University of Idaho College of Law

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UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
4-22-2021 
State v. O'daniel Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48070 
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Recommended Citation 
"State v. O'daniel Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48070" (2021). Not Reported. 6924. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6924 
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Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
ANDREW V. WAKE 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
CURTIS MATTHEW O’DANIEL, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48070-2020 
 
Ada County Case No. 
CR01-19-28511 
 
           
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Curtis Matthew O’Daniel failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion when it imposed a sentence of eight years with three years fixed, suspended in favor of 
probation, on a conviction for felony domestic battery? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
O’Daniel Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 O’Daniel was involved in an argument with his wife and began repeatedly punching her 
Electronically Filed
4/22/2021 12:20 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Melanie Gagnepain, Deputy Clerk
 2 
with a closed fist.  (PSI, pp. 268-69.1)  As O’Daniel punched her “more times than she could 
count,” she managed to retrieve pepper spray from her pocket and use it to stop the attack.  (Id.)  
She was treated for extensive bruising, nausea, a black eye, and other injuries.  (PSI, pp. 36-63, 
131, 269.)  The state charged O’Daniel with felony domestic violence causing a traumatic injury.  
(R., p. 26.)  O’Daniel was convicted following a jury trial.  (R., pp. 82-98, 131-32.)  At sentencing, 
the state recommended ten years with three years fixed, suspended in favor of probation, but with 
some period of jail time to be determined by the court. (Tr., p. 240 (p. 15, Ls. 2-16).2)  Defense 
counsel recommended three years with one year fixed, suspended in favor of probation.  (Tr., p. 
242 (p. 23, Ls. 2-9).)  O’Daniel himself requested probation, but with respect to the underlying 
sentence stated, “I don’t care. I don’t care.  Just do whatever you’re going to do.”  (Tr., p. 242 (p. 
24, Ls. 5-20).)  The district court imposed a sentence of eight years with two years fixed, suspended 
in favor of probation, with no jail time.  (Tr., p. 243 (p. 26, L. 11 – p. 27, L. 7); R., pp. 148-51.)  
O’Daniel timely appealed.  (R., pp. 163-65.)    
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the 
defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing 
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 
159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s 
                                            
1 Citations to the PSI refer to the 426-page electronic document containing the confidential 
exhibits, including the report of the presentence investigator.  
2 The volume of transcripts contains 255 pages of various transcripts, including of the trial.  The 
only transcript cited herein is the transcript of the sentencing hearing, held May 15, 2020, and 
contained at pages 237-47 of the volume.  Following the convention set out in O’Daniel’s opening 
brief (Appellant’s brief, p. 2, n. 1), the state will cite initially to the pagination of the volume as a 
whole, and then parenthetically to the separate pagination and line numbering associated with the 
sentencing hearing in particular.   
 3 
probable term of confinement.  Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).  
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it 
is a clear abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing 
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  In evaluating whether a lower court abused 
its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: 
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”  State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 
261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 
P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). 
 
C. O’Daniel Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
 
 As O’Daniel acknowledges, his underlying sentence is within statutory limits.  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 3.)  As a result, to bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, he must 
establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive.  State v. Farwell, 
144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).  To establish that the sentence was excessive, the 
appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate 
to accomplish any one of the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
retribution.  Id.  A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary 
objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, 
rehabilitation, or retribution.’”  Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895-96, 392 P.3d at 1236-37 (quoting State 
v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)). 
 O’Daniel argues that the district court “did not exercise reason” because it “should have 
imposed a lesser underlying sentencing in light of the mitigating factors, including his mental 
 4 
health issues, success on pre-trial release, and family support.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 3.)  O’Daniel 
has not shown that the district court abused its discretion.   
The district court expressly considered O’Daniel’s mental health issues and his prior 
success on supervised release when formulating the sentence imposed.   The court determined that 
probation was appropriate in light of O’Daniel’s prior success with supervised release.  (Tr., p. 
243 (p. 25, Ls. 2-8).) With respect to O’Daniel’s mental health issues, the court stated that it was 
only because O’Daniel suffered from mental health issues and the court believed those issues were 
“likely” a contributing factor to the offense that the court granted probation rather than retaining 
jurisdiction.  (Tr., p. 243 (p. 25, Ls. 9-21).)  The court thus took both O’Daniel’s mental health 
issues and his prior success on supervised release into consideration in its decision to suspend the 
sentence.  With respect to O’Daniel’s family support, O’Daniel cites a single line from the PSI in 
which his mother stated that she was his “main support” and she believed he wanted to stay sober 
and focus on his mental health.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 4 (citing PSI, pp. 274-75).)  As an initial 
matter, this is the same family support that he had when he battered his wife.  But, in addition, his 
mother goes on only to request probation (just as O’Daniel himself did (Tr., p. 242 (p. 24, Ls. 5-
20)), suggesting that retained jurisdiction would be “traumatic and unsettling for him with his 
medications and health.”  (PSI, pp. 274-75.)  The district court did as she requested by granting 
probation.   
Having taken the mitigating factors to which O’Daniel points on appeal into consideration, 
the court determined that the underlying sentence was necessary in light of “how serious this was” 
and the “visible wounds to the victim.”  (Tr., p. 243 (p. 25, L. 9 – p. 26, L. 10).)  Thus, the court 
balanced the mitigating factors, which led it to grant probation, against the aggravating factors, 
which led it to impose the underlying sentence it did.  O’Daniel has not shown that that balancing 
 5 
was an abuse of discretion.  State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 932, 104 P.3d 969, 974 (2005) 
(emphasizing the discretionary nature of weighing mitigating and aggravating factors).   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 22nd day of April, 2021. 
 
 
  /s/  Andrew V. Wake 
ANDREW V. WAKE 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of April, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
JENNY C. SWINFORD 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  Andrew V. Wake 
ANDREW V. WAKE 
Deputy Attorney General 
AVW/dd 
 


English

State v. O\u27daniel Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48070

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7943/thumbnail.jp

UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
5-19-2021 
State v. Descharme Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48114 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Descharme Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48114" (2021). Not Reported. 6944. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6944 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
JOHN C. McKINNEY 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
MICHELLE RENE DESCHARME, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
Nos. 48114-2020 & 48115-2020 
 
Twin Falls County Case Nos. 
CR42-19-4690 &  
CR42-19-4691 
 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 Has Descharme failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when 
it imposed a sentence of 11 years with five years fixed for forgery and three years fixed for issuing 
an insufficient funds check for $250 or more? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Descharme Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 In February 2019, Descharme issued a check for $323.38 to Swensen’s Market in Twin 
Falls which was returned from the bank for insufficient funds.  (R., p.14.)  The Twin Falls police 
officer investigating the case contacted a detective with the Rupert Police Department who 
reported that he had recently arrested Descharme and she “admitted to writing bad checks all over 
Electronically Filed
5/19/2021 10:53 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
 2 
southern Idaho.”  (R., pp.14-15.)  In Twin Falls County case number CR42-19-4690 (Idaho 
Supreme Court no. 48114-2020), the state charged Descharme with issuing an insufficient funds 
check for $250 or more (R., pp.29-30), followed by an Amended Information alleging that she is 
a persistent violator of law (R., pp.52-55).   
 In April 2019, Joe Miller informed the Kimberly Police Department that, according to a 
report he received from his bank, a check ostensibly from his MCM Trucking Company used his 
name on it and was written to a Michelle Descharme for the amount of $998.59, which was cashed 
by Ridley’s Market on March 25, 2019.  (R., p.174.)  Officer Miller was later informed by 
Lieutenant McEwen with the Rupert Police Department that, during an interview with Descharme, 
she “admitted to printing checks from her house and cashing them at stores all over southern 
Idaho[.]”  (R., p.175.)  According to Lieutenant McEwen’s summary of Descharme’s statements 
to him: 
[Descharme] was helped by a male later identified as Jon C. May.   . . . Jon would 
call Ridleys stores and ask what companies were on the check cashing list.  
Michelle would then print checks and cash them.  All of them under … $1000.00.  
The check she cashed at Ridleys in Kimberly and other locations, was not spoken 
about in detail, but only referenced Kimberly once along with Buhl, Blackfoot, and 
Jerome.  She mentioned that she cashed checks twice at the Rupert store and the 
Pocatello store.  So, the check cashed by Michelle Descharme from a false MCM 
Trucking account in the amount of $998.59 on March 25th would be the one that 
she is alluding to in her interview.    
 
(R., pp.175-176.)  The state charged Descharme with forgery and burglary in Twin Falls County 
case number CR42-19-4691 (Idaho Supreme Court no. 48115-2020) (R., pp.187-189), followed 
by a persistent violator allegation (R., pp.202-205).    
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Descharme pled guilty to all the charges and allegations in 
both cases – with the exception of burglary in the second case.  (R., pp.76-91, 241-256.)  The state 
agreed to dismiss the burglary charge in the second case and case no. CR42-19-5947, and not file 
 3 
charges relating to a check Descharme issued to Hobby Lobby in March 2019.  (Id.)   In each case, 
Descharme requested a mental health assessment and to participate in the mental health program, 
which requests were denied.  (R., pp.114-119, 120-125, 280-291.)  
At a joint sentencing hearing, the district court imposed concurrent sentences of three years 
fixed and zero indeterminate for issuing an insufficient funds check for $250 or more, and 11 years 
with five years fixed for forgery.  (R., pp.135-142, 301-307.)  Descharme filed a timely notice of 
appeal in each case.  (R., pp.146-148, 158-162, 310-312, 316-320.) 
 On appeal Descharme contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence, focusing on the “aggregate unified sentence of eleven years, with five years 
fixed.”1  (Appellant’s brief, pp.1, 4-8.)  Application of the relevant standards shows Descharme 
has failed to show an abuse of discretion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the 
defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing 
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 
159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s 
probable term of confinement.  Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).  
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it 
is a clear abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing 
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  A sentence is reasonable if it appears 
                                            
1  Although Descharme’s “Issue,” “Argument” heading, and “Conclusion” refer to the sentences 
in both cases, she realistically challenges only her sentence for forgery in Twin Falls County case 
no. CR42-19-4691 (Idaho Supreme Court case no. 48115-2020).       
 4 
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of 
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.   State v. Schiermeier, 165 Idaho 447, 
454, 447 P.3d 895, 902 (2019); Anderson, 163 Idaho at 517, 415 P.3d at 385 (citing State v. 
Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982)).   
In evaluating whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a 
four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the 
exercise of reason.”  State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citing 
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). 
 
C. Descharme Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
 
 To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish 
that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive.  State v. Farwell, 144 
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).  The record shows no abuse of discretion.   
The district court said that it had considered and was applying the four sentencing criteria 
set out in Toohill, as well as the factors listed in I.C. § 19-2521 (regarding whether to grant 
probation or order imprisonment).  (Tr., p.22, Ls.6-9.)  The court also considered the Presentence 
Report (“PSI”), the comments and recommendations of counsel, letters submitted in support of 
Descharme, and other documents submitted by the public defender’s office.  (Tr., p.21, L.24 – 
p.22, L.5.)   
In discussing the “first and foremost” Toohill factor, the “good order and protection of 
society,” the district court dispelled any suggestion in the “letters and comments” that Descharme’s 
association with a man named Jon May reduced her culpability for her crimes, stating it had not 
 5 
heard “anything that blamed Jon May for the previous nine felony convictions.”  (Tr., p.22, L.15 
– p.23, L.6.)  To make the record clear, the court chronicled Descharme’s felony convictions up to 
2019: 
In 1989, there was a first-degree theft.  I’m not sure what the disposition on 
that was ….  In 1989, there was unlawful possession of a financial transaction card.  
In 1984, a theft conviction and a forgery conviction.  Actually, the disposition on 
those is also unknown pursuant to the PSI.  I’m not sure exactly on the 1984 or 
1989 theft convictions.  1985, unlawful public assistance, as well as an unlawful 
possession of a financial transaction card.  1996, fugitive, and also – fugitive of a 
mail fraud case.  1997, grand theft.  1997, an unlawful possession of a financial 
transaction card.  1997, possession of a controlled substance.  2002, forgery.  2005, 
forgery.  Those are all prior to any of the instances – any of the eight or nine 
instances we’re dealing with presently from 2019 and 2020. 
 
(Tr., p.23, Ls.10-25.)  The court told Descharme that “[t]he vast majority of them are convictions 
that involve you preying on the public at large; individuals, people who need money just as much 
as you do, and, yet, you are scheming to take their money from them.”  (Tr., p.24, Ls.4-10.)   
Next, the district court recited Descharme’s felony convictions from 2019 forward, 
enumerating “[i]nsufficient funds conviction, Twin Falls; forgery conviction, Twin Falls; forgery 
conviction, Bingham County; forgery conviction, Bannock County; possession of a controlled 
substance, trafficking – that is a pending charge in Minidoka County – possession of a controlled 
substance in Minidoka.”  (Tr., p.24, Ls.11-19.)  The court concluded that Descharme had been 
convicted of “at least 14 or 15” felonies.2  (Tr., p.24, L.20.)   
Acknowledging that Descharme was a drug addict and had mental health issues, the district 
court explained that the protection of society was an overriding consideration: 
I understand that there may be extenuating circumstances, but all of these took place 
over a period of time throughout all of Idaho.  There was clearly time for you to 
reflect and decide to extricate yourself from whatever circumstances you were in.  
I understand that you have some mental health issues.  I am acutely aware of that.  
                                            
2  Despite Descharme’s remarkable criminal record, the LSI-R (“Level of Service Inventory-
Revised) evaluation her as a “moderate” risk for recidivism.  (PSI, p.21.)   
 6 
However, once again, this is not a situation where you’re acting on a mental health 
crises.  This is spread out over time, over distance.  Obviously, you’re driving to 
these places, which is giving you time to reflect on exactly what you’re doing.  So 
the fact that you are an addict, I recognize you are; the fact that you may have 
mental health issues, which I think you do, that cannot excuse the extent to which 
you have preyed on innocent individuals in the community, and at some point, there 
needs to be a stop to the type of conduct here. 
 
(Tr., p.24, L.20 – p.25, L.12.)   
 In discussing deterrence, the district court noted that because of the “sheer number” of 
felony convictions Descharme had, it did not bother to recite Descharme’s misdemeanor 
convictions, plainly indicating that Descharme would not be easily deterred from her criminality.  
(Tr., p.25, Ls.13-22.)  The court agreed that drug court and mental health court may help 
Descharme be rehabilitated, but explained that, “given the – the need that the Court feels to protect 
society, I do not think that those programs are appropriate for you at this time.”3  (Tr., p.25, L.23 
– p.26, L.3.)  Finally, the court observed that there was a need for retribution and punishment, as 
it could “only count one case of an individual who’s had this many felony convictions that’s 
appeared before me.”  (Tr., 26, Ls. 5-8.) 
Notwithstanding the multiple opportunities Descharme has been given to succeed through 
probation and parole4 (see generally PSI, pp.5-11), it has not deterred her from amassing an 
incredible record for theft and fraud related crimes committed against innocent and trusting 
persons and businesses.  Descharme’s criminal history, the nature of her past and current offenses, 
                                            
3  The GAIN Generated MH Diagnoses provisionally found (i.e., “rule out”) that Descharme had 
“major depressive disorder, recurrent, moderate” and “generalized anxiety disorder[.]”  (PSI, p.38 
(capitalization modified).) 
   
4  According to the Presentence Report, Descharme was sent to prison in two separate Idaho cases 
for forgery (2002 and 2006), and “had served two periods of incarceration at the Federal 
Correctional Institution – Dublin in California” for a 1991 mail fraud conviction.  (PSI, p.11.)  
 7 
and the sentencing criteria – especially the need to protect the public – convinced the district court 
that a sentence of 11 years with five years fixed for forgery was appropriate.    
Descharme argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive 
sentence in light of her remorse, her mental health condition, and the support she has from her 
family and the community.  (Appellant’s brief, p.7.)  However, the district court reasonably 
concluded that Descharme’s mental condition had little to do with her premeditated crimes, and 
considered the Presentence Report, letters of support, and arguments and statements presented.  
(Tr., p.21, L.24 – p.22, L.5; p.25, Ls.2-6.)  Descharme is merely asking this Court to reweigh those 
matters.  Although Descharme’s remorse and her support from family and others are certainly 
laudable, they do not negate the harm her continued criminality has inflicted on the public.  The 
court fittingly declared that, “at some point, there needs to be a stop to the type of conduct here.”  
(Tr., p.25, Ls.6-12.)  She has failed to show an abuse of discretion.   
 The district court applied the correct legal standards to its unchallenged factual findings 
and exercised its discretion to impose a reasonable sentence.  Descharme has failed to show error. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 19th day of May, 2021. 
 
 
  /s/  John C. McKinney 
JOHN C. McKINNEY 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
  
 8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of May, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  John C. McKinney 
JOHN C. McKINNEY 
Deputy Attorney General 
JCM/dd 
 
 
 


State v. Descharme Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48114

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7954/thumbnail.jp

UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
3-15-2021 
State v. Slater Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48133 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Slater Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48133" (2021). Not Reported. 6955. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6955 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
VICKI CAROL SLATER, 
 
 Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
)
) 
 
No. 48133-2020 
 
Kootenai County Case No.  
CR28-19-15888 
________________________ 
 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
________________________ 
 
HONORABLE CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER 
District Judge 
________________________ 
 
 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KACEY L. JONES 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
JENNY C. SWINFORD 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
322 E. Front St., Ste. 570 
Boise, Idaho  83702 
(208) 334-2712 
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
Electronically Filed
3/15/2021 3:08 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................................1 
 
 Nature Of The Case .............................................................................................................1 
 
 Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ..................................................1 
 
ISSUE ..............................................................................................................................................3 
 
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................4 
 
 Slater Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred 
 When It Denied Her Motion To Suppress ...........................................................................4 
 
 A. Introduction ..............................................................................................................4 
 
 B. Standard Of Review .................................................................................................4 
 
 C. The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Slater’s 
  Motion To Suppress .................................................................................................5 
 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................7 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................................................8 
 
 
 
 ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) .................................................................................... 4, 5 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) ........................................................................................ 4, 6 
State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 302 P.3d 328 (2012) ................................................................ 5 
State v. Cox, 166 Idaho 894, 465 P.3d 1133 (Ct. App. 2020) ........................................................ 5 
State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 148 P.3d 1240 (2006) ................................................................. 4 
State v. Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 454 P.3d 543 (2019) ................................................................ 5, 6 
State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 17 P.3d 301 (Ct. App. 2000) ................................................... 5 
State v. Pieper, 163 Idaho 732, 418 P.3d 1241 (Ct. App. 2018) ...................................................... 5 
State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112, 175 P.3d 801 (Ct. App. 2007) ................................................ 6, 7 
State v. Vasquez, 129 Idaho 129, 922 P.2d 426 (Ct. App. 1996) ................................................... 6 
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) ................................................................................... 5 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const. amend. IV .................................................................................................................... 5 
 
 
 
 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Vicki Carol Slater appeals from the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Law enforcement obtained a search warrant for a residence in Post Falls.  (R., p.13.)  At 
the time officers executed the warrant, Slater (who was not a resident) was present visiting a friend.  
(R., pp.13-14.)  Officers detained the residence’s occupants, including Slater, while executing the 
warrant.  (R., p.13.)  Another officer ran a drug dog around the vehicles parked in the driveway of 
the residence.  (R., p.14.)  The drug dog alerted on Slater’s vehicle.  (R., p.14.)  Officers searched 
the vehicle and found a baggie of methamphetamine.  (R., p.14.)  Thereafter, Slater made 
incriminating statements to law enforcement regarding the methamphetamine.  (R., p.14.)  
 The state charged Slater with possession of methamphetamine.  (R., pp.37-38.)  Slater filed 
a motion to suppress, arguing the dog sniff and subsequent search were unlawful because her 
vehicle was parked in the driveway of a private residence when law enforcement arrived.  (R., 
pp.44-48.)  The state opposed the motion.  (R., pp.49-52.)  The district court held a hearing on the 
motion.  (See R., pp.54-58; see also Tr., pp.39-85.1) 
 Detective Ryan Jacobson testified that he executed the search warrant at the residence, 
along with other officers.  (Tr., p.46, Ls.14-21.)  Slater was present when the officers arrived.  (Tr., 
p.46, L.22 – p.47, L.15.)  Detective Jacobson notified Slater that she was being detained while 
officers executed the warrant.  (Tr., p.47, L.18 – p.48, L.1.)  Three vehicles, including Slater’s 
                                            
1 For consistency, citations to the transcript will refer to the pagination of the electronic document, 
rather than the internal pagination of the transcript.  (See Appellant’s brief, p.2, n.1.) 
 
 2 
vehicle, were parked in the driveway of the residence.  (Tr., p.48, L.18 – p.49, L.11.)  Detective 
Jacobson requested consent to search Slater’s vehicle; Slater declined.  (Tr., p.50, L.2 – p.51, L.1.) 
 Deputy Nathan Nelson testified that he and his drug detection canine Pogo were on the 
scene to assist with the execution of the search warrant.  (Tr., p.63, Ls.14-24.)  Deputy Nelson 
conducted a dog sniff with Pogo around the three vehicles in the driveway.  (Tr., p.64, Ls.3-9.)  
Pogo alerted on Slater’s vehicle.  (See Tr., p.68, Ls.4-9.)   
After taking the matter under advisement, the district court denied Slater’s motion.  (R., 
pp.60-66.)  The district court found that Slater did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the residence or surrounding area because Slater was neither a resident nor an overnight guest.  
(R., pp.64-65.)  Further, the district court found that the officers and Pogo were lawfully positioned 
in the driveway when the dog sniff occurred.  (R., pp.62-64.)  “Under the circumstances, it is not 
unreasonable to have a drug detection dog conduct a sniff around vehicles parked in a driveway, 
before entering the residence, when executing a search warrant.”  (R., p.65.)  Once Pogo alerted 
on the vehicle, probable cause existed to justify the search of the vehicle.  (R., p.65.)  Therefore, 
the district court denied Slater’s motion to suppress.  (R., p.66.)   
 Thereafter, Slater entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine.  
(See Tr., p.94, Ls.10-14; p.95, L.17 – p.96, L.12.)  The district court withheld judgment and placed 
Slater on probation for two years.  (R., pp.102-04; Tr., p.116, Ls.4-7.)  Slater filed a timely notice 
of appeal.  (R., pp.113-15, 123-26.) 
  
  
 
 3 
ISSUE 
 
Slater states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Slater’s motion to suppress? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)  
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Slater failed to show that the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress? 
 
 
 
 4 
ARGUMENT 
 
Slater Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied Her Motion To 
Suppress 
 
A. Introduction 
“Mindful” that a dog sniff is not a search and that an individual cannot demonstrate 
standing solely by being a visitor at another’s residence, Slater argues that the district court erred 
when it denied her motion to suppress because the dog sniff of her vehicle was unlawful.2  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-7 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) and Illinois v. Caballes, 
543 U.S. 405 (2005)).)  Slater has failed to demonstrate a violation of her Fourth Amendment 
rights.  First, the dog sniff did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.  Second, Slater did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the odors emanating from her vehicle parked in the 
driveway of a friend’s residence.  Third, the officer conducting the dog sniff was lawfully present 
in the driveway, executing a search warrant of the residence.  Therefore, the district court did not 
err when it denied Slater’s motion to suppress.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a decision on a motion 
to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that are 
supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles 
to those facts.  State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).  “At a 
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, 
                                            
2 Slater does not dispute that the search of her vehicle was supported by probable cause based on 
the drug dog’s alert, but challenges only the constitutionality of the dog sniff.   
 
 5 
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.”  State v. Pieper, 163 Idaho 
732, 734, 418 P.3d 1241, 1243 (Ct. App. 2018). 
 
C. The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Slater’s Motion To Suppress 
 
 The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  “[A] defendant bringing a motion to suppress must show that 
there was a Fourth Amendment search, that he has standing to challenge the search, and that the 
search was unreasonable.”  State v. Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 905, 454 P.3d 543, 547 (2019).  Slater 
has failed to make such a showing. 
 First, Slater does not challenge a Fourth Amendment search or seizure.  “A dog sniff along 
the outside of a motor vehicle does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.”  State 
v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363, 17 P.3d 301, 307 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing United States v. Place, 
462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)); see also Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.  When a reliable drug dog indicates 
that a vehicle contains the odor of controlled substances, the officer has probable cause to believe 
there are drugs in the vehicle and search it without a warrant.  State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 
706, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012); State v. Cox, 166 Idaho 894, ___, 465 P.3d 1133, 1137 (Ct. App. 
2020). 
 Slater challenges only the dog sniff of her vehicle.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp.5-7 (“[T]he 
officer unlawfully ran the drug dog around her car.”).)  She does not dispute that the dog alert 
provided sufficient probable cause to support the search of her vehicle, nor does she argue that the 
dog sniff occurred during an unlawful detention or unlawfully prolonged an otherwise lawful 
detention.  However, a dog sniff does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.  Because Slater 
is not challenging a Fourth Amendment search or seizure, she has failed to raise a cognizable 
Fourth Amendment claim.   
----- ------
 
 6 
 Second, Slater does not have standing.  “Standing in the Fourth Amendment context is used 
as shorthand for the question of whether the defendant personally has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the place searched.”  Maxim, 165 Idaho at 906, 454 P.3d at 548 (emphasis in original).  
“[F]or Fourth Amendment purposes, one who has no ownership or possessory interest and is not 
a resident but who is merely paying a brief, casual visit, has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in a residence.”  State v. Vasquez, 129 Idaho 129, 131, 922 P.2d 426, 428 (Ct. App. 1996); see 
also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142-46. 
 Slater was merely a casual visitor at her friend’s residence and did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in her friend’s property, including the driveway.  (R., pp.14, 61.)  Slater 
does not challenge the district court’s finding that she had no reasonable expectations of privacy 
which were violated.  (See Appellant’s brief, p.6 (citing R., pp.64-65).)  Accordingly, Slater has 
no standing to challenge the validity of the dog sniff.  See Vasquez, 129 Idaho at 131, 922 P.2d at 
428 (“His status as a casual visitor did not accord him a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
apartment. Therefore, the entry by the Nampa police, even if not constitutionally justified, did not 
violate Vasquez’s Fourth Amendment rights.”).  
 Last, even if the dog sniff itself implicated Slater’s own Fourth Amendment rights, she has 
failed to show that it was unreasonable.  Law enforcement officers are allowed to be in places open 
to the public, including direct access routes to private property.  See State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 
112, 115, 175 P.3d 801, 804 (Ct. App. 2007).  “Direct access routes to the house, including 
driveways, parking areas, and pathways to the entry, are areas to which the public is impliedly 
invited.”  Id.  Officers that come onto private property for some legitimate purpose and restrict 
their activities to such areas where ordinary visitors could be expected to go are permitted the same 
 
 7 
intrusion as would be expected of a citizen and observations from such vantage points are lawful.  
Id.     
Deputy Nelson conducted the dog sniff of the vehicle in the driveway of the residence—a 
direct access route to which the public, including law enforcement, is impliedly invited.  (Tr., p.64, 
Ls.3-9.)  Further, the officers were executing a valid search warrant for the residence, and therefore 
had authority to intrude onto the private residence beyond its public access routes to search for and 
seize evidence, including drugs and drug paraphernalia.  (See R., pp.60-61.)  Because the valid 
search warrant specifically authorizes law enforcement to search for evidence of drug activity, 
conducting dog sniffs around the vehicles located on the property was reasonable.  The district 
court did not err when it denied Slater’s motion to suppress. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 15th day of March, 2021. 
 
 
        
   /s/  Kacey L. Jones 
 KACEY L. JONES 
 Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
  
 
 8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 15th day of March, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
 JENNY C. SWINFORD 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
   /s/  Kacey L. Jones 
      KACEY L. JONES 
Deputy Attorney General 
KLJ/dd 
 
 
 
 


State v. Slater Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48133

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State v. Alvarez Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48134

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UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
1-11-2021 
State v. Stone Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48147 
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https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6971 
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ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #6555 
JACOB L. WESTERFIELD 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #9841 
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Phone: (208) 334-2712 
Fax: (208) 334-2985 
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id. us 
Electronically Filed 
1/11/2021 12:12 PM 
Idaho Supreme Court 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court 
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plain tiff-Respondent, 
V. 
COOPER JADE STONE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NO. 48147-2020 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY 
NO. CR42-18-14556 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
__________ ) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
After Cooper Stone pied guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance, the district 
court sentenced him to five years, with two years fixed. A motion to revoke Mr. Stone's 
probation was subsequently filed. After Mr. Stone entered admissions to violating his probation, 
the district court revoked his probation and retained jurisdiction. The district court later entered 
an order relinquishing jurisdiction. Mr. Stone appeals, and he argues that the district court 
abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction instead of placing him on probation. 
1 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
In December 2018, the State filed a criminal complaint alleging that Mr. Stone 
committed felony possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine). (R., pp.11-12.) 
According to the Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI"), 1 Mr. Stone was a passenger in a 
vehicle that was stopped for a traffic violation. (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Stone informed law enforcement 
that a backpack in the vehicle was his, and Mr. Stone provided a set of keys to unlock padlocks 
for the compartments of the backpack. (PSI, p.4.) Methamphetamine residue was ultimately 
discovered in one of the compartments of the backpack. (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Stone pled guilty to 
felony possession of a controlled substance, and he was sentenced to five years, with two years 
fixed, and placed onto probation. (R., pp.41-51, 61-68.) 
A motion to revoke Mr. Stone's probation was filed thereafter. (R., pp.73-89.) Mr. Stone 
subsequently entered admissions to violating his probation. (R., p.91.) At the disposition 
hearing for those violations, the district court revoked Mr. Stone's probation but retained 
jurisdiction (a "rider"). (R., pp.96-98.) Mr. Stone successfully completed his programming on 
the rider and obtained his GED.2 (PSI, pp.47-61.) However, Mr. Stone received disciplinary 
sanctions near the end of his programming for (1) informing staff that he received a black eye 
while working out when he had received that injury as a result of horseplay and (2) allowing 
another inmate to use his phone pin number so that that other inmate could make a call, which 
resulted in that other inmate violating a no contact order. (PSI, pp.48, 53.) 
1 Citations to the PSI refer to the 61-page electronic document with the confidential sentencing 
materials, titled "Supreme Court No. 48147-2020 Cooper Jade Stone - Confidential Exhibits." 
2 Mr. Stone completed the CBI-Substance Abuse (CBI-SA), Career Bridge Two (GED), and Pre-
release programs. (PSI, pp.47-61.) 
2 
At the rider review hearing, Mr. Stone requested that the district court released him onto 
probation.3 (Tr., p.10, L.6-p.11, L.2.) The district court relinquished its jurisdiction over 
Mr. Stone, and the underlying sentence was executed. (R., pp.101-03; Tr., p.14, L.21-p.15, 
L.2.) 
Mr. Stone timely appealed from the order relinquishing jurisdiction. (R., pp. I 05-08.) 
ISSUES 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction 
An appellate court reviews a district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction for an 
abuse of discretion. State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998). The district court's discretion 
in deciding whether to relinquish jurisdiction is not limitless. State v. Rhoades, 122 Idaho 837, 
837 (Ct. App. 1992). 
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the sequence of 
inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial court: (1) correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices available to it; and ( 4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason. 
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018). Furthermore, a district court's decision to 
relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed a clear abuse of discretion if the court has sufficient 
information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under 
LC.§ 19-2521. See State v. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 729 (2013). 
3 The State's recommendation for the district court was, "[s]o if you do choose to put him on 
probation, the State just wants to make sure that your decision is an educated one concerning the 
goals of society protection as well as rehabilitation." (Tr., p.9, Ls.17-20.) The recommendation 
in the addendum to the presentence investigation ("APSI") was for Mr. Stone to be released onto 
probation. (PSI, pp.46, 51.) 
3 
In this case, Mr. Stone asserts the district court did not exercise reason and therefore 
abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction rather than following his recommendation to 
release him onto probation. (See Tr., p.10, L.6-p.11, L.2.) Specifically, Mr. Stone contends 
that the district court abuse its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction, in light of his completion 
of his programming on his rider, young age, limited criminal history, and acceptance of 
responsibility for his action. 
Mr. Stone completed the CBI-Substance Abuse program and obtained his GED during 
the period of retained jurisdiction. (PSI, pp.47-52.) The APSI recommended that Mr. Stone be 
released onto community supervision, noting that: 
Mr. Stone started his programming with a positive attitude. He participated in group 
discussions and the role plays. He was able to challenge his risky thinking and create 
more positive thinking. He applied the skills he learned in class and on the unit. He 
attended workshops to help identify outside resources. Mr. Stone did struggle with 
consistently following rules and if released would benefit from a higher level of 
supervision in the community. 
(PSI, p.51.) As Mr. Stone's defense counsel explained at the rider review hearing, the 
Department of Corrections had monitored Mr. Stone's progress and issues during his rider and 
still determined that he would be an appropriate candidate for probation. (Tr., p.10, Ls.6-16.) 
Mr. Stone was  years old at the time of the offense, and his only prior criminal 
conviction was for misdemeanor possession of alcohol while under the age of . (PSI, 
pp.3, 5-6.) Mr. Stone successfully completed his probation for that misdemeanor case. (PSI, 
p.6.) Mr. Stone appears to have been fully cooperative with the police during their investigation 
that led to his criminal charge. (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Stone expressed remorse for his actions, writing 
in his presentence investigation report that he "immensely" regretted his involvement in his 
criminal activities. (PSI, p.5.) In his Global Appraisal of Individual Needs ("GAIN") 
evaluation, Mr. Stone disclosed that he had been homeless and unemployed for months prior to 
4 
committing the criminal offense. (PSI, pp.8, 10, 16-17.) However, Mr. Stone reconnected with 
his family, made arrangements to live with his family, and had employment available upon his 
release. (PSI, pp.49-50; Tr., p.11, Ls.14-22.) 
In sum, Mr. Stone maintains that the district court did not exercise reason when 
relinquishing jurisdiction in light of his completion of his programming on his rider, young age, 
limited criminal history, and acceptance of responsibility for his action. The district court should 
have instead followed Mr. Stone's recommendation by releasing him back into the community. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Stone respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
relinquishing jurisdiction, and remand his case to the district court with the instruction that the 
district court place him on probation. 
DATED this 11th day ofJanuary, 2021. 
/s/ Jacob L. Westerfield 
JACOB L. WESTERFIELD 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11 th day of January, 2021, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be served as follows: 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
JLW/eas 
/s/ Evan A. Smith 
EV AN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 
5 


State v. Stone Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48147

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State v. Santee Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48153 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #4115
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO. 48153-2020
)
v. ) KOOTENAI COUNTY
) NO. CR28-19-16470
)
ANTHONY SANTEE, )
) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
Defendant-Appellant. )
____________________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Anthony Santee pled guilty to delivery of a controlled substance, heroin, and the district
court imposed a prison sentence of five years, with two fixed.  The court denied Mr. Santee’s
subsequent Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence.  On appeal, Mr. Santee
claims his sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts, including those he
presented with his Rule 35 motion, representing an abuse of the district court’s sentencing
discretion.  He respectfully asks this Court to reverse the order denying his Rule 35 motion, vacate
his sentence, and remand his case for resentencing.
Electronically Filed
6/1/2021 10:08 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Santee struggled with a terrible drug addiction and faced significant obstacles to
housing and employment due to his prior drug convictions.  (Conf.Docs., pp.3-4.)  However, he
fought hard to overcome that addiction, and in the summer of 2017, Mr. Santee moved to Oregon
and began living a new life; he has been living clean, sober, and crime-free since then.
(Conf.Docs., pp.3-4.)
In October of 2019, the State decided to file a Criminal Complaint charging Mr. Santee
with a drug offense from more than two years earlier: delivering a controlled substance to a
confidential informant.  (R., pp.6, 24.)  By that time, Mr. Santee had been promoted to assistant
manager at a furniture store, had started college, secured a lease for his own apartment, and was
providing for himself and his support dog.  (Conf.Docs., pp.3-4.)
Mr. Santee pleaded guilty to the charge, and his presentence investigator recommended
probation.  (Tr., p.4, Ls.15–24, p.14, Ls.1-24; Conf.Docs., p.14.)1  At sentencing, the State asked
the court to impose a prison sentence of six years, with three years fixed.  (Tr., p.24, Ls.14-18.)
Mr. Santee requested probation.  (Tr., p.32, L.24 – p.33, L.12.)  The court declined Mr. Santee’s
request and imposed a prison term of five years, with two years fixed.  (Tr., p.38, Ls.3-8.)
Mr. Santee timely filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentence.
(R., p.51.)  At his Rule 35 hearing, he asked the court to reduce the fixed portion of his five-year
sentence from two years to one.2  (R., p.51; Aug.Tr., p.7, Ls.2-7.)  In support of his request,
Mr. Santee informed the court of his rehabilitative progress while in custody.  (Aug.Tr., p.8, L.4 –
1 Citations to “Tr.” are to the electronic file containing the combined transcripts of the plea hearing
held on January 23, 2020, and of the sentencing hearing held on May 20, 2020.  Citations to
“Aug.Tr.” are to the transcript of the Rule 35 hearing held on January 1, 2021.
2 Mr. Santee is currently eligible for parole in May of 2022.
https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/prisons/offender_search/detail/107157.
3
p.10, L.18.)  He informed the court that, notwithstanding the lockdowns and diminished
programming at the prison due to Covid-19, he had found work at the prison, first helping with
sanitation, then as a fulltime diet cook at the CAPP facility, until he was selected and moved to the
Twin Falls Community Release Center to work fulltime as a head cook.  (Aug.Tr., p.8, Ls.8-25.)
He became eligible to work outside the compound and was seeking employment in the community.
(Aug.Tr., p.8, Ls.8-25.)  Mr. Santee also described the cognitive behavior course he was taking to
help improve his decision-making, and he explained he would complete the course prior to being
parole-eligible, if the requested one-year reduction was granted.  (Aug.Tr., p.9, Ls.5-17.)
The district court denied Mr. Santee’s motion.  (Aug.R., p.1; Aug.Tr., p.16, Ls.21-23.)
Mr. Santee filed a Notice of Appeal that is timely from his judgment of conviction and
sentence, and the denial of his Rule 35 motion. See I.A.R.17(e)(1)(C).  (R., p.43.)
       ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence and by denying
Mr. Santee’s motion for reduction of sentence?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence And By Denying
Mr. Santee’s Motion For Reduction Of Sentence
A. Introduction
Mr. Santee asserts his sentence is excessive in light of the mitigating facts presented in his
case, especially the evidence of his rehabilitation and value to the community, and that the district
court abused its discretion by denying his request to reduce the fixed portion of his sentence, from
two years to one.
4
B. Standard Of Review
The district court’s sentencing decisions are reviewed under the multi-tiered abuse of
discretion standard. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 826, 834 (2011).  Under this standard, the appellate
court engages in a multi-tiered inquiry to determine “whether the trial court:  (1) correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3)
acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4)
reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 113 (2018).
When a defendant challenges his sentence as excessively harsh, the appellate court will
conduct “an independent review of the record,” giving consideration to governing criteria, i.e., the
nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.  Miller,
151 Idaho 828.  The appellate court will deem the sentence to be excessive if the sentence is
unreasonably harsh “under any reasonable view of the facts.” See State v. Strand, 137 Idaho at
460; State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982).  These same criteria apply on review of
the district court’s denial of a defendant’s Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. State v. Trent,
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).
Mr. Santee asserts that, in view of the mitigating facts of his case, including those presented
with his Rule 35 motion, the imposition of a two-year fixed term renders his sentence excessive
and objectively unreasonable, and represents an abuse of discretion under the fourth prong of the
abuse-of-discretion standard.
C. Mr. Santee’s Sentence Is Excessive And Objectively Unreasonable, In Light Of The
Mitigating Facts Of His Case
Mr. Santee was  years old at the time of his sentencing.  (Conf.Docs., p.1.)  He
grew up in a loving family in northern Idaho, and attended Coeur d’Alene High School through
11th grade; he later obtained his GED.  (Conf.Docs., pp.6-8.)  Mr. Santee starting using illegal
5
drugs when he was twenty-two.  (Conf.Docs., p.11.)  He suffered from addiction and had acquired
drug convictions; he had completed a rider in 2016 and done well on probation before his brief
relapse and commission of the underlying offense.  (Conf.Docs., pp.1-8.)
As he explained at his sentencing, after completing a rider and being eight months clean
and sober in the community, he mistakenly believed he had his addiction under control.
(Conf.Docs., pp.3-4.)  However, he fell back with his former bad company and quickly relapsed.
(Conf.Docs., pp.3-4.)  This time, however, Mr. Santee had a frank talk with his mother, who
warned he would be dead or imprisoned unless he changed his ways.  (Conf.Docs., pp.3-4.)  They
agreed it was necessary for Mr. Santee to move away from the negative influences and his toxic
relationships in Idaho; Mr. Santee decided to move to Oregon.  (Conf.Docs., pp.3-4.)  Regrettably,
before regaining stability and judgment, Mr. Santee made the very poor decision to sell his drugs
to someone else.  (Conf.Docs., pp.3-4.)
Mr. Santee arrived in Oregon ten days later and started his new life.  Conf.Docs., p.9.)   He
obtained employment with the LazyBoy furniture company as a design consultant, and he was
later promoted to assistant manager and kept that job until his sentencing.  (Tr., p.23, Ls.1-5;
Conf.Docs., p.9.)  Mr. Santee got a second job as a night manager of a restaurant, and for nine
months he worked both jobs, living in his car while looking for housing.  (Tr., p.23, Ls.6-12.)  It
was difficult to find someone who would rent him a room, but when he finally found one,
Mr. Santee stayed for over a year.  (Tr., p.23, Ls.6-12.)  He also started college, and he eventually
got his own apartment.  (Tr., p.23, Ls.11-14.)
By the time the State decided to file the underlying criminal charge, Mr. Santee had been
living on his own, clean and sober, and fully employed, for more than two years.  (Tr., p.23, Ls.20-
23.)  He asked the court to consider how far he had come in the short time since his relapse and
6
re-offense in 2017, and he asked the court to take into account the immense effort he invested to
turn his life around.  (Tr., p.24, Ls.6-10.)
Mr. Santee recognizes that success and achievement do not erase his prior drug history or
his criminal conduct in 2017.  However, he is not the same person he was in 2017.  Mr. Santee
now sets critical boundaries and turns to the right people when he needs help.  He has become a
productive worker who contributes to his community.  Society is better with Mr. Santee in it.  In
light of his effort and achievements, and the other relevant facts of his case, the two-year fixed
portion of his sentence is excessive, and objectively unreasonable, representing an abuse of
discretion.  The motion requesting reduction of sentence should have been granted.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Santee respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence, reverse the district
court’s order denying his motion for reduction of his sentence, and remand his case with
instructions that the district court reduce the fixed portion of his sentence.
DATED this 1st day of June, 2021.
/s/ Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
7
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of June, 2021, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
KAC/eas


State v. Santee Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48153

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UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
8-4-2021 
State v. Karadza Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48178 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
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https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7000 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
ANDREW V. WAKE 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
MIGDAD KARADZA, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
Nos. 48178-2020 & 48179-2020 
 
Ada County Case Nos. 
     CR01-18-54346 & CR01-20-15079 
 
           
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
ISSUES 
 
1. Should this Court dismiss without considering the merits of Karadza’s consolidated 
appeals because he failed to file timely notices of appeal in either of the criminal cases 
below?  
2. Has Karadza failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when, following a 
conviction for grand theft, it revoked his existing probation and executed the underlying 
sentence, and imposed a concurrent sentence of nine years with two years fixed on the 
grand theft conviction? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Electronically Filed
8/4/2021 12:13 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
 2 
ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
This Court Should Dismiss Because Karadza Did Not File Timely Notices Of Appeal 
 
“The filing of a timely notice of appeal is jurisdictional.” State v. Thomas, 146 Idaho 592, 
594, 199 P.3d 769, 771 (2008).  “An appellant’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives 
the appellate court of jurisdiction and requires dismissal of the appeal.”  State v. Schultz, 147 Idaho 
675, 677, 214 P.3d 661, 663 (Ct. App. 2009).  To be timely, the notice of appeal must be filed 
within forty-two days of the filing of the judgment or order appealed from.  I.A.R. 14(a).   
This is a consolidated appeal in which Karadza failed to file timely notices of appeal in 
either of the two criminal cases below.  In No. 48179 (associated with CR01-20-15079), Karadza 
“appeals from his judgment of conviction for grand theft.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 1.)  In No. 48178 
(associated with CR01-18-54346), he appeals from “the district court’s order revoking his 
probation and executing [the underlying sentence].”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 1.)  Both the judgment 
of conviction in No. 48179 and the order revoking probation and executing the underlying sentence 
in No. 48178 were entered on June 4, 2020.  (48179 R., pp. 44-47; 48178 R., pp. 129-32.)  In both 
cases, Karadza filed notices of appeal forty-six days later on July 20, 2020.  (48179 R., pp. 53-55; 
48178 R., pp. 135-37.)  The time to file notices of appeal was not extended by the filing of any 
motion.  Under Idaho Appellate Rule 14,  
The time for an appeal from any criminal judgment, order or sentence in an action 
is terminated by the filing of a motion within fourteen (14) days of the entry of the 
judgment which, if granted, could affect the judgment, order or sentence in the 
action, in which case the appeal period for the judgment and sentence commences 
to run upon the date of the clerk's filing stamp on the order deciding such motion. 
 
I.A.R. 14(a).  While Karadza filed Rule 35 motions in both of the underlying cases, he did so on 
the same date he filed his notices of appeal, forty-six days after the judgment and order from which 
 3 
he is appealing, not within fourteen days as required to terminate the time to file an appeal.  (48179 
R., p. 51; 48178, p. 133.)  Karadza’s notices of appeal were therefore untimely.   
 Nor can Karadza contend that this Court should consider the merits of his appeal because 
the notices―while untimely from the judgment in No. 48179 or from the order revoking probation 
in No. 48178―were timely, premature appeals from the district court’s later denial of his Rule 35 
motions.  Assuming arguendo that Karadza could prematurely appeal from the denial of those 
motions by filing an untimely notices from the judgment and order, that would still only permit 
review of the denial of the Rule 35 motions.  See State v. Alberts, 124 Idaho 489, 490, 861 P.2d 
59, 60 (1993) (where notice of appeal was timely from denial of Rule 35 motion but not from the 
original judgment and sentence, limiting review to the former).  But Karadza has not asked this 
Court to review the denial of his Rule 35 motions and has not argued that the district court erred 
by denying them.  His brief does not even mention that the motions were filed, much less discuss 
the merits of the district court’s orders denying them or cite and apply the appropriate legal 
standards.  (See generally Appellant’s brief.)  There is good reason for that.  “When presenting a 
Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional 
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”  State v. 
Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).  Karadza submitted no new or additional 
information and so his Rule 35 motions were meritless.  (48179 R., p. 51; 48178, p. 133.)  But 
regardless of the merits or the reason Karadza has not addressed the Rule 35 motions on appeal, 
issues not raised in the opening brief are waived for purposes of appeal, as are issues not supported 
by argument and authority.  I.A.R. 35(a)(6); State v. Hawkins, 159 Idaho 507, 517, 363 P.3d 348, 
358 (2009); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996).  Even if the notices of 
 4 
appeal might have permitted review of the denial of his Rule 35 motions, Karadza waived the issue 
by failing to address it, by failing to cite applicable authority, and by failing to make any argument.    
Karadza’s only argument on appeal is that the district court erred by imposing the sentence 
in No. 48179 and by revoking his probation and executing the underlying sentence in No. 48178.  
Because he did not timely appeal from the judgment of conviction in No. 48179 or from the order 
revoking probation and executing the underlying sentence in No. 48178, this Court should decline 
to consider the merits of his appeal and dismiss.   
 
II. 
Karadza Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 This Court should affirm in both of the consolidated appeals if it concludes it has 
jurisdiction to reach the merits.  The district court did not abuse its sentencing discretion, nor did 
it abuse its discretion by revoking Karadza’s probation and executing his sentence.   
 In March of 2020, Karadza was on probation for a burglary conviction entered in February 
of 2019―with a suspended, underlying sentence of ten years with two years fixed―when the state 
moved for a probation violation for a variety of reasons, including use of narcotics, failure to 
maintain employment, failure to complete drug treatment, absconding from supervision, failure to 
pay fines and fees, failure to pay restitution. (48178 R., pp. 25-26, 56-60, 94-99.)  A month later, 
in April of 2020, Karadza was charged with four counts of burglary and four counts of grand theft 
arising out of four occasions in January and February of 2020 when he entered Fred Meyer stores 
 5 
and stole purses containing financial transaction cards. (48179 R., pp. 8-10, 27-29; Conf. Exs., pp. 
5-73.1)   
With respect to the alleged probation violations, Karadza admitted that he violated 
probation by using narcotics and failing to successfully complete treatment.  (48178 R., p. 121; 
3/25/20 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 2-20.)   
With respect to the new charges, Karadza accepted a plea agreement pursuant to which he 
would plead guilty to one count of grand theft, the state would recommend no more than ten years 
with two years fixed to run concurrently with the sentence underlying his probation in No. 48178, 
and the two matters would be consolidated for sentencing and disposition.  (48179 R., pp. 40-41; 
5/22/20 Tr., p. 5, L. 9 – p. 6, L. 3.)  The district court accept the guilty plea.  (48179 R., pp. 40-41; 
5/22/20 Tr., p. 11, L. 21 – p. 13, L. 4.)   
The sentencing on the burglary charge and disposition of the probation violation were 
consolidated.  (48178 R., p. 127.)  At the joint sentencing/disposition hearing, the district court 
revoked probation and imposed the underlying sentence of ten years with two years fixed, and, on 
the grand theft conviction, imposed and executed a concurrent sentence of nine years with two 
years fixed.  (6/3/20 Tr., p. 14, L. 22 – p. 16, L. 12; 48178 R., pp. 129-31; 48179 R., pp. 44-46.)  
Karadza filed untimely notices of appeal in both matters.  (48179 R., pp. 53-55; 48178 R., pp. 135-
37.)    
 On appeal Karadza contends the district court abused its discretion by revoking his 
probation in No. 48178 and by imposing an excessive sentence in No. 48179.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 2-6.)  If the merits of the argument are addressed, no abuse of discretion is shown. 
 
                                            
1 References to “Conf. Exs.” are to the 110 page pdf file titled “Appeal Confidential Exhibits 11-
10-2020 . . .”  
 6 
B. Standard of Review 
 
“Once a probation violation has been proven, the decision of whether to revoke probation 
is within the sound discretion of the court.”  State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 765, 171 P.3d 253, 256 
(2007).  Likewise, where “a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of 
showing a clear abuse of discretion by the court imposing the sentence.”  State v. McIntosh, 160 
Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Abuse of discretion 
review asks whether the district court “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of 
reason.”  State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 113, 426 P.3d 461, 464 (2018).  There is no dispute 
here that Karadza violated his probation and that his sentence does not exceed the statutory 
maximum.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 2-4.)   
C. Karadza Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion  
To establish an abuse of sentencing discretion, the appellant must show the sentence is 
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628.  A 
sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting 
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.  
Id.  The district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights 
when deciding upon the sentence.  Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 
965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of 
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation).  “‘In 
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where 
reasonable minds might differ.’”  McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting State v. 
 7 
Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).  “Furthermore, ‘[a] sentence fixed 
within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion 
by the trial court.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).  
“Probation may be revoked if the judge reasonably concludes from the defendant’s conduct that 
probation is not achieving its rehabilitative purposes.”  State v. Reine, 122 Idaho 928, 930, 841 
P.2d 458, 460 (Ct. App. 1992).   
In support of his claim that the district court abused its discretion by revoking probation 
and imposing the sentence it did, Karadza claims that his crimes “are drive by his addiction” and 
he has been “taking steps to confront that addiction” while incarcerated on the instant charges.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-6.)  Karadza has not shown an abuse of discretion.   
As the district court noted at the sentencing/disposition hearing, the court was very familiar 
with Karadza over years during which he was given repeated but squandered opportunities on 
supervised release, through the retained jurisdiction program, and in the drug court to address his 
addiction and refrain from criminal conduct.  (6/3/20 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 1-6. See also 6/3/20 Tr., p. 6, 
L. 16 – p. 8, L. 13 (prosecutor recounting Karadza’s many failed opportunities to comply with 
probation).)  In 2014, Karadza pled guilty to burglary, received a withheld judgment, and was 
placed on probation for eight years.  (Conf. Exs., pp. 91-95.)  He was convicted of attempted petit 
theft and petit theft in 2015 and 2017, respectively.  (Supp. Conf. Exs., p. 3.2)  In 2017, he was 
convicted again of burglary and the district court retained jurisdiction.  (Conf. Exs., pp. 99-102.)   
Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended his sentence and ordered 
eight years of probation.  (Conf. Exs., pp. 105-08.)  Roughly a year later, in 2019, Karadza was 
convicted again of burglary, the district court imposed a sentence of ten years with two years fixed, 
                                            
2 “Supp. Conf. Exs.” refers to the file titled “Supplemental Confidential Exhibits – PSI.pdf.”  
 8 
but suspended that sentence in favor of five years of probation contingent on successful completion 
of a drug court program.  (48178 R., pp. 56-60.)  Karadza then failed to appear for drug court and 
absconded from supervision.  (48178 R., pp. 64-66, 74-79.)  The district court revoked probation, 
but again retained jurisdiction.  (48178 R., pp. 83-85.)   After the period of retained jurisdiction, 
Karadza was again granted probation, this time for a period of ten years.  (48178 R., pp. 88-91.)  
Karadza almost immediately violated probation by using narcotics and failing to complete 
treatment.  (48178 R., pp. 94-96, 121.)  And, of course, in January of 2020, again, almost 
immediately after being placed on his most recent period of probation, he committed the additional 
grand theft of which he was convicted in No. 48179.  (41879 R., pp. 44-46.)   
Notwithstanding Karadza’s claim that this time he is taking his rehabilitation seriously, the 
district court had excellent reason to conclude that Karadza was not a good candidate for probation, 
and that the goals of protecting society and rehabilitating Karadza could be served only by his 
receiving treatment in an incarcerated setting.  When Karadza was convicted of burglary in 2019, 
he told the court that he recognized his problem with drugs, recognized the importance of avoiding 
additional criminal conduct, and wanted to mature.  (Supp. Conf. Exs., p. 5.)  When he received 
probation, he then promptly avoided drug treatment that was a condition of his probation and 
committed additional criminal conduct.  He told the district court here the same thing.  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 5.) Karadza has proven over and over again that he is not a good candidate for probation, 
and that he is a danger to the community and cannot be rehabilitated on supervised release.  That 
Karadza has allegedly performed well in jail does not, as Karadza contends, support his argument 
that the district court abused its discretion.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-6.)  Karadza successfully 
completed multiple periods of retained jurisdiction.  It seems clear that Karadza can do well while 
incarcerated.  What is equally clear, though, is that Karadza fails miserably when on supervised 
 9 
release in the community.  The district court correctly recognized that, after a large number of 
opportunities to rehabilitate through the retained jurisdiction program, probation, and drug courts, 
the concurrent sentences executed were necessary for purposes of rehabilitation and to protect the 
community.    
Karadza has failed to show the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation 
and executing his underlying sentence in No. 48178, and imposing a concurrent sentence of nine 
years with two years fixed for his grand theft conviction in No. 48179.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 4th day of August, 2021. 
 
 
  /s/  Andrew V. Wake 
ANDREW V. WAKE 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 4th day of August, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/ Andrew V. Wake 
ANDREW V. WAKE 
Deputy Attorney General 
AVW/dd 
 


State v. Karadza Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48178

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7997/thumbnail.jp

UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
4-23-2021 
State v. Maxe Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48176 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Maxe Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48176" (2021). Not Reported. 6998. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6998 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
JOHN C. McKINNEY 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
 
STEVEN PAUL MAXE, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
No. 48176-2020 
 
Twin Falls County Case No. 
CR42-17-6631 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 Has Steven Maxe failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his 
probation, and executing his underlying sentence for battery on a police/peace officer? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Maxe Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 A Twin Falls Police Officer went to the El Rancho Motel to talk to Maxe about a case, and 
when he arrived, “[m]ultiple residents that were near the room informed [the officer] that the male 
inside had been yelling and throwing things all day.”  (PSI, p.4.)  The officer contacted the motel 
Electronically Filed
4/23/2021 12:30 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
manager, who opened the motel room door for police to evict Maxe.  (Id.)  Maxe got upset when 
informed of his eviction, and threw his belongings into his truck, breaking some dishes.  (Id.)  The 
officer asked Maxe if he had been drinking, and had him perform a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus 
test, leading the officer to believe Maxe had consumed alcohol or some other illegal substance.  
(Id.)  Maxe continued to ignore the officer’s request to leave the motel.  (Id.)  When officers 
informed Maxe that he was under arrest for trespassing, and tried to put handcuffs on him,   
[Maxe] spat on Officer Christensen’s leg, bit Officer Summers on his left hand 
thumb, and kicked his left shin.  Maxe’s actions caused officers to push him against 
his truck in order to place the handcuffs on him and place a spit mask on his head.   
 
(Id.)   
Maxe was charged with, and subsequently pled guilty to, battery on a police/peace officer.  
(R., pp.32-34, 42-52.)  The district court sentenced Maxe to five years, with one and one-half years 
fixed, and placed him in the retained jurisdiction (“rider”) program for one year.  (R., pp.55-60.)  
Upon completion of his rider, the court suspended Maxe’s sentence and placed him on probation 
for two and one-half years.  (R., pp.63-67.)     
In May 2020, the state filed a motion to revoke Maxe’s probation based on the following 
allegations:  (1) committing a new law violation (DUI), (2) drinking alcohol on three days in 2020, 
(3) “failing to appear for, or submitting dilute drug testing samples on seven different occasions 
since being placed on random substance testing[,]” (4) “failing to make any payments toward his 
Court ordered financial obligations[,]” and (5) failing to pay supervision fees.  (R., pp.75-77.)  
Maxe admitted the first, second, and fifth allegations, and the state withdrew allegations 3 and 4.  
(R., p.86; see generally 6/9/20 Tr.)  The district court revoked Maxe’s probation and ordered his 
underlying sentence executed.  (R., pp.92-94.)  Maxe filed a Rule 35 motion for reconsideration, 
 3 
which was denied.  (R., pp.95-98.)  Maxe filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.99-102, 106-
110.)  
 On appeal, Maxe argues that “the district court abused its discretion by revoking his 
probation.  He contends that the district court should have reinstated his probation, or in the 
alternative, retained jurisdiction.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.1.)  Maxe has failed to show that the district 
court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and executing his underlying sentence.                   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
“‘[T]he decision whether to revoke a defendant’s probation for a violation is within the 
discretion of the district court.’”  State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 710, 390 P.3d 434, 436 (2017) 
(quoting State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003)).  In 
determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving 
the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society.  State v. Cornelison, 154 
Idaho 793, 797, 302 P.3d 1066, 1070 (Ct. App. 2013) (citations omitted).  A decision to revoke 
probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion.  
Id. at 798, 302 P.3d at 1071 (citing State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 326, 834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. 
App. 1992)). 
 
C. Maxe Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
Maxe violated his probation by committing a new law violation (DUI), drinking alcohol 
on several occasions in 2020, and failing to pay fees for his supervision.  (R., p.86.)  The court was 
not persuaded by Maxe’s explanations for his alcohol consumption – he said he used Nyquil not 
thinking that it contained alcohol, and he only consumed 4 beers over a three hour period which 
inexplicably resulted in BAC readings of .180 and .167.  (6/16/20 Tr., p.10, L.1 – p.11, L.13.)  
 4 
Maxe’s complaint that his probation officer had been “riding” him for a year must have been 
equally unimpressive to the court, and certainly bore little, if any, relationship to his probation 
violations.  (See 6/19/20 Tr., p.10, Ls.14-17.)   
In revoking probation and ordering Maxe’s sentence executed, the district court said:  
The Court, for purposes of sentencing, does, as it has said, consider the four goals 
of sentencing.  The Court also does consider those factors under 19-2521 to 
determine whether probation or some form of incarceration is appropriate.   
 
The Court does consider the character – your character, the nature of the 
underlying offense, as well as your prior record. 
 
From what I could tell, this was your first felony.  However, it was a 
significant and serious felony.  You do have a longstanding misdemeanor record.[1]  
Admittedly, a lot of those never went to conviction, but it was still a significant 
record. 
 
The Court has reviewed the nature of the violations.  Certainly those are 
issues that I’m sure were previously addressed in your prior opportunity to 
participate in the retained jurisdiction program. 
  
I would note that the department is recommending imposition of sentence.  
I don’t believe that a second rider is appropriate because, given the amount of time 
that you’ve expended upon the rider program previously, given the nature of the 
sentence, you would be parole eligible within the time of the completion of any 
second rider.  So I do believe that imposition of sentence, given the nature of the 
underlying offense and your prior record, is appropriate. 
 
So the Court, having found you in willful violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation, will reimpose the original sentence of five years, one-and-
a-half years fixed, three-and-a-half years indeterminate, not to exceed five. 
 
(6/16/20 Tr., p.12, L.7 – p.13, L.10.) 
                                            
1  Maxe’s misdemeanor record includes convictions for family abuse (1988 HI), disorderly conduct 
(2000 AZ), DUI (2005 ID), DWP (2016 ID), possession of drug paraphernalia (2017 ID), and 
trespass (2017 ID – deferred prosecution).  (PSI, pp.6-9.)  Maxe had “no disposition available” 
designations for disturbing the peace and resisting/obstructing (1993 CA), DUI and disorderly 
conduct (1999 CA), and threaten/intimidate with injury or property damage (2002 AZ).  (Id., pp.6-
8.)  In 2016, Maxe had dismissals for petit theft, assault, and DWP.  (Id., p.8.)    
 5 
In sum, the district court found that, considering the nature of Maxe’s underlying crime, 
character, criminal history, opportunities to succeed on probation, and probation violations, he was 
no longer a viable candidate for another probation or a second rider; imposition of his underlying 
sentence was therefore justified.     
On appeal, Maxe argues that “his probation was achieving its rehabilitative objective while 
providing adequate protection for society.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.4)  Maxe notes several mitigating 
factors that should have led to the court to reinstate his probation: he had a rough childhood, 
significant mental health issues, major depressive disorder, PTSD or acute stress disorder, serious 
alcohol addiction, and this was his first felony conviction.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.)  Although 
most or all of those factors can be mitigating, they do not show that the district court abused its 
discretion in revoking his probation.   
Maxe does not show any error in the district court’s revocation of his probation and order 
executing his sentence.  As set forth in the Introduction section of this brief, the district court 
granted Maxe the opportunity of a rider, then probation.  Despite being on felony probation, Maxe 
drove a vehicle while having a BAC over twice the legal limit of 0.08, endangering the public’s 
safety.  Therefore, Maxe’s probation was not “achieving its rehabilitative objective while 
providing adequate protection for society[,]” at least to the point where he should remain on 
probation or be given a second rider.  (See Appellant’s brief, p.4.)   
Although the district court could have reinstated Maxe’s probation, based on his character, 
the nature of his offense, his criminal history, and his probation violations, its decision to revoke 
Maxe’s probation was well within the exercise of its reasonable discretion.  Maxe has failed to 
show that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and executing his 
underlying sentence.    
--
 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 23rd day of April, 2021. 
 
 
 
  /s/  John C. McKinney  
      JOHN C. McKINNEY 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of April, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
 KILEY A. HEFFNER 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
        /s/  John C. McKinney 
      JOHN C. McKINNEY 
      Deputy Attorney General 
JCM/dd 
 
 


State v. Maxe Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48176

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State v. Samperi Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48225 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
ANDREW V. WAKE 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
MARK ANTHONY SAMPERI, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
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) 
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NO. 48225-2020 
 
Canyon County Case No. 
     CR14-19-25830 
 
           
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Mark Anthony Samperi failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when 
it imposed a sentence of five and one-half years with one and one-half years fixed following a 
felony conviction for failure to register as a sex offender? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Samperi Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 Samperi is required to register as a sex offender as a result of 2004 Louisiana conviction 
for indecent behavior with juveniles.  (R., p. 7; PSI, p. 1.)  While on probation in Idaho, and 
following a violation of that probation, he moved without permission and without providing notice 
Electronically Filed
3/1/2021 1:06 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
of his new address.  (Id.)  Samperi could not be located.  (Id.)  More than a month later, he was 
arrested on a warrant.  (R., pp. 11-14.)  He was charged with one count of failure to register as a 
sex offender in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-8307, 18-8309, and 18-8311.  (R., pp. 32-33.)  
Samperi agreed to plead guilty, with the state agreeing to recommend at most two years fixed and 
five years indeterminate, and agreeing to dismiss a misdemeanor charge in another case.  (Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 3, L. 5 – p. 4, L. 11.1)  The court accepted Samperi’s plea.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 4, L. 17 – p. 8, L. 
20.)   At the sentencing hearing, the state recommended a term of incarceration of seven years with 
two years fixed, to run concurrently with a sentence of five years with two years fixed on a sentence 
executed after Samperi admitted probation violations in Canyon County case number CR017-
2340, and concurrently with a sentence of one and one-half years fixed imposed on a conviction 
for felony possession of a controlled substance in Ada County case number CR01-19-52835.  (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 11, Ls. 10-23; PSI, pp. 2-3, 6.)  While Samperi asked for a withheld judgment (Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 8, Ls. 20-25), his counsel acknowledged that that was not very likely “under the current 
circumstances” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 16, Ls. 9-12).  Instead, defense counsel requested a sentence of three 
years with one year fixed.  (Tr. Vol. II, p. 15, Ls. 15-21.)  The district court imposed a sentence of 
five and one-half years with one and one-half years fixed, to run concurrently with all other 
sentences.  (Tr. Vol. II, p. 22, L. 9 – p. 23, L. 18; R., pp. 117-18.)  Samperi timely filed a notice of 
appeal.  (R., pp. 124-26.)   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the 
defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing 
                                            
1 “Tr. Vol. I” refers to the transcript of the change of plea hearing, held June 2, 2020.  “Tr. Vol. 
II” refers to the transcript of the sentencing hearing, held July 22, 2020.   
 3 
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 
159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s 
probable term of confinement.  Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).  
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it 
is a clear abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing 
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  In evaluating whether a lower court abused 
its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the court: (1) 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”  State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 
261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 
P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). 
 
C. Samperi Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
 
 To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish 
that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive.  State v. Farwell, 144 
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).  In determining whether the appellant met this burden, 
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release the defendant on parole 
is exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be 
the period of actual incarceration.  State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) 
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391).  To establish that the sentence was excessive, 
the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was 
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, 
and retribution.  Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401.  A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears 
 4 
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of 
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’”  Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895-96, 392 
P.3d at 1236-37 (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)). 
 On appeal, Samperi argues that the district court failed to exercise reason because it did 
not adequately consider his drug addiction and mental health issues as mitigating factors.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-7.)  That argument fails. 
 The district court judge considered the applicable legal standards, and stated that he had 
carefully considered the parties’ arguments at the hearing, Samperi’s statements to the court, and 
the presentence materials.  (Tr. Vol. II, p. 19, Ls. 10-23.)  The presentence materials included a 
mental health examination report under Idaho Code § 19-2524.  (PSI, pp. 61-64.)  The report 
indicated provisional diagnoses of stimulant use disorders and an anxiety disorder.  (PSI, p. 61.)  
It indicated that Samperi’s “mental health needs” were being adequately addressed through 
treatment in jail, and recommended that he continue to receive mental health treatment if he was 
incarcerated.  (PSI, p. 63.)   His substance abuse issues were discussed extensively at the sentencing 
hearing (Tr. Vol. II, p. 3, L. 8 – p. 4, L. 25; p. 9, L. 7 – p. 10, L. 18; p. 14, L. 22 – p. 15, L. 13), 
and are also discussed extensively in the GAIN assessment (PSI, pp. 48-60).   
The district court was well aware of this information when it stated that “the main reason 
that I’m putting you into prison is to help you get the treatment that you need and the opportunities 
that you need to really truly be successful when you do earn parole.”  (Tr. Vol. II, p. 21, L. 20 – p. 
22, L. 3.)  In light of the “type of conviction” and Samperi’s “criminal history,” particularly his 
failures on supervised release, the court recognized the necessity of the fixed period of confinement 
for Samperi to receive that treatment he needed and prove he “belong[s] in society.”  (Tr. Vol. II, 
 5 
p. 21, Ls. 17-25.)  Samperi’s criminal history certainly reflects that he has had difficulties 
managing his issues in the community on supervised release. 
Samperi was convicted of felony possession of a controlled substance in 2017 and was 
sentenced to five years with three years fixed, suspended in favor of probation.  (PSI, p. 3.)  Only 
two months later, he admitting to using methamphetamine.  (PSI, pp. 3-4.)  He “was no longer 
working, was essentially homeless and noncompliant with his sexual offender registration, . . . had 
yet to engage in treatment, and again tested positive for methamphetamine and admitted to using 
‘every couple days.’”  (PSI, p. 4.)  Following a report of violation and an arrest on new felony and 
misdemeanor charges, the district court revoked probation and retained jurisdiction in March of 
2018.  (Id.)  Samperi completed a rider and was re-admitted to probation on a new, three year term.  
(Id.)  Though he was receiving mental health treatment, he continued to violate rules associated 
with his housing, leading to his eviction, was suspended from his employment, missed medication 
appointments, and again admitted using methamphetamine.  (Id.)  In August of 2019, he was 
arrested on a warrant for failure to comply with sexual offender registration requirements.  (PSI, 
pp. 4-5.)  In a report of probation violation, his parole officer noted that he had been charged with 
“new misdemeanor offenses, changed residences without permission, used methamphetamine, 
failed to report contact with law enforcement as instructed, and associated with felons without 
permission.”  (PSI, p. 5.)  While awaiting adjudication on those violations, he tested positive for 
methamphetamine and failed to report for scheduled visits with his parole officer.  (Id.)  His 
probation was again revoked and reinstated for a new period of three years.  (Id.)  Nine days after 
those proceedings, he was found in possession of pornographic videos and “a number of small 
baggies,” and his “text messages revealed exchanges wherein other individuals asked for ‘a half 
gram’ and ‘a gram.’”  (Id.)  While he denied selling narcotics, he again admitted using 
 6 
methamphetamine.  (Id.)  He was removed from his housing at a rehabilitation facility for failure 
to follow rules, and again repeatedly failed to attend his scheduled appointments with his parole 
supervisor.  (Id.)  In December of 2019, when officers responded to a report of suspected drug 
activity at the home of another parolee, Samperi gave a false name, stated that he had been living 
there for several days, and was discovered to be in possession of methamphetamine.  (PSI, pp. 5-
6.)   He was arrested on possession charges, as well as on the warrant issued in this case.  (PSI, p. 
6.)  
 Samperi acknowledged at his sentencing hearing that he is “not good on probation” (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 17, Ls. 17-18), but that dramatically understates the facts.  In light of his performance 
on supervised release and his failures to take advantage of mental health and substance abuse 
treatment while in the community, it was perfectly reasonable for the district court to conclude that 
Samperi required an opportunity for treatment and rehabilitation during a period of incarceration.  
Finally, as the district court noted, because the sentence was to run concurrently with the eighteen 
month fixed term for his conviction for felony possession in Ada County case number CR01-19-
52835, and concurrently with the sentence of five years with two years fixed that was executed 
following the revocation of his probation from the 2017 conviction for felony possession in 
Canyon County case number CR2017-2340, his sentence in this case did not add any additional 
fixed time.  (Tr. Vol. II, p. 23, Ls. 7-18.)  Instead, it simply gave the Department of Correction 
additional “leeway” to determine when Samperi is ready for parole.  (Tr. Vol. II, p. 22, Ls. 4-8.)   
 The district court considered Samperi’s substance abuse and mental health issues and 
determined that, in light of his failures on supervised release, the sentence imposed was appropriate 
to ensure he received adequate treatment and rehabilitation.  Samperi has not shown any abuse of 
discretion.    
 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 1st day of March, 2021. 
 
 
  /s/  Andrew V. Wake 
ANDREW V. WAKE 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1st day of March, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
JACOB L. WESTERFIELD 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  Andrew V. Wake 
ANDREW V. WAKE 
Deputy Attorney General 
AVW/dd 


State v. Samperi Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48225

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