accident. (Conf. Ex. R., p.61.) In addition, she has had medical problems throughout her life,
and has been hospitalized numerous times. (Conf. Ex. R., p.61.)
Ms. Bonning’s mental health is also a significant mitigating factor. Idaho Code § 19-2523
requires the sentencing court to consider the defendant’s mental health condition if it is a
significant factor, and the record must show that the sentencing court adequately considered this
factor when imposing a sentence. I.C. § 19-2523; State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132–33
(2011). While Ms. Bonning developed normally at first, her learning development began to slow
at a young age. (Conf. Ex. R., p.60.) Ms. Bonning struggled in school, repeating the seventh-
grade multiple times. (Conf. Doc. R., p.83.) She eventually dropped out when she became
pregnant with her first child. (Conf. Ex. R., p.65.) Ms. Bonning’s mental health assessment
reveals that she suffers from severe bipolar II disorder4 with psychotic features, posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), and mild cognitive impairment. (Conf. Ex. R., pp.77, 83-84.)
Ms. Bonning has had numerous psychological evaluations and has repeatedly requested
assistance with her mental health issues from staff at the Ada County Jail. (Conf. Ex. R., p.61.)
Ms. Bonning’s cognitive impairment specifically affects her logical thinking, judgment, risk-
taking, and mood regulation. (Conf. Ex. R., p.81.) Ms. Bonning has never addressed her mental
health issues, but is now ready and recognizes she needs help. (Sent. Tr., p.25, Ls.22–26.)
4 The functional consequences of bipolar II disorder include: “poorer occupational performance,
higher unemployment, difficulties in relationships and cognitive impairment,” and poor insight
into one’s behavior. (Conf. Doc. R., p.80.) “[T]he severity of the disorder ebbs and flows
although the presence of pervasive depression is common.” (Conf. Doc. R., p.80.)
6
In addition to mental health issues, Ms. Bonning has substance abuse issues. Though not
an excuse, Ms. Bonning had difficulty accepting her mental health condition and used drugs
because they “make her feel normal.” (Conf. Ex. R., pp.75-76.) The impact of substance abuse
on the defendant’s criminal conduct is “a proper consideration in mitigation of punishment upon
sentencing.” State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981). Exposed to substance abuse as a
young child, it is no wonder that Ms. Bonning began her own venture into illicit drug use in her
teens. (Conf. Ex. R., p.16.) Due to emotional and mental abuse, Ms. Bonning often self-
medicated with illegal substances. (Conf. Ex. R., p.62.) While her substance abuse may
exacerbate her mental health issues (Conf. Ex. R., p.72), her mental health assessment indicates
incarceration will further worsen her mental health issues. (Conf. Ex. R., p.72.) Ms. Bonning
knows she needs help; however, incarceration may not provide the help she needs. Rather it will
likely aggravate Ms. Bonning’s anxiety, PTSD symptoms, and thought disorganization, “and
lead to worsening of her mental condition” (Conf. Ex. R., pp.72, 80.)
Ms. Bonning contends the combination of mitigating factors warranted a more lenient
sentence. Therefore, she submits the district court did not exercise reason, and thus abused its
discretion, by imposing an excessive sentence.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Bonning’s Rule 35 Motion For A
Reduction Of Sentence
If a sentence is within the statutory limits, then the request for a sentence reduction
pursuant to Rule 35 is a plea for leniency and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2006). As noted above, in determining if an abuse of discretion
occurred, appellate review centers on whether the trial court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as
7
one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its
decision by the exercise of reason.” Bodenbach, 165 Idaho at 591. “When presenting a Rule
35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule
35 motion.” Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203.
In support of her Rule 35 motion, Ms. Bonning submitted documentation of her
commitment to rehabilitation, including an email exchange regarding her programming (Aug.
R., p.2), two letters from the Ada County Sherriff’s officer stating Ms. Bonning successfully
completed programing (Aug. R., pp.5, 7), two certificates of program completion (Aug. R., pp.6,
8), transcripts of programming Ms. Bonning has completed since her incarceration (Aug.
R., pp.9-14), and a flyer with notes regarding mental health services after completing an inpatient
program. (Aug. R., p.4.) In addition, Ms. Bonning submitted her Initial Classification Score
Sheet from Idaho Department of Corrections, which rated her offense as low severity requiring
minimal supervision. (Aug. R., p.3.)
Ms. Bonning is dedicated to managing her mental health and taking an active role in her
rehabilitation as evidenced by her performance while incarcerated. See State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho
166, 171 (Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing willingness to seek treatment as mitigating factor).
Ms. Bonning argues this new and additional information warranted a more lenient sentence. This
is particularly true when this information is viewed in combination with the abundance of
mitigating evidence present at the initial sentencing.
8
Ms. Bonning submits that in light of the additional information provided to the court, the
district court failed to exercise reason, and therefore abused its discretion, by denying her Rule
35 motion.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Bonning respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it deems
appropriate.  Alternatively, she requests that her case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 1st day of July, 2021.
/s/ Emily M. Joyce
EMILY M. JOYCE
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of July, 2021, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
EMJ/eas


State v. Bonning Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48574

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6-17-2021 
State v. Sanchez Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48587 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JEREMY FLORES SANCHEZ, 
 
 Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
)
) 
 
No. 48587-2021 
 
Canyon County Case No.  
CR-2002-5737 
________________________ 
 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
________________________ 
 
HONORABLE THOMAS W. WHITNEY 
District Judge 
________________________ 
 
 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KACEY L. JONES 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
MAYA P. WALDRON 
Waldron Legal, PLLC 
P. O. Box 1316 
Boise, Idaho  83701 
(208) 244-0735 
E-mail: maya@waldronlegal.com  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
Electronically Filed
6/17/2021 11:15 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................................1 
 
 Nature Of The Case..............................................................................................................1 
 
 Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ...................................................1 
 
ISSUE ..............................................................................................................................................3 
 
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................4 
 
 Sanchez Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s 
 Order Denying His Motion To Quash The Restitution Order ..............................................4 
 
 A. Introduction ..............................................................................................................4 
 
 B. Standard Of Review .................................................................................................4 
 
 C. The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied 
  Sanchez’s Motion To Quash The Restitution Order ................................................4 
 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................6 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................................................6 
 
 
 
 ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
State v. Boren, 156 Idaho 498, 328 P.3d 478 (2014) ...................................................................... 4 
Workman v. Rich, 162 Idaho 711, 403 P.3d 1200 (Ct. App. 2017) ........................................... 4, 5 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 19-5304 ............................................................................................................................. 5, 6 
I.C. § 19-5305 ......................................................................................................................... 2, 4, 5 
I.C. § 20-209H ............................................................................................................................ 5, 6 
I.C. §§ 10-1110, 10-1111 ................................................................................................................ 5 
 
 
 
 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Jeremy Flores Sanchez appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to 
quash the restitution order.  
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 In 2003, Sanchez was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery, 
conspiracy to commit first degree kidnapping, first degree kidnapping, aggravated battery, and 
aiding and abetting attempted first degree murder.  (See A.R., pp.123-28.1)  The district court 
sentenced Sanchez to consecutive fixed life sentences.  (A.R., pp.160-62, 176-79.)  Thereafter, 
the district court ordered Sanchez pay restitution in the amount of $70,737 “and that such 
restitution be paid to the Court to be distributed by the Court to the victim.”  (A.R., pp.168-69.) 
 Over sixteen years later, Sanchez filed a motion to quash the restitution order on the basis 
that it “was not recorded as a judgment…pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5305(1), and could not be 
renewed pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 10-1110, 11-1111.”  (L.R., pp.32-36.)  The district court 
concluded Sanchez showed “neither a factual nor a legal basis” to quash the restitution order and 
denied his motion.  (L.R., pp.38-39.)    
Sanchez filed a second motion to quash the restitution order, this time on the basis that 
the order was “void” because it had not been renewed within ten years pursuant to I.C. §§ 10-
1110 and 10-1111.  (L.R., pp.41-44.)  The district court again denied Sanchez’s motion.  (L.R., 
pp.45-49.)  The district court recognized the “distinction between a civil judgment and an order 
                                            
1 For consistency with the Appellant’s brief, citations to “L.R.” refer to the limited clerk’s record 
prepared for appeal in this case and citations to “A.R.” refer to the third volume of the clerk’s 
record in the first appeal, docket number 30202.  (See Appellant’s brief, p.1, ns.1-2; L.R., p.68.)  
 
 2 
of restitution.”  (L.R., p.46.)  Restitution under I.C. § 19-5305(1) is collected by the victim “in 
the manner of a civil judgment” and must be recorded; however, restitution under I.C. § 19-
5305(2) is collected by the court on the victim’s behalf “in the same manner that it collects debts 
owed to the court.”  (L.R., p.47.)  Although “the record is unclear as to whether the restitution 
order was ever recorded,” the district court found that the language of the restitution order itself 
made clear restitution would be collected pursuant to I.C. § 19-5305(2), where the order stated 
restitution was to be “paid to the Court to be distributed by the Court to the victim.”  (L.R., p.47.)  
The district court concluded Sanchez failed to show that the restitution was invalid or 
unenforceable under I.C. § 19-5305(2).2   
Sanchez filed a timely notice of appeal.  (L.R., pp.51-54, 69-71.) 
  
                                            
2 The district court also concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the Idaho Department of 
Corrections (IDOC) and therefore could not order IDOC to cease garnishing Sanchez’s inmate 
account or return garnished amounts.  (L.R., pp.48-49.)   
 
 3 
ISSUE 
 
Sanchez states the issue on appeal as: 
 
 Did the district court err by denying Mr. Sanchez’s motion to quash the restitution order? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.2.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Sanchez failed to show that the district erred when it denied his motion to quash the 
restitution order? 
 
 4 
ARGUMENT 
 
Sanchez Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Order Denying His Motion To Quash 
The Restitution Order 
 
A. Introduction 
 “Mindful” that he moved to quash the restitution order pursuant to statutory provisions 
inapplicable to “restitution collected on behalf of a victim by the IDOC or the clerk of court,” 
Sanchez nevertheless argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to quash.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 2-3.)  Sanchez has failed to show any error in the district court’s decision.  
In this case, restitution was collected by the clerk of court for payment to the victim pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-5305(2); it was not collected by the victim as a civil judgment under § 19-5305(1).  
Therefore, as the district court properly concluded, the statutory provisions related to collection 
of restitution as a civil judgment are inapplicable and Sanchez failed to show any basis to quash 
the restitution order.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. 
State v. Boren, 156 Idaho 498, 499, 328 P.3d 478, 479 (2014). 
 
C. The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Sanchez’s Motion To Quash The 
Restitution Order 
 
“[T]he legislature provided two different avenues for crime victims to receive restitution 
from the perpetrators of the crime.”  Workman v. Rich, 162 Idaho 711, 715, 403 P.3d 1200, 1204 
(Ct. App. 2017).  As set forth in I.C. § 19-5305, once restitution has been ordered: (1) within 
forty-two days from its entry, the order of restitution “may be recorded as a judgment and the 
victim may execute as provided by law for civil judgments”; or (2) the clerk of court may act “to 
 
 5 
collect on the order of restitution on behalf of the victim.”  A restitution order recorded as a civil 
judgment under subsection (1) will expire unless renewed.  I.C. §§ 10-1110, 10-1111.  However, 
where restitution is not pursued as a civil judgment but instead collected by the clerk of court for 
payment to the victim “neither I.C. § 10-1110 nor 10-1111 are applicable.”  Workman, 162 Idaho 
at 715, 403 P.3d at 1204.  The argument that restitution “must be collected under one civil 
judgment methodology is without merit.”  Id. 
The restitution order in this case specifically ordered that “restitution be paid to the Court 
to be distributed by the Court to the victim.”  (A.R., pp.168-69.)  In accordance with that order 
and pursuant to I.C. § 20-209H, IDOC garnished Sanchez’s inmate account for payments towards 
the outstanding restitution to be paid to the clerk of court for payment to the victim.  (See L.R., 
pp.42, 48.)  Because restitution was collected pursuant to I.C. § 19-5305(2) and not as a civil 
judgment, the requirements of §§ 10-1110 and 10-1111 applicable to civil judgment do not 
apply.  See Workman, 162 Idaho at 715, 403 P.3d at 1204.  Therefore, the district court did not 
err when it denied Sanchez’s motion to quash the restitution order pursuant to those statutory 
provisions.  
“Mindful that Mr. Sanchez’s motion to quash challenged the validity of the restitution 
order under §§ 10-1110 and 10-111[1], which governs restitution orders recorded as civil 
judgments to create a lien on real property and not restitution collected on behalf of a victim by 
the IDOC or the clerk of court…[Sanchez] nevertheless contends that the IDOC has no 
jurisdiction to garnish his inmate account pursuant to § 20-209H.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.3.)  
Sanchez has failed to show error, as IDOC is clearly acting within its statutory authority.  Where 
an inmate is ordered to pay restitution pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304 and such restitution is still 
owing, IDOC is specifically authorized to garnish twenty percent of each deposit into that 
 
 6 
inmate’s account to be paid “to the clerk of the court in which the restitution order was entered 
for payment to the victim.”  I.C. § 20-209H.  It is undisputed that restitution was ordered 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304, (see A.R., pp.168-69), and IDOC has deducted twenty percent of 
deposits into Sanchez’s inmate account to be paid to the court towards the outstanding 
restitution, (see L.R., p.42).  Therefore, the district court did not err when it denied Sanchez’s 
motion to quash. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 17th day of June, 2021. 
 
 
        
   /s/  Kacey L. Jones 
 KACEY L. JONES 
 Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of June, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
 MAYA P. WALDRON 
 WALDRON LEGAL, PLLC 
 maya@waldronlegal.com 
 
 
 
   /s/  Kacey L. Jones     
 KACEY L. JONES 
Deputy Attorney General 
KLJ/dd 


State v. Sanchez Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48587

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5-27-2021 
State v. Betancourt Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48597 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
KILEY A. HEFFNER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #10999
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 48597-2021
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-20-36188
v. )
)
CARL ROBERT BETANCOURT, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
______________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Carl Betancourt entered an Alford1 plea to felony possession of a controlled
substance and driving under the influence, the district court imposed an aggregate sentence of
seven years, with one and one-half years fixed. On appeal, he argues the district court abused its
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. He submits the district court should have imposed
a lesser indeterminate sentence.
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
Electronically Filed
5/27/2021 12:19 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Late one evening, Mr. Betancourt was pulled over by an Idaho State Police trooper for
speeding and driving without headlights. (PSI, p.5.) Because he had bloodshot and glassy eyes,
the trooper had Mr. Betancourt perform a series of field sobriety tests, which he failed. (PSI,
p.5.) He was then arrested for driving under the influence. (PSI, pp.5, 168-86.) Although a breath
test showed he had a blood alcohol content of .000, the trooper obtained a warrant for a blood
draw, and a subsequent toxicology report showed that Mr. Betancourt had amphetamine and
methamphetamine in his system. (PSI, pp.5, 168-86.) In the meantime, during an inventory
search of Mr. Betancourt’s car, officers discovered a bag with a crystal powder that appeared to
be methamphetamine, a methamphetamine pipe, and syringes. (PSI, p.5.)
The State filed a complaint against Mr. Betancourt alleging felony possession of a
controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and misdemeanor operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of drugs and/or an intoxicating substance. (R., pp.7-8.) After
Mr. Betancourt waived his preliminary hearing, he was bound over to district court on those
offenses. (R., pp.26-30.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Betancourt entered an Alford plea to felony possession
of a controlled substance and misdemeanor driving under the influence, and the State dismissed
the remaining charge. (Tr., p.10, L.12 – p.12, L.20; R., pp.32-44.)
At the sentencing hearing in January 2020, the State recommended the district court
impose a sentence of seven years, with two years fixed for felony possession of a controlled
substance. (Tr., p.17, L.24 – p.19, L.11.) As to the DUI charge, the State recommended the
district court impose concurrent jail time. (Tr., p.19, Ls.12-15.) Defense counsel recommended a
sentence of six years, with two years fixed, for the felony, to run concurrently to
3
Mr. Betancourt’s other holds.2 (Tr., p.19, L.20 – p.21, L.2.) The district court sentenced him to
seven years, with one and one-half years fixed, for felony possession of a controlled substance,
and six months in jail for DUI, to run concurrently. (Tr., p.23, L.18 – p.25, L.1; R., pp.51-55.)
The district court also made these sentences concurrent with the sentence in Jerome County Case
No. CR-2013-1801. (Tr., p.23, L.24 – p.24, L.20.)
Mr. Betancourt filed a Criminal Rule 35 motion in early April 2021. The district court
has not yet ruled on this motion. Mr. Betancourt timely appealed from the judgment of
conviction. (R., pp.56-58.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an aggregate sentence of seven years,
with one and one-half years fixed, upon Mr. Betancourt?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Aggregate Sentence Of Seven
Years, With One And One-Half Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Betancourt
Mr. Betancourt asserts that, given any view of the facts, his aggregate sentence of seven
years, with one and one-half years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an
independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character
of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771
(Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
2 At the time of the instant offense, Mr. Betancourt was on parole for his conviction in Jerome
County Case No. CR-2013-1801.
4
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Betancourt does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory
maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, he must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The
governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2)
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
Appellate courts use a four-part test for determining whether a district court abused its
discretion: Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
Here, Mr. Betancourt asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends the district
court should have sentenced him to a lesser indeterminate term of imprisonment in light of the
mitigating factors, including his troubled childhood, his substance abuse and its longstanding
impact on his life, and the fact that he has gainful employment upon release.
Mr. Betancourt had a very tumultuous childhood. A defendant’s “extremely troubled
childhood is a factor that bears consideration at sentencing.” State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618,
620 (Ct. App. 2001). Mr. Betancourt was raised in an environment rife with drugs and alcohol,
and stated that his mother was always out partying, and was using drugs while she was pregnant
with him. (PSI, p.201.) His father was not really a part of his life, and Mr. Betancourt did not
have any stable positive role models in his life when he was growing up. (PSI, p.212.) He
5
reported being abused by both his father and grandfather, and stated that his grandfather made
him steal. (PSI, pp.127, 201, 202, 222.) Mr. Betancourt had no structure growing up with his
mother, and explained that he was often homeless, and in and out of foster care due to “[his
mother’s] drug problem, and abuse to [him].” (PSI, pp.202, 212, 222.) He reported that when he
was about  years-old, his mother began yelling at him and held him under the water
while taking a bath. (PSI, pp.215, 218, 222, 238.) He stated that he moved around a lot, and has
lived in twenty-four different states, as well as in Mexico. (PSI, p.202.) Mr. Betancourt explained
that his mother passed away when he was  years-old, due to her “lifestyle, mental
health issues, and diabetes.” (PSI, p.202.) He reported that he was involved in special education
classes throughout his schooling, and eventually dropped out after completing the tenth grade.
(PSI, p.212.) However, Mr. Betancourt was able to obtain his GED while in custody in Arizona.
(PSI, p.212.)
After being exposed to drugs and alcohol at such a young age, Mr. Betancourt eventually
developed a severe substance abuse problem. The impact of substance abuse on the defendant’s
criminal conduct is “a proper consideration in mitigation of punishment upon sentencing.”
State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981). Mr. Betancourt started using drugs and alcohol
at a very young age. (See PSI, pp.120, 122, 125, 202, 207, 212, 223, 231.) He reported that he
first used marijuana somewhere between the ages of five and nine, and first used alcohol before
age  and stated that he last used both substances in 2013. (See PSI, pp.120, 202, 207, 212,
223.) He explained that he first used methamphetamine for the first time when he was around
 years-old, and last used it two days prior to his arrest in September 2020. (See PSI,
pp.120, 122, 202, 207, 212, 223, 231.) Mr. Betancourt reported that prior to his arrest, he was
smoking methamphetamine about two to three times per week. (PSI, p.120.) He also reported
6
experimenting with peyote and mushrooms when he was about ten or  years-old. (PSI,
p.207.) Mr. Betancourt further reported that he tried to drink himself to death after his mother
passed away, and he was hospitalized as a result. (PSI, p.207.) The Global Appraisal of
Individual Needs (“GAIN”) evaluator diagnosed him with severe substance use disorder. (PSI,
pp.122, 128, 130.) When asked how his substance use has impacted his life, Mr. Betancourt said,
“It has been a loss in my life because I always end up in jail or prison.” (PSI, p.218.)
Mr. Betancourt accepted responsibility for his crimes and recognized that he needs
counseling and substance abuse treatment. (See PSI, pp.113, 218, 226; Tr., p.21, Ls.6-17.) He
acknowledged that his substance use underlies his criminal behavior, and stated that his criminal
behavior is “all because of meth, how I was brought up in life. Meth is the nightmare in my life.”
(PSI, p.208.) Mr. Betancourt admitted that he was under the influence of methamphetamine
when he committed the instant offenses, and stated, “I feel horrible for my relapse and crimes!”
(PSI, p.114.) He stated that he is 100% ready to remain clean and sober, and is willing to explore
how substances affect his personal goals. (PSI, pp.125, 128.)
The fact that Mr. Betancourt will be able to return to his full-time job upon his release
also stands in favor of mitigation. See State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 118 (1955) (recognizing
gainful employment as a mitigating factor); see also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594–95
(1982) (employment and desire to advance within company were mitigating circumstances).
Mr. Betancourt worked at CS Beef Packers (“CS Beef”) from May 19, 2020 until August 27,
2020, and will be able to return to that job upon his release into the community. (See PSI, p.276.)
The Human Resources director for CS Beef stated, “Mr. Betancourt was an excellent performer
with an outstanding attitude.” (PSI, p.276.) The letter further stated that he was an asset, and the
company intended to hire him for a full-time position upon his release. (PSI, pp.117, 276.)
7
Despite Mr. Betancourt’s tumultuous childhood and serious substance abuse, he has
shown a willingness to try to overcome his addiction, and has recognized the detrimental effect it
has had on his life. He accepted responsibility for his criminal behavior and acknowledged the
importance of maintaining his sobriety. Upon his release, Mr. Betancourt plans to return to his
job at CS Beef and continue participating in substance abuse treatment.
Proper consideration of these mitigating factors supported a more lenient indeterminate
sentence. In light of these facts, Mr. Betancourt submits that the district court did not exercise
reason, and thus abused its discretion, by sentencing him to serve seven years, with one and one-
half years fixed.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Betancourt respectfully requests that this Court reduce the indeterminate portion of
his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 27th day of May, 2021.
/s/ Kiley A. Heffner
KILEY A. HEFFNER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
8
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of May, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
 KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
KAH/eas


State v. Betancourt Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48597

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UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
7-28-2021 
State v. Rasmussen Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48600 
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Recommended Citation 
"State v. Rasmussen Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48600" (2021). Not Reported. 7213. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7213 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9525
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 48600-2021
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) CASSIA COUNTY NO. CR16-20-64
v. )
)
TIFFANY DAWN RASMUSSEN, )
) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
Defendant-Appellant. )
____________________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Tiffany Rasmussen was sentenced to a unified term of eight years, with two years fixed,
after she pled guilty to one count of felony driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), with the
understanding that she would likely be placed on probation. The district court relinquished
jurisdiction over Ms. Rasmussen before she had the opportunity to participate in a rider program.
She contends the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over her, as
she deserves the opportunity to participate in rider programming.
Electronically Filed
7/28/2021 9:28 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
2
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Ms. Rasmussen by Information with one count of felony DUI, after
she was stopped by law enforcement while driving in Cassia County, and her breath alcohol level
was measured at .135, .080, and .087. (R., pp.17-18.) The State alleged Ms. Rasmussen had two
prior convictions for DUI, one from April 2015, and one from March 2014. (R., p.18.)
Ms. Rasmussen entered into an agreement with the State pursuant to which she agreed to
plead guilty to the charged offense, and the State agreed to recommend a unified sentence of
eight years, with two years fixed, and not to object to Ms. Rasmussen’s request that her sentence
be suspended, and that she be allowed to participate in DUI court, if accepted. (R., pp.23-31, 34-
46.) The State also agreed that if Ms. Rasmussen was not accepted into DUI court, it would not
object to her withdrawing her guilty plea. (R., p.44.) The district court accepted
Ms. Rasmussen’s guilty plea. (See R., p.33.)
Even though Ms. Rasmussen was accepted into DUI court, and even though the
prosecutor recommend probation, the district court sentenced Ms. Rasmussen to an imposed term
of eight years, with two years fixed, albeit with a period of retained jurisdiction. (5/18/20
Tr., p.7, Ls.22-23; R., pp.49-55.) The sentencing hearing was conducted via Zoom, pursuant to
the March 25, 2020 Order of the Idaho Supreme Court, issued in response to the COVID-19
pandemic. (See R., p.66, n.1.) The district court ordered Ms. Rasmussen to turn herself into
county jail immediately following the hearing. (See R., pp.57, 66-67.) Ms. Rasmussen requested
24 or 48 hours to make arrangements, and the district court said:
Absolutely not. This had to be, she had to be aware this could happen. The PSI
recommends incarceration. Absolutely not will I give her 24 hours. This should
have been planned . . . . There’s absolutely not—I will not let her remain out for
24 to 48 hours. You need to go turn yourself in.
3
(5/18/20 Tr., p.16, Ls.2-9.) Ms. Rasmussen did not immediately turn herself in. (See R., pp.57,
66-67.)
The judgment of conviction was entered on May 18, 2020. (R., pp.51-55.) The district
court held a hearing on June 1, 2020, via Zoom, and counsel for Ms. Rasmussen represented to
the court that she had not been in contact with her client. (See R., p.57.) The district court held a
hearing on December 21, 2020, again via Zoom. (See R., p.59.) Counsel for Ms. Rasmussen
again told the court she had not been in contact with her client. (12/21/20 Tr., p.4, Ls.9-11.) The
district court relinquished jurisdiction over Ms. Rasmussen. (12/21/20 Tr., p.7, Ls.2-11.) The
order relinquishing jurisdiction was entered on December 21, 2020.1 (R., pp.61-62.) On
February 1, 2021, Ms. Rasmussen filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court’s order
relinquishing jurisdiction.2 (R., pp.757-77.)
1 Ms. Rasmussen was arrested on January 17, 2021, and placed in the custody of the Idaho
Department of Correction. (See R., pp.66-67.)
2 Ms. Rasmussen filed a motion to reconsider, asking the district court to retain jurisdiction over
her for a second time. (R., pp.63-65.) The district court denied the motion, concluding it lacked
authority to retain jurisdiction again under State v. Flores, 162 Idaho 298, 302 (2017). (R., pp.66-
69.) Ms. Rasmussen filed another motion to reconsider, this time citing Idaho Criminal Rule 35.
(R., pp.70-72.) The district court denied the motion. (See R., p.70.) Ms. Rasmussen later filed
another pro se motion to reconsider under Idaho Criminal Rule 35. (R., pp.91-96.) The district
court denied the motion. (R., pp.97-101.) Ms. Rasmussen does not challenge the district court’s
rulings on these motions in this appeal.
4
ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over
Ms. Rasmussen?
ARGUMENT
Considering The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case, The District Court Abused Its
Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over Ms. Rasmussen
This Court reviews a district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction for an abuse of
discretion. See State v. Latneau, 154 Idaho 165, 166 (2013); see also I.C. § 19-2601(4). When a
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry
to determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270 (2018). The district court abused its discretion when it
relinquished jurisdiction over Ms. Rasmussen because it did not reach its decision by an exercise
of reason.
Counsel for Ms. Rasmussen told the district court during the hearing on December 21,
2020, that she did not know why her client “decided to make the choices that she’s made,” but
advised the court “she would not want jurisdiction relinquished.” (12/21/20 Tr., p.6, Ls.5-13.)
The district court said Ms. Rasmussen’s actions, presumably her failure to report to jail, “clearly
demonstrate that she’s not a viable candidate for probation.” Ms. Rasmussen’s actions might
reflect the opposite.
Ms. Rasmussen is the mother and primary caretaker of three children (5/18/20 Tr., p.8,
Ls.14-15.) She pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, with the understanding that she would
likely be placed on probation. (R., pp.23-31, 34-46.) The district court did not follow the
5
recommendations of the prosecutor and defense counsel, and imposed Ms. Rasmussen’s
sentence. (5/18/20 Tr., p.7, Ls.22-23; R., pp.49-55.) Ms. Rasmussen requested 24 or 48 hours to
make arrangements before turning herself in, but the district court flatly denied her request,
stating:
Absolutely not. This had to be, she had to be aware this could happen. The PSI
recommends incarceration. Absolutely not will I give her 24 hours. This should
have been planned . . . . There’s absolutely not—I will not let her remain out for
24 to 48 hours. You need to go turn yourself in.
(5/18/20 Tr., p.16, Ls.2-9.)
The fact that Ms. Rasmussen did not turn herself in reflects her commitment to her
family, and the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. While Ms. Rasmussen understands she
should have followed the court’s orders, she contends she should be given a chance to complete
a rider.  Ms. Rasmussen does not present a danger to the community, and she should be allowed
to complete the programming necessary to demonstrate she can succeed on probation.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Rasmussen respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s December
21, 2020 order relinquishing jurisdiction, and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 28th day of July, 2021.
/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28th day of July, 2021, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
AWR/eas


State v. Rasmussen Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48600

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UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
4-22-2021 
State v. Church Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48603 
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https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7215 
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Appeal No. 48603-2021 
j .f; ~i 
t ! 
Idaho Supreme Court Idaho Court of Appeals 
STATE OF IDAHO 
V FILED· AL 
APR 2 1 2021 
PHILIP RAYMOND CHURCH 
Appellant - Defendant 
On Appeal from The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for 
The County of Ada. 
Case# CR-FE-2011 -18221 
Honorable Jason Scott 
Appellate Brief PHILIP RAYMOND CHURCH 
7121 SAN FERNANDO 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701 
Phone# (360)560-2423 
APPENDIX Page 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED 1 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 11 
IDAHO CODE SECTION 19-2603 (PRONOUNCEMENT AND EXECUTION 
OF JUDGMENT AFTER VIOLATION OF PROBATION) lll 
Filed: 01/11/2021 15:59:49 
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County 
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court . 
By: Deputy Clerk - Parpart, Melissa 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PHILIP RAYMOND CHURCH, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-FE-2011-18221 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED 
On April 10, 2012, Philip Church received a ten-year prison sentence for 
conspiracy to commit grand theft by extortion, but jurisdiction was retained under 
I.C. § 19-2601(4) while he participated in rider programming in the custody of the 
Idaho Department of Correction. Church was put on probation after the rider 
programming, but he didn't succeed. On three separate occasions, he was found to 
have violated the conditions of probation. The first time, his probation was revoked 
and reinstated, giving him a second chance. The second time, his probation was 
revoked and he was ordered to participate in rider programming again, after which 
he received a third chance. Finally, the third time, on November 1, 2019, his 
probation was revoked and his sentence was ordered into execution. The final 
revocation order awarded him 860 days of credit for time served. 
On December 30, 2020, Church filed a motion asking the Court to revisit its 
calculation of credit for time served and award him an additional 2230 days, for a 
total of 3090 days. The motion is timely because "[a] motion to correct a court's 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED - 1 
computation of credit for time served ... may be made at any time." I.C.R. 35(c). 
When presented with a motion like this one, the trial court has the duty "to 
determine the accurate credit for time served as reflected by the record and award 
that time accordingly." State u. Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 21, 319 P.3d 501, 505 (Ct. 
App. 2014). That duty extends to withdrawing erroneously granted credit for time 
served. State u. Mace, 157 Idaho 885, 887, 341 P.3d 602, 604 (Ct. App. 2015) 
('When credit [for time served] has been erroneously granted, courts may withdraw 
the credit to correct the sentence."). So, filing a motion like this one carries the risk 
that the trial court, in double-checking its count, will determine that the defendant 
has received too much, not too little, and withdraw the excess. That's the outcome 
here, though the reduction in credit for time served is slight. 
Part of the disparity between Church's count of his credit for time served and 
the Court's count is explained by his request for credit for the time he has served 
after his prison sentence was ordered into execution on November 1, 2019. The 
Court has no responsibility, however, for awarding that time. Awarding it is the 
Idaho Department of Correction's job. Its awards are challengeable only in habeas 
litigation, Mickelsen u. Idaho State Corr. Inst., 131 Idaho 352, 355, 955 P.2d 1131, 
1134 (Ct. App. 1998), not in the underlying criminal case. For that reason, the 
Court declines to award credit for time served after November 1, 2019. 
The rest of the disparity between Church's count and the Court's count is 
explained by Church's request for credit for time served for the periods he was out 
of custody on probation. No credit is due for those periods. See LC. § 19-2603 ("The 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED - 2 
time [a probationer] shall have been at large under such suspended sentence shall 
not be counted as a part of the term of his sentence."). For that reason, the Court 
also declines to award credit for time served for the periods Church was out of 
custody on probation. 
As already noted, the Court had awarded Church 860 days of credit for time 
served as of November 1, 2019. After double-checking its count because of Church's 
motion, the Court determines that the correct count as of that date is four days 
lower: 856 days. These 856 days comprise the following periods: (i) 387 days from 
Church's initial arrest on November 14, 2011, through December 4, 2012, when he 
was released on probation after a rider; (ii) three days of discretionary jail time 
imposed by his probation officer from February 23-25, 2013; (iii) another three days 
of discretionary jail time from January 31, 2015, through February 2, 2015; (iv) 127 
days from May 5, 2015, when he was served with a warrant accusing him of 
probation violations, through September 8, 2015, when he was released after 
serving the jail time ordered as a condition of reinstatement on probation; (v) 302 
days from September 19, 2016, when he was served with a second warrant accusing 
him of probation violations, through July 17, 2017, when he was released on 
probation after a second rider; and (vi) 34 days from September 19, 2019, when he 
was served with a third warrant accusing him of probation violations, through 
November 1, 2019, when his prison sentence was ordered into execution. So, 
Church's earlier award is reduced by four days to 856 days. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED - 3 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that Church's motion for credit for time served is denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Church's credit for time served as of 
November 1, 2019, is reduced from 860 days to 856 days. 
b J'.}_ .&c.ett .,,.., """""'""" 
ason D. Scott 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED - 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on January l l, 2021 , I served a copy of this document as follows: 
Ada County Prosecutor 
acpocourtdocs@adacoun ty .id. gov 
Ada County Public Defender 
pu blic.defender@adacoun ty .id. gov 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
centralrecords@idoc.idaho.gov 
PHIL McGRANE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Signed · 1/1112021 04 :00 PM 
By: __!_o/rt~,_d~•-~J~~K.--~LU~l&Otl!IN___ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
ORDER DENYING .MOTION FOR CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED - 5 
Filed: 01/26/2021 09:20:43 
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County 
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court 
By: Deputy Clerk - Parpart, Melissa 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PHILIP RAYMOND CHURCH, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-FE-2011-18221 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
On January 11, 2021, the Court issued an order denying Philip Church's 
motion for additional credit for time served. The order details the Court's 
calculation of the credit for time served to which Church is entitled. It also explains 
that the law doesn't entitle him to credit for time served for the periods he was out 
of custody on probation. See I.C. § 19-2603 ("The time [a probationer] shall have 
been at large under such suspended sentence shall not be counted as a part of the 
term of his sentence."). Not convinced of that conclusion, Church filed a motion to 
reconsider, contending again that section 19-2603 entitles him to credit for time 
served for those periods, which sometimes are called "street time." But he misreads 
section 19-2603. It doesn't entitle probationers to credit for time served for street 
time. State v. Stevenson, 157 Idaho 798, 802, 339 P.3d 1202, 1206 (Ct. App. 2014) 
("Since credit is awarded only for periods of incarceration, and Stevenson was not 
incarcerated, he is not entitled to credit for the time during which his sentence was 
suspended and he was on probation."). So, the motion to reconsider is denied. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER - 1 
Along with the motion to reconsider, Church filed a motion to discharge his 
public defender, freeing him to pursue this credit-for-time-served argument on his 
own behalf. That motion is granted. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that Church's motion to reconsider is denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Church's motion to discharge the public 
defender is granted. The public defender has no further obligation to represent 
Church in connection with this case. 
~co'!•~ 1/26/2021 9:09:54 AM 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on January 26, 2021 , I served a copy of this document as follows: 
Ada County Prosecutor 
acpocourtdocs@adacounty.id.gov 
Ada County Public Defender 
public.defender@adacounty.id.gov 
Philip Raymond Church 
7121 San Fernando 
Boise, ID 83701 
Idaho Department Of Correction 
centralrecords@idoc.idaho.gov 
PHIL McGRANE 
Clerk of the District Court 
1/26/2021 9:21 :07 AM 
By: _o/lt{...Lf....\~••~-~,....:.,.°t,~-1c....,~:JM~lfMM.lJL.__ 
Deyutj Court Clerk 
ORDER DENTING MOTION TO RECONSIDER - 3 
• Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 19 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 26 
SUSPENSION OF JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE AND PAROLE OFFENDERS 
19-2 603. PRONOUNCEMENT AND EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT AFTER VIOLATION OF 
PROBATION. When the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms 
and conditions of probation , it may , if judgment has been withheld, 
pronounce any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, or, if 
judgment was originally pronounced but suspended, revoke probation . The 
time such person shall have been at large under such suspended sentence 
shall not be counted as a part of the term of his sentence . The defendant 
shall receive credit for time served from the date of service of a bench 
warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to believe 
the defendant has violated a condition of probation , for any time served 
following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20 - 227 , Idaho 
Code , and for any time served as a condition of probation under the 
withheld judgment or suspended sentence . 
History: 
[(19 - 2603) 1915, ch . 104 , part of sec . 1, p . 245; reen . C . L. , sec . 
8001 ; C . S . , sec . 9 0 4 5 ; I . C . A. , sec . 19 - 2 5 0 5; am . 2015 , ch . 9 9 , sec . 2 , p. 
24 0 . ] 
How current is this law? 
Search the Idaho Statutes and Constitution 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
V 
Philip Raymond Church 
IDAHO COURTS OF APPEAL 
48603-2021 
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT CASE 
CR-FE-2011-18221 
Question 
Did the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for 
The County of Ada error when they fail to grant the Defendant time served in 
according to Idaho Legislation Idaho Statute section 19- 2603 (Pronouncement and 
execution of Judgment After Violation of Probation). 
Statement of Case: 
A bench warrant was issued by the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho in and for the County of Ada on May 16, 2019 to have the Defendant-Appellate Arrested 
for a Probation Violation. 
On September 30, 2019 The Defendant-appellate was arrested and video arraigned on the bench 
warrant for his alleged probation violation on the charge of "Theft by any Common Law 
Larceny, Extortion or receiving stolen Goods, etc ... " 
On November 01 , 2019 The Honorable court sentenced the Defendant, Philip Raymond Church 
to a maximum of 10 years which included the first three and one-half (3.5) years of which is 
fixed and the remaining six and one-half (6.5) years which is indeterminate and granting the 
Defendant ONLY 860 days ' credit for time served out on a conviction that was originally from 
November 14, 2011 and has been on probation since and have served some incarceration time as 
well. 
The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho in and for The County of 
Ada Took all the time that was previously served by the defendant-appellant and gave him only 
860 days' credit for time serve at sentencing on November 1, 2019 which was incorrect in 
accordance to Idaho Legislation Statute Idaho code 19-2603. 
Idaho Legislation Statue (The Law) 
Idaho Code section 19-2603 (Pronouncement and Execution of Judgment After Violation of 
Probation) 
The Defendant shall receive credit for time served from the date of service of a bench warrant 
issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to believe the defendant has violated a 
condition of probation, for any time served following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to 
section 20-227, Idaho Code, and for any time served as a condition of 12robation under the 
withheld judgment or suspended sentence. 
According to the Statute's Express Language, Probationers are entitled to credit for time served: 
1. Following service of a bench warrant for an alleged probation violation 
2. Following an arrest on an agent's warrant for an alleged probation violation 
3. Time served as a condition of probation. Probationers are also entitled to credit for time 
served [* 4] under the functional equivalent of a bench warrant, Kesling, 15 5 Idaho at 677-78, -
315 P. 3d at 865-66 
State v. Johnston, 2020 Ida. App Unpub. Lexis 158, Defendant received credit for time serve 
while on probation when his probation was revoked 
Time Calculation while on Probation and Incarcerated 
which the Defendant is Entitled to: 
November 14. 2011 -December 05, 2012 12 months 21 days Incarcerated 
December 05, 2012 -March 20, 2015 25 months 18 days Probation 
May 06. 2015 -July 10,2015 64 days Incarcerated 
July 10, 2015 -August 30, 2016 13 months 20 days on Probation 
September 19, 2016 - July 17, 2017 9 months 27 days Incarcerated 
July 17, 2017 -May 16, 2019 21 months and 29 Probation 
September 31, 2019 - December 22, 2020 14 months 21 days Incarcerated 
A Grand total of 8 years 5 months 20 days total on the 
underline conviction/sentence (3,090 days) 
Once the bench warrant was issued to the time of the Defendant-Appellate arrest 
there are no days for time serve added. 
In Conclusion: 
The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho in and for The County of 
Ada Error when they fail to grant the Defendant-Appellate time served while on Probation and 
while he was incarcerated on the Conviction of"Theft by any Common Law Larceny, Extortion 
or receiving stolen Goods, etc ... " 
The Defendant, Philip Raymond Church is entitled to received credit for time he has served 
while he was incarcerated (1,228 days) and credit for all time he served while on Probation 
(1,862 days) in according to the Idaho Legislation Statute's Idaho Code section 19 -2603. 
The Defendant, Philip Raymond Church Hopes and Prays that the Honorable Idaho Court of 
Appeals Grants Him Credit for all the time he has served on the conviction of "Theft by any 
Common Law Larceny, Extortion or receiving stolen Goods, etc ... " as Idaho Legislation Statute 
Idaho Code section 19-2603 (Pronouncement and Execution of Judgment After Violation of 
Probation) entitles him to them. Respectfully dated this 22nd day of April 2021. 
Signed Philip Raymond Church Dated 


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