University of Idaho College of Law

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
3-2-2021 
State v. Ybarra Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48016 
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Recommended Citation 
"State v. Ybarra Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48016" (2021). Not Reported. 6894. 
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of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
ALEXIS NEVAREZ YBARRA, 
 
 Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
)
) 
 
No. 48016-2020 
 
Cassia County Case No.  
CR-16-19-2209 
________________________ 
 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CASSIA 
________________________ 
 
HONORABLE MICHAEL P. TRIBE 
District Judge 
________________________ 
 
 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
322 E. Front St., Ste. 570 
Boise, Idaho  83702 
(208) 334-2712 
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
Electronically Filed
3/2/2021 3:42 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
i 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................................1 
 
 Nature Of The Case .................................................................................................1 
 
 Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ......................................1 
 
ISSUE ..................................................................................................................................2 
 
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................3 
 
 Ybarra Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred 
 When It Denied His Motion For Credit For Time Served 
 On Charges From A Different Case .........................................................................3 
 
 A. Introduction ..................................................................................................3 
 
 B. Standard Of Review .....................................................................................3 
 
 C. Ybarra Is Not Entitled To Credit For Time Served 
  On Charges Other Than The Offense For Which 
  The Judgment Was Entered In This Case ....................................................3 
 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................4 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................................5 
 
 
 
ii 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
State v. Brand, 162 Idaho 189, 395 P.3d 809 (2017) .......................................................... 4 
State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 139 P.3d 771 (Ct. App. 2006) .......................................... 3 
State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 439 P.3d 1267 (2019) .................................................... 4 
State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 343 P.3d 30 (2015) .............................................................. 4 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 18-309(1)................................................................................................................... 3 
RULES 
 
I.C.R. 35 ...............................................................................................................................1 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Alexis Nevarez Ybarra appeals from the denial of his motion for credit for time 
served. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The district court entered a judgment of conviction upon Ybarra’s guilty plea to one 
count of possession of a controlled substance.  (R., pp. 54-56.)  The district court sentenced 
Ybarra to five years with two years determinate.  (R., p. 54.)  The district court awarded 
credit for 105 days served.  (R., p. 55.)   
 Ybarra filed a Rule 35 motion requesting credit for an additional 132 days of time 
served.  (R., pp. 59-60.)  Ybarra’s motion states that he “was out on bond in this matter and 
received new charges on July 25, 2019, however, his bond was never revoked in this instant 
matter after being incarcerated on those new charges.”  (R., p. 59.)  Ybarra argued that “his 
bond should have been revoked and that he should therefore receive the additional credit 
for time served” because of the new charges.  (Id.) 
 The district court denied the motion for additional credit for time served.  (R., pp. 
64-66.)  The district court found that Ybarra “was indeed incarcerated between July 24 and 
December 3 of 2019, however his incarceration was due to” the charges in the new case, 
and “not this case.”  (R., p. 66.)  Ybarra filed a notice of appeal timely from the denial of 
his Rule 35 motion.  (R., pp. 69-70.) 
 
2 
 
ISSUE 
 
 Ybarra states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ybarra’s motion for credit for 
time served? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Ybarra failed to show that the district court erred when it denied his motion for 
credit for time served on charges from a different case? 
 
 
3 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Ybarra Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied His Motion 
For Credit For Time Served On Charges From A Different Case 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Ybarra moved in this case for credit for time served on charges brought in a 
different case on the theory that his bond in this case should have been revoked but was 
not.  (R., pp. 59-60.)  The district court denied the motion because Ybarra was not in 
custody for the offense for which the judgment was entered.  (R., pp. 64-66.) 
 On appeal Ybarra contends the district court erred “notwithstanding” controlling 
authority applied by the district court.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)  Because his argument is 
contrary to controlling authority, Ybarra has failed to show error. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “Whether the district court properly applied the law governing credit for time 
served is a question of law over which we exercise free review.”  State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 
169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006).  “We defer to the trial court’s findings of 
fact, however, unless those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence 
in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous.”  Id. 
 
C. Ybarra Is Not Entitled To Credit For Time Served On Charges Other Than The 
Offense For Which The Judgment Was Entered In This Case 
 
 A defendant is entitled to credit for time served “for any period of incarceration 
prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the offense or an included offense 
for which the judgment was entered.”  I.C. § 18-309(1).  The test for whether a defendant 
is entitled to credit is whether he was (1) “incarcerated during the intervening period from 
 
4 
 
when the arrest warrant was served and the judgment of conviction was entered” and (2) 
“putting aside any alternative reason for the defendant’s incarceration, the relevant offense 
must be one that provides a basis for the defendant’s incarceration.”  State v. Brand, 162 
Idaho 189, 192-93, 395 P.3d 809, 812-13 (2017).  This second prong of this test “lays aside 
any alternative reason for the defendant’s incarceration and simply requires that the 
relevant offense be one that provides a basis for incarceration.”  State v. Gonzalez, 165 
Idaho 95, 99, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019).  The defendant is entitled to credit only if his 
“prejudgment jail time was for ‘the offense’ the defendant was convicted of and sentenced 
for.”  State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4, 343 P.3d 30, 33 (2015). 
 Here Ybarra sought credit for time he was in jail on charges other than the offense 
for which he was convicted and sentenced in this case.  (R., pp. 59-60.)  He contended that 
although he was not in fact in custody for the offense for which the judgment was entered 
in this case, he should have been.  (Id.)  The district court applied the relevant legal 
standards and rejected this argument.  (R., pp. 64-66.)  On appeal Ybarra does not assert 
that the district court incorrectly applied the law to the facts.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)  He 
has therefore failed to show error. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order denying 
the Rule 35 motion for credit for time served. 
 DATED this 2nd day of March, 2021. 
 
 
        /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
5 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 2nd day of March, 2021, served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by 
means of iCourt File and Serve: 
 
 ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
KKJ/dd 
 


English

State v. Ybarra Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48016

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7927/thumbnail.jp

UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
3-31-2021 
State v. Baca Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48083 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Baca Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48083" (2021). Not Reported. 6928. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6928 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
TROY ALLEN BACA, 
 
 Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
)
) 
 
Nos. 48083-2020 & 48084-2020 
 
Twin Falls County Case Nos.  
CR-2015-131 & CR-2015-1942 
________________________ 
 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
________________________ 
 
HONORABLE BENJAMIN J. CLUFF 
District Judge 
________________________ 
 
 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KACEY L. JONES 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
322 E. Front St., Ste. 570 
Boise, Idaho  83702 
(208) 334-2712 
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
Electronically Filed
3/31/2021 1:59 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................................1 
 
 Nature Of The Case .............................................................................................................1 
 
 Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ..................................................1 
 
ISSUE ..............................................................................................................................................3 
 
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................4 
 
 Baca Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused 
 Its Discretion When It Revoked His Probation....................................................................4 
 
 A. Introduction ..............................................................................................................4 
 
 B. Standard Of Review .................................................................................................4 
 
 C. Baca Has Failed To Show That The District Court 
  Abused Its Discretion ...............................................................................................5 
 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................8 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................................................8 
 
 
 
 ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 429 P.3d 149 (2018) ................................................................... 5 
State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 426 P.3d 461 (2018) ................................................................ 4 
State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 288 P.3d 835 (Ct. App. 2012) .................................................... 5 
State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 566 P.2d 1110 (1977) ................................................................ 5 
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 233 P.3d 33 (2009) .................................................................... 4 
State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 899 P.2d 984 (Ct. App. 1995) ....................................................... 5 
 
 
 
 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Troy Allen Baca appeals from the district court’s order revoking his probation and 
executing his underlying sentences in case numbers CR-2015-131 and CR-2015-1942.  
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Law enforcement responded to a domestic battery call by A.A., who alleged Baca picked 
her up and threw her down during an argument.  (PSI, p.5.)  Officers found a methamphetamine 
pipe on top of Baca’s backpack; inside the backpack, officers found twelve small zip-lock baggies 
containing a white powder residue and one baggie containing a trace amount of white powder.  
(PSI, p.6.)  Baca admitted he recently used marijuana and methamphetamine.  (PSI, p.6.)  The 
white powder residue tested positive for amphetamine.  (PSI, p.6.)  The state charged Baca with 
possession of a controlled substance in case number CR-2015-131.  (R., pp.26-27.)   
Around a month-and-a-half later, law enforcement responded to an unknown injury 
accident.  (PSI, p.6.)  Baca, A.A., and their two children were at the scene; all complained of 
injuries.  (PSI, p.6.)  Baca was combative with medical personnel on the scene.  (PSI, p.6.)  His 
eyes were glassy and bloodshot and his speech was slurred.  (PSI, p.6.)  One of the children told 
law enforcement that A.A. was driving when Baca reached over and pulled the steering wheel.  
(PSI, p.7.)  A.A. told law enforcement the same thing: she was driving when Baca became upset 
with her, reached over, and pulled the steering wheel.  (PSI, p.7.)  This caused A.A. to lose control 
of the vehicle; the vehicle rolled and the children were ejected.  (PSI, p.7.)  Afterwards, Baca 
wanted them to get back in the vehicle and drive away but A.A. refused, so Baca got in the vehicle 
himself and attempted to leave A.A. and the injured children behind.  (PSI, p.7.)  However, the 
vehicle was damaged and traveled only a short distance.  (PSI, p.7.)  A.A. told officers that Baca 
 
 2 
wanted her “to take the blame.”  (PSI, p.7.)  Later while in jail, Baca called A.A. and advised her 
what to say and do to get the charges against him “thrown out.”  (PSI, pp.7, 32-38.)  In case number 
CR-2015-1942, the state charged Baca with two counts of felony injury to child and one count of 
witness intimidation.  (R., pp.162-63, 168-70.)   
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Baca pleaded guilty to all charges.  (R., pp.40-50, 172-82.)  
The district court sentenced Baca to five years with three years fixed in the drug case and retained 
jurisdiction.  (R., pp.62-68.)  In the other case, the district court sentenced Baca to ten years with 
five years fixed on each count of injury to child and five years indeterminate for witness 
intimidation, with the sentences to run concurrently with each other and his sentence in the drug 
case, and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.194-201.)  After the rider, the district court suspended 
Baca’s sentences and placed him on a four-year period of probation.  (R., pp.75-80, 210-14.)   
 The state filed a motion to revoke probation, alleging that Baca violated the terms of his 
probation by committing a battery on his wife, and failing to make himself available for 
supervision or absconding.1  (R., pp.91-95, 224-28.)  Baca admitted both allegations.  (R., pp.109, 
242; 2/25/2020 Tr., p.7, L.19 – p.9, L.8.)  The district court revoked Baca’s probation and imposed 
his underlying sentences.  (R., pp.120-21, 139-41, 247-48, 264-66.)  Baca filed a Rule 35 motion 
for reduction of his sentences.  (R., pp.123-26, 250-53.)  The district court denied his motion with 
respect to the drug case, but reduced Baca’s sentences on the each injury to child count to ten years 
with four years fixed.  (R., pp.127, 254.)  Baca filed timely notices of appeal.  (R., pp.129-32, 256-
59.)  This Court consolidated the cases on appeal.  (R., p.268.)   
                                            
1 The motion also alleged Baca used controlled substances while on probation.  (R., p.92.)  
However, the attached supporting documentation referred only to the conduct of a Mr. Mosqueda 
in Texas.  (R., p.94.)  Ultimately, the district court found the state failed to meet its burden with 
respect to that allegation.  (See R., pp.109-10; see also 2/25/2020 Tr., p.14, Ls.5-6.) 
 
 3 
ISSUE 
 
Baca states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Baca’s probation and 
executed his underlying sentences? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Baca failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his 
probation? 
 
 
 
 4 
ARGUMENT 
 
Baca Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked His 
Probation  
 
A. Introduction 
Baca argues the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-8.)  Baca has shown no abuse of discretion.  The district court considered 
the conduct underlying Baca’s admitted violations of the terms of his probation and the 
rehabilitative options he had already been given, as well as the protection of society.  The district 
court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Baca’s probation based on its finding that Baca 
posed a high risk of reoffending and probation was not serving its rehabilitative purpose. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
In reviewing the district court’s decision to revoke probation, the Court employs “a two-
step analysis.”  State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citation omitted).  
First, the appellate court determines “whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation.”  
Id.  If the appellate court determines “that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his 
probation, the second question is what should be the consequences of that violation.”  Id. 
The decision to revoke probation is within the sound discretion of the court.  State v.  
Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 113, 426 P.3d 461, 464 (2018).  “A district court’s decision to revoke 
probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion.”  
Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105, 233 P.3d at 36 (citation omitted).  When a trial court’s discretionary 
decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine 
whether the lower court: (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the 
boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the 
 
 5 
specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.  State v. Herrera, 
164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018). 
 
C. Baca Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
When reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the 
conduct underlying the trial court’s decision to revoke probation.  State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 
621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012).  “In determining whether to revoke probation a court must 
consider whether probation is meeting the objective of rehabilitation while also providing adequate 
protection for society.”  State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995) 
(citation omitted).  If the court reasonably concludes from the defendant’s conduct that probation 
is not achieving its rehabilitative purpose, then probation may be revoked.  See State v. Mummert, 
98 Idaho 452, 454-55, 566 P.2d 1110, 1112-13 (1977). 
The facts underlying Baca’s probation violations support the district court’s decision to 
revoke probation.  Baca’s first probation violation was based on his commission of a battery on 
his wife.  During a heated argument, Baca head-butted his wife in the face.  (R., p.101.)  When 
officers responded, his wife’s nose was “swelling and crooked”; she reported her pain level was a 
“10, on a scale of 1-10.”  (R., p.101.)  Baca was charged with and convicted of Fourth Degree 
Assault.  (PSI, pp.87-88.)  Second, Baca failed to make himself available for supervision from 
June to August of 2019, despite numerous attempts by probation to contact him.  (See R., pp.94-
95.)  Probation officers contacted Baca’s listed employer and found that Baca had been fired for 
failing to show up.  (R., p.94.)  Probation officers attempted to contact Baca at his listed residence, 
but were unable to do so; his daughter reported Baca wasn’t home and “she doesn’t see him often.”  
(R., pp.94-95.)  As Baca’s probation officer noted, Baca’s disregard of the terms of probation 
demonstrate that he does “not appreciate the opportunity of probation awarded to him” and has 
 
 6 
“not shown he is ready to be a productive member of society.”  (R., p.95.)  Thus, the probation 
officer opined that Baca “is in need of a greater level of supervision and treatment at this time and 
would benefit from a more structured environment,” and recommended Baca’s probation be 
revoked.  (R., p.95.)   
Further, Baca has failed to take accountability for his actions and instead has minimized 
his conduct by downplaying it and placing the blame on others.  In the PSI, Baca reported he 
“wasn’t aware [he] was doing anything wrong!”  (PSI, p.85.)  He denied responsibility for his 
actions, blaming his conviction for Fourth Degree Assault on his wife and characterizing his failure 
to be available for supervision as “a big misunderstanding in an otherwise perfect 4 years of 
supervision (no violations or sanctions).”  (PSI, pp.85, 94-95.)  However, his probation had not 
been “perfect”; during a 2018 home visit, his probation officer found alcohol in his home and Baca 
admitted to consuming alcohol while on probation, leading to him serving several days in jail.  
(PSI, p.88.)   
Further, Baca “was not forthright in many areas of his interview” and seems unwilling to 
recognize his issues, despite opportunities for treatment and rehabilitation.  (See PSI, p.95.)  Baca 
received substance abuse treatment.  (PSI, p.88.)  Nonetheless, he consumed alcohol and kept 
alcohol in his home while on probation.  (PSI, p.88.)  However, when asked when he last consumed 
alcohol, Baca reported he had not had alcohol since 2015.  (PSI, p.93.)  Baca received “Batterer 
Specific” treatment.  (PSI, p.88.)  Nonetheless, he battered his wife by head-butting her in the face 
during an argument.  (See R., p.101.)  However, Baca asserted he “has never struggled with his 
anger.”  (PSI, p.93.)  The PSI concluded that “[b]ased on [Baca]’s non-compliance on supervision 
during the past year, coupled with his conviction for a violent offense, he does not appear to be a 
good candidate for community supervision.”  (PSI, p.96.) 
 
 7 
The district court reviewed the addendum to the PSI.  (5/5/2020 Tr., p.13, Ls.17-19.)  It 
considered that Baca had the opportunity to complete a rider and was then given the opportunity 
of probation, which began successfully.  (Tr., p.13, Ls.19-22.)  However, the common theme in 
Baca’s history has been “the lack of accountability.”  (Tr., p.14, Ls.1-5.)  The district court noted 
that Baca blamed his behavior on his wife and represented that his probation had been perfect 
despite his alcohol violation.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.10-17.)  The district court found that there was a high 
risk that Baca would reoffend if he returned to probation.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.18-21.)  In light of the 
underlying conduct, the finding that Baca posed a high risk to reoffend if placed on probation, the 
PSI’s recommendation to impose sentence, and Baca’s prior rehabilitative opportunities, the 
district court imposed Baca’s underlying sentences.  (Tr., p.14, L.18 – p.15, L.2.)  The district 
court did not abuse its discretion by doing so. 
Baca argues the district court should not have revoked probation because he did well for 
most of the probationary period, his violations were “minor,” and he does not present a risk to 
society.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-8.)  Baca’s “minor” violations demonstrate that he poses a risk to 
society, given that one violation was based on his commission of a violent battery against another 
person.  Further, Baca’s failure to make himself available for supervision demonstrates that he is 
not amenable to community supervision and instead is in need of a greater level of supervision in 
a more structured environment, as his probation officer noted.  (See R., p.95.)  The district court 
did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the rehabilitative purpose of probation was not 
being achieved where Baca continued to engage in concerning behavior—including drinking and 
battering his wife—despite receiving treatment specifically targeted to address that conduct, and 
evaded supervision efforts by his probation officer. 
 
--
 
 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 31st day of March, 2021. 
 
 
        
   /s/  Kacey L. Jones 
 KACEY L. JONES 
 Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 31st day of March, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
 ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
   /s/  Kacey L. Jones 
      KACEY L. JONES 
Deputy Attorney General 
KLJ/dd 
 
 
 
 


State v. Baca Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48083

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7934/thumbnail.jp

State v. McComas Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48105

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7939/thumbnail.jp

Electronically Filed
1/8/2021 12:24 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
CHRISTOPHER CANGRO,
Petitioner-Appellant, Supreme Court N0. 48108-2020
vs. CV01'19'16299
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
VVVVVVVVVV
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
HONORABLE MICHAEL REARDON
District Judge
Dennis Benjamin, ISB 4199 IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & Kacey L. Jones, Deputy
BARTLETT LLP Criminal Law Division
303 W. Bannock P.O. Box 83720
P.O. BOX 2772 Boise, ID 83720-0010
Boise, ID 83701 (208) 334-4534
(208) 343-1000
db@nbmlaw.com
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Table of Authorities .............................................. ii
II. Argument in Reply ............................................... 1
A. Introduction .................................................... 1
B. Why Relief Should be Granted ..................................... 1
1. Deficient performance ....................................... 1
2. Prejudice .................................................. 2
III. Conclusion .................................................... 5
II. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)...................... 1, 2, 4, 6
STATE CASES
Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612 (201 1) .................................... 2
ii
II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A. Introduction
The state asserts that evidence of motive was unimportant to its trial case
because “[t]he only dispute was Whether Cangro saw the activated police lights.”
Respondent’s Brief, p. 5. But that is a non sequitur because the state asked the jury
t0 conclude Mr. Cangro saw the activated police lights and fled because he had a
motive t0 d0 so. These were the first words out 0f the state’s mouth in its opening
statement and the last words uttered in its rebuttal argument. R 183 (EX. C pg. 96,
1n. 10-13); R 237 (EX. C pg. 311, 1n. 2-3). In between, it repeatedly argued t0 the jury
the fact that Mr. Cangro had a motive to elude the officer When he activated his
lights was compelling evidence that he saw the lights. As shown below, the state’s
current position that motive is immaterial is a Charade.
B. WhyReliefShouId be Granted.
1. Deficient performance
The state does not contest the post-conviction court’s conclusion that trial
counsel’s failure t0 impeach Ms. Prindle’s testimony was deficient performance
under Strickland V. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); nor does it contest that the
deficient performance went t0 both the DUI and eluding counts. It only argues that
Mr. Cangro’s defense t0 the eluding count was not affected by the deficient
performance. See Respondent’s Brief, p. ’7. This Court should conclude there was
deficient performance as t0 both counts for the reasons previously argued. Opening
Brief, p. 12-13.
2. Prejudice
Whether Mr. Cangro was prejudiced by the deficient performance is a mixed
question 0f law and fact. Booth V. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617 (2011), citing
Strickland, 466 U.S., at 698. “When faced With a mixed question 0f fact and law, the
Court Will defer t0 the district court’s factual findings if supported by substantial
evidence, but Will exercise free review over the application of the relevant law to
those facts.” Id. Under this standard, this Court should freely review the post-
conviction court’s application 0f the law t0 the facts and conclude Mr. Cangro was
prejudiced as t0 the eluding count.
In its responsive brief, the state spends a great deal 0f time proving that
motive is not an element of the eluding count. Why it does so is not clear since it
also notes that fact is undisputed. Respondent’s Brief, p. 8. N0 further comment 0n
that argument is needed.
Next, the state argues that since “the only dispute” at trial was Whether Mr.
Cangro’s eluding was done “willfully,” the question of motive was immaterial. Id,
p. 9. That argument is wrong. The jury was instructed that, “An act is done
willfully When it’s done 0n purpose.” R 227 (EX. C. pg. 269, 1n. 15-16). The jury had
t0 find that Mr. Cangro willfully fled 0r attempted t0 elude a pursuing police
vehicle. R 226 (EX. C. pg. 267, 1n. 12-14). In order t0 attempt to elude a pursuing
police vehicle “0n purpose,” the defendant must be aware a police vehicle is in
pursuit. Thus, the resolution of the “willfully” dispute at trial turned 0n Whether
Mr. Cangro had a reason t0 elude the police and the state asserted he had such a
2
reason. It posited that Mr. Cangro acted willfully t0 avoid being arrested for DUI.
It is only since obtaining the conviction has the state downplayed the importance 0f
motive.
Without the state’s asserted motive t0 elude, the state’s evidence 0n that
count was weak. First, there was n0 documentary evidence that the deputy even
activated his lights, as he failed t0 activate his patrol vehicle’s Video-recorder. R 197
(EX. C pg. 151, 1n. 3-11). The officer’s failure t0 follow the “normal course 0f duties”
is suspicious and a rational jury could have harbored doubts about Whether the
deputy activated his lights at all, especially after hearing Mr. Cangro’s testimony.
Further, While unmentioned by the state in its recitation 0f facts, Deputy Hickam
stated in his police report, “I was unsure if he saw my emergency lights.” He
confirmed that report at the trial. R 200 (EX. C pg. 162, 1n. 11-24). He also testified
that “I assumed that he had seen my lights” based upon Mr. Cangro’s “lack 0f
swerving” and “high rate 0f speed.” R 203 (EX. C. p. 1’75, 1n. 11-14) (emphasis
added).
Thus, the state’s only Witness t0 the lights being activated forgot t0 turn on
his Video-recording t0 prove he activated them, could not say Mr. Cangro saw them
and only assumed Mr. Cangro saw them. In opposition t0 the state’s scant proof 0f
willfulness, Mr. Cangro testified that he did not see any police lights. R 215 (Exhibit
C, pg. 221, 1n. 13-14, p. 22, 1n. 12-13). Given the deputy’s inability t0 testify that Mr.
Cangro willfully ignored his signals t0 stop and Mr. Cangro’s testimony t0 the
contrary, the state’s newly found confidence in the strength 0f its evidence 0f
8
willfulness is not supported by the trial record. In fact, the absence 0f evidence 0f
willfulness is why the state emphasized the motive evidence at the trial. It was the
only way it could prove willfulness, an essential element of the offense.
Ms. Prindle’s mistaken testimony that Mr. Cangro left the Longhorn Bar at
10130, instead 0f 12345 was central t0 the state’s theory 0f intoxication as motive.
The trial prosecutor emphasized that Ms. Prindle, “an uninterested Witness . . .
testified that Mr. Cangro left the Longhorn between 10330 and 11300.” R 231 (EX. C
pg. 286, 1n. 13-14). He continued:
So we’ve got n0 testimony between about 11300 and 12345. That’s almost two
hours unaccounted for. What could he have done during that two hours[?]
Id. (EX. C pg. 286, 1n. 24 — pg. 287, 1n. 4. The state’s answer t0 its question was Mr.
Cangro had spent that time getting drunk at Cowgirls. While the state now
downplays the importance 0f that evidence, it emphasized it in closing argument!
That 11019 1'11 the timeljne 1's important. Moving it matters because What the
Witnesses testified is that nobody saw him — nobody Who testified saw him
that night after about 11300 o’clock. That leaves over an hour, an hour and 45
minutes before he was pulled over.
R 237 (EX. C pg. 309, 1n. 3'8) (emphasis added).
And absent the inference that Mr. Cangro had spent the two hours drinking
at Cowgirls, the state evidence 0f the DUI motive was weak. The state had t0
charge Mr. Cangro With the driving “While under the influence,” R 28, rather than
the “per se” alternative because there were n0 blood or breath tests administered.
There were also n0 field sobriety tests administered. The only evidence 0f drinking
was Ms. Prindle’s and Mr. Cangro’s testimony that he drank one'half 0f a beer. R
4
210-213 (EX. C, pg. 203, 1n. 9-17; pg. 216, 1n. 21 — pg. 217, 1n. 2.). Ms. Prindle
testified that Mr. Cangro appeared t0 be sober and Mr. Cangro testified that what
he drank did not affect or impair his driving abilities. TT pg. 203 1n. 25 — pg. 204,
1n. 1; pg. 220, 1n. 12-19. Likewise, Ray Berryman did not see Mr. Cangro drink any
alcohol When they were together that evening. R 210 (EX. C pg. 209, 1n. 13-18).
Mr. Cangro’s driving pattern was not strong evidence 0f intoxication. In fact,
the prosecutor elicited testimony that Mr. Cangro was driving skillfully. R 221 (EX.
C pg. 248, 1n. 10-13. (Q. You agree that you were driving pretty skillfully that
night; right, around barricades and 0n bank canal? A. Yeah”) The prosecutor also
emphasized the skillful driving during his closing argument. R 232 (EX. C pg. 292,
1n. 15 [“skillfully avoiding police officer,” 1n. 19-21 [“And he was answering
coherently and he was driving skillfully”], 1n. 25 [“Skillfully eluding 0n the road
bike.”]). Skillful driving is not impaired driving.
Finally, as t0 Mr. Cangro’s refusal t0 submit t0 testing, that only raises an
inference of guilt. And it is a weak inference because a rational jury armed With the
testimony that Mr. Cangro did not have the opportunity t0 drink in the time
between leaving the Longhorn and being spotted by Deputy Hickam, would
understand why Mr. Cangro was upset and confused about being asked t0 submit t0
testing. It would have seen that as an error in judgment, as Mr. Cangro
forthrightly admitted at trial, and not as evidence of guilt.
Considering the above, the post-conviction court found the failure 0f defense
counsel t0 impeach Ms. Prindle was prejudicial under Strickland as t0 the DUI
count. It found:
Given that the impeachment evidence at issue goes directly t0 Petitioner’s
whereabouts during that timeframe, the Court finds a reasonable probability
that the outcome would have been different had the jury been able to more
fully weigh Ms. Prindle’s credibility and the conflicting testimony provided by
Petitioner. Thus, With respect t0 the misdemeanor DUI Charge, the Court
grants Petitioner’s motion for summary disposition and denies the State’s
motion for summary disposition.
R 335. Since Ms. Prindle’s testimony was central t0 the DUI conviction, it follows
that it was also central t0 the establishment 0f the state’s DUI motive in the eluding
charge. Notably, the state did not cross-appeal that ruling, nor does it challenge
that finding 0n appeal.
Where Mr. Cangro was coming from was relevant to the eluding count
because if he were coming from Cowgirls (01‘ any bar other than the Longhorn) he
could have been drinking there. If that were the case, it would support the state’s
theory that Mr. Cangro must have seen the police lights because his subsequent
actions could be explained by his motive to avoid a DUI arrest. Otherwise, it could
not prove Mr. Cangro acted “0n purpose” t0 evade the police. What time he left the
Longhorn was relevant for the same reason. The state’s trial counsel thought so
and it is disingenuous for the state t0 deny that now.
II. CONCLUSION
The post'conviction court’s conclusion that evidence 0f motive was immaterial
t0 the eluding charge is illogical, contrary t0 law and human experience, and
6
unsupported by the record. The state’s argument in support 0f it is all the above
and is also contradicted by its argument at trial. Consequently, the order granting
the state’s motion t0 summarily dismiss the petition as t0 the eluding charge and
the order denying Mr. Cangro’s motion for summary disposition in his favor 0n that
charge should both be reversed. The matter should be remanded for the entry 0f a
judgment in favor 0f Mr. Cangro 0n the eluding count.
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of January 2021.
/s/ Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Christopher Cangro
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE AND SERVICE
The undersigned does hereby certify that the electronic brief submitted
follows all the requirements set out in I.A.R. 34.1, and that an electronic copy was
served 0n each party at the following email address(es)3
Idaho State Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
ecf@ag.idah0.g0v
Dated and certified this 8th day 0f January 2021.
/s/Dennis Beniamin
Dennis Benjamin


Cangro v. State Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48108

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
3-9-2021 
State v. Descharme Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48114 
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"State v. Descharme Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48114" (2021). Not Reported. 6943. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6943 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #7353
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NOS. 48114-2020 & 48115-2020
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) TWIN FALLS COUNTY NOS. CR42-19-4690
v. ) & CR42-19-4691
)
MICHELLE RENE DESCHARME, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
______________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Michelle Descharme, pled guilty to passing a check with
insufficient funds in one case, and forgery with a persistent violator enhancement in a second
case.  She received an aggregate unified sentence of eleven years, with five years fixed.  On
appeal, Ms. Descharme contends that her sentences represent an abuse of the district court’s
discretion, as they are excessive given any view of the facts.
Electronically Filed
3/9/2021 9:38 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
2
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Supreme Court Docket No. 48114-2020 (Twin Falls County district court case number
CR42-19-4690 (hereinafter, the insufficient funds case)) and Supreme Court Docket No. 48115-
2020 (Twin Falls County district court case number CR42-19-4691 (hereinafter, the forgery
case)) have been consolidated for appellate purposes.  (R., p.152.)
In the insufficient funds case, in February of 2019, Ms. Descharme wrote several checks
on her own checking account, which contained insufficient funds to pay for the amounts written
on the checks.  (R., pp.14-15.)  Based on these facts, Ms. Descharme was charged by information
with one count of issuing a check with insufficient funds and the persistent violator sentencing
enhancement.  (R., pp.29-31, 52-55.)
In the forgery case, Ms. Descharme wrote a check on a business’s checking account, and
forged the signature of the business owner on the check.  (Presentence Investigation Report
(hereinafter, PSI),1 p.3; R., pp.174-75.)  Based on these facts, Ms. Descharme was charged by
information with one count of forgery, one count of burglary, and the persistent violator
sentencing enhancement.  (R., pp.187-89, 217-20.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement resolving several pending cases, Ms. Descharme pled guilty
to passing a check with insufficient funds, forgery, and the persistent violator sentencing
enhancement.  (12/23/19 Tr., p.6, L.7 – p.7, L.20; p.15, L.2 – p.17, L.3; R., pp.60-69, 225-34,
241-51.)  In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the burglary charges in Twin Falls County
case numbers CR42-19-4691 and CR42-19-5947, to dismiss the charge of issuing a check
1 Appellant’s use of the designation “PSI” includes the packet of documents grouped with the
electronic copy of the PSI, and the page numbers cited shall refer to the corresponding page of
the electronic file.
3
without funds at Hobby Lobby on March 6, 2019,2 and to recommend a unified sentence of
fifteen years, with seven years fixed.  (12/23/19 Tr., p.7, L.21 - p.8, L.24; R., p.76.)
Ms. Descharme was screened for entrance into the mental health court program.  (R., pp.114-
121, 280-91.)
In the insufficient funds case, the State asked the district court to sentence
Ms. Descharme to three years fixed.  (6/1/20 Tr., p.10, Ls.1-2.)  Ms. Descharme’s counsel asked
the district court to retain jurisdiction, or to sentence her to probation and a specialty court such
as mental health court or drug court.  (6/1/20 Tr., p.14, L.13 – p.15, L.23, p.17, Ls.19-22.)
However, Ms. Descharme was sentenced to a period of three years, fixed.  (6/1/20 Tr., p.26,
Ls.15-17; R., pp.135-42.)
In the forgery case with the persistent violator sentencing enhancement, the State asked
the district court to sentence Ms. Descharme to a sentence of fifteen years, with seven years
fixed.  (6/1/20 Tr., p.9, L.25 – p.10, L.3.)  Ms. Descharme’s counsel asked the district court to
retain jurisdiction, or to sentence her to probation and a specialty court.  (6/1/20 Tr., p.14, L.13 –
p.15, L.23, p.17, Ls.19-22.)  However, Ms. Descharme was sentenced to eleven years, with five
years fixed.  (6/1/20 Tr., p.26, Ls.11-14; R., pp.301-07.)  The court ordered the sentences to be
served concurrently.  (R., p.301.)
Ms. Descharme filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgments of conviction.
(R., pp.146-48, 158-62, 310-12, 316-20.)
2 In February of 2019, Ms. Descharme wrote several checks to several businesses on her own
checking account, which contained insufficient funds to pay for the amounts written on the
checks.  (R., pp.14-15.)
4
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of eleven years,
with five years fixed, upon Ms. Descharme following her plea of guilty to issuing a check with
insufficient funds, forgery, and the persistent violator sentencing enhancement?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Eleven Years,
With Five Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Descharme Following Her Plea Of Guilty To Issuing A Check
With Insufficient Funds, Forgery, And The Persistent Violator Sentencing Enhancement
Ms. Descharme asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentence of eleven
years, with five years fixed, is excessive.  Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court
imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).  In
reviewing a trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, the relevant inquiry regards four
factors:
Whether the trial court:  (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
Ms. Descharme does not allege that her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show the district court abused its discretion by failing to reach its
decision by the exercise of reason, Ms. Descharme must show that in light of the governing
criteria, the sentences were excessive considering any view of the facts. Id.  The governing
criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:  (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
5
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or
retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Ms. Descharme’s sentence is
excessive considering any view of the facts.
Ms. Descharme has been diagnosed with severe depression, PTSD, and multiple
personality disorder.  (PSI, pp.18-19, 21.)  Ms. Descharme’s depression began in 2016, when her
husband passed away.  (6/1/20 Tr., p.12, Ls.10-22; PSI, p.4.)  After her husband passed away,
Ms. Descharme turned to drugs to cope with her husband’s death.  (6/1/20 Tr., p.13, Ls.1-20.)
She knows that she needs help to deal with her feelings of grief and anger surrounding her
husband’s sudden death.  (PSI, p.18.)  She told the presentence investigator that she believed she
would benefit from counseling because “Since my husband died, I have not been ok.  It has [ ]
really taken me to a whole other life.”  (PSI, p.18.)  After her husband’s passing, Ms. Descharme
began an abusive relationship with an opiate addict and joined his theft scheme whereby she
committed these crimes.  (PSI, pp.4, 13, 19, 68.)  Ms. Descharme asked for help for her addiction
and her mental health issues by seeking drug court or mental health court.  (6/1/20 Tr., p.14, L.13
– p.15, L.23.)  The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the trial court must consider a defendant’s
mental illness as a factor at sentencing. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).
Ms. Descharme does have a supportive family to assist her in her rehabilitation.  (6/1/20
Tr., p.27, Ls.4-10; PSI, pp.12, 15.)  Ms. Descharme has a good relationship with her parents,
who were there at her sentencing hearing to show their support.  (6/1/20 Tr., p.27, Ls.4-10; PSI,
p.12.)  Ms. Descharme received half a dozen supportive letters in preparation for her sentencing.
(PSI, pp.14-15, 42-51, 83-89.)  Members of the community and Ms. Descharme’s friends
describe her as “a beautiful woman, inside and out” and a person with a “huge loving heart.”
6
(PSI, p.14.) See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of
defendant who had the support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts).
Further, Ms. Descharme expressed considerable remorse and accepted responsibility for
her actions.  (12/23/19 Tr., p.6, L.7 – p.7, L.20; p.15, L.2 – p.17, L.3; PSI, pp.20-21.)
Ms. Descharme expressed regret and told the court and the victims how sorry she was for her
actions.  (PSI, pp.20-21.)  At her sentencing hearing, she told the court:
Your Honor, I am an addict and have struggled with addiction since I have been a
teenager.  I hate addiction and everything it represents in my life.  I do not do the
things that I do when I’m under the influence of a mind-altering chemical.
I was sober for 13 years when I relapsed.  I have proven to a lot of people that I
had made the changes in my life that were noticed by many, especially my family.
Until one day in 2016, I came home to find my husband on the couch, and he’d
passed away from a heart attack.  It was by far the most devastating thing that I
had ever encountered.  I was about a year from graduating college with a degree
in addiction studies, and I had the tools that I needed to work through addiction;
but I had never in my life ever began to understand the whole grief process and
what I was about to encounter.  I did well for a short time.  And after I graduated,
I slowly pulled myself away from everyone and went into a deep depression.  I
didn’t know what to do at this point, and I went back to what I knew, was my
addiction, and numbed out everything that I had to feel.
Of course, not long before I got myself into a very unhealthy relationship, which,
again, clouded by my addiction, and the result of this was it being a very drug-
driven, abusive relationship.  I was not in any situation to be in a relationship
when I was struggling so much with grieving my husband.
Addiction really is real, and in my mind I thought after 13 years sober, there was
no way that I could ever relapse because I thought I had all the tools that I needed.
What I did not realize was that I had never thought that I would lose my husband,
who, at 42, still had a whole lot of life left.  It had been -- it has been humbling to
me and has made me a stronger person so that when I am -- when I’m allowed, I
can go back to practicing what I dreamed to do my whole life, and that’s helping
people.
Your Honor, I know that looking at this case makes me look like a monster, but so
does the grip of addictions.  I literally picked up where I left off 13 years ago.  I
hate addiction.  It is something that I will have to deal with the rest of my life.  I
want to make amends and pay back what -- what I have -- what I have selfishly
7
taken, and I want to be accountable for that.  Making amends, to me, today, means
showing -- showing others, striving to be the best person I can be.
I have since been making the positive changes in my life today, Your Honor, and
I’m striving to be my absolute best that I can be.  I have been in treatment -- I
have been in treatment at preferred -- doing counseling and personal development
and recently I have taken a mental health evaluation and was diagnosed with
bipolar disorder, PTSD, and multiple personality disorder. I am now taking
medication, which has been very helpful and has actually started making me feel a
lot better about my esteem and my depression.
I’m trying to get into the drug court, and I am currently waiting approval.  I know
this program will be beneficial to me as it will give accountability and structure
and would help me lift my spirits and self-esteem.  I can focus on my grieving and
have the structure to do so.
Your Honor, I have been clean since October 15th, 2019, and every day I strive to
be a better person.  I want to make amends with the people I have harmed and
work through my grief issues.  I can be a success, and I know that I can be a better
person due to help of others.  I’m asking that you place -- please let me show you,
and I am -- that I am worthy of this Court to allow me probation so that I can be a
productive member of society.  I want to prove to you in that -- I want to prove to
you that I am not a bad person.  Thank you for your time and listening.
(6/1/20 Tr., p.18, L.12 – p.21, L.9.)  Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a
defendant expresses remorse for her conduct and accepts responsibility for her acts. Shideler,
103 Idaho at 595; State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Ms. Descharme asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences upon her.  She asserts that had the district
court properly considered her remorse, mental health conditions, and her family and community
support, it would have imposed less severe sentences.
8
CONCLUSION
Ms. Descharme respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentences as it deems
appropriate.  Alternatively, she requests that her cases be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 9th day of March, 2021.
/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of March, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
SJC/eas


State v. Descharme Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48114

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State v. Hooper Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48122

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7950/thumbnail.jp

State v. Hooper Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48122

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7960/thumbnail.jp

UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
2-18-2021 
State v. Jolley Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48139 
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Recommended Citation 
"State v. Jolley Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48139" (2021). Not Reported. 6961. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6961 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KACEY L. JONES 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
ISABELLE JOLLEY, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
     NO. 48139-2020 
 
Bingham County Case No.  
CR06-19-3665 
 
           
     RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
ISSUES 
 
1. Has Jolley failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it 
imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years with five years fixed following her plea of guilty to 
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon?   
 
2. Has Jolley failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying her Rule 
35 motion for reduction of sentence?   
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Law enforcement responded to a call by Jolley reporting that she had been shot.  (PSI, p.9.)  
Officers spoke to both Jolley and Andrew Young, whom she reported shot her; both gave 
Electronically Filed
2/18/2021 1:29 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
consistent accounts of what occurred.  (PSI, pp.9-11.)  Jolley entered Young’s home wearing a 
hockey-type mask.  (PSI, p.9-11.)  She found Young in a bedroom, pointed a loaded handgun at 
him, and pulled the trigger.  (PSI, pp.9-11.)  However, the gun did not discharge.  (PSI, pp.9-11.)  
Young knocked the gun out of Jolley’s hands.  (PSI, pp.9-11.)  As Jolley ran from the house to her 
vehicle, Young picked up the gun and fired numerous shots towards Jolley and the vehicle.  (PSI, 
pp.9-11.)  One of the shots struck Jolley in the leg.  (PSI, p.9.)  Jolley called law enforcement and 
stopped at a nearby gas station to wait for assistance.  (PSI, p.9.) 
The state charged Jolley with attempted murder in the first degree and burglary, with a 
deadly weapon enhancement.  (R., pp.30-32, 43-44.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, the state 
amended the attempted murder charge to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and dismissed 
the burglary charge; Jolley pleaded guilty to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and the 
weapon enhancement.  (R., pp.100-11, 114-15; 3/23/2020 Tr., p.8, Ls.8-21; p.15, L.6 – p.17, L.12.)  
The district court sentenced Jolley to a unified sentence of fifteen years with five years fixed.  (R., 
pp.132-34.)  Jolley filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.137-39, 150-53.)  Thereafter, Jolley 
filed a Rule 35 motion for the reduction of her sentence, which the district court denied.  (R., 
pp.155-76; Aug., pp.1-6.)  
 
ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
Jolley Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 Jolley asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced her to a unified 
sentence of fifteen years with five years fixed following her plea of guilty to aggravated assault 
with a deadly weapon, along with the weapon enhancement.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-11.)  Jolley 
 3 
has shown no abuse of discretion.  Although there were many mitigating factors in this case, the 
district court reasonably determined that the objectives of deterrence, punishment, and the 
protection of society would be best achieved through the imposition of sentence, given the extreme 
and violent nature of Jolley’s conduct. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the 
defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing 
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 
159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden 
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 
614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  In evaluating 
whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which 
asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within 
the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to 
the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”  State 
v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 
Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).  
 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish 
that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive.  State v. Farwell, 144 
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).  In determining whether the appellant met this burden, 
the court considers the entire sentence but presumes that the determinate portion will be the period 
 4 
of actual incarceration.  State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (citing 
Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391).  To establish that the sentence was excessive, the 
appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate 
to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.  
Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401.  “‘In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not 
substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.’”  State v. 
Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2018) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 
139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).   
The district court considered Jolley’s circumstances and history, much of which was 
mitigating, before imposing sentence.  As the PSI detailed, Jolley grew up in an abusive household, 
was used as a prostitute at the age of  and was involved in an abusive relationship with 
Young, who was fourteen years her senior.  (PSI, pp.12-14.)  The district court acknowledged 
Jolley’s young age, lack of prior criminal history, and mental health issues.  (PSI, pp.7, 12, 15-17; 
6/1/2020 Tr., p.27, L.3; p.28, Ls.19-20; p.29, Ls.2-4.)  As the district court recognized, there are 
“a lot of mitigating factors in this case, but there are a lot of aggravating factors.”  (6/1/2020 Tr., 
p.30, Ls.10-12.) 
Jolley indicated she initially obtained her father’s gun with the intention of killing herself.  
(PSI, p.10.)  Somehow, Jolley’s plan evolved from suicide, to killing herself at Young’s home so 
he would have to see it, to killing Young.  (See PSI, p.11.)  Jolley drove to retrieve her father’s 
gun because she was “angry” and wanted to kill either herself or Andrew. (PSI, p.11.)  She 
considered killing Young as she drove to his home.  (PSI, p.11.)  “She put a turban on her head 
and donned a face mask when she got to [Young’s] house and went inside with the gun.”  (PSI, 
p.11.)  She approached him, coming within an arm’s reach, pointed the gun at him, and pulled the 
 5 
trigger.  (PSI, pp. 9-10, 40.)  Jolley meant to kill Young when she pulled the trigger, and but for 
her inexperience with firearms, she would have.  
The district court expressed concern that Jolley demonstrated critical and dangerous 
thinking errors.  (See 6/1/2020 Tr., p.28, Ls.4-13.)  When asked how she felt about the crime, 
Jolley reported she felt humbled by the experience and that “good & bad came from” it.  (PSI, 
p.11.)  She reported she thinks about “suicide, self-harm, murder, violence[,] assault, etc.”  (PSI, 
pp.16-17.)  The PSI noted that Jolley’s mental health problems include depression and self-harm, 
but also “the need to kill herself or someone else.”  (PSI, p.20.)  Although at sentencing Jolley 
clarified that she hadn’t felt the need to kill someone else before or after her attempt to kill Young, 
(6/1/2020 Tr., p.11, L.19 – p.12, L.1), the fact remains that Jolley felt compelled to take another 
person’s life and she followed through by attempting to do so.  
The district court considered the objectives of criminal sentencing and the criteria set forth 
in I.C. § 19-2521.  (6/1/2020 Tr., p.26, L.20 – p.27, L.2.)  The district court agreed with the state 
that “it’s absolutely frightening” that this is occurred in the community.  (6/1/2020 Tr., p.28, Ls.4-
13.)  The district court expressed concern about the risk to society posed by Jolley’s thoughts of 
self-harm, murder, and violence; although it noted that Jolley did not indicate a present intention 
to harm anyone, Jolley’s actions demonstrate her ability to follow through on such thoughts with 
potentially devastating consequences.  (6/1/2020 Tr., p.29, Ls.5-12.)  The district court recognized 
the mitigating factors, but determined that the aggravating factors were weighty, significantly 
Jolley’s decision to take Young’s life.  (6/1/2020 Tr., p.30, Ls.10-19.)  Ultimately, the district court 
concluded that the objectives of deterrence (both of Jolley specifically and society generally) and 
punishment carried the most weight.  (6/1/2020 Tr., p.30, L.21 – p.31, L.2.)  Further, society would 
be protected by Jolley receiving “the proper attention and rehabilitation in the confined setting, 
--
 6 
and that will serve the interests of justice as well through punishment and deterrence.”  (6/1/2020 
Tr., p.32, Ls.4-7.) 
Jolley argues the sentence is excessive in light of the mitigating factors.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.6-11.)  As discussed above, the district court carefully considered the mitigating and 
aggravating factors before it.  (See 6/1/2020 Tr., p.27, L.3 – p.30, L.19.)  In fact, the mitigating 
factors were the reason “why the fixed portion is only five years and not higher.”  (6/1/2020 Tr., 
p.31, Ls.20-22.)  The sentence of fifteen years with five years fixed is reasonable given the violent 
nature of the crime, the fact that Jolley intended to commit a murder on that day, the need to punish 
her actions, deter her and others from taking similar action, and protect society while she receives 
treatment and programming in prison.  Jolley has failed to show that the district court abused its 
sentencing discretion.   
 
II. 
Jolley Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Her 
Rule 35 Motion For Reduction Of Sentence 
 
A. Introduction 
 Jolley asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her Rule 35 motion 
for reduction of sentence.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-12.)  Jolley has shown no abuse of discretion.  
Because Jolley failed to support her motion with any new or additional information showing that 
the sentence imposed was excessive, the district court properly denied her Rule 35 motion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency, 
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.”  State v. Anderson, 163 Idaho 513, 517, 415 P.3d 
381, 385 (Ct. App. 2015).  Where a sentence is neither illegal nor excessive when pronounced, 
 7 
“the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information 
subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion.”  State v. Burggraf, 160 Idaho 
177, 180, 369 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 840).  
“An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the 
underlying sentence absent the presentation of new information.”  Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 
P.3d at 840. 
 
C. Jolley Failed To Show Her Sentence Was Excessive In Light Of New Information 
 
 The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Jolley’s Rule 35 Motion.  
Jolley moved for a reduction of her sentence “based on records provided to the Court at sentencing” 
and documents attached to the motion, which included letters of support from her family and 
friends and her mental health records.  (R., pp.155-76.)  Jolley failed to present any new 
information which would render her sentence excessive.   
In her motion, Jolley argued that her sentence was excessive for a variety of reasons, 
including her lack of criminal history, prior abuse, Young's request for leniency on her behalf, her 
age, performance on pretrial release, support system, employment history, mental health, 
acceptance into drug court, education, LSI score and GAIN recommendation, and the PSI’s 
recommendation.  (R., pp.155-57.)  This information was detailed extensively in the PSI and 
considered at sentencing.  (See PSI, pp.7, 12-20, 30.)  Thus, it is not new information upon which 
the district court could grant a reduction of her sentence.  Nor did the attached medical records 
constitute new information; they had previously been provided to the district court in support of 
her motion for pretrial release.  (Compare R., pp.89-97 with R., pp.168-76.)  Only the letters could 
be considered “new” since they post-date Jolley’s sentencing; however, the letters reiterate that 
Jolley has gone through difficult times and has a support system willing to assist her and provide 
 8 
her with a safe environment upon her release.  (R., pp.161-65.)  Because Jolley failed to present 
any new or additional information showing that her sentence was excessive, the district court’s 
denial of the Rule 35 motion was not an abuse of discretion.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.   
 DATED this 18th day of February, 2021. 
 
 
        /s/  Kacey L. Jones 
      KACEY L. JONES 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
            I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 18th day of February, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
EMILY M. JOYCE 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
                                                                         /s/  Kacey L. Jones 
                                                                        KACEY L. JONES 
                                                                        Deputy Attorney General 
KLJ/dd 
 


State v. Jolley Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48139

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State v. Amos Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48150 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
JUSTIN R. PORTER 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
BRANDYN LYNN AMOS, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48150-2020 
 
Bear Lake County Case No.  
CR04-19-1253 
 
           
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
Has Brandyn Lynn Amos failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, and retained 
jurisdiction upon his conviction for aiding and abetting burglary? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Amos Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction   
The state charged Amos with burglary.  (R., p.52.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Amos 
pled guilty to an amended charge of aiding and abetting burglary.  (R., pp.95-99, 110-13; 2/20/20 
Tr., p.7, Ls.15-19; p.13, L.23 – p.15, L.5.)  During sentencing, the parties jointly recommended 
Electronically Filed
3/11/2021 2:06 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
probation.  (5/21/20 Tr., p.53, Ls.4-6; p.55, Ls.17-18.)  The court rejected the joint 
recommendation and imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, and retained 
jurisdiction.  (R., pp.120-23; 5/21/20 Tr., p.70, L.12 – p.71, L.10.1)  Several months later, the 
district court held a rider review hearing and placed Amos on probation.  (Aug., pp.1-7.)  Amos 
timely appealed.  (R., pp.120, 187-88.)   
On appeal, Amos asserts the district court did not exercise reason, and therefore abused its 
sentencing discretion, when it imposed an excessive sentence of five years, with two years fixed.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-6.)  He has failed to show an abuse of discretion.  The sentence imposed 
was reasonable. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of 
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.  State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008).  It is presumed 
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of confinement.  State 
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). 
 
C. Amos Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Sentencing Discretion 
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of five 
years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  “A sentence fixed within the limits 
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial court.”  
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 
                                            
1 Amos timely filed a Rule 35 motion.  (R., pp.120, 127-28, 142-45, 195-204.)  The district court 
denied the motion.  (R., pp.176-85, 205-06; see 7/2/20 Tr., pp.75-122)  Amos does not challenge 
the denial of his Rule 35 motion on appeal.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp.2-3.)   
 3 
324 (1982)).  Furthermore, where a sentence fits within statutory limits, the appellant bears the 
burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.  Id. (citations omitted).  To carry this 
burden the appellant must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  
Id.  To establish that the sentence was excessive, the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable 
minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of 
protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.  State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 
170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).   
A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of 
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or 
retribution.  McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citation omitted).  The district court has 
the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when deciding upon the 
sentence.  Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) 
(holding district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of punishment, 
deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation).  “In deference to the 
trial judge, [the appellate court] will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where 
reasonable minds might differ.”  McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens, 146 
Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).   
Amos concedes that his sentence “does not exceed the statutory maximum.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p.4.)  Burglary is punishable by imprisonment for not less than one year but not more than 
ten.  I.C. § 18-1403.  In this case, the district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with 
two years fixed.  (R., pp.120-23.)  Because the sentence imposed fits within the statutory limits, 
Amos “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any 
 4 
reasonable view of the facts.”  State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002).  He 
cannot do so. 
The sentence imposed was reasonable.  In fashioning Amos’s sentence, the court reviewed 
the PSI materials and considered the necessary sentencing factors.  (5/21/20 Tr., p.64, L.20 – p.65, 
L.4.)  The PSI revealed that Amos has an extensive criminal history.  (PSI, pp.5-13.)  The district 
court found that Amos’s criminal history began in 1995 and spans about twenty-five years.  
(5/21/20 Tr., p.66, Ls.16-19; PSI, pp.5-13.)  He had been charged with nearly forty-five 
misdemeanors, which resulted in thirty convictions.  (5/21/20 Tr., p.66, Ls.19-24; PSI, pp.5-13.)  
He had also been charged with three felonies, which resulted in one conviction.  (5/21/20 Tr., p.67, 
Ls.9-12; PSI, pp.5-13.) The court expressly tied Amos’s substantial criminal history with the need 
to protect society and to the related goals of punishment and deterrence.  (5/21/20 Tr., p.66, L.11 
– p.67, L.17.)  Additionally, the court considered the fact that Amos was a moderate risk to 
reoffend, and that he had a demonstrated history of “significant and chronic” substance abuse.  
(5/21/20 Tr., p.69, L.21 – p.70, L.11.) 
The court also considered Amos’s conduct in light of his history of property crimes.  
(5/21/20 Tr., p.67, Ls.3-17.)  The court noted that Amos’s misdemeanor convictions included 
“numerous” property crimes and that Amos had a prior burglary charge that was ultimately 
dismissed.  (5/21/20 Tr., p.66, L.22 – p.67, L.17; see PSI, pp.5-13.)  In this case, the court found 
that Amos illegally entered the business premises of a car wash with the intent to commit a crime.  
(5/21/20 Tr., p.67, Ls.3-8.)  According to the prosecutor, Amos drove himself and his accomplices 
to the car wash, took money out of a machine and then spent the money at a casino.  (5/21/20 Tr., 
p.55, Ls.7-15.)  Given Amos’s underlying conduct in light of his criminal history, chronic 
 5 
substance abuse, and moderate risk to reoffend, the sentence imposed was reasonable to achieve 
the goals of sentencing. 
Amos contends his sentence is excessive in light of certain mitigating factors.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.3-4.)  Specifically, Amos points to his expression of remorse and acceptance of 
responsibility, “lesser culpability” in relation to his accomplices, cooperation with law 
enforcement, commitment to sobriety, and steady employment.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-6.)  
According to Amos, had the court properly considered these mitigating factors, it would have 
imposed a more lenient sentence.  (Id.)  He is incorrect. 
The district court properly weighed any mitigating factors when it originally imposed 
Amos’s sentence.  The court considered defense counsel’s sentencing argument as well as Amos’s 
expression of remorse.  (5/7/20 Tr., p.20, L.14 – p.27, L.5; 5/21/20 Tr., p.51, L.14 – p.54, L.23; 
p.57, L.16 – p.58, L.15; p.60, L.1 – p.65, L.4.)  The district court indicated that Amos did “appear 
to be less culpable.”  (5/21/20 Tr., p.65, Ls.9-20.2)  The court also addressed Amos’s family 
history, his level of schooling, his employment history, his need for substance abuse and mental 
health treatment.  (5/21/20 Tr., p.67, L.18 – p.70, L.8.)  The court recognized that the sentence 
imposed may “jeopardize” his employment.  (5/21/20 Tr., p.71, Ls.11-15.)  But even considering 
this mitigating information, the court determined that the sentence imposed was necessary because 
it balanced the need to achieve the goals of sentencing while providing an opportunity for Amos 
to receive treatment and to demonstrate to the court that he merited a period of probation.  (5/21/20 
Tr., p.71, L.11 – p.72, L.6.)  Amos has failed to show that the court did not exercise reason simply 
                                            
2 However, during the hearing on Amos’s Rule 35 motion, the court stated that it was surprised to 
discover that it made such a statement during the sentencing hearing, and then clarified that it must 
have misspoken because it did not, in fact, feel that Amos was less culpable than the others who 
participated in the robbery.  (7/2/20 Tr., p.85, L.13 – p.86, L.23.)   
 6 
because it gave less weight to the mitigating circumstances than he desired.  See State v. Cobler, 
148 Idaho 769, 773, 229 P.3d 374, 378 (2010) (finding no abuse of discretion upon a weighing of 
mitigating and aggravating factors in sentencing); State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 932, 104 P.3d 
969, 974 (2005) (emphasizing the discretionary nature of weighing mitigating and aggravating 
factors).   
In sum, because the district court properly considered and applied the goals of sentencing 
and weighed the aggravating circumstances against any mitigating information in fashioning 
Amos’s underlying sentence, Amos has failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 11th day of March, 2021. 
 
 
        /s/  Justin R. Porter  
      JUSTIN R. PORTER 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
  
 7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
            I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11th day of March, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
JENNY C. SWINFORD 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  Justin R. Porter 
      JUSTIN R. PORTER 
      Deputy Attorney General 
JRP/dd 
 
 


State v. Amos Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48150

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