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State v. Ponce Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48097

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
1-15-2021 
State v. Campbell Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48107 
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"State v. Campbell Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48107" (2021). Not Reported. 6938. 
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ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #6555 
JASON C. PINTLER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #6661 
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Phone: (208) 334-2712 
Fax: (208) 334-2985 
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id. us 
Electronically Filed 
1/15/2021 8:34 AM 
Idaho Supreme Court 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court 
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plain tiff-Respondent, 
V. 
SCOTT D. CAMPBELL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Nature of the Case 
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NO. 48107-2020 
BLAINE COUNTY NO. CR07-19-3501 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Scott Campbell pleaded guilty to felony driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), and 
was sentenced to a suspended unified term of five years, with three years fixed, and placed on 
probation for three years. Mr. Campbell asserts that the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing an excessive underlying sentence, in light of the mitigating factors that exist in his 
case. 
1 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
In October of 2019, a concerned citizen called police after witnessing a vehicle driving at 
various speeds and failing to maintain its lane on a state highway. (PSI, pp.3-5.)1 An officer 
pulled the vehicle over and eventually arrested Scott Campbell for driving under the influence. 
(Id.) The State filed a criminal complaint charging Mr. Campbell with felony DUI for driving 
under the influence, and having two misdemeanor DUI convictions within the previous ten years. 
(R., pp.8-13.) A preliminary hearing was held and Mr. Campbell was bound over into the 
district court, and an Information was filed charging him with the above crime. (R., pp.51-57.) 
Mr. Campbell entered into a plea agreement with the State wherein he pleaded guilty as charged, 
and was free to argue for any sentence he felt was appropriate; in exchange, the State agreed to 
recommend the district court impose a suspended unified sentence of five years, with three years 
fixed, and to place Mr. Campbell on a three-year term of probation. (R., pp.69-78; Tr., p.8, L.3 -
p.23, L.12.) 
During the sentencing hearing, the State asked the district court to impose a suspended 
five-year sentence, with three years fixed, and to place Mr. Campbell on probation for three 
years. (Tr., p.32, Ls.8-10.) Mr. Campbell did not recommend a specific underlying sentence but 
agreed that a three-year period of probation would be appropriate. (Tr., p.36, Ls.4-7.) The 
district court followed the recommendation made by the State and sentenced Mr. Campbell to a 
suspended term of five years, with three years fixed, and placed him on probation for three years. 
(R., pp.139-51; Tr., pp.91-105; Tr., p.44, Ls.12-17.) Mr. Campbell filed a timely Notice of 
Appeal. (R., pp.131-34.) 
1 Citations to the Presentence Investigation Report and its attached documents include the 
designation "PSI," and the page number associated with the 35-page electronic file containing 
those documents. 
2 
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive underlying sentence of five 
years, with three years fixed, in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Underlying Sentence Of 
Five Years, With Three Years Fixed, In Light Of The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case 
Mr. Campbell asserts that, given any view of the facts, his underlying unified sentence of 
five years, with three years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing 
court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent 
review of the record considering the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: 
(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the 
possibility of rehabilitation; and ( 4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. 
Starting around 2013, Mr. Campbell hit a rough patch in his life. Going through a 
divorce while shutting down his law practice, Mr. Campbell started drinking too much, and he 
wound up getting two misdemeanor DUI convictions in Washington State within a year. (PSI, 
pp.6-7, 11-12.) His drinking affected his family life and eventually Mr. Campbell got help 
through a 90-day in-patient program in Louisiana. (PSI, pp.8, 12; Tr., p.37, Ls.1-3.) 
Mr. Campbell was able to maintain his sobriety between 2014 and 2018, and he eventually 
moved to Hailey. (PSI, pp.8, 12.) Unfortunately, as Mr. Campbell explained, '"After several 
years of sobriety, I thought I could drink again. I was wrong."' (PSI, p.12.) 
Mr. Campbell had been drinking at home on the day he received his DUI in the present 
case, when a friend of his called and asked for a ride. (PSI, p.5.) He then made what he 
described as an "erroneous decision that I was OK to drive," and he picked up his friend and 
3 
gave him a ride to Ketchum, before being pulled over on the drive back home. (Id.) 
Mr. Campbell acknowledged that it "was a stupid decision." (PSI, p.6.) He stated, "[g]iven my 
prior DUis, I should have remembered that my judgment was extremely poor when it came to 
driving and drinking." (Id.) After he was arrested, Mr. Campbell made use of the skills he 
learned during his inpatient treatment and maintained his sobriety, complying with the terms of 
his pretrial conditions and testing. (Tr., p.35, Ls.16-22.) 
During the sentencing hearing, Mr. Campbell told the court that he was very remorseful 
for his actions, apologizing to the court and the community, and stating, "I'm very, very sorry 
about this incident." (Tr., p.36, L.13 - p.37, L.20.) Idaho courts recognize that alcoholism and 
the desire to remain sober, coupled with remorse for one's actions, are mitigating factors that 
should counsel a court to impose a less severe sentence. See State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982); 
State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991). In light of the mitigating factors that exist in 
this case, Mr. Campbell asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive underlying sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Campbell respectfully requests that this Court reduce his underlying sentence as it 
deems appropriate. 
DATED this 15th day ofJanuary, 2021. 
/s/ Jason C. Pintler 
JASON C. PINTLER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of January, 2021, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be served as follows: 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
JCP/eas 
/s/ Evan A. Smith 
EV AN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 
5 


State v. Campbell Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48107

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UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
4-9-2021 
State v. Campbell Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48107 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Campbell Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48107" (2021). Not Reported. 6939. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6939 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KALE D. GANS 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
SCOTT D. CAMPBELL, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
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          No. 48107-2020 
 
          Blaine Co. Case No.  
          CR07-19-3501 
           
 
          RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 
 
      Issue 
Has Campbell failed to establish that the district court abused its sentencing discretion? 
 
 
Campbell Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
In October of 2019, the state charged Campbell with one count of felony DUI, alleging 
that he had committed two DUIs within the prior ten years.  (R., pp.55-56.)  Pursuant to a plea 
agreement with the state, Campbell pleaded guilty as charged.  (R., pp.69-78; Tr., p.21, L.20 – 
Electronically Filed
4/9/2021 1:05 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
p.23, L.12.)  The district court sentenced Campbell to five years, with three years fixed, and 
placed him on probation.  (R., pp.139-40.)  Campbell timely appealed.  (R., pp.131-33.) 
 Campbell argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-4.)  Review of the record and application of the 
relevant legal standards shows no abuse of discretion. 
Where “a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a 
clear abuse of discretion by the court imposing the sentence.”  State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 
368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).  To carry this burden the appellant 
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  Id.  A sentence is 
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and 
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.  Id.  The 
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when 
deciding upon the sentence.  Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of 
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation).  “‘In 
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where 
reasonable minds might differ.’”  McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting State v. 
Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).  “Furthermore, ‘[a] sentence 
fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of 
discretion by the trial court.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 
(1982)). 
 Campbell fails to meet his burden to show the district court abused its discretion by 
sentencing him to five years with three years fixed.  On appeal he argues that, in “light of the 
 3 
mitigating factors that exist in this case … the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive underlying sentence.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.4.)  Campbell cites his history of 
“alcoholism and the desire to remain sober, coupled with” his “remorse for [his] actions,” which 
he purports “are mitigating factors that should counsel a court to impose a less severe sentence.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.3-4.)   
This argument fails because the district court was well aware of Campbell’s remorseful 
statements, and history of alcoholism, which it considered along with all the other aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances statements at sentencing.  (See Tr., p.36, L.8 – p.44, L.11.)   As for 
Campbell’s addiction history, those facts were far more aggravating than mitigating.  The district 
court noted that, a month prior to sentencing, Campbell had told the presentence investigator “the 
reason for coming to Kimi Recovery Center was because ‘I need to get this done, I don’t need 
treatment.’”  (PSI, p.17 (boldface omitted).) Campbell made these comments despite having 
previously “completed a 90-day inpatient program with Narconon in 2013,” and despite accruing 
three DUIs in less than ten years.  (PSI, pp.6-7, 12.)  As such, the district court correctly found 
that Campbell had little insight into the depths of his problems with alcohol, and rightly viewed 
Campbell’s pronouncements that he had “remained sober with the help of the things—skills I 
learned at Narconon” (Tr., p.36, L.25 – p.37, L.1), with skepticism: 
But then something that is germane to the sentencing, you state you don’t 
need treatment. You told the GAIN—in the GAIN report you said, “I need to get 
this done.  I don’t need treatment.”  That was a quote in the GAIN report.  And 
you would like to avoid the treatment because you feel you’ve learned enough 
from the inpatient program that you were in in Louisiana in 2013…. 
 
But the point still remains that you had the tools that you claim you have 
right now, therefore, you don't need any further treatment.  But, of course, you 
had those very same tools before you got behind the vehicle [sic] on October 2, 
2019. 
 
(Tr., p.42, L.10 – p.43, L.12.) 
--
 4 
These conclusions were supported by the GAIN report, which likewise found Campbell 
“demonstrate[d] minimal awareness of” his substance abuse “problem and the need to change,” 
as follows: 
Scott has been unable to control his alcohol use with an attendant probability of 
harming himself or others as evidenced by his report of Scott reported being 
arrested for his 3rd DUI on 10/02/2019.  Scott needs an understanding of the skills 
to change current substance use patterns such as to prevent high-risk situations 
and stabilize him to avoid relapse.  Scott lacks the skills needed to prevent 
continued use.  Scott has a high likelihood of relapse without the close monitoring 
and support of Level 1.0 Outpatient Program. 
 
(PSI, p.23.) 
In light of Campbell’s substance abuse issues, his own lack of insight into them, and the 
continuing risks they posed to himself and the community, the five-year sentence here was 
justified. 
And while Campbell certainly made some remorseful statements during his presentence 
interview and the sentencing hearing (see, e.g., Tr., p.36, L.20 – p.37, L.20), the district court 
was still required to weigh that mitigating evidence against the facts of this case.  The court 
correctly found those facts showed Campbell still posed a great risk to society: 
So I went through this and I always try to look at aggravating and mitigating 
factors and, Mr. Campbell, you were a danger to society.  You got behind the 
wheel of a vehicle at .246.  I don’t know how much you had to drink to get to that 
level, but it is a significant amount and it would indicate to me that you have a 
problem with alcohol.  And it’s not just a problem with one—I don’t think a 
person could get to that level without being—having an addiction or a drinking 
problem.  And your judgment is clearly impaired when you’re at that level. 
 
You were a danger to citizens when you drove that vehicle. And this would be a 
far different sentencing if you had swerved into the southbound lane—I’m sorry, 
into the northbound lane of Highway 75 and struck someone.  And this is 
dangerous. This is unacceptable.  You should know better. 
 
(Tr., p.43, L.15 – p.44, L.5.) 
-- --
 5 
In light of the facts of this case, Campbell’s prior history, and all the other mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances, the court rightly concluded a five-year sentence was necessary to 
“protect society” and help Campbell address his issues.  (Tr., p.44, Ls.6-17.)  That sentence was 
well within the bounds of the court’s discretion.  Campbell fails to show otherwise. 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Campbell’s sentence. 
 DATED this 9th day of April, 2021. 
 
 
 
        /s/  Kale D. Gans 
      KALE D. GANS 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 9th day of April, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
JASON C. PINTLER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
        /s/  Kale D. Gans 
      KALE D. GANS 
Deputy Attorney General 
KDG/dd 


State v. Campbell Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48107

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UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
5-13-2021 
State v. Sedillo Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48127 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Sedillo Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48127" (2021). Not Reported. 6953. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6953 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
 
JACKIE SHAYDE SEDILLO, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
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NO. 48127-2020 
 
 
 
Idaho County Case No. CR25-19-1671 
 
 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Jackie Shayde Sedillo failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
sentencing him to thirty-three years, with eighteen years determinate for two counts of possession 
of stolen property, two counts of grand theft auto, one count of armed robbery, one count of eluding 
an officer, one count of unlawful possession of a firearm, and one count of exhibition of a deadly 
weapon? 
 
  
Electronically Filed
5/13/2021 5:01 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
ARGUMENT 
 
Sedillo Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
In September of 2019, Holly Ann Cedillo reported that her black Kia Sedona had been 
stolen, and that her debit card had been stolen and used twice at a Chevron gas station.  (PSI, p. 
2.)  Authorities approached the Kia Sedona in the gas station parking lot and contacted Jackie 
Shayde Sedillo sitting in the front street.  (PSI, p. 2.)  When asked if he owned the vehicle, Sedillo 
said he did and pointed to the temporary tag in the back window.  (PSI, p. 2.)  Authorities advised 
Sedillo that the vehicle had been reported stolen, and asked if Sedillo had any weapons, as they 
noticed he had a black pistol near the center console.  (PSI, p. 2.)  Sedillo denied having a weapon, 
mumbled something, and put the Sedona in reverse.  (PSI, p. 2.)  Sedillo accelerated backward as 
an officer grabbed the steering wheel and attempted to stop Sedillo from leaving.  (PSI, p. 2.)  
Sedillo dragged the officer thirty to forty feet before coming to a stop.  (PSI, p. 2.)  The officer 
released the steering wheel, and Sedillo sped off as authorities pursued.  (PSI, p. 2.) 
Sedillo drove down Highway 95 around 100 miles per hour as he passed other vehicles.  
(PSI, p. 2.)  Sedillo entered Idaho County and outran authorities after they were unable to keep 
pace with Sedillo.  (PSI, pp. 2-3.)  A deputy stopped oncoming traffic and attempted to end the 
pursuit by parking his patrol vehicle in the northbound lane with his emergency lights activated.  
(PSI, p. 3.)  Sedillo drove around the patrol vehicle and passed slower moving vehicles at speeds 
around 100 miles per hour.  (PSI, p. 3.)  Authorities then set up a spike strip to disable the Sedona, 
which later deflated the front passenger side tire after Sedillo drove through the spikes around 
eighty to 100 miles per hour.  (PSI, p. 3.)  One mile down the road, another deputy stopped 
approximately twenty vehicles of oncoming traffic as Sedillo approached their position.  (PSI, p. 
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3.)  The damaged tire began to come apart as pieces were flying from the wheel, and Sedillo 
brought the Sedona to a halt.  (PSI, p. 3.)  Sedillo briefly exited the Sedona and ran to the front of 
the vehicle.  (PSI, p. 3.)  The deputy in the area drove past the Sedona, and Sedillo ran back into 
the roadway.  (PSI, p. 3.)  The deputy observed a black handgun in Sedillo’s right hand as he ran 
directly towards a 2000 BMW being driven by Gary King.  (PSI, p. 3.)  Sedillo ran to the driver’s 
door, pointing the handgun at Gary as he used his left hand to open the door.  (PSI, p. 3.)  Sedillo 
grabbed Gary by his shirt and removed him from the BMW, throwing Gary to the ground.  (PSI, 
p. 3.)  Sedillo entered the BMW and drove southbound on Highway 95, and responding officers 
collided with the Sedona, which then struck the on-scene deputy’s patrol vehicle.  (PSI, p. 3.)   
Gary King suffered injuries to his left knee and chest, and was transported to a local 
hospital.  (PSI, p. 4.)  Witnesses of the events around the BMW theft reported that they heard a 
gunshot, but authorities were unable to locate a casing from the firearm.  (PSI, p. 4.)  George and 
Stephanie Pinque reported that Sedillo drove toward them and pointed a handgun at them, and that 
they were in fear for their lives.  (PSI, p. 4.)   
The pursuit continued until authorities were unable to locate the stolen BMW due to traffic 
congestion.  (PSI, p. 4.)  While authorities searched for Sedillo, Tyran Pain reported that his work 
truck had been stolen.  (PSI, p. 4.)  Tyran reported that he heard the backup alarm on the truck 
beeping, and as he looked out the back of the residence, he saw the truck driving away and Gary 
King’s BMW left in the driveway.  (PSI, p. 4.)  Authorities observed a bullet hole in the center 
console and front passenger seat of the BMW, and later located Sedillo driving the stolen 2003 
Ford F350.  (PSI, p. 4.)  Sedillo used Idaho County Roads to elude officers, and later left the 
roadway, driving across several fields and eventually abandoning the F350 in Cottonwood Creek 
Canyon.  (PSI, p. 4.)  Sedillo fled on foot, and avoided arrest by hiding in the canyon until the 
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following morning.  (PSI, p. 4.)  Holly Cedillo gave permission to search the Kia Sedona, and 
authorities located Sedillo’s Idaho Identification Card and two financial transactions cards, along 
with driver’s licenses belonging to Holly Cedillo and Tracene Janda, and one financial transaction 
card belonging to Angel Cedillo.  (PSI, pp. 4-5.) 
The state charged Sedillo with one count of possession of stolen property, two counts of 
grand theft auto, one count of armed robbery, one count of eluding an officer with a firearm 
enhancement, one count of felon in possession of a firearm, three counts of aggravated assault, 
two counts of burglary, three counts of possession of stolen property, one count of battery with 
intent to commit a serious felony, and a persistent violator enhancement.  (R., pp. 69-74.)  Sedillo 
pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of stolen property, two counts of grand theft auto, one 
count of armed robbery, one count of eluding an officer, one count of unlawful possession of a 
firearm, and one count of exhibition of a deadly weapon, amended from aggravated assault.  (R., 
pp. 187-192.)  The state filed a second amended information, and agreed to dismiss the remaining 
charges, including the persistent violator enhancement.  (R., pp. 187-192, 200-203.)   
For count one, possession of stolen property, the district court sentenced Sedillo to two 
years determinate.  (R., p. 233.)  For count two, grand theft auto, the district court sentenced Sedillo 
to two years determinate, to run consecutive to the sentence imposed in Count one.  (R., p. 233.)  
For count three, grand theft auto, the district court sentenced Sedillo to two years determinate, to 
run consecutive to counts one and two.  (R., pp. 233-234.)  For count eight, amended from count 
twelve, possession of stolen property, the district court sentenced Sedillo to two years determinate, 
to run consecutive to counts one, two and three.  (R., p. 234.)  For count six, unlawful possession 
of a firearm, the district court sentenced Sedillo to two years determinate, to run concurrent to the 
sentences imposed in counts one, two, three, and eight.  (R., p. 234.)  For count five, eluding an 
 5 
officer, the district court sentenced Sedillo to five years determinate, to run consecutive to counts 
one, two, three and eight.  (R., pp. 234-235.)  For count four, armed robbery, the district court 
sentenced Sedillo to twenty years, with five years determinate, to run consecutive to counts one, 
two, three, five and eight.  (R., p. 235.)  For count seven, exhibition of a deadly weapon, the district 
court imposed six months in jail, with credit for time served since his arrest.  (R., p. 235.)  Sedillo 
filed a Rule 35 motion, which the district court denied, and then filed a timely appeal.  (R., pp. 
228-230, 238, 240-242.)   
On appeal, Sedillo argues that “his sentence of thirty-three years, with eighteen fixed, is 
excessive and therefore an abuse of discretion.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 1.)  Sedillo has failed to 
show that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him to thirty-three years, with 
eighteen years determinate for two counts of possession of stolen property, two counts of grand 
theft auto, one count of armed robbery, one count of eluding an officer, one count of unlawful 
possession of a firearm, and one count of exhibition of a deadly weapon. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
“Appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard.  Where a 
sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and, thus, a clear 
abuse of discretion.”  State v. Schiermeier, 165 Idaho 447, 451, 447 P.3d 895, 899 (2019) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted).  A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time 
of sentencing that confinement is necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting 
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution 
applicable to a given case.  Id. at 454, 447 P.3d at 902.  “A sentence fixed within the limits 
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion.”  Id. (internal 
quotations omitted).  “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a 
 6 
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.”  State v. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 
608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2019) (citation omitted). 
 
C. Sedillo Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
The record shows the district court perceived its discretion, employed the correct legal 
standards to the issue before it, and acted reasonably and within the scope of its discretion.   
At the sentencing hearing, the district court acknowledged that it has “the power to send 
[Sedillo] to prison for the rest of [his] life and lock the door and [he’d] never have the opportunity 
to be out,” but it was “not going to do that.”  (Tr., p. 101, Ls. 22-25.)  The district court stated that 
prior judges have “tried probation, [Sedillo] violated [his] probation on a number of occasions, 
and sometimes committ[ed] further felony charges.  They put [Sedillo] through the rider program,” 
and “one of the consistent things that they tried to address are the controlled substance issues.”  
(Tr., p. 102, Ls. 19-25.)  The district court acknowledged that “in the past it’s kind of been analysis 
of depression or anxiety and only recently really focused on the mania and the bipolar.” (Tr., p. 
103, Ls. 3-5.)  But there does “come a time when the judge’s goals of trying to rehabilitate 
somebody does have to take a back seat to the issue of protecting society from someone who is a 
proven risk and is capable of making some very poor decisions.”  (Tr., p. 108, Ls. 8-13.)  The 
district court stated that “these sentences really required here is going to be one that more serves 
the goals of punishment and protecting society than those of rehabilitation and deterrence.”  (Tr., 
p. 103, L. 23 – p. 104, L. 1.)  The district court stated that the defense recommendations for 
sentencing “would depreciate the seriousness of these various offenses,” and that Sedillo has 
“taken [himself] far beyond the possibility of retained jurisdiction and a specialty court.”  (Tr., p. 
104, Ls. 6-13.)  The district court stated that Sedillo has “proven [himself] as a risk to society,” 
and although “it may be somewhat less if the prescription medications that [Sedillo has] found and 
 7 
[is] now utilizing and the latest diagnosis of [his] condition,” the district court couldn’t “conclude 
at this point in time that it’s gone.”  (Tr., p. 105, Ls. 4-12.)  The district court concluded that 
“punishment is certainly appropriate in this case given the number of offenses that [Sedillo] 
committed in this relatively short period of time, multiple and serious offenses.”  (Tr., p. 106, Ls. 
19-23.)   
Sedillo argues that the mitigating factors–age, mental health issues, substance abuse issues, 
acceptance of responsibility, remorse, employment opportunities, acceptance of responsibility and 
remorse–show an abuse of discretion.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-8.)  In 2015, Sedillo’s LSI score 
was thirty two, placing him in the high risk to reoffend category.  (PSI, p. 145.)  His extensive 
criminal history consists of numerous felonies, and opportunities on probation and retained 
jurisdiction.  (PSI, pp. 7-9, 132-137.)  Following a period of retained jurisdiction, Sedillo was 
placed back on probation in two cases in January of 2019.  (PSI, p. 9.)  Sedillo then absconded 
supervision in August of 2019, and the state filed reports of probation violation.  (PSI, p. 9.)  The 
presentence investigator stated that Sedillo “has been given multiple opportunities to comply with 
conditions of community supervision, yet rather than embrace and take advantage of opportunities 
afforded to him, he has chosen not to conform.”  (PSI, p. 11.)  The presentence investigator stated 
that Sedillo has “committed multiple new felonies, placing himself and the surrounding 
communities in extreme danger,” and recommended that Sedillo “be sentenced to the physical 
custody of the Idaho Department of Correction.”  (PSI, p. 12.)   
The instant offenses placed the community at risk, and victimized numerous people.  The 
sentences imposed provide proper protection to society, and appropriate punishment for the serious 
crimes committed against multiple people.  The sentence provides proper deterrence to Sedillo and 
other possible offenders, and a lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the instant 
 8 
offense.  Sedillo has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him 
to thirty-three years, with eighteen years determinate for two counts of possession of stolen 
property, two counts of grand theft auto, one count of armed robbery, one count of eluding an 
officer, one count of unlawful possession of a firearm, and one count of exhibition of a deadly 
weapon. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 13th day of May, 2021. 
 
 
      /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      ZACHARI S. HALLETT 
      Paralegal 
 
 
 
  
 9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
            I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of May, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
KIMBERLY A. COSTER  
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
                                                                        /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____ 
                                                                        KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
                                                                        Deputy Attorney General 
 


State v. Sedillo Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48127

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State v. Davidson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48144 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9263
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 48144-2020
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR28-19-11203
v. )
)
YOLAUNDA SUE DAVIDSON, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
______________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After a jury found Yolaunda Davidson guilty of three drug-related offenses, the district
court placed her on probation for two years, with an underlying sentence of four years, with two
years fixed. Ms. Davidson appeals, and she argues the district court abused its discretion by
imposing an excessive sentence.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Ms. Davidson by information with possession of methamphetamine,
possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.40–41.) She pled not
Electronically Filed
2/11/2021 11:29 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
2
guilty and went to trial. (R., pp.43, 102–33.) After a two-day trial, the jury found her guilty of all
three offenses. (R., pp.120–33, 134.)
At sentencing, Ms. Davidson and the State both recommended probation. (Tr., p.355,
Ls.22–23, p.356, Ls.6–8.) Ms. Davidson requested an underlying sentence of one or one and
one-half years fixed, plus one and one-half years indeterminate, and the State recommended an
underlying sentence of four years, with two years fixed. (Tr., p.355, L.24–p.356, L.1, p.356,
Ls.10–12.) The district court agreed with the parties’ probation recommendation, with an
underlying sentence of four years, with two years fixed. (Tr., p.359, Ls.6–9.) The district court
gave Ms. Davidson credit for time served for possession of marijuana and possession of drug
paraphernalia. (Tr., p.362, Ls.2–9.)
Ms. Davidson timely appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.149–50, 155–57.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of four years, with
two years fixed, upon Ms. Davidson, for possession of a controlled substance?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Four Years,
With Two Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Davidson For Possession Of A Controlled Substance
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Ms. Davidson’s sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. See I.C. § 37-2732(c) (seven-year maximum). Accordingly, to show the sentence
3
imposed was unreasonable, Ms. Davidson “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing
criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460
(2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
In this case, Ms. Davidson asserts the district court did not exercise reason and thus
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive underlying sentence upon any reasonable view of
the facts. Specifically, she contends the district court should have sentenced her to a lesser term
of imprisonment in light of the mitigating factors. For example, Ms. Davidson’s goals were to
stay sober and raise her daughter. (PSI,1 p.18.) She had a  daughter that she
called her “miracle.” (PSI, p.14.) She wanted to be a good role model for her. (PSI, p.18.) She
was “trying [her] hardest being a single parent” and hoped to put this behind her to focus on her
daughter. (Tr., p.357, Ls.22–25.) Ms. Davidson also wanted to go back to school to “better [her]
daughter’s life.” (PSI, pp.14, 18.) In the meantime, Ms. Davidson worked full-time in
housekeeping at a new hotel. (PSI, pp.14–15.) She was proud to be the first employee hired by
1 Citations to the PSI refer to the thirty-two page electronic document with the confidential
exhibits.
4
this hotel. (Tr., p.358, Ls.1–2.) She started this job soon after her pretrial release and remained
employed throughout the case. (PSI, pp.14–15; Tr., p.356, Ls.15–22, p.358, Ls.1–3.) See State v.
Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 118 (1955) (recognizing gainful employment as a mitigating factor); see
also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594–95 (1982) (employment and desire to advance within
company were mitigating circumstances). Maintaining employment was no simple task for her
either. Ms. Davidson described her physical health as “not good”—she has a “spot on her brain”
and has had seizures and a stroke. (PSI, pp.15–16.) She also had mental health issues, including
PTSD, depression, and anxiety. (PSI, p.16.) Despite these challenges, Ms. Davidson was “willing
to do whatever it takes just to clear this up,” including drug treatment and community service.
(Tr., p.357, Ls.20–21; PSI, p.18.) Ms. Davidson submits this mitigating information supported a
more lenient sentence. Therefore, she maintains the district court abused its discretion by
imposing an excessive underlying sentence of four years, with two years fixed.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Davidson respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, she respectfully requests that the Court remand this case to the district
court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 11th day of February, 2021.
/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
5
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11th day of February, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JCS/eas


State v. Davidson Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48144

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State v. Stone Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48147 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
JOHN C. McKINNEY 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
COOPER JADE STONE, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
     No. 48147-2020 
 
     Twin Falls County Case No. 
     CR42-18-14556 
                
      
     RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
     
      ISSUE 
Has Stone failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing 
jurisdiction? 
ARGUMENT 
 
Stone Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
On December 24, 2018, Stone was driving a car that law enforcement had earlier seen 
being driven by Jeremiah Hernandez, whose driver’s license was suspended.  (PSI, p.4.1)  After a 
                                                          
1 PSI page numbers correspond with those of the electronic file “Confidential Exhibits.pdf.” 
Electronically Filed
3/19/2021 12:25 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2 
baggie of marijuana was found in Hernandez’s pocket, police officers conducted a vehicle search 
and found a backpack – with every compartment locked – in the car which Stone admitted owning.  
(Id.)  After Stone provided officers with a key to open the compartments, a black case was found 
inside which “contained small plastic baggies, a scale, and a silver metal pen type object.”  (Id.)  
The scale had a plastic cover with residue on it which field tested presumptive for 
methamphetamine.  (Id.)  Stone was arrested for possession of methamphetamine.  (Id.)  The 
district court described the events that followed: 
[O]n June 4, 2019, a judgment of conviction was entered on the charge of 
possession of a controlled substance.  The Court imposed a sentence of five years, 
two fixed, three indeterminate.  That sentence was suspended.  Mr. Stone was 
placed on probation. 
 
 On July 11 of 2019, there was a motion to revoke probation.  After 
admissions were entered on September 1 of 2019, the Court did retain jurisdiction. 
 
(Tr., p.4, Ls.18-25.)   
At the end of his rider, the Department of Correction recommended that Stone be placed 
on supervised probation.  (PSI, p.46.)  However, after a hearing, the district court relinquished its 
jurisdiction over Stone and imposed his sentence.  (R., pp.101-103.)  Stone filed a notice of appeal 
timely from the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction.  (R., pp.105-108.)  
Stone “contends that the district court abuse[d] its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction, 
in light of his completion of his programming on his rider, young age, limited criminal history, 
and acceptance of responsibility for his action.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.4.)  Stone has failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion.    
  
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to place a defendant on probation or whether, instead, to relinquish 
jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court and will 
3 
not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.  State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 
889, 303 P.3d 241, 248 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 
(1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990)).  A court’s 
decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has 
sufficient information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be 
inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.  State v. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 729, 316 P.3d 640, 645 (2013); 
Hansen, 154 Idaho at 889, 303 P.3d at 248 (citing State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137, 30 P.3d 
290, 292 (2001)).     
  
C. Stone Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
Application of these legal standards to the facts of this case shows no abuse of discretion.  
While Stone notes that his minimal criminal record and successes while on his rider – completion 
of the CBI-Substance Abuse program and obtaining his GED – were enough to earn a “probation” 
recommendation from IDOC, the district court reasonably concluded otherwise.  (See Appellant’s 
brief, p.4; PSI, pp.5-6, 46-52.)    
Before Stone pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine, he “failed to report for drug 
testing on seven occasions” and “failed to appear for his meeting with his Court Compliance 
officer.”  (PSI, p.6.)  After he was sentenced, Stone admitted violating his probation by failing to 
maintain an approved residence and absconding until he was arrested on a new criminal charge 
about a month after he was placed on probation.  (R., pp.74, 91.)  The APSI summarized the 
disciplinary sanctions Stone received during his rider: 
6/2/20: Mr. Stone lied during an investigation.  Staff interviewed Mr. Stone about 
how he got a black eye and he stated he slipped while working out.  Several other 
4 
witnesses came forward and reported that the injury happened as a result of 
horseplay[2] on the unit. 
 
6/4/20:  Mr. Stone provided another inmate his phone pin number so that the inmate 
could make a call.  This call violated that inmates No Contact Order. 
 
Additionally, Mr. Stone received 5 written warnings for sleeping during program 
hours, being off bunk during count, and not being on his assigned bunks after light 
out. 
   
(PSI, p.48.)   
The district court was concerned about Stone’s conduct during his rider, and asked him 
why he wasn’t “honest with the department officials during the course of their investigation that 
led to [his] black eye?”  (Tr., p.13, Ls. 10-12.)  Stone’s answer that, at the time, he thought his 
“decision was the best one to make to get off the rider,” but now realized it was not (Tr., p.13, Ls. 
13-15), could not have inspired much confidence in Stone’s veracity when placed in a difficult 
situation.  Even more troubling to the court was Stone’s admitted assistance in another inmate’s 
use of his phone PIN number which, “in effect, aided and abetted the violation of a no-contact 
order.”  (Tr., p.13, Ls.16-20.)  Stone’s complicity in the inmate’s violation of a no contact order 
happened more than once.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.8-10.) 
Before announcing its decision, the district court explained it was considering “the four 
goals of sentencing as well as those factors under [I.C. §] 19-2521 to determine whether probation 
or some form of incarceration is appropriate[,]” Stone’s character, the nature of the underlying 
offense, and his rider performance.  (Tr., p.14, Ls. 13-20.)  The court concluded: 
The Court is extremely concerned over the events that concerned – or occurred 
within this month prior to this hearing.  Certainly, in my view, there is a great deal 
more you need to learn.  I – I don't know that you've taken the programming as 
                                                          
2 The prosecutor explained that “‘horseplay’ is a very loose term for a wide range of activity, 
usually not meant in a positive or playful manner.  It resulted in a black eye in this case.  So we 
can assume that he was involved in an altercation.”  (Tr., p.8, Ls.11-16.)   
5 
seriously as you should.  And based upon the events disclosed in June of 2020, the 
Court does intend to relinquish jurisdiction. 
 
(Tr., p.14, L.21 - p.15, L.2.) 
 Although Stone performed well in some respects during his rider, he also failed in two very 
important ways by getting involved in a physical confrontation with another inmate and facilitating 
another inmate’s violation of a no contact order.  In light of those facts and Stone’s performance 
while on pre-trial release and probation, he was not an appropriate candidate for probation.  Stone 
has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order relinquishing 
jurisdiction. 
 DATED this 19th day of March, 2021. 
 
 
 
        /s/ John C. McKinney 
      JOHN C. McKINNEY    
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of March, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
 JACOB L. WESTERFIELD 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
   
     
        /s/ John C. McKinney 
      JOHN C. McKINNEY 
JCM/dd     Deputy Attorney General 


State v. Stone Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48147

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State v. Hartman Ammended Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48171 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM EDWARD HARTMAN, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48171-2020 
 
Minidoka County Case No. 
CR-2013-3447 
 
 
           
AMENDED RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Hartman failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it 
revoked probation and imposed sentences of seven years with two five years determinate for 
possession of a controlled substance? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Hartman Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 The district court first entered judgment in 2014 on Hartman’s plea of guilty to possession 
of a controlled substance, sentenced him to seven years with two five years determinate, and 
Electronically Filed
2/5/2021 2:03 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
retained jurisdiction.  (R., vol. 1, pp. 153-55.)  The district court later suspended the sentence and 
granted probation.  (R., vol. 1, pp. 174-75.)   
 Hartman violated his probation.  (R., vol. 1, pp. 185-200; vol. 2, pp. 212-13.)  The district 
court revoked probation, executed the sentence, and retained jurisdiction.  (R., vol. 2, pp. 214-16.)  
The district court later placed Hartman on probation.  (R., vol. 2, pp. 222-23.)   
 Hartman again violated his probation.  (R., vol. 2, pp. 229-51, 263-68, 271-72; Supp. Tr., 
p. 10, L. 11 – p. 16, L. 12.)  The district court executed the judgment.  (R., vol. 2, pp. 274-75; Tr., 
p. 11, L. 23 – p. 14, L. 19.)  Hartman timely appealed.  (R., vol. 2, pp. 281-82.)   
 On appeal Hartman argues the district court abused its discretion by not granting him 
another probation or retaining jurisdiction a third time.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-6.)  Hartman has 
failed to show an abuse of discretion because the record supports the district court’s order revoking 
probation. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “Once a probation violation has been proven, the decision of whether to revoke probation 
is within the sound discretion of the court.”  State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 113, 426 P.3d 461, 
464 (2018) (quotation marks omitted).  When reviewing a claim of abuse of discretion, the four 
essential elements are “[w]hether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the 
exercise of reason.”  Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018). 
 
  
 3 
C. Hartman Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
 
 First, the district court correctly perceived the issue of revocation of probation to be 
discretionary.  In revoking, the district court stated it was doing so “in the exercise of discretion.”  
(Tr., p. 14, Ls. 4-5.)  Hartman makes no argument that the first element of discretion is not met.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-6.)   
 Second, the district court acted within the boundaries of its discretion.  The district court 
was statutorily authorized to revoke probation upon a finding of a probation violation.  I.C. § 19-
2603.  Here Hartman had violated his probation in multiple ways on two separate occasions.  (R., 
vol. 1, pp. 185-200; vol. 2, pp. 212-13, 229-51, 263-68, 271-72; Supp. Tr., p. 10, L. 11 – p. 16, L. 
12.)  The district court acted within the boundaries of its discretion.  Hartman, again, does not 
dispute this.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-6.) 
 Third, the district court acted consistently with the applicable legal standards.  “In deciding 
whether revocation of probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers 
whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued probation is 
consistent with the protection of society.”  Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 441-42, 163 P.3d 222, 
230-31 (Ct. App. 2007).  The district court specifically found that probation was accomplishing 
neither of these goals.  (Tr., p. 13, L. 15 – p. 14, L. 3.)  Again, Hartman does not contend the third 
factor of discretion is not met.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-6.) 
 Finally, the district court reached its decision by the exercise of reason.  The district court 
recognized that Hartman had substance abuse and mental health issues, but reasoned that without 
grounds to believe that rehabilitation or community protection could be achieved through 
probation “the other goals of sentencing … predominate.”  (Tr., p. 13, L. 19 – p. 14, L. 3.)  Hartman 
contends this element was not met because he has substance abuse and mental health issues, 
 4 
completed the rider program twice, and took other rehabilitative efforts such as mental health court.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-6.)  It was not unreasonable to conclude, as did the district court, that a 
third rider would not be more successful at protecting the community and rehabilitating Hartman 
than the first two had been.  Hartman has not shown the district court failed to exercise reason, and 
has therefore failed to show any abuse of discretion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 5th day of February, 2021. 
 
 
  /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of February, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AMENDED RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means 
of iCourt File and Serve: 
 
JACOB L. WESTERFIELD 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
KKJ/dd 
 


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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
 
JEREMY WILLIAM LOWTHER, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
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NO. 48189-2020 
 
 
 
Ada County Case No. CR01-19-31262 
 
 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Jeremy William Lowther failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
sentencing him to ten years, with two years determinate, and by relinquishing jurisdiction? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Lowther Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
In July of 2019, Jeremy William Lowther battered and attempted to strangle his live-in 
girlfriend, Autumn Needham.  (PSI, p. 185.)  Lowther slapped Autumn with an open hand 
following an argument, and pushed her onto a couch and placed his hand around her throat.  (PSI, 
Electronically Filed
6/3/2021 8:20 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
p. 185.)  Autumn grabbed at Lowther’s neck in an attempt to defend herself, and after about five 
seconds, Lowther released her.  (PSI, p. 185.)  During the confrontation, Autumn sustained a 
cigarette burn to her left chest, but did not remember exactly how she was burned.  (PSI, p. 185.)  
Autumn fled the residence after the conflict.  (PSI, p. 185.)   
The state charged Lowther with one count of attempted strangulation, and one count of 
domestic violence or battery.  (R., pp. 21-22.)  Lowther pleaded guilty to one count of domestic 
violence or battery, and the state agreed to dismiss the attempted strangulation charge.  (R., pp. 24, 
32-33.)  The district court sentenced Lowther to ten years, with two years determinate and retained 
jurisdiction.  (R., pp. 44-46.)  Following a period of retained jurisdiction, the district court 
relinquished jurisdiction and credited Lowther with 355 days served.  (R., p. 62.)  Lowther then 
filed a timely appeal.  (R., pp. 64-65.) 
On appeal, Lowther argues that “the district court abused its discretion when it imposed 
this sentence,” and “when it relinquished jurisdiction over him.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 1.)  Lowther 
has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him to ten years, with 
two years determinate, and later relinquishing jurisdiction and crediting Lowther with 355 days 
served. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
“Appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard.  Where a 
sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and, thus, a clear 
abuse of discretion.”  State v. Schiermeier, 165 Idaho 447, 451, 447 P.3d 895, 899 (2019) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted).  A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time 
of sentencing that confinement is necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting 
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution 
 3 
applicable to a given case.  Id. at 454, 447 P.3d at 902.  “A sentence fixed within the limits 
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion.”  Id. (internal 
quotations omitted).  “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a 
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.”  State v. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 
608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2019) (citation omitted).   
The decision whether to retain jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion of the 
district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.  State v. Lee, 
117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990).  The primary purpose of a district 
court retaining jurisdiction is to enable the court to obtain additional information regarding whether 
the defendant has sufficient rehabilitative potential and is suitable for probation.  State v. Jones, 
141 Idaho 673, 677, 115 P.3d 764, 768 (Ct. App. 2005).  Probation is the ultimate goal of retained 
jurisdiction.  Id.  There can be no abuse of discretion if the district court has sufficient evidence 
before it to conclude that the defendant is not a suitable candidate for probation.  Id. 
The decision to place a defendant on probation is a matter within the sound discretion of 
the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.  State v. 
Reed, 163 Idaho 681, 684, 417 P.3d 1007, 1010 (Ct. App. 2018) (citations omitted).  Rehabilitation 
and public safety are dual goals of probation.  State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 114, 426 P.3d 
461, 465 (2018).  A decision to deny probation will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if it is 
consistent with the criteria articulated in I.C. § 19-2521.  State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278, 61 
P.3d 632, 635 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567, 650 P.2d 707, 709 (Ct. 
App. 1982)). 
 
  
 4 
C. Lowther Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
The sentence imposed is within the statutory limits of I.C. § 18-918(2)(b).  The record 
shows the district court perceived its discretion, employed the correct legal standards to the issue 
before it, and acted reasonably and within the scope of its discretion.   
At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated “in the situation that the defendant struck 
the victim, pushed her onto a couch, put his hand on her throat – she did not pass out, but she did 
exhibit some physical injuries – alcohol certainly seemed to play a major part in this offense.”  
(Tr., p. 26, Ls. 19-24.)  The district court acknowledged that Lowther “admitted to being an 
alcoholic,” and that “the offense happened also ended up with the victim receiving a cigarette burn, 
which is pretty painful.”  (Tr., p. 26, L. 25 – p. 27, L. 3.)  The district court stated that “it is of 
concern to [the district court] that the evaluation does rate [Lowther] as high risk.  That certainly 
seems consistent with the background that is described in the report.”  (Tr., p. 27, Ls. 4-8.)  The 
district court stated that it’s “particularly concerned about [Lowther’s] 21 adult misdemeanor 
convictions.  The presentence investigator counted 14 violent offenses, presumably including this 
one.  [The district court] counted slightly less, but [the district court] counted more than the State 
has.”  (Tr., p. 27, Ls. 11-15.)  The district court stated that “there is such an unusually significant 
record at the misdemeanor level of violent offenses for battery, and offenses involving property 
damage.  And that is pretty significant because that is a longer standing pattern.  And it’s quite a 
significant pattern.”  (Tr., p. 27, Ls. 16-21.)  The district court acknowledged that the “first time 
you see an offense of violence is way back in 2002, and so it’s not … just something that is new 
in the defendant’s life.  And … it’s very likely to be connected to a lot of what he observed as a 
child.”  (Tr., p. 28, Ls. 4-9.)   
 5 
The district court stated that “[t]he problem is, all these misdemeanor convictions at some 
point should have alerted [Lowther] to make a change to the way he was doing things so that he 
wouldn’t keep getting in trouble.  And that doesn’t seem … to be what happened.”  (Tr., p. 28, Ls. 
10-15.)  After imposition of the sentence and retaining jurisdiction, the district court stated that 
“when a pattern of conduct has gone on this long, it’s going to take more work to change that 
direction,” and that it would “consider things like whether this is the amount of probationary time 
that is necessary, but [the district court] would like to see how [Lowther] approaches relevant 
programming.”  (Tr., p. 29, Ls. 8-18.) 
At the rider review hearing, the district court noted that the “situation was certainly 
considerably worsened by the defendant’s alcoholism, but he had also came before the Court with 
an unusual number of battery convictions as an adult, property damage convictions, as well as 
NCO violations."  (Tr., p. 36, Ls. 8-13.)  The district court stated that Lowther “had 21 adult 
misdemeanor convictions, 14 violent offenses, and repeatedly violated his probation in those 
matters.  So he already came before the Court with a lot of red flags waving.”  (Tr., p. 36, Ls. 13-
17.)  The district court stated that Lowther “didn’t get hiccups.  He got serious multiple infractions, 
disobedience to orders.  He was angry and hostile.  He got major disciplinary offenses, including 
an infraction and four written warnings,” and “the basic thing that was revealed by his behavior 
was that he can do well in class, but then he doesn’t apply it in real life.  He does not apply the 
skills that he’s learned.”  (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 4-12.)  The district court stated Lowther’s problems with 
programming “really is another warning sign that things are not in a position where it would be 
safe for the public.”   (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 14-16.)  Furthermore, Lowther “has not shown that he can 
progress on the key problems that are bringing him before the Court, even when he is in custody.”  
(Tr., p. 37, L. 24 – p. 38, L. 1.)   
 6 
Lowther argues that the mitigating factors—acceptance of responsibility and commitment 
to addressing his alcoholism—show an abuse of discretion.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 3.)  Lowther’s 
argument does not show an abuse of discretion.  Lowther claims that “[a] term of incarceration 
will not deter [him] unless he is provided the necessary treatment.  And a term of incarceration is 
not likely to deter the public generally, as the offense was not planned or thought out.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-4.)  Lowther’s extensive criminal history with battery and other violent 
offenses, in conjunction with probation he received for many of those convictions, shows that 
community supervision and probationary programming have been ineffective in rehabilitating 
him.  (PSI, pp. 189-197.)  A sentence of incarceration is reasonable if necessary to deter a 
defendant “from similar or even more severe offenses.”  State v. Richards, 127 Idaho 31, 40, 896 
P.2d 357, 366 (Ct. App. 1995).  Lowther’s long history of violence supports the district court’s 
determination that he would be deterred only by incarceration. 
Lowther argues that the sentence “cannot be justified by the second objective of criminal 
punishment, which is the possibility of rehabilitation,” because “[t]he treatment [he] needs is best 
provided in the community, not in a prison.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)  Lowther’s violent criminal 
history and LSI score of twenty-three, which places him in the moderate-risk category to reoffend, 
show Lowther’s risk to the community.  (PSI, pp. 189-197, 207.)  Community supervision is not 
a suitable setting for a violent offender to learn how to understand or manage their triggers.  
Lowther’s period of retained jurisdiction, which he did not complete, was the appropriate time and 
setting to learn how to manage his anger.  (PSI, p. 364.)  Lowther received CBI-Substance Abuse 
and Aggression Replacement Training.  (PSI, pp. 365-368.)  A deputy warden from the rider 
program stated that “[e]ven after completing ART Mr. Lowther continued to challenge staff.  He 
was not able to control his anger with authority figures and even inserted himself in a situation in 
 7 
order to yell at staff and create conflict.”  (PSI, p. 369.)  The deputy warden further stated “[g]iven 
that he has completed ART and still cannot control his temper staff feel that recommending 
probation is not appropriate.”  (PSI, p. 369.)  The district court was well within its discretion to 
conclude that retained jurisdiction, rather than probation, was appropriate, and that Lowther’s 
performance on his rider demonstrated he was not a suitable candidate for probation. 
Lowther next contends that he “did harm someone he loved, which should not be 
minimized, but he is not deserving of a term of incarceration.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)  In her 
victim impact statement, Autumn stated that “the scariest thing that happened that night, is when 
Jeremy had his hands around my neck, started off with one and then he placed two.  The trauma I 
experienced that night still seems foggy in areas.”  (PSI, p. 185.)  Autumn stated that Lowther 
“needs to understand that when he placed his hands around my neck, he moved into the next level.  
If [Lowther] is not careful and doesn’t get the help, [sic] he needs he is very much on his way to 
becoming a murderer,” and “[a]ll it would have [taken] was a little more pressure, a tighter squeeze 
and he could have killed me.”  (PSI, p. 186.)  Autumn “wonder[s] if [Lowther] has thought about 
the magnitude that he could have killed [her] that night or if he just justifies it because his intent 
wasn’t to kill [her].  [She] know[s] he put his hands around [her] neck to gain power over [her].”  
(PSI, p. 186.)  The harm caused to Autumn by Lowther has deeply affected her physically and 
mentally.  The sentence of ten years, with two years determinate provides proper punishment to 
Lowther for the physical violence he committed to his then-girlfriend.   
Lowther argues that the “sentence cannot be justified by the fourth objective of criminal 
punishment, which is the protection of society.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)  His LSI score of twenty-
three and violent criminal history shows that Lowther is a risk to the community.  (PSI, pp. 189-
197, 207.)  While conducting his rider, Lowther received disciplinary remarks for disobedience to 
 8 
orders and abusive or obscene language.  (PSI, pp. 366-367.)  His inability to manage his anger 
shows that he’s not a suitable candidate for community supervision, and execution of the 
underlying sentence is an appropriate measure to protect society.   
Finally, Lowther argues that the “district court should have suspended [his] sentence and 
placed him on probation or given him another opportunity at rider programming.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 6.)  Lowther’s numerous opportunities and failures on previous probations, and failure to 
complete this rider shows that he’s not amenable to alternative treatment, or community 
supervision.  Lowther has exhausted the district court’s options, and left the district court with no 
other recourse than to execute the underlying sentence.  Lowther is not a suitable candidate for 
probation, or a second period of retained jurisdiction, and a lesser sentence than that imposed 
would depreciate the seriousness of the instant offense.  Lowther has failed to show that the district 
court abused its discretion by sentencing him to ten years, with two years determinate, and later 
relinquishing jurisdiction and crediting Lowther with 355 days served. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 3rd day of June, 2021. 
 
 
      /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      ZACHARI S. HALLETT 
      Paralegal 
 
 
 
  
 9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
            I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of June, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS  
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
                                                                        /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____ 
                                                                        KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
                                                                        Deputy Attorney General 
 


State v. Lowther Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48189

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4-7-2021 
State v. Torson Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48209 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Torson Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48209" (2021). Not Reported. 7012. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7012 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
BRANDON ALLAN TORSON, 
 
 Defendant-Appellant. 
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No. 48209-2020 
 
Ada County Case No.  
CR01-19-37518 
________________________ 
 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
________________________ 
 
HONORABLE STEVEN J. HIPPLER 
District Judge 
________________________ 
 
 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
322 E. Front St., Ste. 570 
Boise, Idaho  83702 
(208) 334-2712 
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
Electronically Filed
4/7/2021 5:04 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
i 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................................1 
 
 Nature Of The Case .................................................................................................1 
 
 Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ......................................1 
 
ISSUE ..................................................................................................................................3 
 
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................4 
 
 The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Officer 
 Had Reasonable Suspicion To Inquire Whether Torson 
 Had Taken A Narcotic .............................................................................................4 
 
 A. Introduction ..................................................................................................4 
 
 B. Standard Of Review .....................................................................................4 
 
 C. The Officer Had Reasonable Suspicion To Inquire 
  About Whether Torson Had Used A Narcotic .............................................5 
 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................8 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................................9 
 
 
 
ii 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
State v. Hogan, 868 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. 2015) ................................................................ 7, 8 
State v. Mullins, 164 Idaho 493, 432 P.3d 42 (2018) ......................................................... 4 
State v. Pachosa, 160 Idaho 35, 368 P.3d 655 (2016) ........................................................ 5 
State v. Perez, 164 Idaho 626, 434 P.3d 801 (2019) ........................................................... 5 
State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 329 P.3d 391 (Ct. App. 2014) ................................. 7 
State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 336 P.3d 232 (2014) .......................................................... 5 
 
 
 
1 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Brandon Allan Torson appeals from his conviction for felony DUI.  On appeal he 
challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Torson with felony DUI.  (R., pp. 24-25.)  Torson filed a motion 
to suppress “all statements he made at the scene and evidence seized,” contending “law 
enforcement unlawfully extended his detention.”  (R., pp. 32-42.)   
 The district court found the following facts in relation to the motion to suppress: 
An officer stopped the car Torson was driving for an expired registration at about 4:30 in 
the afternoon.  (R., p. 72.)  Torson admitted not having a driver’s license and provided an 
expired proof of insurance.  (Id.)  Torson seemed nervous.  (Id.)  The officer “called for a 
drug dog and additional officers as he walked back to his patrol car.”  (Id.) 
 At the patrol car the officer “ran Defendant’s information and wrote citations for 
having an expired registration and invalid driver’s license.”  (Id.)  A canine officer and a 
backup officer arrived while the initial officer “was writing the citations.”  (Id.)  The 
backup officer had Torson exit the car and sit on a curb.  (Id.)  As he did so he “noticed 
Defendant had ‘pinpoint pupils’ and red, watery eyes” that he recognized to be a 
“physiologic response to a narcotic.”  (Id.)  The officer asked Torson whether he was taking 
any medication and Torson stated he was on antibiotics “for a pulled tooth,” which 
conversation was overheard by the initial officer.  (R., pp. 72-73.) 
 The initial officer finished the citations “[a]pproximately twelve minutes after the 
initial stop.”  (Id.)  Rather than immediately delivering the citations, the initial officer 
 
2 
 
inspected Torson’s eyes for himself and likewise concluded their appearance could be a 
result of narcotics use.  (Id.)  Believing that taking an antibiotic would not explain Torson’s 
constricted pupils, he questioned Torson, who then admitted taking a narcotic as well as an 
antibiotic.  (Id.)  At this point the officer also smelled alcohol.  (Id.)  The initial officer then 
employed field sobriety testing, which Torson failed, and breath testing, which revealed a 
BAC of .09/.09.  (Id.) 
 The district court denied the motion to suppress.  (R., pp. 71-76.)  The district court 
reasoned that the officer who conducted the initial (unchallenged) traffic stop had 
reasonable suspicion to inquire about whether Torson had used a narcotic prior to driving 
based on seeing Torson had constricted pupils and red eyes, something the officer 
recognized as a physiological sign of narcotic use, and hearing Torson state that he was 
taking an antibiotic after having a tooth pulled.  (R., pp. 72-73, 75.)  That interaction led to 
an admission that Torson had in fact taken a narcotic and discovery of the smell of alcohol 
on Torson’s person.  (Id.)   
 Torson entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal the denial of 
his suppression motion.  (R., p. 80.)  The district court entered judgment and Torson timely 
appealed.  (R., pp. 92-99.)   
  
 
 
 
3 
 
ISSUE 
 
 Torson states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Torson’s motion to 
suppress. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Torson failed to show that the district court erred when it concluded that the 
officer had reasonable suspicion to inquire whether Torson had taken a narcotic? 
 
 
4 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Officer Had Reasonable Suspicion To 
Inquire Whether Torson Had Taken A Narcotic 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The district court found the initial officer had reasonable suspicion to investigate 
whether Torson had taken a narcotic based on Torson having “pinpoint” pupils; red, watery 
eyes; and Torson’s statement that he had a tooth pulled and was taking antibiotics.  (R., pp. 
73-76.)  The court concluded that even if the constricted pupils alone were not enough, the 
additional facts rendered an investigation into whether Torson had taken a narcotic 
reasonable.  (Id.)   
 On appeal Torson contends that constricted pupils alone are not enough to create 
reasonable suspicion and “more additional factors were needed to create reasonable 
suspicion in his case.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9.)  This argument fails for two reasons.  
First, a physiological sign of narcotics use is enough alone to create reasonable suspicion 
of narcotics use and, second, even if it was not alone enough the officer also had (1) unusual 
nervousness, (2) red and watery eyes, and (3) Torson’s statement that he had a tooth 
removed and was taking medications (specifically antibiotics) for it.  All of these facts 
together amount to reasonable suspicion to extend the detention long enough to ask if 
Torson was taking a narcotic along with the antibiotic. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the Court accepts the trial 
court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.”  State v. Mullins, 164 Idaho 
 
5 
 
493, 496, 432 P.3d 42, 45 (2018) (quotation marks omitted).  “Thus, determinations of 
reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo, while findings of fact that support a 
determination of reasonable suspicion are reviewed for clear error.”  State v. Perez, 164 
Idaho 626, 628, 434 P.3d 801, 803 (2019) (quotation marks and brackets omitted).  Torson 
has not claimed clear error in the district court’s factual findings.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 
6-11.)  Thus, the only issue before this court is the de novo application of the law to the 
facts found by the district court. 
 
C. The Officer Had Reasonable Suspicion To Inquire About Whether Torson Had 
Used A Narcotic 
 
 “Under the Fourth Amendment, limited investigatory detentions, based on less than 
probable cause, are permissible when justified by an officer’s reasonable articulable 
suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.”  Perez, 164 Idaho 
at 628, 434 P.3d at 803 (quotation marks omitted).  “To determine whether such reasonable 
articulable suspicion existed, courts must examine the totality of the circumstances which 
were known to the officer before the detention occurred.”  State v. Pachosa, 160 Idaho 35, 
39, 368 P.3d 655, 659 (2016).  “Although it must be more than a mere hunch, the level of 
suspicion required to create a reasonable suspicion is less than is necessary for probable 
cause and considerably less than proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”  State v. 
Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 305, 336 P.3d 232, 238 (2014).  “Further, while conduct might be 
explained by another cause, the Supreme Court of the United States has consistently 
recognized that reasonable suspicion need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.”  
Perez, 164 Idaho at 628, 434 P.3d at 803 (quotation marks omitted).   
 
6 
 
 In this case the officers observed “pinpoint pupils” which are a “physiologic 
response to a narcotic.”  (R., p. 72.)  Although there may be other possible explanations for 
why Torson would have extremely contracted pupils during daylight hours, the possibility 
it was because he had used a narcotic was more than a hunch.  It was therefore 
constitutionally reasonable to extend the traffic stop to conduct further investigation of 
whether Torson was under the influence of a narcotic and was in fact safe to drive the car. 
 Even if the fact of “pinpoint pupils” alone was not enough to reasonably suspect 
the possibility that Torson had used a narcotic, that was not the only fact in the totality of 
circumstances known to the officers.  Additional facts include Torson’s unusual 
nervousness, that Torson’s eyes were also red and watery, and Torson’s explanation that 
he had recently had dental work and was taking an antibiotic.  (R., p. 72.)  As determined 
by the district court, these factors in conjunction make suspicion Torson had taken a 
narcotic reasonable.  (R., p. 75.)  Although nervousness alone does not create reasonable 
suspicion, it is properly considered.  Moreover, although Torson explained his red and 
watery eyes, such explanation does not negate consideration of this fact.  Finally, Torson’s 
explanation for his “pinpoint pupils” being the result of antibiotics from a dental procedure 
is quite suspicious, because the recent dental procedure would be one reason why Torson 
might be taking a narcotic as a painkiller and because antibiotics were not, in the officer’s 
experience, a reason for the constricted pupils.  (R., pp. 72-73.)  The totality of the 
circumstances in this case included “pinpoint pupils,” a known physiologic response to a 
narcotic; unusual nervousness; red and watery eyes; and Torson’s statements that he had a 
tooth extraction for which he was taking antibiotics.  This totality made suspicion he had 
taken a narcotic reasonable.  Investigation based on this reasonable suspicion led quickly 
 
7 
 
to evidence Torson had in fact taken a narcotic for pain from the tooth extraction and 
additional evidence he was under the influence.  The district court correctly denied the 
motion to suppress. 
 Torson argues the district court erred.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9.)  He first cites 
State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 616, 329 P.3d 391, 398 (Ct. App. 2014), for the 
proposition that “the presence of bloodshot and glassy eyes is not alone sufficient to 
provide reasonable suspicion.”  Of course in this case Torson’s red and watery eyes were 
not the only, or even most significant, evidence possessed by the officer.   
Moreover, Torson’s casual bait and switch of bloodshot and glassy eyes for 
“pinpoint pupils” is not well taken.  Bloodshot and glassy eyes are more common and could 
happen for many reasons, only one of which is alcohol consumption.  By contrast, pinpoint 
pupils are far rarer, and narcotic use is the most likely explanation.  In a word, “pinpoint 
pupils” are more suspicious than glassy and bloodshot eyes. 
Finally, even if “pinpoint pupils” are analogous to bloodshot and glassy eyes, the 
totality of the circumstances in this case still shows reasonable suspicion.  The Court stated 
in Perez-Jungo that “few additional facts are needed beyond bloodshot and glassy eyes to 
provide reasonable suspicion of impaired driving or illegal drug activity.”  Id.  Here, in 
addition to red and watery eyes the officers observed “pinpoint pupils,” nervousness, and 
Torson’s statement about a recent tooth extraction for which he was taking antibiotics.  The 
district court’s ruling that this constituted additional facts is consistent with, and not 
contrary to, Perez-Jungo. 
 Torson’s argument based on State v. Hogan, 868 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. 2015), is 
likewise unpersuasive.  In that case the district court discounted the officer’s testimony 
 
8 
 
about the defendant’s “pupils being restricted.”  Id. at 131-32.  The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court concluded that “the State could have made a valid case that Deputy Smith had 
reasonable suspicion to pursue field sobriety tests with Patrick Hogan,” but that case “was 
not made, and, consequently, Judge Day’s ruling on this point was not error.”  Id. at 132.  
Rather than a hard and fast rule that constricted pupils would never alone create reasonable 
suspicion, the Hogan court stated that it could, but that the state would have to first 
convince a factfinder of the significance of those observations.  Unlike in Hogan, the 
district court’s unchallenged factual findings in this case support its conclusion the officers 
had reasonable suspicion of narcotics use. 
 The totality of the circumstances found by the district court included “pinpoint 
pupils,” a “physiologic response to a narcotic”; red, watery eyes; unusual nervousness; and 
Torson’s statement that he had a tooth pulled and was taking antibiotics.  (R., pp. 73-76.)  
The “pinpoint pupils” alone was enough to make suspicion of narcotic use reasonable.  In 
combination with the other circumstances, the district court correctly held officers had 
reasonable suspicion to further investigate the possibility of narcotic use. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s judgment. 
 DATED this 7th day of April, 2021. 
 
 
 
        /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 7th day of April, 2021, served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by 
means of iCourt File and Serve: 
 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
KKJ/dd 
 


State v. Torson Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48209

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State v. Myers Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48232 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KALE D. GANS 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
ASHLEY MARIE MYERS, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
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NO. 48232-2020 
 
Ada County Case No. 
CR01-17-6960 
 
           
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
ISSUE 
 
Has Ashley Marie Myers failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it 
revoked her probation and executed her sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, for felony 
DUI? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Myers Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 In March 2017, the state charged Myers with felony DUI, alleging two prior DUI 
convictions within the past ten years.  (R., pp.22-23.)    Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, 
Electronically Filed
4/28/2021 12:23 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Sara Velasquez, Deputy Clerk
 2 
Myers pleaded guilty as charged.  (R., pp.29-39.)  The district court sentenced Myers to ten years, 
with two years fixed, and placed her on probation for a period of ten years.  (R., pp.44-45.) 
In January of 2018, the state filed a probation violation report, alleging that Myers violated 
the terms and conditions of probation in a variety of ways.  (R., pp.60-62.)  Myers admitted to five 
of the violations, acknowledging that she had prohibited contacts with another person, possessed 
drug paraphernalia, consumed alcohol on two occasions, and drove a car without being “properly 
licensed and insured.”  (R., pp.61-62, 70.)  The district court revoked probation and retained 
jurisdiction, placing Myers on a rider.  (R., pp.72-73.) 
In September of 2018, following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district again placed 
Myers on probation for a period of ten years.  (R., pp.76-81.) 
Myers was subsequently arrested in Payette County, in January of 2020, for felony DUI, 
two counts of misdemeanor battery on an officer, and one count of misdemeanor resisting and 
obstructing.  (R., pp.84, 92-93.)  The state moved to revoke Myers’ probation based on the Payette 
County charges, among other alleged violations.  (R., p.86-91.)  Myers ultimately pleaded guilty 
to the Payette County felony DUI charge; thereafter, in this case, she admitted to the probation 
violation based on that charge.  (R., p.117; 6/1/20 Tr., p.4, L17 – p.5, L.16.)  Following Myers’ 
admission, the district court revoked probation and imposed her underlying sentence.  (R., pp.122-
23; 8/3/2020 Tr., p.16, L.18 – p.19, L.16.)  Myers timely appealed.  (R., pp.125-26.) 
 Myers argues the district court abused its discretion “by executing her sentence without 
retaining jurisdiction.” (Appellant’s brief, p.6.)  Review of the record and application of the 
relevant legal standards shows no abuse of discretion. 
 
 
 3 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “Once a probation violation has been proven, the decision of whether to revoke probation 
is within the sound discretion of the court.”  State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 113, 426 P.3d 461, 
464 (2018) (quotation marks omitted).  In evaluating whether a lower court abused its discretion, 
the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) 
acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) 
reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”  State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 
149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). 
 
C. Myers Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
 
 “A district court’s decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a 
showing that the court abused its discretion.”  State v. Day, 154 Idaho 649, 650, 301 P.3d 655, 656 
(Ct. App. 2013).  “Relevant considerations in making this decision are whether the probation is 
serving the goals of rehabilitation and whether imprisonment is necessary for the protection of 
society.”  State v. Kerr, 115 Idaho 725, 726, 769 P.2d 602, 603 (Ct. App. 1989).  “[W]e examine 
all the circumstances bearing upon the decision to revoke probation and require execution of the 
sentence, including events that occurred between the original pronouncement of the sentence and 
the revocation of probation.”  State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 672, 962 P.2d 1054, 1056 (Ct. App. 
1998). 
 On appeal, Myers fails to show the district court abused its discretion.  To the contrary, the 
court properly executed Myers’ sentence because Myers’ drinking and driving posed a risk to the 
community, and all prior attempts at rehabilitation had failed.  Myers’ underlying conviction was 
 4 
felony DUI—her fourth lifetime conviction for driving under the influence.1  (PSI, pp.4-6; 6/1/20 
Tr., p.6, Ls.9-11.)  She has twice violated probation in this case, and almost all the admitted 
violations involve drinking and driving.  (R., pp.61-62, 70, 117.)  Myers’ most recent probation 
violation was based on her latest conviction out of Payette County, also for felony DUI, where 
Myers “hit a car being driven by another person” and was “extremely combative with the officers” 
who responded to the scene.  (8/3/20 Tr., p.17, Ls.11-17.)  Lots of things had been tried to address 
Myers’ penchant for drunk driving; indeed, Myers accrued her second felony DUI despite having 
“a mix of probation and programs” under her belt, as well as “sober structured time” during her 
rider in this case.  (8/3/20 Tr., p.17, Ls.2-11; see PSI, pp.11-12.)   
The district court therefore sensibly concluded that Myers’ “really cannot drink at all,” and 
needed more alcohol abuse treatment and “mental health treatment” before she could effectively 
address these issues.  (8/3/20 Tr., p.17, Ls.17-24.)  Given Myers’ prior history and performance in 
this case, the court was likewise well within its discretion to conclude that probation, or even 
another rider, was insufficient to get her there: the district court found “the problem we have gotten 
to is it doesn’t seem safe to deal with this in the community,” at least until Myers accrued “more 
time sober” and had “a better chance … to deal with it better.”  (8/3/20 Tr., p.17, L.24 – p.18, L.4.)  
Myers fails to show this was an abuse of discretion. 
 On appeal Myers argues that “the district court did not exercise reason, and thus abused its 
discretion, by executing her sentence without retaining jurisdiction.” (Appellant’s brief, p.6.)  Her 
claim is that district court should have realized Myers “could be successful in the community,” 
                                            
1 The PSI in the record was prepared before Myers’ 2020 felony DUI and therefore doesn’t show 
that conviction in her criminal history.  (See PSI, pp.4-6; 6/1/20 Tr., p.6, Ls.9-11.)  In addition to 
the four convictions for driving under the influence, Myers’ reckless driving conviction was 
originally charged as a DUI, based on Myers driving with a BAC of “.088/.086.”  (PSI, p.6.) 
 5 
while properly supervised, “if she receives the treatment and programming she needs to address 
her substance abuse issues.”  (Id.) 
 But this ignores that the district court was well aware of Myers’ struggles with substance 
abuse.  It understood how important treatment is.  Those topics were essentially all the court 
discussed at the disposition hearing.  (See 8/3/20 Tr., p.16, L.18 – p.20, L.2.)  And Idaho’s 
appellate courts do “not presume the district court did not consider the information before it, as 
the district court said it did,” nor will they “reweigh the evidence on appeal from a discretionary 
sentencing decision.”  State v. Deboer, Idaho Court of Appeals Docket No. 47840, *5 (filed 
January 28, 2021 (opinion not yet final), citing State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 879, 253 P.3d 
310, 316 (2011)).  This Court should not do so here. 
In any event, the district court sensibly disagreed that Myers “could be successful in the 
community.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.6.)  Far from “not exercis[ing] reason” on that question (see 
Appellant’s brief, p.6), the court quite reasonably assessed the record in front of it, and concluded 
that Myers was demonstrably incapable of solving these problems on her own, on probation, or on 
a rider: 
This is a very significant violation of a probation that had as conditions of 
that probation that you couldn’t purchase, possess or consume alcohol.  And then 
you couple it with the kicking the officers and all of that stuff, I think things are 
very out of control.  And I just don’t feel like we have the capability to manage that 
safely in the public.  Whereas, I think if you got more programming and more 
sobriety, you might be able to move along farther. 
 
… 
 
So I’m going to revoke probation and impose sentence, but you’ve got lots 
of credit for time served.  And I’m going to recommend that you receive additional 
substance abuse counseling and treatment, and I’m also going to recommend in the 
judgment that you receive mental health counseling and treatment.  Because I think 
if you do both of those together and you have some more time sober, you should be 
in a better[,] stronger position when you get out. 
 
 6 
(Tr., p.18, Ls.5 – p.19, L.16.) 
The record in this case affirms that, despite numerous attempts at treatment and non-prison 
supervision, Myers still “violated the key conditions” related to drinking and driving, which are 
“designed to protect people.”  (8/3/20 Tr., p.19, Ls.2-3; R., pp.61-62, 70, 117.)  As such, the district 
court was right to think it would be unsafe to prematurely release Myers without “some more time 
sober” in prison.  (8/3/20 Tr., p.19, Ls.7-16.)  Because probation was not accomplishing its goals, 
nor had Myers’ period of retained jurisdiction made any durable impact on her drinking and 
driving, this was a reasonable conclusion. 
Rehabilitation and community protection are the touchstones of a probation revocation 
decision.  See Kerr, 115 Idaho at 726, 769 P.2d at 603.  And despite many attempts at 
rehabilitation—through probation, treatment, and a rider—Myers’ substance abuse issues 
remained unsolved, and the community remained at risk.  The district court was therefore well 
within its discretion to conclude that nothing short of incarceration, and the non-negotiable 
treatment on offer there, could effectively rehabilitate Myers while protecting the public.  
(Appellant’s brief, p.3.)  The court did not abuse its discretion by revoking probation and executing 
the sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 28th day of April, 2021. 
 
 
  /s/  Kale D. Gans 
KALE D. GANS 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of April, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
JACOB L. WESTERFIELD 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  Kale D. Gans 
KALE D. GANS 
Deputy Attorney General 
KDG/dd  
 


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