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State v. Youngman Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48421

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8-19-2021 
State v. Ashton Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48437 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9525
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NOS. 48437-2020 & 48438-2020
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) SHOSHONEs COUNTY NOS.
v. ) CR40-18-1503 & CR-2015-60
)
WILLIAM JAMES ASHTON, )
) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
Defendant-Appellant. )
____________________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In this consolidated appeal, William James Ashton appeals from the district court’s
judgment revoking his probation and executing his unified sentence of four years, with two years
fixed, in CR-2015-60 (“the 2015 case”), and from the judgment of conviction in CR40-2018-
1503 (“the 2018 case”), imposing a unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed.
Mr. Ashton contends the district court abused its discretion in both cases considering the
substantial mitigating factors that exist.
Electronically Filed
8/19/2021 10:42 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
2
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the 2015 case, Mr. Ashton was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, and
sentenced to a suspended unified term of four years, with two years fixed, on June 10, 2015.
(48438 R., pp.67-76.) On October 26, 2015, the State filed a report of probation violation,
alleging Mr. Ashton violated probation by avoiding supervision. (48438 R., pp.83-84.) The State
alleged Mr. Ashton did not check into the probation office following entry of the judgment of
conviction, but inquired by telephone about a possible interstate transfer. (48438 R., p.82.) A
bench warrant was issued for Mr. Ashton’s arrest, and Mr. Ashton was arrested on October 3,
2018, following a traffic stop. (See 48438 R., p.85.) Mr. Ashton was driving in Idaho, and was
stopped by a police officer for having an obstructed license plate. (48437 R., p.12.) A drug dog
alerted on Mr. Ashton’s vehicle and drugs and drug paraphernalia were found inside the vehicle.
(48437 R., pp.12-13.) The State filed a new case against Mr. Ashton, the 2018 case, charging
him with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. (48437
R., pp.59-61.)
Mr. Ashton agreed to plead guilty to violating his probation in the 2015 case, and to
possession of a controlled substance in the 2018 case, and the prosecutor agreed to recommend a
sentence in the 2018 case not to exceed a retained jurisdiction. (1/9/19 Tr. p.5, Ls.13-21.) The
district court accepted Mr. Ashton’s admission and his guilty plea, and released him on his own
recognizance on January 9, 2019. (1/9/19 Tr. p.9, Ls.13-22, p.10, Ls.5-15; 48438 R., pp.98-99.)
Mr. Ashton did not appear for the disposition/sentencing hearing.
On October 15, 2020, Mr. Ashton was arrested following a traffic stop, when he and his
son were traveling from Washington to Montana to buy a puppy. (See 48438 R., p.104; 11/4/20
Tr., p.12, Ls.5-8.) The district court held the delayed disposition/sentencing hearing on
3
November 4, 2020. (See 11/4/20 Tr., p.5, Ls.3-8.) The prosecutor acknowledged he had made an
agreement with Mr. Ashton to recommend a retained jurisdiction, but said Mr. Ashton violated
the terms of the agreement by failing to appear for sentencing. (11/4/20 Tr., p.9, Ls.5-9.) The
prosecutor thus recommended an imposed sentence. (11/4/20 Tr., p.8, Ls.9-10.) Mr. Ashton
requested that he be continued on probation. (11/4/20 Tr., p.13, L.23 – p.14, L.6.)
The district court revoked Mr. Ashton’s probation in the 2015 case, and imposed his
unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed. (11/4/20 Tr., p.16, Ls.18-25.) In the 2018
case, the district court sentenced Mr. Ashton to a unified term of four years, with two years
fixed, to be served concurrently. (11/4/20 Tr., p.17, Ls.1-6.) The judgments in both cases were
filed on November 4, 2020. (48437 R., pp.107-12; 48438 R., pp.115-17.) Mr. Ashton filed timely
notices of appeal. (48437 R., pp.99-102; 48438 R., pp.107-10.)
 On November 11, 2020, Mr. Ashton filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his
admission to violating his probation. (48437 R., pp.113-14, 199-20; 48438 R., pp.118-19, 124-
25.) He said he believed the prosecutor breached the terms of the plea agreement by
recommending that the district court impose his sentence. (48437 R., pp.136-45.) Following a
hearing, the district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to grant Mr. Ashton’s motion in the
2015 case under State v. Fleshman, 144 Idaho 772 (Ct. App. 2007). (2/24/21 Tr., p.11, Ls.5-18.)
In the 2018 case, the district court concluded Mr. Ashton did not meet the “manifest injustice”
standard. (2/24/21 Tr., p.12, L.13 – p.13, L.8.) The district court explained:
This case is one where the defendant was clearly unhappy with . . . the court’s
sentence in these cases. Mr. Ashton had a different idea as to what the appropriate
sentence should be in his case, and the court exercised its discretion properly in
imposing the sentence that it did based on his prior record and his lack of
compliance with the Idaho sentences.
(2/24/21 Tr., p.12, Ls.18-25.)
4
ISSUES
I. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Ashton’s probation and
executed his sentence in the 2015 case?
II.  Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced him in the 2018 case to a
unified term of four years, with two years fixed, and did not retain jurisdiction?
ARGUMENT
I.
Considering The Mitigating Factors, The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked
Mr. Ashton’s Probation And Executed His Sentence In The 2015 Case
 “Review of a probation revocation proceeding involves a two-step analysis.” State v.
Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 710 (2017) (citations omitted). First, the reviewing court determines
“whether the terms of probation have been violated.” Id. (citation omitted). If the terms of
probation have been violated, the reviewing court then determines “whether the violation
justifies revocation of the probation.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, Mr. Ashton does not contest
that he violated a term of his probation, but contends his violation does not justify revocation.
In determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether probation is
achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society. State v.
Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325 (Ct. App.
1992); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558 (Ct. App. 1998). A decision to revoke probation will be
reversed on appeal where the decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Beckett, 122 Idaho
at 325. In reviewing an alleged abuse of discretion, this Court considers “[w]hether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries
of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
5
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life,
163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (citation omitted).
In this case, the district court did not reach its decision to revoke Mr. Ashton’s probation
by the exercise of reason because his probation was achieving the goal of rehabilitation (albeit
without the involvement of Mr. Ashton’s probation officer), and was consistent with the
protection of society. Mr. Ashton admitted to violating his Idaho probation by absconding
supervision. (1/9/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.5-14.) While Mr. Ashton certainly should have stayed in
contact with his Idaho probation officer, he was not absconding supervision in the typical sense.
Mr. Ashton was actually on probation in Washington at the time he was convicted in the 2015
case, and was always living at the same residence. (11/4/20 Tr., p.11, Ls.6-10.) Mr. Ashton
completed his probation in Washington by the time of the probation violation hearing in this
case, and had no violations. (11/4/20 Tr., p.11, Ls.16-20.) The fact that Mr. Ashton was able to
successfully complete his Washington probation means he is not a danger to the public.
Mr. Ashton has struggled with drug use, and the presentence investigator originally
recommended Mr. Ashton be allowed to participate in a rider program so that he could “relearn
the skills necessary to remain clean and sober.” (48438 PSI, pp.18, 26.) Mr. Ashton still needs to
work on remaining clean and sober. The district court’s decision to revoke Mr. Ashton’s
probation will not help Mr. Ashton on his journey to sobriety and is not necessary to protect
society. Counsel for Mr. Ashton explained to the district court that Mr. Ashton was in the
hospital at the time of the initial disposition/sentencing hearing, and then did not turn himself in
because he was the sole custodial parent of his son, with whom he resided in Spokane,
Washington. (11/4/20 Tr., p.10, L.19 – p.11, L.5.) While this does not excuse Mr. Ashton’s
conduct, it does suggest Mr. Ashton should not be incarcerated.
6
II.
Considering The Mitigating Factors, The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Sentenced Mr. Ashton In The 2018 Case To A Unified Term Of Four Years, With Two Years
Fixed, And Did Not Retain Jurisdiction
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that where, as here, a district court imposes a sentence
within statutory limits, the appellant “has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on
the part of the court imposing the sentence.” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). In order to succeed on appeal under this standard, an
appellant “must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive
considering the objectives of criminal punishment,” which are deterrence, the possibility of
rehabilitation, punishment or retribution for wrongdoing, and the protection of society. State v.
Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 856 (2001) (citation omitted). Mr. Ashton can make the necessary
showing, as the district court should have retained jurisdiction, considering the objectives of
criminal punishment.
The first objective of criminal punishment is deterrence of the individual and the public
generally. See Varie, 135 Idaho at 856. Mr. Ashton is working on his sobriety, and is highly
motivated to succeed in order to be a good father. Sending Mr. Ashton to prison will not provide
him, or the general public, with any additional deterrence.
The second objective of criminal punishment is the possibility of rehabilitation. See
Varie, 135 Idaho at 856. Mr. Ashton needs substance abuse treatment, as originally
recommended in the 2015 case. (See 48438 PSI, pp.18, 26.) Being sentenced to a term of
imprisonment in Idaho, when his friends and family live out-of-state, will not aid Mr. Ashton in
his rehabilitation.
7
The third objective of criminal punishment is punishment. See Varie, 135 Idaho at 856.
While Mr. Ashton is deserving of some punishment, as he admitted to violating Idaho law, the
crime (possession of a controlled substance) does not warrant a term of imprisonment on the
record presented.
The final and most important objective of criminal punishment is the protection of
society. See Varie, 135 Idaho at 856. As discussed above, with respect to Mr. Ashton’s 2015
case, the public does not need to be protected from Mr. Ashton, as he proved he can live in the
community by successfully completing his Washington probation. The district court may have
been frustrated with Mr. Ashton’s decision not to appear in court as ordered, but that does not
indicate he needs to be incarcerated, where he poses no danger to anyone other than himself if he
continues to use drugs. On the record presented, the district court should have retained
jurisdiction to allow Mr. Ashton to obtain substance abuse treatment and earn a chance at
probation.
CONCLUSION
In CR-2015-60, Mr. Ashton respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s
order revoking his probation and executing his sentence, and remand this case to the district
court for further proceedings. In CR40-2018-1503, Mr. Ashton respectfully requests that this
Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand this case back to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 19th day of August, 2021.
/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
8
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 19th day of August, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
AWR/eas


State v. Ashton Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48437

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
3-23-2021 
State v. Peterson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48494 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Peterson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48494" (2021). Not Reported. 7166. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7166 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9263
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO. 48494-2020
)
v. ) KOOTENAI COUNTY
) NO. CR28-19-17730
ROBERT WILLIAM PETERSON, )
) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The district court sentenced Robert Peterson to a suspended sentence of one year in jail
after his Alford1 plea to telephone harassment. Mr. Peterson appeals, and he argues the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In October 2019, the State filed a criminal complaint alleging Mr. Peterson committed
one count of first-degree stalking and one count of telephone harassment for repeatedly calling
and texting his mother with threatening messages. (R., pp.13–14, 18.) The State later amended
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
Electronically Filed
3/23/2021 11:49 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
the complaint to add another stalking count. (R., pp.141, 143–45.) After a preliminary hearing,
held in June 2020, the magistrate judge found probable cause for the offenses and bound
Mr. Peterson over to district court. (R., pp.127–35, 136.) Mr. Peterson pled not guilty.
(R., p.152.)
In October 2020, the district court held a joint change of plea and sentencing hearing.
(R., pp.188–91.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Peterson entered Alford pleas to one count of
stalking and the telephone harassment charge. (Tr., p.71,2 L.14–p.72, L.7.) The agreement also
provided that the district court would sentence Mr. Peterson to one year of probation for
telephone harassment and set out the sentencing hearing for stalking for one year. (Tr., p.65,
Ls.5–13.) If Mr. Peterson was successful on probation, the State agreed to dismiss the stalking
charge. (Tr., p.65, Ls.14–17.) The State also agreed to dismiss the other stalking count.
(Tr., p.65, L.23.)
After accepting Mr. Peterson’s Alford pleas, the district court proceeded directly to
sentencing on telephone harassment. (Tr., p.72, Ls.12–14.) The district court followed the
parties’ recommendations. The district court sentenced Mr. Peterson to one year in jail, with
credit for time served, suspended the sentence, and placed Mr. Peterson on supervised probation
for one year. (Tr., p.77, Ls.5–17.) Per Mr. Peterson’s stipulation, the district court imposed
forty-five days of discretionary jail time. (Tr., p.77, Ls.12–13.)
Mr. Peterson timely appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.192, 201–01.)
2 Citations to the transcript on appeal refer to the pages of the overall document (bottom right
corner) rather than the internal pagination of each transcript.
3
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by sentencing Mr. Peterson to a suspended sentence of
one year in jail for telephone harassment?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Sentencing Mr. Peterson To A Suspended Sentence
Of One Year In Jail For Telephone Harassment
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Peterson’s sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. See I.C. § 18-6710(1) (one-year maximum). Accordingly, to show the sentence
imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Peterson “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing
criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460
(2002). Similarly, “[t]he choice of probation, among available sentencing alternatives, is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court . . . .” State v. Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 615
(Ct. App. 1990).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
4
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
“It has long been the law in Idaho that one may not successfully complain of errors one
has acquiesced in or invited. Errors consented to, acquiesced in, or invited are not reversible.”
State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 420–21 (2015). Here, mindful of the invited error doctrine,
Mr. Peterson maintains the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
Although Mr. Peterson stipulated to the sentence and discretionary jail time, Mr. Peterson
submits the district court’s sentence was unreasonable.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Peterson respectfully requests this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
Alternatively, he respectfully requests this Court remand his case for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 23rd day of March, 2021.
/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
5
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of March, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JCS/eas


State v. Peterson Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48494

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State v. Alker Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 48516

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
5-24-2021 
State v. Sanchez Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48587 
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Recommended Citation 
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of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 48587-2021 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) CANYON COUNTY NO. CR-2002-5737 
v.     ) 
     ) 
JEREMY FLORES SANCHEZ, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
______________________________) 
________________________ 
 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
________________________ 
 
HONORABLE THOMAS W. WHITNEY 
District Judge  
________________________ 
 
MAYA P. WALDRON    KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Waldron Legal, PLLC    Deputy Attorney General 
I.S.B. #9582      Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 1316     P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83701     Boise, Idaho 83720-0010  
(208) 244-0735     (208) 334-4534 
maya@waldronlegal.com        
        
 
ATTORNEY FOR      ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT   PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
Electronically Filed
5/24/2021 11:14 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 i 
Table of Contents 
 Page 
Table of Authorities ......................................................................................................................... ii 
Statement of the Case ...................................................................................................................... 1 
 Nature of the Case ............................................................................................................... 1 
 
 Factual and Procedural Background .................................................................................... 1 
Issue Presented on Appeal ............................................................................................................... 2 
Argument ......................................................................................................................................... 2 
 
  The district court erred by denying Mr. Sanchez’s motion to quash the restitution order .. 2 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 4 
Certificate Of Service ...................................................................................................................... 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
Table of Authorities 
Cases 
  
Workman v. Rich, 162 Idaho 711 (Ct. App. 2017) ...................................................................... 2, 3 
Statutes 
 
I.C. § 10-1110 .......................................................................................................................... 1, 2, 3 
 
I.C. § 10-1111 .............................................................................................................................. 1, 3 
 
I.C. § 19-5305 .......................................................................................................................... 1, 2, 3 
 
I.C. § 20-209H ............................................................................................................................. 2, 3 
 
Additional Authorities 
 
2015 Idaho Laws Ch. 139 (H.B. 62) ................................................................................................ 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Statement of the Case 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Jeremy Flores Sanchez appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to quash 
the restitution order in this case. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 In 2003, a jury found Mr. Sanchez guilty of seven felony counts related to his alleged 
involvement in attacking a woman on the side of a highway in Canyon County. A.R.1 123–28. The 
district court sentenced him to a fixed life term, id. at 176–79, and ordered Mr. Sanchez and his 
co-defendants to pay the victim seventy-thousand dollars in restitution, id. at 168–73. 
In November 2020, Mr. Sanchez filed a motion to quash the restitution order. L.R.2 41–44. 
He argued that the Idaho Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) and the clerk of the court did not 
have jurisdiction to garnish his inmate account to pay down his restitution because his restitution 
order was never filed with the county recorder or renewed as required by I.C. §§ 10-1110 and 10-
1111. L.R. 41–44. The district court denied the motion. Id. at 45–50. It explained that I.C. § 19-
5305 allowed for the collection of restitution via two separate avenues: (1) the victim can collect 
restitution as a civil judgment by recording the restitution order with the county, or (2) the clerk 
of the court can collect restitution on behalf of the victim. L.R. 46. The court found that it was not 
clear from the record whether the restitution order was ever recorded pursuant to I.C. § 19-5305, 
and that it appeared that the district court’s restitution order was “entered with the intention of 
restitution being collected in the manner prescribed in I.C. § 19-5305(2).” L.R. 47. It cited 
 
1 Citations to “A.R.” refer to the third volume of the clerk’s record from the underlying appeal, 
which this Court augmented into the record in the current appeal. The page numbers cited refer to 
the pages of the .pdf document. 
2 Citations to “L.R.” refer to the limited clerk’s record created for this appeal.  
 2 
Workman v. Rich, 162 Idaho 711 (Ct. App. 2017), for the proposition that a restitution order need 
not be recorded or renewed to remain enforceable. L.R. 47. Finally, the district court found that it 
did not have the authority to interfere with the IDOC’s garnishment of inmate accounts pursuant 
to I.C. § 20-209H because the restitution order in this case remained in effect. L.R. 48.  
Mr. Sanchez timely appealed.  Id. at 51–55. 
Issue 
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Sanchez’s motion to quash the restitution order?  
 
Argument 
The district court erred by denying Mr. Sanchez’s motion to quash the restitution order. 
 
Section 19-5305, which governs the collection of restitution, provides:  
 
 (1) After forty-two (42) days from the entry of the order of restitution or at the 
conclusion of a hearing to reconsider an order of restitution, whichever occurs later, 
an order of restitution may be recorded as a judgment and the victim may execute 
as provided by law for civil judgments. 
 
(2) The clerk of the district court may take action to collect on the order of 
restitution on behalf of the victim . . . . 
 
If the victim elects to record the judgment pursuant to § 19-5305(1), then the provisions of Title 
10 and 11 of the Idaho Code govern the collection of restitution as a civil judgment. Those include 
§ 10-1110, which requires that a judgment be recorded with the county recorder in order for the 
judgment to “become[] a lien upon all real property of the judgment debtor in the county, not 
exempt from execution, owned by him at the time or acquired afterwards at any time prior to the 
expiration of the lien.” Section 10-1110 further requires that “a lien arising from an order for 
restitution to a crime victim where the order of restitution has been recorded as a judgment pursuant 
 3 
to section 19-5305” continues until twenty years from the date of judgment.3 Section 10-1111 
allows the victim-lienholder, prior to the expiration of the lien, to move to renew the lien for an 
additional ten years.  
Section 20-209H provides another mechanism for the collection of restitution. It requires 
the IDOC to establish and maintain an account for each inmate in its custody, and,  
If the court ordered an inmate to make restitution under section 19-5304, Idaho 
Code, and the restitution is still owing, then twenty percent (20%) of each deposit 
in the inmate’s account shall be paid to the state board of correction who shall . . . 
pay such moneys to the clerk of the court in which the restitution order was entered 
for payment to the victim. . . .  
 
Section 20-209H was enacted in 2015, and it “appl[ies] to any inmate confined in a correctional 
facility on or after the effective date of this section.” See also Workman v. Rich, 162 Idaho 711, 
715 (Ct. App. 2017) (considering a challenge to the IDOC’s garnishment of Workman’s inmate 
account, analyzing §§ 19-5305, 10-1110, and 20-209H, and holding that the clerk of the court does 
not need to take any action to execute the restitution order entered as a result of a criminal 
conviction). 
 Mindful that Mr. Sanchez’s motion to quash challenged the validity of the restitution order 
under §§ 10-1110 and 10-111, which governs restitution orders recorded as civil judgments to 
create a lien on real property and not restitution collected on behalf of a victim by the IDOC or the 
clerk of the court, see Workman, 162 Idaho at 715, he nevertheless contends that the IDOC has no 
jurisdiction to garnish his inmate account pursuant to § 20-209H. This Court should grant his 
motion to quash the restitution order.  
 
3 The provisions specific to restitution orders were added to § 10-1110 in 2015. 2015 Idaho Laws 
Ch. 139 (H.B. 62).  
 4 
Conclusion 
 Mr. Sanchez respectfully requests that this Court quash the restitution order in his case.  
 DATED May 24, 2021. 
      /s/ Maya P. Waldron 
      MAYA P. WALDRON 
Attorney for Appellant  
   
Certificate of Service 
A true and correct copy of this Appellant’s Brief has been served on May 24, 2021, via 
the File and Serve system, to the following:  
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN  
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL  
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov  
 
 
/s/ Maya P. Waldron 
       MAYA P. WALDRON 
 


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State v. Custodio Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48581 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
ELIAS MANUEL CUSTODIO, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48581-2021 
 
Ada County Case No. 
CR-FE-1998-333 
 
           
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Elias Manuel Custodio failed to show that the district court erred when it denied, in 
relevant part, his motion to correct an illegal sentence? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Custodio Has Failed To Show That The District Court’s Ruling That It Lacked Jurisdiction To 
Review Parole Decisions Was Error 
 
A. Introduction 
 “A jury found Custodio guilty of voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, 
aggravated battery, and burglary.”  (R., p. 33.)  The district court imposed aggregate concurrent 
sentences of 30 years with 15 years determinate.  (R., p. 33.)  The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed 
Electronically Filed
7/22/2021 10:23 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
Custodio’s convictions, reversed his sentences for involuntary manslaughter and aggravated 
battery because the sentencing enhancement of use of a deadly weapon was improperly applied, 
and affirmed his sentence for voluntary manslaughter, enhanced by the deadly weapon 
enhancement, of 30 years with fifteen years determinate.  (R., pp. 32-47.)  On remand, the district 
court imposed concurrent sentences of ten years determinate for involuntary manslaughter and 15 
years with five years determinate for aggravated battery, leaving intact the aggregate sentences of 
30 years with 15 years determinate.  (R., pp. 57-59.) 
 Nineteen years later, Custodio filed a Rule 35 motion alleging his sentences were illegal.  
(R., pp. 70-74.)  The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part (R., pp. 230-34) 
as follows: (1) the sentence of fifteen years for burglary was facially illegal and therefore reduced 
to ten years (R., pp. 232, 236); (2) any requests for discretionary reduction of the sentences was 
untimely and the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider them (R., pp. 232-33); and (3) the 
district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Custodio’s challenge to the actions of the Commission 
of Pardons and Parole (R., pp. 233-34). 
 Custodio timely appealed.  On appeal he asserts that the Unified Sentencing Act is 
unconstitutional because it results in racial discrimination in the parole decisions of the 
Commission of Pardons and Parole.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-11.)  Custodio has failed to show 
that the district court erred when it concluded it did not have jurisdiction to consider this claim. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “Where the lower court’s decision turns on the interpretation of a criminal rule, this Court 
exercises free review.”  State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 175, 177 P.3d 387, 389 (2008).  “Whether 
a sentence is illegal is a question of law over which we exercise free review.”  State v. Meier, 159 
Idaho 712, 713, 366 P.3d 197, 198 (Ct. App. 2016).  “This Court exercises free review over 
 3 
questions of jurisdiction.”  State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840, 252 P.3d 1255, 1258 (2011) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
 
C. Custodio Has Not Shown The District Court Had Jurisdiction To Consider His Claim 
 
 “[T]he term ‘illegal sentence’ under Rule 35 is narrowly interpreted as a sentence that is 
illegal from the face of the record, i.e., does not involve significant questions of fact or require an 
evidentiary hearing.”  State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 86, 218 P.3d 1143, 1147 (2009) (citing 
I.C.R. 35).  “A sentence is ‘illegal’ within the meaning of Rule 35 only if it is in excess of statutory 
limits or otherwise contrary to applicable law.”  State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 610, 613, 226 P.3d 
552, 555 (Ct. App. 2010).   
“Moreover, Rule 35’s purpose is to allow courts to correct illegal sentences, not to 
reexamine errors occurring at trial or before the imposition of the sentence.”  State v. Wolfe, 158 
Idaho 55, 65, 343 P.3d 497, 507 (2015) (emphasis original).  “The district court cannot usurp the 
power of the executive branch or the power of the legislative branch by unreasonably retaining 
jurisdiction for itself.”  State v. Parvin, 137 Idaho 783, 786, 53 P.3d 834, 837 (Ct. App. 2002).  A 
trial court may not utilize Rule 35 “to infringe upon the duties of the parole board.”  State v. 
Chapman, 121 Idaho 351, 355, 825 P.2d 74, 78 (1992).  A “mechanism within the judicial system” 
that would grant ongoing authority to the judiciary to review parole decisions “would clearly 
violate the separation of powers, Idaho Constitution art. 2, by allowing the judiciary to encroach 
upon the pardoning and paroling authority of the executive branch.”  Brandt v. State, 118 Idaho 
350, 352, 796 P.2d 1023, 1025 (1990). 
 The district court correctly concluded that Rule 35 did not confer jurisdiction upon it to 
“review and modify the Commission of Pardons and Parole’s decision denying [Custodio’s] 
request for parole.”  (R., p. 233.)  First, such an action would have required an evidentiary hearing 
 4 
and factual findings beyond the scope of the existing record.  Second, it would have required the 
district court to improperly review and infringe upon the duties of the parole board.  Custodio may 
have a legal vehicle for asserting his claim that the Board denied him parole because of racial 
animus, but it is not a Rule 35 motion. 
 On appeal Custodio argues that “racial disparities” in the granting of parole renders unified 
sentencing an “illegal statute.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-10.)  He does not present any argument 
or authority that this claim was properly brought under Rule 35.  (See Appellant’s brief.)  Having 
failed to challenge the district court’s determination it lacked jurisdiction under Rule 35, Custodio 
has shown no error. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 22nd day of July, 2021. 
 
        /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of July, 2021, served a true and correct 
paper copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by placing the copy in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
  
 ELIAS MANUEL CUSTODIO 
 IDOC #56658 
 I.M.S.I. – B14 
 P. O. BOX 51 
 BOISE, ID  83707 
  
 
                                                                         /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
                                                                        KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
KKJ/dd     Deputy Attorney General 


State v. Custodio Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48581

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State v. Betancourt Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48597 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
CARL ROBERT BETANCOURT, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48597-2021 
 
Ada County Case No. CR01-20-36188 
 
 
           
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Carl Robert Betancourt failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion when it imposed a sentence of seven years with one and one-half years determinate upon 
his conviction for possession of methamphetamine? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Betancourt Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 The state charged Betancourt with possession of methamphetamine, possession of drug 
paraphernalia, and driving under the influence of drugs.  (R., pp. 29-30.)  Betancourt pled guilty 
to possession of methamphetamine and DUI, and the state dismissed the drug paraphernalia count.  
Electronically Filed
7/12/2021 2:50 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
(R., pp. 32-33, 43-44.)  The district court imposed sentences of seven years with one and one-half 
years determinate for the felony and six months for the misdemeanor, to run concurrently with 
each other and with a previously imposed sentence.  (R., pp. 51-54.)  Betancourt filed a timely 
notice of appeal.  (R, pp. 56-57.) 
 Betancourt claims the district court abused its sentencing discretion “in light of the 
mitigating factors, including his troubled childhood, his substance abuse and its longstanding 
impact on his life, and the fact that he has gainful employment upon release.”  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 4-7.)  Betancourt has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion on the record. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the 
defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing 
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 
159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s 
probable term of confinement.  Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).  
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it 
is a clear abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing 
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  In evaluating whether a lower court abused 
its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: 
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”  State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 
261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 
P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). 
 3 
 
C. Betancourt Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
 
 To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish 
that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive.  State v. Farwell, 144 
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).  In determining whether the appellant met this burden, 
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release the defendant on parole 
is exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be 
the period of actual incarceration.  State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) 
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391).  To establish that the sentence was excessive, 
the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was 
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, 
and retribution.  Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401.  A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears 
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of 
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’”  Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895-96, 392 
P.3d at 1236-37 (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)). 
  At sentencing, the district court noted Betancourt’s “significant criminal history.”  (Tr., p. 
21, L. 24 – p. 22, L. 1.)  The court found “a very significant drug problem” with “very early onset” 
indicating “persistent and sustained drug dependence.”  (Tr., p. 22, Ls. 7-10.)  Considering 
Betancourt’s need for intensive treatment of his drug abuse and a mental health screening, the 
district court imposed sentences of seven years with one and one-half years determinate for the 
felony and six months for the misdemeanor, concurrent with the previously imposed grand theft 
sentence.  (Tr., p. 23, L. 12 – p. 24, L. 19.) 
 The record supports the district court’s exercise of discretion.  Betancourt’s record 
consisted of nine prior felonies and many misdemeanors.  (PSI, pp. 191-99.)  He had a lengthy 
 4 
history of rehabilitation efforts, including extensive drug abuse treatment.  (PSI, pp. 117-18, 120, 
199-200, 206-07.)  He was paroled after his last felony convictions on May 12, 2020, did not 
perform well on parole, and committed the instant offenses by possession and driving under the 
influence of methamphetamine approximately three months later.  (PSI, pp. 5, 114-16, 198.)  The 
district court’s determination that Betancourt serve a year-and-a-half before being parole eligible, 
and then providing a longer period of parole to address Betancourt’s criminality and substance 
abuse, is reasonable. 
 Betancourt claims “[p]roper consideration” of his troubled childhood, his substance abuse, 
and available employment demonstrate the district court abused its sentencing discretion.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-7.)  However, the record shows that the district court considered 
Betancourt’s history, including his history of substance abuse, when imposing sentence.  
Specifically, the court considered the “very early onset” of drug abuse and Betancourt’s “persistent 
and sustained drug dependence.”  (Tr., p. 22, Ls. 7-10.)  More relevant to the district court than 
the childhood of  Betancourt was his more recent history of criminal activity and failed 
parole.  (Tr., p. 21, L. 24 – p. 22, L. 6; p. 22, L. 11 – p. 23, L. 17; see PSI, pp. 112-17, 191-200.)  
Although Betancourt’s prior employer was willing to rehire him, he had worked there only a little 
over three months, which coincided with his period of parole.  (PSI, pp. 112 (crimes committed 
September 9, 2020), 114-15 (paroled May 12, 2020), 276 (worked from May 19, 2020, to August 
27, 2020).)  His overall work record is spotty.  (PSI, pp. 204-05.)  Whatever mitigating effect 
Betancourt’s childhood, drug addiction, and potential employment have, they do not show the 
district court’s sentence to be unreasonable.  He has failed to show an abuse of sentencing 
discretion. 
 
  
--
 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 12th day of July, 2021. 
 
 
  /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 12th day of July, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
KILEY A. HEFFNER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
 


State v. Betancourt Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48597

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
PHILIP RAYMOND CHURCH, 
 
 Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
)
) 
 
No. 48603-2021 
 
Ada County Case No.  
CR-FE-2011-18221 
________________________ 
 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
________________________ 
 
HONORABLE JASON D. SCOTT 
District Judge 
________________________ 
 
 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
PHILIP RAYMOND CHURCH 
7121 San Fernando 
Boise, Idaho  83701 
(360) 560-2423 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRO SE 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
Electronically Filed
7/7/2021 9:57 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................................1 
 
 Nature Of The Case .............................................................................................................1 
 
 Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings .................................................................1 
 
ISSUE ..............................................................................................................................................3 
 
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................4 
 
 Church Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred  
 In Denying His Motion For Additional Credit For Time Served ........................................4 
 
 A. Introduction ..............................................................................................................4 
 
 B. Standard Of Review .................................................................................................4 
 
 C. The District Court Correctly Determined That Church Was  
  Not Entitled To Credit For Time Served For The Periods  
  He Was Out Of Custody And On Supervised Probation .........................................4 
 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................7 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................................................7 
 
 
 
ii 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 851 P.2d 961 (1993) ................................. 5 
Mickelsen v. Idaho State Corr. Inst., 131 Idaho 352, 955 P.2d 1131 (Ct. App. 1998) ................... 5 
Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 76 P.3d 951 (2003) .............................................. 4 
State v. Climer, 127 Idaho 20, 896 P.2d 346 (Ct. App. 1995) ........................................................ 6 
State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 139 P.3d 771 (Ct. App. 2006) ...................................................... 4 
State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 85 P.3d 1130 (Ct. App. 2003)........................................................ 4 
State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 208 P.3d 730 (2009) ......................................................................... 5 
State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989) ......................................................... 4 
State v. Johnston, No. 46999, 2020 WL 1866923 (Ct. App. 2014) ................................................ 6 
State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 233 P.3d 71 (2010) .......................................................................... 4 
State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 79 P.3d 719 (2003) ................................................................... 5 
State v. Stevenson, 157 Idaho 798, 339 P.3d 1202 (Ct. App. 2014) .............................................. 6 
State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 122 P.3d 1167 (Ct. App. 2005) ................................................... 4 
Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866, 187 P.3d 1241 (Ct. App. 2008) .................................................... 6 
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011) ........................ 5 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 18-309 ................................................................................................................................... 6 
I.C. § 19-2603 ..................................................................................................................... 1, 3, 4, 5 
RULES 
I.C.R. 35(c) ..................................................................................................................................... 5 
ID R S.CT. OP. RULES Rule 15 .................................................................................................... 6 
 
1 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Philip Raymond Church appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for 
additional credit for time served.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In February 2012, Church pled guilty to Conspiracy to Commit Grand Theft by Extortion.  
(R., pp.41-47.)  The district court imposed a unified 14-year sentence with four years fixed, but 
retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.52-55.)   At the conclusion of the period of retained jurisdiction, the 
district court suspended Church’s sentence and placed him on probation.  (R., pp.66-71.)  After 
multiple probation violations (R., pp.74-78, 82, 85-90, 92-96, 109), the district court revoked 
Church’s probation and retained jurisdiction a second time (R., pp.111-114).  At the conclusion of 
the second period of retained jurisdiction, the court again suspended Church’s sentence and placed 
him on probation.  (R., pp.116-120.)  In November 2019, after several more probation violations 
(R., pp.121-127, 162, 169-170), the court revoked Church’s probation, but imposed a reduced 
unified 10-year sentence with three and one-half years fixed (R., pp.171-174).  The court granted 
Church credit for 860 days already served.  (R., p.172.) 
In December 2020, Church filed an I.C.R 35(c) motion for additional credit for time served.  
(R., pp.176-178.)  In the motion, Church requested credit for an additional 2,230 days, for a total 
of 3,090 days.  (Id.)  Church argued that pursuant to I.C. § 19-2603, he was entitled to credit for 
all of the time he spent on supervised probation.  (Id.)  
The district court denied Church’s motion.  (R., pp.179-183.)  The court concluded that 
pursuant to Idaho law, Church was not entitled to credit for time served while he was out of custody 
on probation.  (Id.)  Additionally, in re-calculating the time Church was actually entitled to, the 
 
2 
 
court discovered that Church was entitled to only 856 days credit, rather than the previously 
granted 860 days.  (R., p.181.)  Church subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, and to 
proceed pro se in this case.  (R., pp.184-188.)  The district court denied the motion for 
reconsideration and granted the motion to proceed pro se.  (R., pp.194-196.)  Church timely 
appealed from the district court’s order denying his motion for additional credit for time served.  
(R., pp.197-202.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
ISSUE 
 Church states the issue on appeal as:  
  Did the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho in 
and for the County of Ada error [sic] when they [sic] fail[ed] to grant the 
Defendant time served in according [sic] to Idaho Legislation Idaho Statute section 
19-[]2603 (Pronouncement and execution of Judgment After Violation of 
Probation).  
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.12.) 
 The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
 Has Church failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in denying his motion for 
additional credit for time served?  
 
 
 
4 
 
ARGUMENT 
Church Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion For 
Additional Credit For Time Served 
 
A. Introduction 
Church contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for additional credit for 
time served.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-16.)  Specifically, he contends that the district court erred 
in concluding that I.C. § 19-2603 did not allow it to grant him credit for time he spent out of 
custody on supervised probation.  (Id.)  However, a review of the record reveals that the district 
court correctly applied the law in denying Church’s motion.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 “The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit for time served 
to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is subject to free review by the appellate 
courts.”  State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. 
Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)).  The appellate courts “defer to the trial court’s 
findings of fact, however, unless those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent 
evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous.”  State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 
139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 
(Ct. App. 2003)). 
 
C. The District Court Correctly Determined That Church Was Not Entitled To Credit For 
Time Served For The Periods He Was Out Of Custody And On Supervised Probation    
 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent.  State v. Pina, 
149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 
76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003).  Because the best guide to legislative intent is the wording of the statute 
 
5 
 
itself, the interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words.  Verska v. Saint Alphonsus 
Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011); State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 
208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009).  The words of a statute “‘must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary 
meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole.  If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court 
does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.’”  Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265 P.3d 
at 506 (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003)).  “[W]here 
statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be 
consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature.”  Id. (quoting 
City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993)). 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(c) provides that defendant may make a motion to correct a court’s 
computation of credit for time served at any time.  Idaho Code § 19-2603 provides that a defendant 
is entitled to receive credit for:  (1) “time served from the date of service of a bench warrant issued 
by the court after a finding of probable cause to believe the defendant has violated a condition of 
probation”; (2) “for any time served following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-
227, Idaho Code”; and (3) “for any time served as a condition of probation under the withheld 
judgment or suspended sentence.”    
In this case, the district court properly recognized that Church was not entitled to credit 
for time he spent out of custody and on probation.1  The plain language of I.C. § 19-2603 
permits credit for time served only for time actually served following an arrest, the service of a 
                                            
1 In denying Church’s motion, the district court also recalculated Church’s credit for time served 
and reduced the amount of days from 860 to 856; and concluded that it did not have authority to 
consider Church’s request with respect to the time Church served in prison after the November 
2019 execution of his sentence, as such challenges can only be made in habeas litigation (citing 
Mickelsen v. Idaho State Corr. Inst., 131 Idaho 352, 355, 955 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Ct. App. 1998)).  
(R., pp.179-183).  On appeal, Church does not challenge either of these determinations.  (See 
generally Appellant’s brief.) 
 
6 
 
bench warrant, or where jail time is served as a condition of probation.  As the Idaho Court of 
Appeals further recognized in rejecting a similar to Church’s in State v. Stevenson, 157 Idaho 798, 
801-802, 339 P.3d 1202, 1205-1206 (Ct. App. 2014), under Idaho law, “credit for time served is 
awarded only for periods of incarceration.” (emphasis in original) (citing I.C. § 18-309; Taylor v. 
State, 145 Idaho 866, 869, 187 P.3d 1241, 1244 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Climer, 127 Idaho 20, 
22, 896 P.2d 346, 348 (Ct. App. 1995)).  Since credit for time served is awarded only for periods 
of incarceration, and Church was not incarcerated while he was out of custody on probation, he, 
like Stevenson, was not entitled to credit for time during periods in which his sentence was 
suspended and he was on probation.  
The only authority Church cites in support of his contrary interpretation of I.C. § 19-2603 
is an unpublished2 Court of Appeals opinion, State v. Johnston, No. 46999, 2020 WL 1866923 
(Ct. App. 2020) (unpublished).  Church asserts that in that case, Johnston “received credit for time 
serve[d] while on probation when his probation was revoked.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.14.)  This is 
incorrect.  The issue in Johnston was whether the defendant was entitled to credit for time served 
upon the issuance of a bench warrant, or only upon the actual service of that warrant.  Johnston, 
2020 WL 1866923.  Johnston did not seek, and was not granted, credit for time while he was out 
of custody on probation.  See id.  
Because the district court correctly concluded that Church was not entitled to credit for 
time served during the periods he was out of custody and on supervised probation, Church cannot 
demonstrate that the district court erred in denying his motion requesting such.  
                                            
2 As an unpublished opinion, Johnston is subject to the rule, quoted in the Johnston opinion itself, 
that “[e]xcept to the extent required by res judicata, collateral estoppel, the law of the case doctrine 
or any other similar principle of law, no unpublished opinion shall be cited as authority to any 
court.”  See also Idaho Supreme Court Operating Rule 15.  The state cites Johnston not as authority, 
but only to respond to Church’s incorrect assertion about that case.      
 
7 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s denial of Church’s 
motion for credit for additional time served.  
 DATED this 7th day of July, 2021. 
 
         
        /s/  Mark W. Olson 
MARK W. OLSON 
      Deputy Attorney General 
      
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 7th day of July, 2021, served a true and correct paper 
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by placing the copy in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, addressed to: 
 
 Philip Raymond Church 
 7121 San Fernando 
 Boise, ID 83701      
 
 
        /s/  Mark W. Olson 
      MARK W. OLSON 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 


State v. Church  Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48603

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
8-5-2021 
State v. Nickel Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48609 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
KILEY A. HEFFNER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #10999
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 48609-2021
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-20-26899
v. )
)
STACY JAMES NICKEL, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
______________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Stacy Nickel pled guilty to felony unlawful possession of a firearm, the district
court placed him on probation, with an underlying sentence of five years, with two years fixed.
On appeal, Mr. Nickel argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive underlying sentence.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
At the time of the instant offense, Mr. Nickel and his ex-wife had just gone through a
messy divorce, in which Mr. Nickel was awarded possession of a Ram truck. (PSI, p.38; see also
Electronically Filed
8/5/2021 8:13 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
2/1/21 Tr., p.12, L.14 – p.13, L.6.1) Because the truck was still in his ex-wife’s name, his missed
payments on the truck reflected poorly on her credit, so she went to his house to get the truck
with the intention of taking it to the bank to get it refinanced. (PSI, p.38.) Immediately after she
took the truck, Mr. Nickel contacted her and transferred money into her account for the truck
payment, and promised to give her additional cash when she returned the truck. (PSI, p.38.) His
ex-wife reported to police that when she returned the truck in the early morning hours the
following day, Mr. Nickel yelled at her to get out of the truck and pointed a gun at her head.
(PSI, pp.28-30, 38-39.) Due to a previous felony conviction from 2006, Mr. Nickel is not
allowed to possess a gun. (PSI, pp.28, 30-31.) When officers arrived at Mr. Nickel’s home and
spoke with him, he admitted to having possession of a gun, and gave consent for police officers
to retrieve the gun from his bedroom. (PSI, pp.28, 30-32.) As officers went inside his home to
get the gun, they saw drug paraphernalia and three small plastic baggies containing
methamphetamine in plain view. (PSI, pp.28, 30-32.) Mr. Nickel was subsequently arrested for
unlawful possession of a firearm and felony possession of a controlled substance. (PSI, p.32.)
The State filed a complaint against Mr. Nickel in July 2020 for felony unlawful
possession of a firearm, felony aggravated assault, felony possession of a controlled substance,
and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.7-8.) The district court issued a no-
contact order prohibiting Mr. Nickel from contacting his ex-wife. (See R., pp.14-15.) After he
waived his preliminary hearing, Mr. Nickel was bound over to district court on those charges.
(R., pp.23-27.)
1 The Reporter’s Transcript consists of two separately-paginated transcripts in one electronic
document. Each will be cited with reference to its internal pagination. The first transcript, cited
as “11/2/20 Tr.”, contains the entry of plea hearing held on November 2, 2020 (pages four to six
of entire document). The second transcript, cited as “2/1/21 Tr.”, contains the sentencing hearing
held on February 1, 2021 (pages twelve to fifteen of overall document).
3
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Nickel pled guilty to felony unlawful possession of a
firearm, and the State dismissed the remaining charges. (11/2/20 Tr., p.5, Ls.1-17, p.12, L.3 –
p.14, L.8; R., pp.30-40.) As part of the plea agreement, the State also agreed to recommend that
the district court sentence him to five years, with two years fixed, suspend the sentence, and put
Mr. Nickel on probation. (11/2/20 Tr., p.5, Ls.1-6; 2/1/21 Tr., p.6, Ls.1-6; R., pp.39-40.)
A sentencing hearing was held in February 2021. (See generally 2/1/21 Tr.) At that
hearing, the State gave the recommendation required by the plea agreement: five years, with two
years fixed, suspended, with a condition of probation being that he serve ninety days in the Ada
County Jail, or that he serve time in the Jail until he has completed the Active Behavioral
(“ABC”) Health programming. (2/1/21 Tr., p.6, Ls.17-23.) Defense counsel requested a withheld
judgment, with some discretionary jail time. (2/1/21 Tr., p.14, L.14 – p.15, L.12.) The district
court imposed a sentence of five years, with two years fixed, suspended the sentence, and put
Mr. Nickel on probation, with the condition that he serve ninety days in the Ada County Jail, or
serve jail time until he completes the ABC program. (2/1/21 Tr., p.17, L.24 – p.18, L.11;
R., pp.47-52.)
Mr. Nickel timely appealed from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.53-55.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an underlying sentence of five years,
with two years fixed, upon Mr. Nickel for unlawful possession of a firearm?
4
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Underlying Sentence Of Five
Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Nickel For Unlawful Possession Of A Firearm
Mr. Nickel asserts that, given any view of the facts, his underlying sentence of five years,
with two years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed
an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the
record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Nickel does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, he must show that in light of the governing
criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria
or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or
retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
Appellate courts use a four-part test for determining whether a district court abused its
discretion: Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
Here, Mr. Nickel asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends the district court
5
should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment, in light of the mitigating factors,
including his ability to be a productive member of society, his ability to correct his behavior, and
his employability.
In this case,  Mr. Nickel asserts that his ability to be a productive member of
society supports a lesser sentence. Although the instant offense is Mr. Nickel’s second felony
conviction, he has stayed out of trouble and been a contributing member of society for the last
fifteen years. (PSI, pp.4, 9-10, 12.) Since his first felony conviction in Oregon in 2006,
Mr. Nickel has not been charged with any misdemeanors or felonies, and he has fully paid the
outstanding balance for the 2006 charge. (PSI, pp.4, 8-10, 12.) Further, in the pre-sentence
investigation (“PSI”) report, Mr. Nickel was deemed to be a low risk to reoffend. (PSI, p.11.)
Mr. Nickel submits that his ability to correct his behavior also weighs in favor of a lesser
sentence. In fact, while this case was pending, and after a no-contact order was put in place, in
August 2020, Mr. Nickel’s ex-wife came over to his house, and entered through the garage door
and kitchen door, with the intention of confronting him about payments on the Ram truck. (PSI,
pp.61-62.) She ended up taking the truck from Mr. Nickel’s home and refinanced it in her name.
(PSI, pp.60-61.) Rather than contact his ex-wife or attempt to get the truck back, Mr. Nickel
instead hired an attorney and obtained an order that required her to return the truck. (2/1/21
Tr., p.13, Ls.9-16.)
Mr. Nickel contends that his employability supports a lesser sentence as well. See State v.
Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 118 (1955) (recognizing gainful employment as a mitigating factor);
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594–95 (1982) (employment and desire to advance within
company were mitigating circumstances). The pre-sentence investigator noted that Mr. Nickel
appears capable of maintaining employment and meeting financial obligations. (PSI, p.8.)
6
Mr. Nickel reported that he has experience with welding, maintenance, and mechanics. (PSI,
p.6.) Prior to his move to Boise in 1995, Mr. Nickel was working for American Airlines as a
junior mechanic. (PSI, p.8.) His longest period of employment was from 2013 to 2019 when he
worked as a foreman at Vibra Pro. (PSI, p.7.) From 2019 until his arrest in July 2020, Mr. Nickel
worked in maintenance at First Rate Property Management. (PSI, p.7.) He reported that he is
currently self-employed and working at “He’s the Guy.” (PSI, pp.14, 18.) The pre-sentence
investigator noted that his housing accommodations, current employment, and financial stability
are protective factors for Mr. Nickel. (PSI, pp.3, 8.)
Although this offense is Mr. Nickel’s second felony conviction, he has not been charged
with any other offenses in the past fifteen years. Mr. Nickel demonstrated that he has the ability
to correct his behavior and has shown that he can be a productive member of society.
Additionally, he is capable of maintaining gainful employment and meeting his financial
obligations.
Proper consideration of these mitigating factors supported a more lenient sentence. In
light of these facts, Mr. Nickel submits that the district court did not exercise reason, and thus
abused its discretion, by imposing an underlying sentence of five years, with two years fixed.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Nickel respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this 5th day of August, 2021.
/s/ Kiley A. Heffner
KILEY A. HEFFNER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
7
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of August, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
KAH/eas


State v. Nickel Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48609

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9-15-2021 
State v. Schoonover Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48696 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Schoonover Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48696" (2021). Not Reported. 7245. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7245 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6406
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 48696-2021
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-20-45141
v. )
)
ROBYN DEANNE )
SCHOONOVER, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
______________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Robyn Deanne Schoonover appeals from her judgment of conviction for trafficking in
methamphetamine or amphetamine, I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4)(A).  Ms. Schoonover pleaded guilty
and the district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years determinate.
Ms. Schoonover appeals, and she asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing
an excessive indeterminate term.1
1 Ms. Schoonover does not challenge the determinate term because the mandatory minimum for
this charge is three years. See I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4)(A).
Electronically Filed
9/15/2021 1:32 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Ms. Schoonover was charged with trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine by
possessing twenty-eight grams or more of methamphetamine.  (R., p.19.)  She pleaded guilty and
the district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years determinate.
(R., pp.23; 38.)  Ms. Schoonover appealed.  (R., p.45.)  She submits that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive indeterminate term.
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with
three years fixed, upon Ms. Schoonover following her plea of guilty to trafficking in
methamphetamine or amphetamine?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Ten Years,
With Three Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Schoonover Following Her Plea Of Guilty To Trafficking In
Methamphetamine Or Amphetamine
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Ms. Schoonover’s sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. See I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4)(A).  Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was
unreasonable, Ms. Schoonover “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
3
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
Ms. Schoonover asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, she contends that her
indeterminate term is excessive.
Ms. Schoonover addressed the district court at the sentencing hearing.  She stated,
I would like to just take accountability for what I – for my poor decision making,
for one.  It’s an awful lot of methamphetamine.  And I realize the potential risks
involved, that I could have harmed other people including myself and my family.
And I just want to apologize to the Court.  And I have no have excuse for that
behavior whatsoever.  And I just – I just can’t believe I’m here.  And I agree with
the three years wholeheartedly that I’m going to take that time to improve and to
get a job and get some money saved up.  I would like to move back to Wisconsin
where I moved from here in 2004.  It is all farm towns were methamphetamine
does not exist to this day. I have a child there.  Well, he’s an adult now, but he’s
like .  I would like to go back to Wisconsin after this is all said and
done and get to know him.  I haven’t seen him in person for quite sometime.
(Tr., p.10, L.21 – p.11, L.14.)  Counsel emphasized that Ms. Schoonover suffered from a
substance abuse addiction, and that, at  se was “getting too old for this.”  (Tr., p.7, Ls.16-
23.)  Counsel requested that the court impose no indeterminate term or an indeterminate term of
under three years because “tying her to this state is not necessarily the most productive thing we
can do for her.”  (Tr., p.10, Ls.1-8.)  Counsel concluded that “it seems like it may be a better idea
for her to simply leave the state and get away from the old influences she has here.”  (Tr., p.10,
Ls.9-12.)
4
Considering that Ms. Schoonover accepted responsibility, expressed remorse for her
actions, acknowledged her substance abuse addiction, and wished to return to Wisconsin to
escape her old influences and see her family, Ms. Schoonover respectfully submits that the
district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive indeterminate term.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Schoonover respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 15th day of September, 2021.
/s/ Justin M. Curtis
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of September, 2021, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JMC/eas


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