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1-11-2021 
State v. Edmiston Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48055 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 48055-2020
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) WASHINGTON COUNTY
) NO. CR-2015-6957
v. )
)
LEVI HUGH EDMISTON, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
______________________________)
________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON
________________________
HONORABLE SUSAN E. WIEBE
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
State Appellate Public Defender Deputy Attorney General
I.S.B. #6555 Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
KIMBERLY A. COSTER Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender (208) 334-4534
I.S.B. #4115
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
ATTORNEYS FOR ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
Electronically Filed
1/11/2021 2:27 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ........................................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ..................................................................................................... 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ............................................................................................ 4
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................................. 5
The District Court Erred When It Denied Part Of Mr. Edmiston’s
 Request For Credit For Time Served ..................................................................................... 5
A. Introduction  ................................................................................................................. 5
B. Standard Of Review......................................................................................................... 5
C. The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Edmiston Credit For Time Served........................ 5
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................................................... 7
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
State v. Brown, 163 Idaho 941 (Ct. App. 2018) ...........................................................................5
State v. Taylor, 160 Idaho 381 (2016)..........................................................................................5
Statutes
I.C. § 18-309 ........................................................................................................................... 2, 5
Rules
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(c) ...........................................................................................................2
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Levi Hugh Edmiston contends the district court erred by denying, in part, his request for
credit for time served.  He claims that in addition to the time credited by the district court, he is
entitled to credit for time he served in the Canyon County Jail, prior to the complaint being filed
and the original arrest warrant being served on him, plus the time he served in the Payette
County Jail, between the issuance and service of a later bench warrant.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On October 29, 2015, the State filed a Criminal Complaint in this case (“Washington
County Case”) charging Mr. Edmiston with burglary and multiple counts of theft, which the
State alleged Mr. Edmiston committed on June 9, 2015.  (R., pp.25-29.)  Also on October 29,
2015, the magistrate found probable cause, issued a warrant for Mr. Edmiston’s arrest
(“Washington County Warrant”), and the warrant was served upon Mr. Edmiston.  (R., pp.25-29,
31.)  At the time, Mr. Edmiston was in the Canyon County Jail,1 and the Washington County
Warrant was served upon him at that jail.  (R., pp.32, 33.)
Mr. Edmiston remained in custody and was later transported to the Washington County
Courthouse, where he was bound over on the felony charges in this Washington County Case; he
subsequently pled guilty, and he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment with retained
jurisdiction.  (R., pp.41-72, 80.)  On November 10, 2016, following Mr. Edmiston’s successful
rider, the district court entered an Order releasing him to probation.  (R., pp.78-82.)
1 The Canyon County Sheriff’s Office arrest report indicates Mr. Edmiston was booked into the
Canyon County Jail on August 15, 2015, which is after the offenses in this case were alleged to
have been committed.  (R., p.162.)
2
  Approximately six weeks later, on December 27, 2016, Mr. Edmiston was arrested by
Fruitland Police and booked into the Payette County Jail on charges of trespassing and
possessing methamphetamine, and on a warrant from Malheur County, Oregon.  (R., pp.98-117.)
Consequently, on January 12, 2017, Mr. Edmiston missed his probation review hearing in this
Washington County case, and the district court immediately issued a bench warrant for failure to
appear.  (R., p.93.)  The bench warrant was served on Mr. Edmiston on May 17, 2017,2 when he
was released from the Payette County Jail to the custody of the Washington County Sheriff.
(R., pp.118-22.)  Mr. Edmiston did not post bond and remained in custody in Washington
County throughout his subsequent probation revocation proceedings, which ultimately concluded
with an order issued June 19, 2017, revoking his probation and remanding him to the custody of
the Department of Correction.  (R., pp.125-129.)
On December 4, 2018, Mr. Edmiston filed a pro se motion for credit for time served
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35(c).  (R., pp.157-71.)  Mr. Edmiston claimed he was not
properly credited for time he had served in custody prior to his arrival at the Department of
Correction; specifically, the periods he had spent in the various county jails and while on
retained jurisdiction.  (R., p.159.)  The district court issued an order granting Mr. Edmiston’s
motion, in substantial part, and determined Mr. Edmiston was entitled to 402 days of credit for
time served.  (R., p.172.)  On March 24, 2020, Mr. Edmiston filed another motion for credit for
time served, renewing his request to be properly credited for all local, county and state time as
required by I.C. § 18-309.  (R., p.174.)
2 The Payette County Jail Report indicates there had been a “hold” for the warrant that was
“resolved” on May 17, 2017 (R., p.169).  However, there appears to be no documentation in the
record showing the date the hold had placed.  (See generally, R.)
3
The district court issued an Amended Order on April 16, 2020.  (R., p.176.)  Based on
correct arrest dates, the court recalculated Mr. Edmiston’s time served in this case to be 413
days, as follows:
· 10/29/15 – 11/10/16: 379 days (the period starting with the service of the Washington
County Warrant, and ending with the order releasing Mr. Edmiston to probation)
· 05/17/17 – 06/19/17:  34 days (the period starting with the service of the bench warrants,
and ending with the order revoking Mr. Edmiston’s probation and remanding him to the
custody of the Department of Correction.)
(R., p.176.)
The court gave no credit for any of the 74 days Mr. Edmiston spent in the Canyon County
Jail prior to the service of the warrant on October 29, 2015, or for the 125-day period he spent in
the Payette County Jail, between the issuance of the bench warrant on January 12, 2017, and its
service on May 17, 2017.
Mr. Edmiston timely appealed from the Amended Order.  (R., p.178.)
4
ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied part of Mr. Edmiston’s request for credit for time
served?
5
ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Part Of Mr. Edmiston’s Request For Credit For Time
Served
A. Introduction
Mr. Edmiston contends the district court erred by declining credit for two specific periods
of time: a 74-day period he spent in the Canyon County Jail, prior to the filing of the criminal
complaint on October 29, 2015, and contemporaneous service of the arrest warrant; and (2) a
125-day period he spent in the Payette County Jail, between the January 12, 2017 issuance of the
subsequent bench warrant and its service on May 17, 2017.  Mindful that the record lacks the
requisite documentation to support his claims and demonstrate clear error by the district court,
Mr. Edmiston asks this Court to conclude he is entitled to the requested credit for time served.
B. Standard Of Review
A criminal defendant is entitled to receive credit for time served prior to the entry of
judgment “if such incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which the
judgment was entered.”  I.C. § 18-309(1).  On review of a trial court’s order granting or denying
credit for time served, the appellate court exercises free review over whether the trial court
properly applied the law governing credit for time served, and defers to the trial court’s factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Brown, 163 Idaho 941, 943, 422 P.3d 1147,
1149 (Ct. App. 2018).
C. The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Edmiston Credit For Time Served
In order to receive pre-judgment credit for time served, a defendant must show that “the
incarceration is attributable to the offense” for which judgment was entered.  See State v. Taylor,
160 Idaho 381, 386 (2016).  Mindful of this requirement, and that the record in this case contains
6
no documentation of an arrest or hold at the Canyon County Jail, prior to October 29, 2015,
attributable to this Washington County Case, Mr. Edmiston maintains that the district court erred
by denying him credit for the 74 days he served in the Canyon County Jail prior to October 29,
2015.
Additionally, Mr. Edmiston claims he is entitled to credit for the 125 days he served in
the Payette County Jail, between the January 12, 2017 issuance of the Washington County bench
warrant, and the service of that warrant on May 17, 2017. (See R., pp.125-29.)  He points to the
Payette County Jail Booking Report which shows there was a “hold” placed for the Washington
County bench warrant in this case, and that the hold was “resolved” on May 17, 2017. (R.,
p.169.)  He submits that the “hold” was likely placed on a date prior to May 17, and possibly on
January 12, though he acknowledges there is no proof in the record to establish a date.  (See
generally R.).  Mindful that a district court’s findings will be affirmed absent showing of clear
error, and that without the documentation he cannot carry his appellate burden, Mr. Edmiston
maintains that the district court also erred in denying him credit for this 125-day period.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Edmiston respectfully asks this Court to remand his case with instructions that the
district court award him additional credit for time served, specifically, the 74-day period
between August 16, 2015 and October 29, 2015, and the 125-day period between January 17,
2017 and May 17, 2017.
DATED this 11th day of January, 2021.
/s/ Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
7
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11th day of January, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
KAC/eas


English

State v. Edmiston Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48055

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State v. Doerr Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48088

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Hallam v. State Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48137

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UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
3-2-2021 
State v. Kirchner Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48142 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Kirchner Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48142" (2021). Not Reported. 6964. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6964 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9525
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 48142-2020
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) BONNEVILLE COUNTY
v. ) NO. CR10-19-7264
)
KEVIN CARL KIRCHNER, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
____________________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kevin Kirchner, a veteran of the United States Navy who served in Iraq and suffers from
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), was convicted of attempted strangulation after he pled
guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). Mr. Kirchner appeals from his
judgment of conviction, arguing the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to
a unified term of ten years, with two years fixed, considering the substantial mitigating factors
that exist in this case.
Electronically Filed
3/2/2021 9:36 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Kirchner struck his girlfriend and placed his hands around her neck, after waking to
find her in his bed. (Conf. Exs., p.7.) He told the police he woke up at 5:30 a.m., and thought she
was a burglar who had entered his home while he was sleeping, as she did not live with him.
(Conf. Exs., p.9.) He “pushed” her and “held her down” and told the police he would not have
done it if he “had known it was her.” (Conf. Exs., p.9.)
The State charged Mr. Kirchner by Information with felony strangulation (attempted) and
misdemeanor battery. (R., pp.43-45.) Mr. Kirchner entered into an agreement with the State
pursuant to which he agreed to plead guilty to attempted strangulation, as charged. (R., pp.75-78;
Supp. Tr., p.3. L.25 – p.4, L.24.) The parties agreed to jointly recommend Veteran’s Court, if
Mr. Kirchner was accepted, and the State agreed to recommend the district court retain
jurisdiction if Mr. Kirchner was not accepted. (R., p.76.)
At the change of plea hearing, Mr. Kirchner said he held his girlfriend down by her neck
“when she came into my house unlawfully.” (Supp. Tr., p.12, Ls.8-12.) The district court
expressed concern that Mr. Kirchner had a possible defense to the charged crime, but accepted
his guilty plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). (Supp. Tr., p.15, L.16 –
p.17, L.14.) The district court released Mr. Kirchner in advance of sentencing. (Supp. Tr., p.20,
Ls.11-19.)
The district court revoked Mr. Kirchner’s release, on the State’s motion, after the State
alleged Mr. Kirchner violated the terms of his release by using methamphetamine on one
occasion, failing to appear for drug testing on multiple occasions, and being charged with
violation of a no contact order and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.89-94.)
Mr. Kirchner applied to Veteran’s Court and Domestic Violence Court, but was not accepted to
3
either. (Conf. Docs., p.8.) The district court sentenced Mr. Kirchner to a unified term of ten
years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.23, L.20 – p.24, L.7.) The judgment
of conviction was entered on May 18, 2020. (R., pp.111-15.) Mr. Kirchner filed a timely notice
of appeal on June 29, 2020. (R., pp.117-20.) He subsequently filed a motion pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 for a reduction of sentence. (Supp. R., pp.10-11.) The district court denied the
motion following a hearing.1 (Supp. R., pp.17-18.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Kirchner to a unified term of ten
years, with two years fixed, for attempted strangulation?
ARGUMENT
Considering The Substantial Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case, The District Court
Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Kirchner To A Unified Term Of Ten Years, With
Two Years Fixed, For Attempted Strangulation
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that where, as here, a district court imposes a sentence
within statutory limits, the appellant “has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on
the part of the court imposing the sentence.” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). In order to succeed on appeal under this standard, an
appellant “must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive
considering the objectives of criminal punishment,” which are deterrence, the possibility of
rehabilitation, punishment or retribution for wrongdoing, and the protection of society. State v.
Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 856 (2001) (citation omitted). Mr. Kirchner can make the necessary
1 Mr. Kirchner is not challenging the district court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion in light of
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
4
showing, as his sentence was excessive considering these four objectives in light of the
substantial mitigating factors that exist in this case.
Mr. Kirchner’s sentence cannot be justified by the first objective of criminal punishment,
which is deterrence of the individual and the public generally. See Varie, 135 Idaho at 856.
Mr. Kirchner entered an Aflord plea in order to resolve the charges against him, and did not
admit to intentionally harming his girlfriend. (See Supp. Tr., p.15, L.16 – p.17, L.14.) As
Mr. Kirchner explained at every stage in these proceedings, he pushed and held down his
girlfriend when he awoke to find her in bed with him, and did not realize it was her. (See Conf.
Exs., pp.9, 43.) This is not the kind of conduct that can be deterred, either specifically or
generally. It appears Mr. Kirchner’s overreaction may stem, in part, from his PTSD.
Mr. Kirchner served in the United States Navy for four years, and saw combat in Iraq prior to
being honorably discharged. (Conf. Exs., pp.15-16.) He was diagnosed with PTSD in 2015 and
has never received counseling or treatment. (Conf. Exs., p.16). While the harm he caused to his
girlfriend is concerning, it does not warrant a term of incarceration.
Mr. Kirchner’s sentence cannot be justified by the second objective of criminal
punishment, which is the possibility of rehabilitation. See Varie, 135 Idaho at 856. It is clear that
Mr. Kirchner faces a far better chance of being rehabilitated in the community than in prison.
Dr. Landers, a psychologist, assessed Mr. Kirchner in advance of sentencing, and stated
treatment in Veteran’s Court, if available, “would be the ideal fit.” (Conf. Exs., p.16.)
Dr. Landers noted in his report that “[i]ncarceration will ensure the safety of the public while
[Mr. Kirchner] is in a prison environment; however, it is unlikely that time served in and of itself
will create the practical skills and insight necessary [for him] to become a productive member of
society.” (Conf. Exs., p.17.) Dr. Landers also noted that “[a] retained jurisdiction program is not
5
as likely to yield positive outcomes as a community based specialty court program” as it “does
not allow for as much support when the defendant returns to the community.” (Conf. Exs., p.17.)
Mr. Kirchner does not dispute that he needs help, but strongly contends that the help he needs is
only available in the community. The sentence the district court imposed will likely have the
effect of hindering, not helping, Mr. Kirchner’s rehabilitation.
Mr. Kirchner’s sentence also cannot be justified by the third objective of criminal
punishment, which is the punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. See Varie, 135 Idaho at 856.
It is questionable whether Mr. Kirchner is deserving of any punishment or retribution as he
harmed his girlfriend without understanding it was her. (See Conf. Exs., pp.9, 43.) To the extent
that any punishment is warranted, surely a prison sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, is
excessive.
Finally, Mr. Kirchner’s sentence cannot be justified by the fourth objective of criminal
punishment, which is the protection of society. See Varie, 135 Idaho at 856. This was
Mr. Kirchner’s first felony conviction, and he was assessed as presenting only a moderate risk to
reoffend. (Conf. Exs., pp.3, 11.) Mr. Kirchner is years old, and has the majority of his life
ahead of him. (See Conf. Exs., p.4.) Mr. Kirchner recognizes he could benefit from counseling,
which could (and should) be provided in the community. Even Mr. Kirchner’s girlfriend, the
alleged victim in this case, recommended Mr. Kirchner be sentenced to “specialty court or
counseling” instead of jail. (Conf. Docs., p.7.) She stated at sentencing that she was not afraid of
Mr. Kirchner, and she believed she and Mr. Kirchner “could have solved [this] ourselves.”
(Tr., p.7, Ls.6-10.)
At sentencing, counsel for Mr. Kirchner recommended a unified sentence of four years,
with two years fixed, suspended. (Tr., p.9, L.13 – p.10, L.24.) This would have been a reasonable
6
sentence considering the substantial mitigating factors that exist in this case. The sentence the
district court imposed on Mr. Kirchner was excessive, and must be reduced by this Court or the
district court on remand.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Kirchner respectfully requests that the Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that the Court remand this case to the district court for a
new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 2nd day of March, 2021.
/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of March, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
AWR/eas


State v. Kirchner Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48142

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
1-12-2021 
State v. Clarke Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48152 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Clarke Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48152" (2021). Not Reported. 6977. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6977 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
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ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #6555 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #6406 
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Phone: (208) 334-2712 
Fax: (208) 334-2985 
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id. us 
Electronically Filed 
1/12/2021 9:42 AM 
Idaho Supreme Court 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court 
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plain tiff-Respondent, 
V. 
SEAN CLARKE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Nature of the Case 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NO. 48152-2020 
MINIDOKA COUNTY NO. CR34-18-200 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Sean Clarke appeals from the district court's order revoking his probation and executing 
a unified sentence of five years, with two years determinate, for possession of a controlled 
substance. He asserts that the district court abused its discretion by revoking probation and 
executing his sentence rather than retaining jurisdiction. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
In 2018, Mr. Clarke was charged with possession of a controlled substance, hydrocodone, 
and with a sentencing enhancement for a subsequent offense. (R., p.37.) He pleaded guilty and 
1 
the district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years determinate, and the 
court retained jurisdiction. (R., p.58.) The court subsequently suspended the sentence and 
placed Mr. Clarke on probation for a period of three years. (R., p.65.) 
In December 2018, the State filed a motion to revoke probation, asserting that Mr. Clarke 
was a relationship with a woman who was on felony probation, had tested positive for 
methamphetamine, had been discharged from counseling due to his failure to attend, had not 
made himself available for supervision, and had not many any monthly payments. (R., p.72.) 
Mr. Clarke admitted to using methamphetamine and to being discharged from counseling. 
(R., p.99.) The district court revoked probation and imposed the sentence, suspended it for four 
years, and ordered an additional term that Mr. Clarke complete drug court. (R., p.114.) 
Mr. Clarke was subsequently terminated from drug court for using methamphetamine and 
absconding. (R., p.121.) The State also sought to revoke his probation. (R., p.124.) Mr. Clarke 
admitted to violating his probation by being terminated from drug court, by using 
methamphetamine, by failing to report to his probation officer, and by absconding. (R., pp.124, 
149.) The district court revoked Mr. Clarke's probation and executed the underlying sentence. 
(R., p.151.) Mr. Clarke appealed. (R., p.158.) He asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion by revoking his probation. 
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Clarke's probation? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Clarke's Probation 
The district court is empowered by statute to revoke a defendant's probation under 
certain circumstances. LC. §§ 19-2602, -2603, 20-222. The Court uses a two-step analysis to 
review a probation revocation proceeding. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). First, the 
Court determines "whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation." Id. Second, "[i]f it 
is determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation," the Court 
examines "what should be the consequences of that violation." Id. The determination of a 
probation violation and the determination of the consequences, if any, are separate analyses. Id. 
Here, Mr. Clarke does not challenge his admission to violating his probation. "When a 
probationer admits to a direct violation of her probation agreement, no further inquiry into the 
question is required." State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 50 (Ct. App. 1992). Rather, Mr. Clarke 
submits that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. 
"After a probation violation has been proven, the decision to revoke probation and 
pronounce sentence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 
388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987). "A judge cannot revoke probation arbitrarily," however. State v. Lee, 
116 Idaho 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1989). "The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an 
opportunity to be rehabilitated under proper control and supervision." State v. Mummert, 98 
Idaho 452, 454 (1977). "In determining whether to revoke probation a court must consider 
whether probation is meeting the objective of rehabilitation while also providing adequate 
protection for society." State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995). The court may 
consider the defendant's conduct before and during probation. State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392 
(Ct. App. 1987). 
3 
In this case, Mr. Clarke submits that the district court erred by revoking his probation. At 
the disposition hearing, counsel for Mr. Clarke requested that the court place Mr. Clarke on a 
rider or commute his sentence. (Tr., p.8, Ls.17-20.) While Mr. Clarke had been terminated from 
drug court, counsel "believe[ d] that if he can get on a rider, another rider, then come back, we 
might be able to get him back into drug court, just on the basis that he didn't start it anyway. 
There might be that possibility." (Tr., p.9, Ls.7-12.) Counsel believed that Mr. Clarke needed 
additional treatment "and I don't want him just to go off to prison without some sort of follow-up 
treatment afterwards." (Tr., p.9, Ls.13-15.) Counsel also noted that, while Mr. Clarke had 
absconded, he had picked up no new charges., and had a job, house, and wife in Chubbock. 
(Tr., p.10, Ls.5-13.) 
Mr. Clarke also addressed the court at the hearing. He emphasized that he knew that 
absconding was not the right course of action but stated that he was not a "lost cause" or a "drug-
induced criminal." (Tr., p.10, Ls.19-25.) While he was in Pocatello, he "stayed employed 
through the same employer, stayed clean. I obtained vocational certificates, Haz-Mat safety and 
small space confinement." (Tr., p.11, Ls.6-11.) 
Further, Mr. Clarke had concerns with his health. He had been diagnosed with Crohn's 
disease and was scared for his safety being stuck in a cell with someone else for 20 hours when 
he needed to use the restroom. (Tr., p.11, Ls.12-17.) Ifhe remained on probation, Mr. Clarke 
was determined to "show that I can do it. I didn't leave Idaho. I'm not some drug-craved-
induced person. I'm a citizen. I'm a father. I'm a husband." (Tr., p.12, Ls.7-12.) He had not 
used drugs in the past year. (Tr., p.13, Ls.3-6.) 
Considering this information, Mr. Clarke submits that he district court abused its 
discretion by revoking his probation and executing his sentence rather than retaining jurisdiction. 
4 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Clarke requests that the district court's order revoking his probation be vacated and 
his case be remanded to the district court for a new disposition hearing hearing. 
DATED this 12th day ofJanuary, 2021. 
/s/ Justin M. Curtis 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12th day of January, 2021, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be served as follows: 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
JMC/eas 
/s/ Evan A. Smith 
EV AN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 
5 


State v. Clarke Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48152

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State v. Howard Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48154

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
2-25-2021 
State v. Clarke Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48163 
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https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6987 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
VICTORIA RACHEL CLARKE, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
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NO. 48163-2020 
 
Elmore County Case No. 
CR20-19-3526 
 
           
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Clarke failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it 
followed her sentencing recommendation and imposed a sentence of three years with one year 
determinate, suspended with probation, upon her conviction for forgery? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Clarke’s Claim Of Error Is Barred By The Invited Error Doctrine  
 
 Victoria Rachel Clarke presented a forged document to her landlord telling the landlord to 
cease eviction proceedings against Clarke because she qualified for rent assistance.  (PSI, p. 73.)  
She also testified and presented the document to the court in civil eviction proceedings.  (PSI, pp. 
73-74.)  The state charged Clarke with forgery, perjury, and offering false or forged instruments.  
Electronically Filed
2/25/2021 12:18 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
 2 
(R., pp. 24-26.)  Clarke pled guilty to forgery as part of a plea agreement with the state.  (R., pp. 
41, 42-43; 3/2/20 Tr., p. 4, L. 5 – p. 12, L. 10.) 
 At sentencing the defense requested a sentence of three years with one year fixed, 
suspended, with probation.  (5/28/20 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 20-23.)  The district court imposed a sentence 
of three years with one year fixed, suspended, with probation.  (R., pp. 48-51; 5/28/20 Tr., p. 12, 
Ls. 5-11.)  Clarke filed a notice of appeal timely from entry of judgment.  (R., pp. 57-59.) 
 On appeal Clarke, “[m]indful that the district court imposed the sentence she requested,” 
contends that the sentence is excessive.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-4.)  Clarke’s argument is barred 
by the doctrine of invited error. 
 “[T]he doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his or 
her own conduct induces the commission of the error.”  State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 915, 265 
P.3d 519, 528 (Ct. App. 2011).  “A defendant may not request a particular ruling by the trial court 
and later argue on appeal that the ruling was erroneous.  This doctrine applies to sentencing 
decisions as well as to rulings during trial.”  State v. Griffith, 110 Idaho 613, 614, 716 P.2d 1385, 
1386 (Ct. App. 1986) (citation omitted).  “[I]nvited errors are not reversible.”  State v. Edghill, 
155 Idaho 846, 849, 317 P.3d 743, 746 (Ct. App. 2014). 
 The district court imposed the sentence recommended by the defense.  (Compare 5/28/20 
Tr., p. 9, Ls. 20-23 with R., pp. 48-51; 5/28/20 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 5-11.)  Because the district court 
imposed the sentence Clarke requested at the sentencing hearing, Clarke’s claim that the sentence 
is excessive is barred by the invited error doctrine. 
 
  
 3 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 25th day of February, 2021. 
 
 
  /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 25th day of February, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
JASON C. PINTLER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
KKJ/dd 
 


State v. Clarke Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48163

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State v. urias  Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48207

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UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
1-7-2021 
State v. Briggs Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48210 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Briggs Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48210" (2021). Not Reported. 7014. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7014 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
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of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #6555 
EMILY M. JOYCE 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #10410 
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Phone: (208) 334-2712 
Fax: (208) 334-2985 
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id. us 
Electronically Filed 
1/7/2021 9:44 AM 
Idaho Supreme Court 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court 
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plain tiff-Respondent, 
V. 
CODY ROBERT BRIGGS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Nature of the Case 
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NO. 48210-2020 
ADA COUNTY NO. CR-FE-2015-13884 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Cody Briggs was on probation when he admitted to violating his probation by consuming 
alcohol. Based on his admissions, the district court revoked Mr. Briggs's probation and executed 
a unified sentence of seven years, with two years determinate. Mr. Briggs now appeals. He 
argues the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
In September 2015, Mr. Briggs was charged with possession of a controlled substance. 
(R., p.12.) Pursuant to a plea deal, Mr. Briggs pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 
seven years, with two years determinate. (R., pp.35, 39-40.) The district court retained 
1 
jurisdiction. (R., pp.39-40.) In September 2016, after Mr. Briggs successfully completed the rider 
program, the district court suspended Mr. Briggs's sentence and placed him on probation for 
seven years. (R., pp.43-44.) Two and one-half years later, Mr. Briggs admitted to a probation 
violation and the district court revoked and reinstated his probation. (R., p.104.) A year after that, 
the State alleged Mr. Briggs violated his probation, in part, by consuming alcohol on three 
occasions. (R., pp.122-23.) Mr. Briggs admitted to consuming alcohol and the remainder of the 
alleged violations were dismissed. (Tr., p.7, Ls.12-15.) Following his admissions, the district 
court revoked Mr. Briggs's probation and executed his underlying sentence of seven years, with 
two years determinate. (Tr., p.26, Ls.11-14.) Mr. Briggs timely filed a notice of appeal from the 
order revoking his probation. 1 (R., pp.145-46; Aug., p.1.) 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Briggs's probation and 
executed his underlying sentence. 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Briggs's Probation And 
Executed His Underlying Sentence 
The district court abused its discretion when it revoked Briggs's probation because 
probation was achieving its rehabilitative objective. The district court is empowered by statute to 
revoke a defendant's probation under certain circumstances. I.C. §§ 19-2602, -2603, 20-222. The 
district court uses a two-step analysis to determine whether to revoke probation. State v. Sanchez, 
149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). First, the district court determines "whether the defendant violated 
the terms of his probation." Id. Second, "[i]f it is determined that the defendant has in fact 
1 A Motion to Augment the Record with the Notice of Appeal has been filed contemporaneously 
with Appellant's Brief 
2 
violated the terms of his probation," the district court exammes "what should be the 
consequences of that violation." Id. The fmding of a probation violation and the determination of 
the consequences, if any, are separate analyses. Id. 
Here, Mr. Briggs admitted to violating his probation. (R., p.143.) Once a probation 
violation has been found, the district court must determine whether it is of such seriousness as to 
warrant revoking probation. State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). If a knowing 
and intentional probation violation has been proven, a district court's decision to revoke 
probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. LC. § 20-222; I.C.R. 33(f); State v. Leach, 
135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001). In reviewing a district court's discretionary decision, 
appellate courts determine whether the district court: "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and ( 4) reached its decision by an 
exercise ofreason." State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 591 (2019) (citation omitted). 
"The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an opportunity to be rehabilitated 
under proper control and supervision." State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 454 (1977). The district 
court must decide whether probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether 
probation is consistent with the protection of society. State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 
(Ct. App. 2001). In determining whether to revoke probation the court may consider the 
defendant's conduct before and during probation. State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392 (Ct. App. 
1987). 
In this case, Mr. Briggs asserts the district court failed to exercise reason, and therefore 
abused its discretion, by revoking his probation because his probation was achieving its 
3 
rehabilitative objective. Even though Mr. Briggs had a turbulent time during the end of 2019 and 
throughout 2020, he has made significant progress since being placed on probation. 
Mr. Briggs successfully completed a rider program, developing many skills to be 
successful in the community. (PSI, p.108.) For over two and one-half years, Mr. Briggs had very 
positive performance on probation. (See, e.g., R., pp.76-83, 85-93.) He had steady employment. 
(R., p.133; Tr., p.21, Ls.10-11.) He was in good contact with his probation officer. (See pp.76-93 
He was attending AA meetings. (R., p.7.) He was working on getting off parole for an earlier, 
unrelated offense. (R., p.90.) In fact, the only mishap during these first years ofhis probation was 
when, after requesting 48 hours-notice for an appointment, his probation officer only provided 
22 hours and Mr. Briggs was unable to attend the meeting due to work. (R., pp.81-82.) 
Mr. Briggs's Level of Service Inventory ("LSI") score dropped from 21 to 15. (R., p.90.) In 
addition, Mr. Briggs was offered a promotion at work, however, he needed to be able to drive in 
order to get the promotion. (R., p.90.) He requested his probation officer fill out paperwork for 
him to get his driver's license restriction modified, (R., p.90), yet nothing happened for over a 
month. (R., pp.90-92.) Mr. Briggs became frustrated, and like many with substance abuse issues, 
relapsed. (R., p.112.) When in treatment, Mr. Briggs was successful. (R., p133.) 
Mr. Briggs took responsibility and showed remorse for the admitted violations. 
(R., p.120; 6/5/20 Tr., p.15, Ls.2-7, p.16, L.24 - p.17, L.6.) "In reviewing the propriety of a 
probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision 
to revoke probation." State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621 (Ct. App. 2012). Mr. Briggs does 
significantly well on probation, however, because of his issues with substance abuse he has had 
his share of struggles (PSI, p.9), this year in particular. His substance abuse "got its hooks into 
him" and he just could not stop drinking. (Tr., p.20, Ls.16-17.) Amidst his relapse, the COVID-
4 
19 pandemic struck, and he began struggling with his mental health. (Tr., p.20, Ls.24-25.) While 
not an excuse, his relapse explains his probation violation. His probation violations were caused 
by his substance abuse problem and not new crimes. (Tr., p.21, L.14.) Between his probation 
violations, which were a year apart, he had employment (Tr., p.21, Ls.10-11), housing, and he 
was compliant for a lengthy period of time. (Tr., p.21, Ls.12-13.) 
In addition to having substance abuse issues, Mr. Briggs suffers from mental health 
issues (R., p.136) and like many, found the trials and tribulations of the past year difficult, to say 
the least. For those with substance abuse issues, the road to rehabilitation and sobriety is rarely a 
straight smooth road. And while Mr. Briggs has had a few rough patches in his years to recovery, 
he has had very good stretches of success on probation. In light of these facts, Mr. Briggs 
maintains the district court did not exercise reason and therefore abused its discretion by 
revoking his probation because it was achieving its rehabilitative objective. The district court 
should have reinstated his probation. 
5 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Briggs respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order revoking his probation 
and remand his case to the district court for him to be returned to probation. Alternatively, he 
requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new probation violation disposition 
hearing. 
DATED this 7th day of January, 2021. 
/s/ Emily M. Joyce 
EMILY M. JOYCE 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7th day of January, 2021, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows: 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
EMJ/eas 
6 
/s/ Evan A. Smith 
EV AN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 


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