17616 research outputs found
Sort by
Stanger v. Walker & Cattle, LLC Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48092
No full texthttps://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/9390/thumbnail.jp
Eich v. Wilbur J. Eich and Henrietta C. Eich Revocable Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48160
No full texthttps://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/9409/thumbnail.jp
State v. Guerra Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 48193
No full texthttps://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/9416/thumbnail.jp
Taylor v. Taylor Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48380
No full texthttps://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/9437/thumbnail.jp
Out of Mind, Out of Sight: Voting Restrictions Based on Mental Competency
Get PDFA vast majority of states allow for the right to vote to be stripped based on an individual’s mental status. However, the United States Constitution largely leaves voting qualifications to the states, so in practical effect the right to vote is largely determined by mental competency standards that vary between states. In this essay, I explore why mental competency voting restrictions persist, given the historical trend toward expanding the vote to vulnerable populations. Further, I question the “fraud prevention” justification for disenfranchisement based on mental status, given mixed reports on the actual prevalence of voter fraud. I conclude that the perception— not reality—of electoral integrity remains a compelling government interest recognized in election law, arguably served by restricting the vote from those who may not be making an individual, meaningful choice. I discuss proposed mental competency standards that may be narrowly tailored enough to gauge an individual’s actual ability to participate in the electoral process. Finally, I conclude by suggesting that the lack of nationwide uniformity supports the establishment of a national standard for competency-based disenfranchisement. I contend that a workable, constitutionally sound standard eliminates categorical disenfranchisement, and requires individualized judicial inquiry into a voter’s capacity to understand and participate in the electoral process
Ghastly Signs and Tokens: A Constitutional Challenge to Solitary Confinement
Get PDFSince its popular reemergence in the 1980s, courts have not placed significant restrictions on the use of solitary confinement. One small exception has appeared. Lower courts have held that placing prisoners with preexisting severe mental illness in solitary confinement violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.1 Can this relatively limited rule be expanded to abolish solitary confinement altogether? This Comment argues that it can. A large body of diverse research demonstrates that prolonged solitary confinement causes severe mental illness in most prisoners, regardless of their medical history.2 By extension, because there is no principled basis for distinguishing between preexisting and confinement-induced mental illness, solitary confinement must end for all prisoners
