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Marlow v. State  Corrected Appeallant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 48469

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
6-8-2021 
State v. Peterson Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48494 
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"State v. Peterson Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48494" (2021). Not Reported. 7167. 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
 
ROBERT WILLIAM PETERSON, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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) 
 
NO. 48494-2020 
 
Kootenai County Case No.  
CR28-19-17730 
 
 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Robert William Peterson failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
sentencing him to one year in jail, and one year of probation for telephone harassment? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Peterson’s Challenge To His Sentence Is Barred By The Doctrine Of Invited Error 
 
In 2019, Robert William Peterson sent violent and threatening text messages and emails to 
his mother, Tina Busby.  (R., pp. 18, 57-88.)  Peterson also persistently called, texted and emailed 
his sister, Christina Peterson, threatening her with death.  (R., pp. 57-88, 131-133, 137-139.)  The 
Electronically Filed
6/8/2021 11:09 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
state charged Peterson with two counts of felony first degree stalking, and one count of telephone 
harassment.  (R., pp. 137-138.)   
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Peterson pleaded guilty to one count of stalking and one 
count of telephone harassment, and the state agreed to dismiss the remaining stalking count.  
(10/23/2020 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 5-7, 23; p. 12, Ls. 14-17.)  The pretrial settlement offer stipulated that 
the district court would sentence Peterson “on the telephone harassment to one year of supervised 
probation,” and “set out sentencing on the felony stalking for one year.”  (10/23/2020 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 
4-13.)  The PTSO also stipulated that “[i]f the Defendant is successful on misdemeanor probation 
during that one-year time period with no formal probation violation and has committed no new 
crimes, the State will dismiss the felony stalking, count one.”  (10/23/2020 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 14-17.)  
When asked for sentencing recommendations, the state recommended, “consistent with the pretrial 
settlement offer,” for “a year in jail, suspend, with “a year of supervised probation.”  (10/23/2020 
Tr., p. 14, Ls. 5-11.)  The defense recommended that “the court allow him credit for time served, 
put him on supervised probation pursuant to the plea agreement and if the court wanted to, put 
some discretionary jail over his head as well,” specifically, “Peterson would stipulate to 45 days 
discretionary time as well.”  (10/23/2020 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 11-20.) 
The district court stated that “the main goal of sentencing is the protection of society.  
Related to that overall goal are the goals of deterrence, punishment and rehabilitation.”  
(10/23/2020 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 1-4.)  The district court “recognize[d] that this was a product of some 
negotiation,” and “it certainly does have the potential for achieving those goals of sentencing the 
way it’s been structured here.”  (10/23/2020 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 4-9.)  The district court imposed 365 
days in jail, gave Peterson credit for time served, and placed Peterson on supervised probation “for 
a one-year period.”  (10/23/2020 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 5-9; R., p. 192.)  Additionally, the district court 
 3 
“order[ed] 45 days of discretionary jail time as a condition of probation.”  (10/23/2020 Tr., p. 18, 
Ls. 12-13; R., p. 192.)  Peterson then filed a timely appeal.  (R., pp. 200-201.)   
On appeal, Peterson argues that “the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 1.)  Peterson’s argument is barred by the invited error 
doctrine. 
“The invited error doctrine is well settled in Idaho.  A defendant may not request a 
particular ruling by the trial court and later argue on appeal that the ruling was erroneous.  This 
doctrine applies to sentencing decisions as well as to rulings during trial.”  State v. Griffith, 110 
Idaho 613, 614, 716 P.2d 1385, 1386 (Ct. App. 1986).  “In short, invited errors are not reversible.”  
State v. Edghill, 155 Idaho 846, 849, 317 P.3d 743, 746 (Ct. App. 2014).   
Peterson’s argument is made “mindful of the invited error doctrine.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 
4.)  Because he received the sentence he advocated for before the district court, Peterson’s 
challenge to his sentence must be rejected.  In the alternative, Peterson has failed to show any 
abuse of the district court’s sentencing discretion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 8th day of June, 2021. 
 
 
        /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      ZACHARI S. HALLETT 
      Paralegal 
 
 
 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
            I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 8th day of June, 2021, served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt File 
and Serve: 
 
JENNY C. SWINFORD  
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
                                                                          /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
                                                                        KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
                                                                        Deputy Attorney General 


State v. Peterson Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48494

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State v. Hennig Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48502

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
6-10-2021 
State v. Dobson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48528 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Dobson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48528" (2021). Not Reported. 7178. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7178 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
KILEY A. HEFFNER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #10999
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 48528-2020
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-20-32991
v. )
)
MICHAEL RAY DOBSON, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
______________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Michael Dobson pled guilty to felony driving under the influence, the district court
sentenced him to ten years, with four years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Dobson argues that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In August 2020, Mr. Dobson was driving his car when he sideswiped a delivery van that
was parked on the side of the street, and continued driving. (PSI, p.83.) The driver of the delivery
van began to follow him, and called dispatch to report the incident. (PSI, p.90.) Mr. Dobson
Electronically Filed
6/10/2021 1:31 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
eventually pulled over after he noticed the van was following him, and allegedly admitted to the
delivery van driver that he was drunk. (PSI, p.90.) When police officers arrived and spoke with
Mr. Dobson, he admitted to drinking a few beers earlier that day. (PSI, p.90.) The officers
noticed that he had glassy, bloodshot eyes, and they could smell alcohol coming from his breath,
and arrested Mr. Dobson for felony driving under the influence (“DUI”). (PSI, pp.90-91.) He
was charged with a felony due to the fact that he was on probation for a 2014 felony DUI
conviction when he committed the instant offense. (R., p.10; PSI, pp.7-8.) Police officers later
obtained a blood sample from Mr. Dobson, which showed a blood alcohol content of .202. (PSI,
pp.91-94.)
The State filed a complaint against Mr. Dobson in August 2020 for felony DUI, driving
without privileges, and failing to provide information at the scene of an accident involving
damage. (R., pp.6-8.) After he waived his preliminary hearing, he was bound over to district
court on those charges. (R., pp.21-26.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Dobson pled guilty to
felony DUI, and the state dismissed the remaining charges. (R., pp.30-41; Aug. Tr., p.12, L.5 –
p.13, L.11.)
In December 2020, a joint sentencing and disposition hearing was held for the 2014
probation violation case and the 2020 DUI. (See generally Tr; R., p.42.) At that hearing, the State
recommended the district court revoke Mr. Dobson’s probation in the 2014 case and execute his
underlying sentence of ten years, with two years fixed. (Tr., p.9, Ls.12-18.) In the new DUI case,
the State recommended the district court sentence him to ten years, with four years fixed, to run
concurrently with the sentence in the 2014 case. (Tr., p.9, Ls.12-18.) Defense counsel
recommended that the district court retain jurisdiction, or alternatively allow Mr. Dobson an
opportunity to participate in a drug court program. (Tr., p.10, L.2 – p.11, L.11.) The district court
3
sentenced him to ten years, with four years fixed, to run concurrently with the sentence in the
2014 probation violation case, without retaining jurisdiction. (R., pp.45-48; Tr., p.15, L.13 –
p.16, L.16.)
After sentencing, Mr. Dobson filed a Criminal Rule 35 motion with no new information.
(R., pp.50.) The district court denied that motion in January 2021. (R., pp.55-57.)
Mr. Dobson timely appealed from the judgment of conviction in the new case. (R., pp.51-
53.)  He did not appeal from the revocation order in his 2014 case.
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an excessive sentence of ten years,
with four years fixed, upon Mr. Dobson?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Sentence Of Ten Years, With Two
Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Dobson
Mr. Dobson asserts that, given any view of the facts, his sentence of ten years, with four
years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an
excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection
of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Dobson does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, he must show that in light of the governing
4
criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria
or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or
retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
Appellate courts use a four-part test for determining whether a district court abused its
discretion: Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
Here, Mr. Dobson asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends the district court
should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment, in light of the mitigating factors,
including his substance abuse and its longstanding impact on his life, remorse, amenability to
treatment, a history of stable employment, and family support.
Mr. Dobson reported that he first used drugs or alcohol between the ages of seventeen
and nineteen, and acknowledged that his substance of choice is alcohol. (PSI, pp.11, 12, 103.)
The Global Appraisal of Individual Needs (“GAIN”) assessment diagnosed him with severe
alcohol use disorder. (PSI, pp.12, 21, 105.) The impact of substance abuse on the defendant’s
criminal conduct is “a proper consideration in mitigation of punishment upon sentencing.”
State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981). Mr. Dobson admitted that his addiction to
alcohol is his “main problem.” (PSI, p.8.) He acknowledged that the full scope of his criminal
history has centered around driving under the influence of alcohol, and stated “I need to
remember I’m an alcoholic every minute of every day.” (PSI, pp.8-9.) The pre-sentence
5
investigation (“PSI”) report and the GAIN assessment recommended Level 2.1 intensive
outpatient treatment for Mr. Dobson, such as a drug court program. (PSI, p.20.)
Mr. Dobson has expressed remorse for his actions and has recognized the severity of his
choices. (PSI, p.4.) In State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991), the Idaho Court of
Appeals reduced the sentence imposed, “In light of Alberts’ expression of remorse for his
conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive
attributes of his character.” Id. 121 Idaho at 209. During the PSI interview, Mr. Dobson
expressed his gratitude for the help he received to help get him on his feet over the past six years,
writing he was “ashamed for starting to drink again after five years of sobriety.” (PSI, p.2.)
Mr. Dobson recognizes that he has a severe alcohol addiction, and understands the importance of
staying in treatment, and asking for help when he needs it. (See PSI, p.2.) At the sentencing
hearing, he reiterated that he is ashamed of his behavior, and apologized to all the people he let
down. (PSI, p.9; Tr., p.11, Ls.19-25.)
Although Mr. Dobson relapsed, that is part of the recovery process. He has demonstrated
his ability to maintain his sobriety and be a productive member of the community when he is
engaged in treatment and under proper supervision. During a prior period of probation,
Mr. Dobson was sober for about three years before he relapsed. (PSI, p.106.) A 2014 PSI report
states that Mr. Dobson did well on misdemeanor probation – he never received a positive1 urine
analysis, he was accountable, respectful, and cooperative, and he paid his financial obligations
on time (PSI, p.99.) When discussing his recent relapse, Mr. Dobson explained that after his
hours were cut at work due to COVID-19, he feared he would lose his job, and started drinking
again. (PSI, pp.2, 5, 11.) He reported that he relapsed around March or April 2020 after five
1 Page 99 of the PSI states that Mr. Dobson received no negative drug tests, however, it is clear
from the context that the investigator meant positive drug tests.
6
years of sobriety, and stated that he was drinking approximately three to four beers every day to
every other day. (PSI, pp.5, 9, 46-66.)
Mr. Dobson submits that his positive employment history also supports a lesser sentence.
See State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 118 (1955) (recognizing gainful employment as a mitigating
factor); see also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594–95 (1982) (employment and desire to
advance within company were mitigating circumstances). Mr. Dobson has been steadily
employed since at least 1990, and reported that he has never been fired. (See PSI, pp.5-6, 28,
101-02, 106.) Prior to his arrest, he was working at Maravia Corporation as a lead painter from
February 2017 to August 2020, and he is currently serving as the head baker while incarcerated.
(PSI, pp.5-6.)
In addition to a history of stable employment, Mr. Dobson also has a strong support
system. (PSI, p.106.) He has a great relationship with his family, particularly with his niece and
nephew. (PSI, pp.4, 9, 99.) The Idaho Supreme Court noted in State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593,
594 (1982), that family and friend support are factors that should be considered in the court’s
decision as to what is an appropriate sentence. Id. Mr. Dobson’s niece and nephew provided
letters of support to the district court describing him as having a big heart and being selfless by
nature. (PSI, pp.4, 25-27.) They expressed their belief that he feels deep remorse about his
actions, and stated that they remain supportive of their uncle and want to help him stay sober.
(PSI, pp.25-27.)
Despite his serious alcohol addiction, Mr. Dobson has demonstrated his ability to stay
sober and be a productive member of society. He did very well during a prior period of
probation, and he was sober for a period of five years before his recent relapse. Mr. Dobson is
remorseful and ashamed of his behavior, and understands the importance of seeking help when
7
he is struggling with his sobriety. Additionally, Mr. Dobson has a history of gainful employment,
and continues to have support from his family.
Proper consideration of these mitigating factors supported a more lenient sentence. In
light of these facts, Mr. Dobson submits that the district court did not exercise reason, and thus
abused its discretion, by sentencing him to serve ten years, with four years fixed.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Dobson respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this 10th day of June, 2021.
/s/ Kiley A. Heffner
KILEY A. HEFFNER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of June, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
 KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
KAH/eas


State v. Dobson Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48528

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UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
7-22-2021 
State v. Bonning Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48574 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Bonning Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48574" (2021). Not Reported. 7197. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7197 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KACEY L. JONES 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
AMY ROSE BONNING 
AKA AMY ROSE INGRAM, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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) 
) 
) 
 
     NO. 48574-2021 
 
Ada County Case No.  
CR01-20-22541 
 
           
     RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
ISSUES 
 
1. Has Bonning failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it 
sentenced her to six years with two years fixed for possession of a controlled substance with the 
intent to deliver?   
 
2. Has Bonning failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying her Rule 
35 motion for reduction of her sentence?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Electronically Filed
7/22/2021 10:25 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Law enforcement officers assisted probation and parole with a compliance check of 
Bonning’s residence.  (Tr., p.13, Ls.2-10.)  During the search of the residence, Bonning attempted 
to hide a white eyeglasses case.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.2-5.)  Officers searched the case as well as a box 
found near where Bonning had been sitting; inside, they located paraphernalia, baggies, a thyroid 
medication in someone else’s name, two snorting devices, three baggies with eighteen grams of 
methamphetamine, and three additional baggies with smaller weights of methamphetamine.  (Tr., 
p.14, Ls.5-13.)  Bonning admitted she was selling methamphetamine, had been doing so since she 
was last released from prison, and sold about an ounce a day.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.17-20.)   
The state charged Bonning with felony possession of a controlled substance with the intent 
to deliver and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, along with a persistent violator 
enhancement.  (R., pp.17-18, 42-43.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Bonning entered an Alford1 
plea to possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver and the state dismissed the 
paraphernalia charge and persistent violator enhancement.  (R., pp.22-33, 47-57; Tr., p.15, Ls.3-
23.)  The district court sentenced Bonning to six years with two years fixed.  (R., pp.65-67; Tr., 
p.31, Ls.7-14.)  Bonning filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.71-72.)  Thereafter, she filed a 
Rule 35 motion for reconsideration of her sentence, which the district court denied.  (R., p.76; 
Aug., pp.1-16.) 
 
  
                                            
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
 3 
ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
Bonning Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 Bonning asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced her to six 
years with two years fixed.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-6.)  Bonning has shown no abuse of discretion.  
The sentence imposed is reasonable in light of Bonning’s criminal history and the fact that she 
committed the underlying crime while on felony probation.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the 
defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing 
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 
159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden 
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 
614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  In evaluating 
whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which 
asks “whether the court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the 
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”  State v. 
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 
Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).  
 
 
 
 
 4 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish 
that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive.  State v. Farwell, 144 
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).  In determining whether the appellant met this burden, 
the court considers the entire sentence but presumes that the determinate portion will be the period 
of actual incarceration.  State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (citing 
Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391).  To establish that the sentence was excessive, the 
appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate 
to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.  
Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401.  “‘In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not 
substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.’”  State v. 
Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2018) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 
139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).   
  The sentence imposed is reasonable in light of Bonning’s criminal history.  Bonning’s 
lengthy record includes eighteen misdemeanor convictions, many of which are drug related, 
including two convictions for possession of a controlled substance and eight for possession of drug 
paraphernalia.  (PSI, pp.3-10.)  In addition, Bonning has two prior felony convictions for 
possession of controlled substances.  (See PSI, pp.5-6, 10; see also R., pp.42-43.)  Moreover, 
Bonning’s criminal history demonstrates a disregard for following rules.  She has multiple 
convictions for failing to have a driver’s license, failing to maintain car insurance, failing to appear 
at court, contempt of court, resisting arrest, and providing false information to law enforcement.  
(PSI, pp.3-10.) 
 5 
The sentence is also reasonable in light of Bonning’s multiple opportunities for and failures 
on probation in the past.  Bonning has had numerous probation violations over multiple cases.  
(PSI, p.10.)  In her first felony drug possession case, her probation was revoked and the underlying 
sentence was imposed.  (PSI, p.10.)  At the time the PSI was prepared for her second felony drug 
conviction, Bonning had pending probation violations for “missing scheduled meetings with her 
Probation Officer, missing 22 mandatory scheduled substance abuse tests, admitting to using 
marijuana, and not complying with her payment agreement.”  (PSI, p.10.)  And, Bonning was on 
felony probation in that case at the time she committed the underlying offense in this case.  (See 
PSI, pp.19-20.)  Despite being given the opportunity of probation again, she began selling 
methamphetamine upon her release from prison and, by her own admission, sold as much as an 
ounce of methamphetamine a day.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.17-20.)   
The district court reviewed the PSI materials and considered the objectives of criminal 
sentencing.  (Tr., p.27, Ls.7-16.)  The district court emphasized that Bonning was on felony 
probation at the time she committed the underlying crime, which was not merely the possession 
of methamphetamine but possession with the intent to deliver methamphetamine to others.  (Tr., 
p.27, Ls.17-23; p.29, Ls.2-4.)  As the district court noted, Bonning has a long history of 
methamphetamine use, drug convictions, and failures on probation.  (Tr., p.29, Ls.5-11.)  The 
district court recognized Bonning’s mental health issues, but also recognized that her conduct 
posed a risk to the community.  (Tr., p.29, Ls.12-22.)  In light of Bonning’s underlying conduct, 
criminal history, failures on probation, and the fact that she was on felony probation in a prior drug 
case at the time she committed this offense, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
determined that a period of incarceration was necessary. 
--
 6 
Bonning argues that the district court failed to exercise reason and therefore abused its 
discretion because the sentence is “objectively unreasonable” in light of the mitigating factors, 
such as her childhood and adult trauma, medical problems, and mental health and substance abuse 
issues.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-6.)  However, the district court considered that mitigating 
information.  (PSI, pp.11-13, 16-17, 20, 59-90; Tr., p.22, L.12 – p.27, L.11; p.29, Ls.12-18.)  As 
the PSI noted, “[i]t is clear Ms. Bonning has struggled with her substance addiction and criminal 
thinking for over 20 years.  Despite the amount of familial support she has, it has not helped her 
overcome her addiction and criminal behavior.  She has been placed on probation many times and 
has had numerous probation violations.”  (PSI, p.20.)  In light of that information, the district court 
reasonably concluded that a period of incarceration was appropriate.  Bonning has failed to show 
that the district court abused its sentencing discretion. 
 
II. 
Bonning Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Her 
Rule 35 Motion For Reduction Of Sentence 
 
A. Introduction 
 Bonning asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her Rule 35 
motion for reduction of her sentence.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8.)  Bonning has shown no abuse 
of discretion.  The district court did not abuse its discretion when it considered the information 
provided and determined that it did not render the otherwise-reasonable sentence excessive. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency, 
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.”  State v. Anderson, 163 Idaho 513, 517, 415 P.3d 
381, 385 (Ct. App. 2015).  Where a sentence is neither illegal nor excessive when pronounced, 
 7 
“the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information 
subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion.”  State v. Burggraf, 160 Idaho 
177, 180, 369 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 840).  
“An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the 
underlying sentence absent the presentation of new information.”  Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 
P.3d at 840. 
 
C. Bonning Failed To Show Her Sentence Was Excessive In Light Of New Information 
 
 Bonning sought a reduction of her sentence based on documentation of her performance in 
classes and treatment while incarcerated.  (Aug., pp.1-14.)  While encouraging, the district court 
is not required to grant leniency based on positive performance in prison, which is, after all, the 
expectation.  See State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 773, 229 P.3d 374, 378 (2010); State v. 
Copenhaver, 129 Idaho 494, 496, 927 P.2d 884, 886 (1996) (“The district court further did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to view Copenhaver’s good behavior in prison between his 
sentencing and the Rule 35 hearing as a mitigating factor.”).  The district court reviewed the 
documentation and concluded that, “[d]espite the additional information presented by Bonning, 
…the sentence is not excessive given the nature of the offense and Bonning’s criminal history.”  
(Aug., p.16.)  Further, as the district court noted, “shortly after the sentence was imposed, 
Bonning’s probation in a separate case (Ada County Case No. CR01-18-48323) was revoked, her 
suspended prison sentence of a similar length to this one was ordered into execution without a 
period of retained jurisdiction, and she didn’t file a Rule 35(b) motion seeking a period of retained 
jurisdiction.”  (Aug., p.16.)  “Given the outcome of that case, it would make little practical sense 
to retain jurisdiction in this case now.”  (Aug., p.16.)  Bonning has failed to show any abuse of the 
district court’s discretion. 
 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.   
 DATED this 22nd day of July, 2021. 
 
 
        /s/  Kacey L. Jones 
      KACEY L. JONES 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
            I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of July, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
EMILY M. JOYCE 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
                                                                         /s/  Kacey L. Jones 
                                                                        KACEY L. JONES 
                                                                        Deputy Attorney General 
KLJ/dd 


State v. Bonning Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48574

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UIdaho Law 
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8-16-2021 
State v. Rasmussen Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48600 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
TIFFANY DAWN RASMUSSEN, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48600-2021 
 
Cassia County Case No. CR16-20-64 
 
 
           
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Tiffany Dawn Rasmussen failed to show that the district court abused its discretion 
when it relinquished jurisdiction over her? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Rasmussen Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 On January 3, 2020, law enforcement stopped Rasmussen’s vehicle because there were 
three small children unrestrained in the moving vehicle.  (PSI, p. 5.)  The officer noticed the odor 
Electronically Filed
8/16/2021 4:54 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
of alcohol emanating from Rasmussen.  (Id.)  Rasmussen’s breath alcohol level tested 0.135, 0.080, 
and 0.087.  (Id.)    
The state charged Rasmussen with felony driving under the influence of alcohol in 
violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-8004 and 18-8005(6).  (R., pp. 17-18.)  Rasmussen pled guilty to 
the charge.  (R., p. 33.)   
On May 18, 2020, the district court held a sentencing hearing via Zoom.  (05/18/20 Tr., p. 
4, Ls. 1-12.)  The PSI recommended Rasmussen “be placed in the physical custody of the Idaho 
Department of Correction.”  (PSI, p. 18.)  The state recommended an eight-year sentence with two 
years fixed, with no objection to Rasmussen’s assignment to DUI court.  (05/18/20 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 
16-24.)  Rasmussen’s counsel requested, “We would hope that the Court would follow the State’s 
recommendations in assigning her to DUI court and further give her the time to serve any jail 
sentence that may be imposed.”  (05/18/20 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 15-18.)  The court sentenced Rasmussen 
to eight years, with two years determinate, and retained jurisdiction.  (R., p. 51.)  The court ordered 
Rasmussen to “turn [her]self in to the jail immediately.”  (05/18/20 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 16-17.)   
Rasmussen did not turn herself in.  (R., p. 57.)  The court issued a warrant for her arrest.  
(Id.)  About two weeks later, on June 1, 2020, the court held a hearing.  (Id.)  Rasmussen was still 
missing and had not responded to her counsel’s attempts to contact her.  (Id.)  More than six months 
passed, during which Rasmussen still did not turn herself in or contact her counsel.  (See R., p. 
59.)  On December 21, 2020, the court held a hearing and then relinquished jurisdiction.  (R., pp. 
59-61.)  Rasmussen was arrested on January 17, 2021.  (See R., pp. 66-67.)   
Rasmussen timely appealed from the order relinquishing jurisdiction.  (R., pp. 61, 75.)  On 
appeal, Rasmussen contends that absconding for eight month demonstrates that she was a good 
candidate for probation.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5.)  Rasmussen reasons that because she is the 
 3 
“mother and primary caretaker of three children” and requested 24 to 48 hours to “make 
arrangements before turning herself in,” the district court should have concluded that she “did not 
turn herself in” out of a “commitment to her family” and “the challenges of the COVID-19 
pandemic.”  (Id.)  The record does not support her argument.  She has shown no abuse of discretion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The appellate court reviews a decision to relinquish jurisdiction for abuse of discretion.  
State v. Haws, 167 Idaho 471, 480, 472 P.3d 576, 585 (2020).  In evaluating whether a lower court 
abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the 
trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”  State v. 
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 
Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). 
 
C. Rasmussen Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
 
Factors relevant to the decision to relinquish jurisdiction include the defendant’s criminal 
history and the defendant’s performance during the period of retained jurisdiction.  See State v. 
Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 729, 316 P.3d 640, 645 (2013).  In Brunet, the court held there was no 
abuse of discretion when the district court decided to relinquish jurisdiction, having considered the 
defendant’s criminal history, the defendant’s performance during probation and rider program, and 
mitigating factors from defendant’s childhood as noted in his PSI.  Id.  This information was “more 
than sufficient for the district court to determine that [the defendant] was not a good candidate for 
any sentencing alternatives, and thus amounted to a reasonable basis for relinquishing 
 4 
jurisdiction.”  Id.  See also State v. Latneau, 154 Idaho 165, 166, 296 P.3d 371, 372 (2013) 
(affirming order relinquishing jurisdiction when the defendant’s history indicated he would not be 
a good candidate for probation).   
Here, the district court appropriately relinquished jurisdiction over Rasmussen.  Rasmussen 
violated the court’s order to turn herself in to begin her rider programming and absconded for 
about eight months.  (R., pp. 66-67.)  This conduct demonstrated that Rasmussen was not 
cooperative or amenable to sentencing alternatives.  See Brunet, 155 Idaho at 729, 316 P.3d at 
645; Latneau, 154 Idaho at 166, 296 P.3d at 372.  Further, the district court was familiar with 
Rasmussen’s criminal history and background.  For instance, the court noted in the sentencing 
hearing that the underlying conviction occurred while Rasmussen was still on probation from 
earlier DUI convictions, Rasmussen had not taken responsibility for her conduct, blaming her 
friend for Rasmussen’s drinking on the day of her felony driving under the influence violation, 
and Rasmussen had endangered her children by driving under the influence with the children 
unrestrained in the car.  (05/18/20 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 11-25.)  There was no abuse of discretion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 16th day of August, 2021. 
 
 
   /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
  
 5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 16th day of August, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
   /s/   Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
 


State v. Rasmussen Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48600

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UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
9-15-2021 
State v. Mossi Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48649 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
 
DAVID LEE MOSSI, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48649-2021 
 
 
 
Ada County Case No. CR01-20-37057 
 
 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has David Lee Mossi failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
sentencing him to five years, with three years determinate for stalking in the first degree? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Mossi Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
In July of 2020, David Lee Mossi continually called, texted and e-mailed his estranged 
wife, Michelle Ford.  (PSI, p. 18.)  Michelle blocked Mossi on all electronic platforms, but he 
made new e-mail addresses to contact Michelle.  (PSI, p. 18.)  Mossi also went to the residence 
Electronically Filed
9/15/2021 11:04 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
that Michelle had been living at, and knocked on the doors in an attempt to find Michelle.  (PSI, 
p. 18.)  Michelle reported Mossi’s conduct, and authorities contacted Mossi and told him to have 
no further contact with Michelle.  (PSI, p. 19.)  A few hours later, Mossi sent another email to 
Michelle, using a new email address, and telling her that he intended to file for divorce.  (PSI, p. 
19.)  Police contacted Mossi again, and reiterated that he should not contact Michelle in any way, 
and to only communicate through attorneys.  (PSI, p. 19.)  In August of 2020, police followed up 
with Michelle, and she advised that Mossi had continued to email her.  (PSI, p. 19.)  Michelle 
advised that Mossi had hacked into her accounts, and contacted her friends and family, spreading 
lies and harassing them.  (PSI, p. 19.)   
The state charged Mossi with one count of stalking in the first degree, as he had been 
convicted of stalking in the second degree in 2020.  (R., pp. 29-30; PSI, p. 30.)  Mossi pleaded 
guilty to stalking in the first degree, and the district court sentenced him to five years, with three 
years determinate.  (R., pp. 31-32, 60-62.)  Mossi then filed a timely appeal.  (R., pp. 64-65.)   
On appeal, Mossi argues that “the district court abused its discretion when it imposed an 
excessive sentence.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 1.)  Mossi has failed to show that the district court 
abused its discretion by sentencing him to five years, with three years determinate for stalking in 
the first degree. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
“Appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard.  Where a 
sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and, thus, a clear 
abuse of discretion.”  State v. Schiermeier, 165 Idaho 447, 451, 447 P.3d 895, 899 (2019) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted).  A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time 
of sentencing that confinement is necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting 
 3 
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution 
applicable to a given case.  Id. at 454, 447 P.3d at 902.  “A sentence fixed within the limits 
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion.”  Id. (internal 
quotations omitted).  “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a 
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.”  State v. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 
608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2019) (citation omitted).   
The decision to place a defendant on probation is a matter within the sound discretion of 
the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.  State v. 
Reed, 163 Idaho 681, 684, 417 P.3d 1007, 1010 (Ct. App. 2018) (citations omitted).  Rehabilitation 
and public safety are dual goals of probation.  State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 114, 426 P.3d 
461, 465 (2018).  A decision to deny probation will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if it is 
consistent with the criteria articulated in I.C. § 19-2521.  State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278, 61 
P.3d 632, 635 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567, 650 P.2d 707, 709 (Ct. 
App. 1982)). 
 
C. Mossi Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
The sentence imposed is within the statutory limits of I.C. § 18-7905.  The record shows 
the district court perceived its discretion, employed the correct legal standards to the issue before 
it, and acted reasonably and within the scope of its discretion.   
At the sentencing hearing, the district court considered “the four goals of sentencing under 
Idaho law: Protection of the community, rehabilitation, punishment, [and] deterrence,” as well as 
“the factors that are outlined in Idaho Code Section 19-2521 to determine what’s an appropriate 
sentence.”  (Tr., p. 33, Ls. 3-11.)  The district court stated that “what [Mossi] did to Ms. Ford was 
constant, persistent stalking of her, the significant other people in her life, getting into her personal 
 4 
matters.  And [he] persisted in this behavior despite her clear expression of her individual choice, 
her right not to have contact with [Mossi].”  (Tr., p. 33, Ls. 19-25.)  The district court stated that 
“[i]t persisted.  [He] kept doing this.  [He] kept coming at her despite more than one admonition 
from law enforcement not to contact her, not to harass her, not to stalk her.  [He] kept doing it.  
[He] terrorized her.”  (Tr., p. 33, L. 25 – p. 34, L. 4.)  The district court stated “from reading this 
presentence report and looking at the nature of [Mossi’s] other offenses, she isn’t the first person 
that [he’s] done this to.  This occurs, it appears, after being sentenced for second-degree stalking 
with another victim in Canyon County.”  (Tr., p. 34, Ls. 5-10.)   
The district court found it was clear that Mossi “knew exactly what [he was] about.  [He] 
knew exactly that the kind of conduct [he was] engaging in was wrong, that it was criminal.”  (Tr., 
p. 34, Ls. 11-14.)  The district court stated that “it didn’t matter what Ms. Ford thought or what 
Ms. Ford wanted or her individual respect and rights as a human being.  It didn’t matter what a 
uniformed officer, law enforcement officer, was telling [Mossi], and it didn’t matter that [he was] 
engaging in conduct that [he] knew to be criminal.”  (Tr., p. 34, Ls. 15-21.)  The district court 
stated that Mossi’s “criminal history is particularly disturbing,” and noted “[b]attery and telephone 
harassment in 1999, a burglary and attempt, the malicious injury to property in ’04, malicious 
injury to property in ’07, second-degree stalking earlier in 2020 before this offense.”  (Tr., p. 34, 
L. 22 – p. 35, L. 2.)  The district court stated that it is “problematic because [his] offenses and [his] 
criminal conduct have victims.”  (Tr., p. 35. Ls. 4-5.)  The district court credited Mossi for 
“talk[ing] about the fact that [he] broke the law.  [He] talk[ed] about the fact that [he’s] accepting 
responsibility,” but when Mossi talks about this offense he “minimize[s] to the point of 
disappearance [of his] criminal conduct, and [he] portray[s] [himself] as the victim.”  (Tr., p. 35, 
Ls. 6-14.)  The district court stated that Mossi portrays “what [he] did as righteous in some respect, 
 5 
motivated by virtuous feelings” even though what he did criminal, aggressive, and harassment.  
(Tr., p. 35, Ls. 15-19.)   
The district court found Mossi was not “amenable to treatment.  Certainly not in the 
community.  It’s too much of a risk to have [him] out in the community.”  (Tr., p. 36, Ls. 16-19.)  
The district court found that Mossi was “a high risk for future stalking behavior” and a “moderate 
risk potential for future violence to Ms. Ford,” noting Mossi “had two victims within the past 
year,” and finding “it’s apparent from this history and the evaluation that despite the intervention 
of law enforcement and judicial system, [Mossi’s] behavior continues.”  (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 9-16.)  The 
district court stated that the instant offense “deserves a serious response,” and that Mossi is “not a 
good candidate for probation.”  (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 18-19; p. 38, Ls. 9-10.)  The district court couldn’t 
“in any respect, feel anything except that there is undue risk of future criminal conduct if [Mossi’s] 
placed in the community,” and was “troubled by the thought of even what a period of retained 
jurisdiction would do in [his] particular case given [his] criminal history and the criminal conduct 
involved in this case and given [his] attitude about that.”  (Tr., p. 38, Ls. 10-18.)  Because the 
district court applied the proper legal standards to the facts before it and reached a reasonable 
conclusion through the exercise of reason it did not abuse its discretion. 
Mossi argues that mitigating factors—mental health issues, military service, employability 
and support system—show an abuse of discretion.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)  Mossi’s argument 
does now show an abuse of discretion.  Mossi’s LSI score is thirty, placing him in the high risk to 
reoffend category.  (PSI, p. 23.)  His criminal history consists of numerous crimes involving 
victims, and opportunities on probation.  (PSI, p. 30.)  The presentence investigator stated that 
Mossi “minimized his actions and often took the victim stance.  When discussing his prior 
convictions, Mr. Mossi presented himself as the victim in the cases.”  (PSI, p. 33.)  Mossi was on 
 6 
probation for a prior stalking conviction at the time of the instant offense and claimed that he was 
innocent of that offense and pled guilty only to get out of jail.  (PSI, pp. 13, 33-34.)  The 
presentence investigator stated that Mossi “appears to struggle controlling his emotions and lashes 
out at others when he feels he is wronged or not in control of the situation.”  (PSI, pp. 33-34.)  The 
presentence investigator stated that Mossi blamed Michelle “for leaving and blamed the victim’s 
ex mother-in-law, from her previous marriage, for interfering in the relationship,” and Mossi 
“insisted the victim was committing crimes and was mentally unstable” and that he was 
“attempting to help her.”  (PSI, p. 34.)  Mossi completed Anger Management and Thinking Errors 
as part of his 1999 conviction, and he failed to complete a fifty-two week domestic violence 
treatment program following his 2020 second degree stalking conviction.  (PSI, p. 34.)  The victim, 
Michelle Ford, reported that she “no longer feel[s] safe, [she] wake[s] up every night screaming in 
terror from vivid dreams that [Mossi] is in [her] room watching [her].”  (PSI, p. 20.)  Michelle 
stated that she “was afraid to sleep, so [she] would watch [her] daughter sleep, check to see if 
[Mossi] was outside and check the doors and windows constantly.”  (PSI, pp. 20-21.)   
Mossi’s continuous stalking and harassment has caused great harm to Michelle, and the 
sentence imposed protects the community and serves as appropriate punishment.  Mossi’s LSI 
score and criminal history shows that he’s not amenable to community supervision, and there’s an 
undue risk to reoffend.  The sentence serves as an appropriate deterrence to Mossi and other 
possible offenders, and a lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the instant offense.  
Mossi is not suitable candidate for probation, and he has failed to show that the district court abused 
its discretion by sentencing him to five years, with three years determinate for stalking in the first 
degree. 
 
  
 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 15th day of September, 2021. 
 
 
        /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen  
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      ZACHARI S. HALLETT 
      Paralegal 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
            I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 15th day of September, 2021, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of 
iCourt File and Serve: 
 
KILEY A. HEFFNER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
                                                                          /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen  
                                                                        KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
                                                                        Deputy Attorney General 
 


State v. Mossi Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48649

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Chambers v. Idaho Board of Pharmacy and Agency Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48657

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UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
8-17-2021 
State v. Browne Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48776 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
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This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
JENNIFER JENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL STEVEN BROWNE, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48776-2021 
 
Nez Perce County No. 
CR35-20-5088 
 
           
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Michael Browne failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it 
revoked his probation and executed his underlying sentence? 
 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Browne Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 On August 25, 2020, Browne was arrested on a misdemeanor warrant for failure to appear.  
(PSI, p. 1.)  During the search incident to his arrest, law enforcement discovered a glass pipe and 
a plastic bag with a white crystal-like substance in it.  (Id.)      
Electronically Filed
8/17/2021 2:49 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
 2 
The court released Browne on his own recognizance pending trial.  (R., p. 88.)  During his 
pre-trial release, Browne agreed to report through Justice Services in Lewiston, Idaho.  (R., p. 89.) 
On October 27, 2020, the state charged Browne with one count of felony possession of 
methamphetamine in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1).  (R., p. 97.)  The state also sought a 
persistent violator sentencing enhancement due to prior felony convictions in the State of 
Washington—two for malicious mischief, one for assault, and two for possession of a controlled 
substance.  (R., p. 98.)  Browne pled guilty to the charge of felony possession of methamphetamine.  
(R., p. 111.) 
On March 11, 2021, the district court sentenced Browne to five years, with two years fixed, 
and suspended the sentence for a period of five years’ probation.  (R., pp. 118-19.)   
On March 23, 2021, the state moved for a warrant, alleging Browne had failed to report to 
his probation officer.  (R., pp. 134, 136.)  According to the probation violation report attached to 
the motion, Browne was living in Spokane, Washington “at a sober house.”  (R., p. 136.)  He was 
required to report to Lewiston, Idaho.  (R., p. 137.)  Browne wrote a “very inappropriate interstate 
application” requesting permission to report in Washington, which his probation officer apparently 
did not submit for approval.  (See R., pp. 136-37; Ex., pp. 2-6.)  Among other things, in response 
to the question “Are you required to register as a sex offender?” Browne wrote, “Fuck no Rappos 
+ Chimo’s should be castrated[.]”  (Ex., p. 4.)  In response to the question, “How will you pay the 
100$ application fee?” Brown wrote, “By selling my ass.  LOL.  By ABD Plazma donation family, 
or college or a go fund me page.  Cause I ain’t dealing dope.”  (Ex., p. 5.)  When his probation 
officer informed him that he would need to report in Lewiston because this interstate application 
could not be submitted, Browne sent two emails to her full of profanity and accusations.  (See Ex., 
pp. 10-11.)  Browne also posted on Facebook a statement about his probation officer too profane 
 3 
to quote.  (See Ex., p. 12.)  He apologized to his probation officer via email.  (Ex., p. 10.)  The 
following day, however, he called his probation officer and said “he did not have money for a bus 
ticket to Lewiston and wasn’t sure if he could report” on the required day, “then asked if probation 
wanted him to go punch a cop so that he [could] get transportation” to Lewiston.  (R., p. 137.)  
Browne ultimately reported in Lewiston a day late and was taken into custody.  (R., p. 141.)  
On March 25, 2021, the court held an admit/deny hearing.  (R., p. 145.)  At the hearing, 
Browne admitted that he had “failed to appear at Probation and Parole before 4:00 p.m. on March 
22nd.”  (Tr., p. 21, L. 23 – p. 22, L. 2.1)  The district court revoked probation and imposed his 
original sentence, retaining jurisdiction.  (R., pp. 146-48.) 
Browne timely appealed.  (See R., pp. 146, 150.) 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “Review of a probation revocation proceeding involves a two-step analysis.  First, it is 
determined whether the terms of probation have been violated.  If they have, it is then determined 
whether the violation justifies revocation of the probation.”  State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 710, 
390 P.3d 434, 436 (2017) (citations omitted).  As to the first step, a “court’s finding that a violation 
has been proved will be upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence in the record to support 
the finding.”  State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003) (citations 
omitted).  “As to the second step, the decision whether to revoke a defendant’s probation for a 
violation is within the discretion of the district court.”  Id. (citations omitted).2 
                                            
1 The state refers to the page numbers of the pdf file that includes the transcripts submitted to this 
Court on appeal.   
2 Browne admits that he violated the terms of his probation.  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)  
Accordingly, this Court need only consider the second step of the probation revocation review.   
 4 
 In evaluating whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a 
four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the 
exercise of reason.”  State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing 
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). 
 
C. Browne Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
 
“In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation 
is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society.”  State v. 
Hanson, 150 Idaho 729, 733, 249 P.3d 1184, 1188 (Ct. App. 2011).  Courts act within their 
discretion to revoke a defendant’s probation when the defendant’s violations demonstrate that 
probation is not serving its rehabilitative purpose.  See, e.g., State v. Cornelison, 154 Idaho 793, 
798-99, 302 P.3d 1066, 1071-72 (Ct. App. 2013) (affirming probation revocation due to 
defendant’s use of alcohol and marijuana and failure to report because probation was not serving 
the goal of rehabilitation); Hanson, 150 Idaho at 733, 249 P.3d at 1188 (affirming probation 
revocation because the violations demonstrated probation was not achieving rehabilitation and that 
defendant’s heavy drinking posed a risk to society). 
State v. Adams is also instructive.  115 Idaho 1053, 772 P.2d 260 (Ct. App. 1989).  In 
Adams, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s revocation of probation when the 
defendant “was a dubious candidate for probation when the original sentence was pronounced and 
suspended,” and the defendant subsequently violated the terms of his probation “by making 
disrespectful and profane statements to a custodial officer[.]”  Id. at 1055, 772 P.2d at 262. 
 5 
Here, the district court appropriately revoked probation.  As described further below, 
Browne’s probation violation and circumstances surrounding it showed that he was not a good 
candidate for probation, which failed to have a rehabilitative effect on him, and he posed a risk to 
society.  The district court had been lenient when granting probation in the first place, a decision 
contrary to the PSI’s recommendation.  (See PSI, p. 13.)  At sentencing, the court had noted that 
Browne’s “prior record’s horrendous, quite frankly.”  (Tr., p. 12, Ls. 10-11.)  The instant felony 
was his tenth.  (PSI, p. 12.)  And Browne had a history of noncompliance with probation.  (PSI, p. 
13.)  Browne reported for the PSI that “he has never completed a single bit of his multiple terms 
of supervision even though he has basically been on probation since he was 15.”  (PSI, p. 3.)  
Despite these considerations, the court acknowledged the steps Browne had taken “since this case 
started” and decided “to give [Browne] one chance[.]”  (Tr., p. 12, Ls. 14-17.)  The district court 
even warned Browne at the sentencing hearing, “And I’m going to go on the record right now, Mr. 
Browne, that if you mess up on probation, given your record, given all the things I’ve seen in this 
case, we’ll be talking about prison at that time, okay?”  (Tr., p. 12, Ls. 22-25.)  Like the defendant 
in Adams, Browne was a dubious candidate for probation to begin with, and his failure to report 
and profanity directed at his probation officer were more than sufficient grounds to revoke 
probation.  See 115 Idaho at 1055, 772 P.2d at 262.  Browne demonstrated—through his failure to 
timely report and his communications to and about his probation officer—that he would not abide 
by the terms of probation.  As the state noted at the admit/deny hearing, this conduct showed that 
Browne was “running his own program” and “not going to abide by any terms and conditions they 
give him.”  (Tr., p. 25, Ls. 12-14.)  Probation was not having its intended rehabilitative effect.  See 
Cornelison, 154 Idaho at 798-99, 302 P.3d at 1071-72 (affirming probation revocation because 
probation was not serving the goal of rehabilitation).  Further, the extreme nature of his words 
 6 
regarding his probation officer in the Facebook post and his question whether he should “punch a 
cop” could fairly be construed to demonstrate he posed a danger to the community.  (See Ex., p. 
12; R., p. 137; Hanson, 150 Idaho at 733, 249 P.3d at 1188 (affirming probation revocation because 
probation was not achieving rehabilitation and defendant posed a risk to society).)  The district 
court also noted that Browne would be able to participate in the rider program and that he would 
have another chance at probation if upon completion of the rider program, the Department of 
Correction recommended probation.  (Tr., p. 29, Ls. 6-13.)  There was no abuse of discretion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 17th day of August, 2021. 
 
 
  /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of August, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
KILEY A. HEFFNER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
KKJ/dd 
 
 


State v. Browne  Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48776

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State v. Knudson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48838 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #7259
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 48838-2021
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-20-49719
v. )
)
TERRY DAVID KNUDSON, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
______________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Terry David Knudson appeals from the district court’s Judgment of Conviction and
Commitment.  Mr. Knudson was sentenced to a unified sentence of fifteen years, with three
years fixed, for trafficking in methamphetamine.  He asserts that the district court abused its
discretion because in light of the evidence, including the mitigating factors present in his case,
the ultimate sentencing conclusion was unreasonable.
Electronically Filed
9/8/2021 12:22 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On January 11, 2021, an Information was filed charging Mr. Knudson with trafficking in
methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp.22-23.)  The charges were the
result of a housekeeper locating methamphetamine in Mr. Knudson’s room at the Inn America.
(PSI, p.1.)1  Mr. Knudson quickly took responsibility for the methamphetamine (PSI, p.1) and
entered a guilty plea the trafficking charge (R., p.29).  The remaining charge was dismissed.
(R., p.29.)
At sentencing, the State recommended a unified sentence of nineteen years, with four
years fixed.  (Tr., p.25, Ls.2-5.)  Defense counsel requested that the district court impose a
unified sentence of eleven years, with three years fixed.  (Tr., p.27, Ls.18-20.)  The district court
imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed.  (R., pp.47-50.)  Mr. Knudson
filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of Conviction and
Commitment.  (R., pp.55-57.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Mr. Knudson, a unified sentence
of fifteen years, with three years fixed, following his plea of guilty to trafficking in
methamphetamine?
1 For ease of reference, the electronic file containing the Presentence Investigation Report and
attachments will be cited as “PSI” and referenced pages will correspond with the electronic page
numbers contained in this file.
3
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon Mr. Knudson, A Unified
Sentence Of Fifteen Years, With Three Years Fixed, Following His Plea Of Guilty To
Trafficking In Methamphetamine
Mr. Knudson asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of fifteen
years, with three years fixed, is excessive.  Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court
imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)).  Mr. Knudson does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory
maximum.   Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Knudson must show that
in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts.
Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Brown, 121 Idaho 385 (1992)).  The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:
(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting
State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136
Idaho 138 (2001)).
Appellate courts use a four-part test for determining whether a district court abused its
discretion: Whether the trial court:  (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
4
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).  Mr. Knudson asserts in light of
the evidence, including the mitigating factors present in his case, the ultimate conclusion was
unreasonable and, as a result, the district court did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason.
Several mitigating factors are present in Mr. Knudson’s case.  First, Mr. Knudson has a
long history of substance abuse and a desire for treatment.  Idaho courts have previously
recognized that substance abuse and a desire for treatment should be considered as a mitigating
factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982).
Mr. Knudson began drinking alcohol at the , smoking marijuana at the ,
and using methamphetamine at the .  (PSI, p.5.)  He has been diagnosed with
Drug Dependence – Amphetamine and Other Psychostimulant Dependence and Stimulant Use
Disorder – Amphetamine Type, Moderate.  (PSI, pp.6, 15, 25.)  It was recommended that he
participate in Level I Outpatient Treatment.  (PSI, p.23.)  While Mr. Knudson asserts that he was
clean and sober at the time of the offense (Tr., p.32, Ls.22-23), he acknowledges that additional
treatment may be necessary for him to continue to lead a sober life.
Additionally, Idaho courts have previously recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523
requires the trial court to consider a defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v.
State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).  Mr. Knudson has been previously diagnosed with depression,
anxiety, schizophrenia, post traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, panic disorder, and
ADHD.  (PSI, pp.3, 7.)  After his mother’s death he attempted suicide in 2010 and again in 2014.
(PSI, pp.3-4.)  In the past, he has been prescribed Clonidine, Artane, Paxil, and Risperdal.  (PSI,
p.80.)  While in custody, prior to sentencing, he was taking Abilify to address his mental health
concerns.  (PSI, p.4.)
5
Furthermore, in State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court
noted that family and friend support were factors that should be considered in the Court’s
decision as to what is an appropriate sentence.  Mr. Knudson has the support of his friends and
family.  (PSI, pp.29-33.)  He provided several letters of support describing what a kind, helpful
person he is; that he is a hard-worker; and that he has a strong desire to make positive changes in
his life.  (PSI, pp.29-33.)
Finally, Mr. Knudson has taken responsibility for committing the instant offense.  In
State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991), the Idaho Court of Appeals reduced the sentence
imposed, “In light of Alberts’ expression of remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his
problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character.” Id.
121 Idaho at 209.  Mr. Knudson noted, “I take fully responsibility for my actions . . .” (PSI, p.2.)
In his comments to the district court he stated:
I want to first say I am fully guilty of this crime.  I want to say I always get out of
prison and mess up within a couple months or less.  This time I got a recovery
specialist weekly, my mentor daily.  Got on the right medication and did
counseling on my own.  I made it 16 months on parole.  I got treatment by the
Mexicans I owed from my past so I got scared and put in work for them.  Yes[,] I
made the wrong choice.  I even got my LSI score down to the lowest in 20 years.
I was going to start college and get my counseling degree and now I’m here.  I
have talked to my family and I am moving out to Tennessee when I get to my
fixed sentence.  I am asking for a 3 year sentence so I can get out and keep the
progress I did achieve this time.  Thank you for your help.
(PSI, p.12.)  He made a similar statement at the sentencing hearing stating that he had made
progress while released, his brother recently came back into his life and offered him support, and
noting his desire to go to college and make a better life for himself.  (Tr, p.31, L.12 – p.35, L.16.)
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Knudson asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him.
6
CONCLUSION
Mr. Knudson respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 8th day of September, 2021.
/s/ Elizabeth Ann Allred
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of September, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
EAA/eas


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