University of Idaho College of Law

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
7-13-2021 
State v. Flores-Ramirez Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48660 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
JACOB L. WESTERFIELD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9841
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 48660-2021
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-20-16581
v. )
)
JUAN MIGUEL )
FLORES-RAMIREZ, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Juan Flores-Ramirez pled guilty to aggravated assault and the use of a firearm or
deadly weapon during the commission of a crime, the district court sentenced him to fifteen
years, with five years fixed.  Mr. Flores-Ramirez appeals, and he argues that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive aggregate sentence.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In May 2020, the State filed an amended criminal complaint alleging that Mr. Flores-
Ramirez committed the crimes of kidnapping in the first degree, stalking in the first degree,
Electronically Filed
7/13/2021 11:16 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
aggravated assault, two counts of felony intimidating a witness, felony injury to children, using a
firearm or deadly weapon during the commission of a crime, and unlawful entry.  (R., pp.28-32.)
According to the law enforcement version of events included in the presentence investigation
report (“PSI”),1 Mr. Flores-Ramirez showed up at and entered the residence where his ex-wife
and children lived.  (PSI, p.1.)  While in the residence, Mr. Flores-Ramirez began to argue with
his ex-wife and then pulled out a loaded handgun.  (PSI, p.1.)  When Mr. Flores-Ramirez’s ex-
wife attempted to pull the gun away, one round was discharged from the firearm.  (PSI, p.1.)
Eventually, the police arrived and arrested Mr. Flores-Ramirez at the residence.  (PSI, p.1.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Flores-Ramirez pled guilty to aggravated assault and
the use of a firearm during the commission of a crime.  (Tr., p.28, L.18—p.29, L.7; R., pp.72-
87.)  The State agreed to dismiss the other charges and to recommend an executed sentence of
twenty years, with ten years fixed.  (R., pp.86-87.)
At sentencing, the State recommended a sentence of twenty years, with ten years fixed,
and asked that the sentence be executed.  (Tr., p.34, Ls.13-20, p.40, Ls.4-9.)  Mr. Flores-Ramirez
requested that the district court sentence him to ten years, with three year fixed, and that the
district court retain jurisdiction.  (Tr., p.44, Ls.13-18, p.52, L.21—p.53, L.4.)  The district court
ordered Mr. Flores-Ramirez to serve an executed aggregated sentence of fifteen years, with five
years fixed, for aggravated assault and the use of a firearm during the commission of a crime.
(Tr., p.60, L.21—p.61, L.6; R., pp.92-96.)  Mr. Flores-Ramirez timely appealed from the
judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.97-99.)
1 Citations to the PSI refer to the 107-page electronic document with the confidential sentencing
materials, titled “Appeal Confidential Exhibits 05-06-2021 12.26.55 46784925 22B482D0-
FD71-49CB-94AD-0FBB5A1448F4”.
3
ISSUES
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Flores-Ramirez to serve fifteen
years, with five years fixed?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Flores-Ramirez To Fifteen
Years, With Five Years Fixed
“Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, ‘the appellant
bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.’” State v. Windom, 150
Idaho 873, 875 (2011) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).  In this matter, Mr. Flores-Ramirez’s
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum of twenty years. See I.C. § 18-906 (five-year
maximum for aggravated assault); I.C. § 19-2520 (use of a firearm or deadly weapon increases
the maximum sentence authorized for the crime by fifteen years).  Accordingly, to show that the
sentence imposed was an abuse of discretion, Mr. Flores-Ramirez “must show that the sentence,
in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v.
Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘[R]easonableness’” implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to the
purposes for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App.
1982).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
4
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008).  “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
In this case, Mr. Flores-Ramirez asserts that the district court did not exercise reason and
therefore abused its discretion by imposing a sentence that is excessive under any reasonable
view of the facts.  Specifically, Mr. Flores-Ramirez contends the district court should have
sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment and retained jurisdiction in light of the mitigating
factors, including his mental condition, statements of remorse, and lack of a significant prior
criminal history.
First, Mr. Flores-Ramirez’s mental condition is a significant mitigating factor that
supports leniency in sentencing.  The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho
Code § 19-2523 not only suggests, but requires, the trial court to consider a defendant’s mental
illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).  If a defendant’s
mental condition is a significant factor, then Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the court to consider
factors such as:  (a) the extent to which the defendant is mentally ill; (b) the degree of illness or
defect and level of functional impairment; (c) the prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation;
(d) the availability of treatment and level of care required; (e) any risk of danger which the
defendant may create for the public if not incarcerated, or the lack of such risk; and (f) the
capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his
or her conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the offense charged.  “The factors
listed in Idaho Code § 19–2523 provide a manner in which to evaluate
the mental health information presented to the sentencing court.” Strand, 137 Idaho at 461.
5
Mr. Flores-Ramirez’s mental health was evaluated in his Global Appraisal of Individual
Needs (“GAIN”) assessment and in a Department of Health and Welfare mental health
examination report.  (PSI, pp.10-20.)  In the GAIN assessment, Mr. Flores-Ramirez reported that
he had been previously diagnosed with “depression, dysthymia, bipolar, or other mood disorder.”
(PSI, p.13.)  Mr. Flores-Ramirez informed the assessor that he had been receiving treatment for
depression for approximately eighteen months since the start of his divorce proceedings.  (PSI,
p.13.)
In the mental health examination report prepared pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2524,
Mr. Flores-Ramirez was found to “present with a serious mental illness (SMI) or other mental
health needs.”  (PSI, p.20.)  The report recommended that Mr. Flores-Ramirez received mental
health treatment “to minimize risk of further deterioration of daily function and to monitor for
any ongoing risk.”  (PSI, p.20.)  The report further determined that Mr. Flores-Ramirez “will
continue to struggle with symptoms and problems may increase” if he does not received
treatment for his mental health.  (PSI, p.20.)
Defense counsel noted at sentencing that Mr. Flores-Ramirez’s “life began to fall apart”
in 2019 due to issues with his marriage that ultimately culminated in divorce, and Mr. Flores-
Ramirez “began suffering from mental health issues that he never had before.  He began feeling
severely depressed, fairly anxious and attempted to commit suicide in 2019.”  (Tr., p.41, Ls.10-
16.)    Mr. Flores-Ramirez had begun attending counseling for his mental health issues over a
year prior to the incident in this case.  (PSI, pp.44-70.)
Mr. Flores-Ramirez asserts that the district court did not adequately consider his mental
health as a factor at sentencing as required under Idaho Code § 19-2523.  Mr. Flores-Ramirez’s
mental health was a significant factor, and there were substantial concerns listed if Mr. Flores-
6
Ramirez does not receive adequate treatment for his mental health needs. “The sentencing court
is not required to recite each of the factors listed.” Strand, 137 Idaho at 461.  However,
Mr. Flores-Ramirez asserts that the district court did not give adequate consideration to the
factors listed under Idaho Code § 19-2523, and the lengthy prison sentence imposed suggests it
did not.  Mr. Flores-Ramirez’s mental condition stands in favor of mitigation and leniency in this
case.
Second, Mr. Flores-Ramirez has expressed great remorse for his actions and accepts
responsibility for the crime.  Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret are all factors in
favor of mitigation. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982).  The presentence investigator
found that Mr. Flores-Ramirez “[e]xpressed remorse for his crime, expressed concern for
emotional damage to victims.”  (PSI, p.4.)  In a statement provided in the presentence
investigation report, Mr. Flores-Ramirez stated that he was “sorry for the emotional damage to
my children and to their mom that my behavior caused.”  (PSI, p.8.)  Defense counsel explained
at sentencing that Mr. Flores-Ramirez was “mortified of the events that occurred” in this case
and that defense counsel could not “stress enough at how horrified that Juan is that this crime
occurred.”  (Tr., p.46, Ls.7-10, p.51, Ls.3-10.)  According to defense counsel, Mr. Flores-
Ramirez “has shown deep remorse” for his actions in this case and has taken responsibility for
those actions.  (Tr., p.47, L.21—p.48, L.11.)  Mr. Flores-Ramirez informed the district court that
he was “really sorry for what [he] did”, and he asked for forgiveness for “the damage [he] caused
to the mother of [his] children” and “to [his] oldest daughter.”  (Tr., p.55, L.24—p.56, L.1, p.56,
L.22—p.57, L.3.)  These statements of acceptance, remorse, and regret stand in favor of
mitigation.
7
Third, the absence of any significant prior criminal history also supports a lesser sentence
for Mr. Flores-Ramirez.  “The absence of a criminal record is a mitigating factor that courts
consider.” State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 836 (2011).  “It has long been recognized that ‘[t]he
first offender should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal.”  State v.
Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (Ct. App. 1998) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nice, 103
Idaho 89, 91 (1982)).  According to the presentence investigation report, Mr. Flores-Ramirez’s
only prior criminal charge was a misdemeanor aggravated assault charge from 2001.2  (PSI,
pp.7-8.)  Mr. Flores-Ramirez “reported no previous experience on probation.”  (PSI, p.8.)
Furthermore, Mr. Flores-Ramirez’s conduct in this case was “highly out of character” for
him.  (Tr., p.44, L.25—p.45, L.8.)  During an interview with one of the responding police
officers, Mr. Flores-Ramirez’s ex-wife informed the police that “it has never become physical
between the two of them until tonight.”  (PSI, p.79.)  Following Mr. Flores-Ramirez’s arrest in
this case, CARES interviews were held with each of Mr. Flores-Ramirez’s three children.  (PSI,
pp.92-98.)  One child stated that “nothing really drastic” had happened between his parents
before the incident in this case, another child indicated that the arguments between the parents
“were always verbal”, and the youngest child “did not make any disclosures of any violence.”
(PSI, pp.92-98; see Tr., p.45, L.15—p.46, L.3.)
As defense counsel explained at sentencing, “this was a disruptive event that caused the
crime.  This crime solely occurred because of the divorce proceedings and the turmoil that that
caused in Juan’s life.”  (Tr., p.49, Ls.9-21.)  Defense counsel indicated that “the commission of
2 The disposition of the misdemeanor aggravated assault charge from 2001 is unclear in the
presentence investigation report.  That charge is listed as having been “Stricken Off with Leave
to Reinstate”, but the presentence investigation also indicated that records associated with that
charge “were unable to be obtained from Illinois due to a required fee.”  (PSI, pp.7-8.)  Defense
counsel stated at sentencing that “there is no prior history” for Mr. Flores-Ramirez “[o]r he has
led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time, for over 20 years.”  (Tr., p.47, Ls.14-17.)
8
another crime is unlikely” due to the extenuating circumstances present at the time of the offense
and Mr. Flores-Ramirez’s attitude after the offense.  (Tr., p.48, Ls.6-11.)  Mr. Flores-Ramirez
submits that the district court failed to give adequate consideration to his lack of significant
criminal history.
In sum, Mr. Flores-Ramirez maintains the district court did not exercise reason at
sentencing because it failed to give adequate weight to the mitigating factors in his case.  Proper
consideration of these factors supports a lesser prison sentence and a rider.  Mr. Flores-Ramirez
submits that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive aggregate sentence.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Flores-Ramirez respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 13th day of July, 2021.
/s/ Jacob L. Westerfield
JACOB L. WESTERFIELD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of July, 2021, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
 /s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JLW/eas


English

State v. Flores-Ramirez Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48660

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/8238/thumbnail.jp

UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
9-7-2021 
State v. Malm Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48674 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
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https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7239 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
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of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6661
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 48674-2021
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR28-20-17334
v. )
)
AARON WARREN MALM, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
______________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Aaron Malm pleaded guilty to felony domestic violence and was sentenced to a unified
term of five years, with two and one-half years fixed.  He asserts the district court abused its
discretion by failing to retain jurisdiction, in light of the mitigating factors that exist in his case.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Malm with attempted strangulation, felony domestic battery,
malicious injury to property, and false imprisonment.  (R., pp.44-46.)  Pursuant to an agreement
with the State, Mr. Malm pleaded guilty to felony domestic battery, the State agreed to dismiss
Electronically Filed
9/7/2021 1:20 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
the remaining charges, and the parties were free to argue for whatever sentence they believed
appropriate.  (R., pp.49-51, 55-56; Tr., p.5, L.23 – p.17, L.18.)
The State asked the district court to sentence Mr. Malm to a unified term of ten years,
with five years fixed (Tr., p.33, Ls.15-21), while Mr. Malm asked the court to impose a unified
term of five years, with two and one-half years fixed, and to either suspend the sentence and
place Mr. Malm on probation, or retain jurisdiction (Tr., p.39, Ls.14-22).  The district court
sentenced Mr. Malm to a unified term of five years, with two and one-half years fixed, but
declined to place Mr. Malm on probation or retain jurisdiction.  (R., pp.61-63; Tr., p.44, Ls.4-
10.)  Mr. Malm filed a timely Notice of Appeal.  (R., pp.66-69.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by failing to retain jurisdiction, in light of the mitigating
factors present in Mr. Malm’s case?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Retain Jurisdiction, In Light Of The
Mitigating Factors Present In Mr. Malm’s Case
Mr. Malm asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its discretion
by failing to retain jurisdiction and allow him to participate in a rider program.  Where a
defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record considering the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.  The governing
criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:  (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or
retribution for wrongdoing.  The decision whether to retain jurisdiction in left to the sound
3
discretion of the sentencing court, and such decisions are reviewed on appeal under the abuse of
discretion standard.
Not long after graduating from high school, Aaron Malm decided he wanted to serve his
country, and he joined the U.S. Army.  (PSI, pp.22-23.)1  He served as mechanic, and was
honorably discharged as a corporal and team leader in 2015.  (PSI, p.22.)  Unfortunately,
Mr. Malm developed an addiction to alcohol while he was in the Army, and he continued
drinking after his term of service ended.  (PSI, pp.9, 13.)  Mr. Malm attended a 30-day inpatient
program through the Veteran’s Administration, and was participating in an aftercare program
through the Spokane V.A., but stopped attending in February of 2020 due to the COVID-19
pandemic.  (PSI, pp.10, 21.)  Around the same time, Mr. Malm was laid off from his job, also
due to the pandemic.  (PSI, p.23.)  Out of a job and unable to attend treatment, Mr. Malm’s
drinking took a hold of his life.  (PSI, p.21.)
Mr. Malm’s mother, grandmother, and sister, informed the PSI writer that they support
Mr. Malm, but recognize that he becomes an angry and sometimes violent person when he is
drinking, and he needs to participate in more inpatient treatment for his addiction.  (PSI, pp.20-
22, 41-42.)  Even Mr. Malm’s victim, a woman with whom he had been in a dating relationship
for three months prior to the incident, acknowledged that Mr. Malm had generally been “‘patient
and kind,’” but he just “‘snapped’” when he attacked her.  (PSI, pp.20-21.)  Mr. Malm admitted
that he was under the influence of alcohol throughout the day of his offense.  (PSI, pp.9, 17-18.)
Fortunately, Mr. Malm recognizes both the harm that he caused, and the reality that he
needs treatment for his addiction, and he wants to live an alcohol-free life.  (PSI, pp.12-13, 18,
1 Citations to the Presentence Investigation Report and its attached documents will include the
designation “PSI,” and the page numbers associated with the 42-page electronic file containing
those documents.
4
21-22.)  Mr. Malm informed the PSI writer that it was hard to live with his actions, and that
thinking about what he has done makes him ill.  (PSI, p.18.)  He acknowledged that he was
intoxicated when he committed his crime, and that he needs to return to counseling and seek a
support group in order to remain sober in the future.  (PSI, pp.17, 27.)  During his sentencing
hearing, Mr. Malm took responsibility for his actions, and expressed remorse and his desire for
treatment:
 At this point, I don’t believe it’s any secret to anyone present here today
that I have been at war with my addiction to alcohol for several years now.  There
have been many bumps along that road, but an alarming number of people might
label as wake-up calls and to some degree they were.
But this time around is different.  This time I hurt someone very close to
my heart.  Someone that I love and care about more than anything.  This time I’m
awake.  I will not stand here and tell you that this is not my fault.  I will not stand
here and say that the alcohol made me do it.  It was indeed a factor, but I was the
one who chose to drink again knowing the risks therein.  Reasons I did this,
reasons that I relapsed this time are irrelevant, because at the end of the day, no
one forced me to do anything.
It is my hope to impress upon the Court today my feelings of
responsibility and also of determination.  Regardless of the sentence that the
Court deems fit to give me today, I want to let it be known that I will be taking
full advantage of every resource available to me within these walls and without to
ensure that no one or their families will ever have to feel at my hands the way that
[the victim] and her family must be feeling now.  For my children, for my own
family, for everyone around me, and for myself, this is my promise to you.
Your Honor, this – I’ve been in treatment more than once for alcohol and
– inpatient and outpatient.  And someone asked me today what would be different
this time around.  And I always do good.  I do really well for about six months,
and I get complacent and get comfortable and I start making mistakes.
And I think the difference this time around is the motivation.  The
motivating factors have changed dramatically.  This time I just – I became
someone that’s not me.  That’s not who I am. And I started to hurt people that I
love, physically.  And that’s not – that’s not the kind of person, the kind of man
that I want to be.
(Tr., p.31, L.1 – p.32, L.20.)  Mr. Malm ended his allocution by stating the following:
5
My heart aches for [the victim] and her family.  I don’t have the words to
say what I need to say to her, or the – only that I’m going to do whatever I can to
stay moving forward to make sure that I don’t ever let that happen again to anyone.
(Tr., p.33, Ls.6-11.)
Idaho Courts recognize that alcohol addiction and the willingness to seek treatment, the
support of family and friends, prior military service, and remorse for one’s conduct, are all
mitigating factors that should counsel a court to impose a less severe sentence. See State v. Nice,
103 Idaho 89 (1982); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204
(Ct. App. 1991).  In light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case, Mr. Malm asserts the
district court abused its discretion by failing to retain jurisdiction, and affording Mr. Malm the
opportunity to deal with his alcohol problem in a controlled setting, while allowing him the
chance to demonstrate pro-social behaviors.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Malm respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and remand his case to
the district court with instructions to retain jurisdiction, or to otherwise reduce his sentence as
this Court deems appropriate.
DATED this 7th day of September, 2021.
/s/ Jason C. Pintler
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7th day of September, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JCP/eas


State v. Malm Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48674

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/8243/thumbnail.jp

UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
9-27-2021 
State v. Clayborn Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48695 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Clayborn Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48695" (2021). Not Reported. 7244. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7244 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
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of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
JUSTIN R. PORTER 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JUSTIN EARL CLAYBORN, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48695-2021 
 
Minidoka County Case No.  
CR34-18-4108 
 
           
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
Has Justin Earl Clayborn failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, upon his 
conviction for felony eluding?  
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Clayborn Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction   
The state charged Clayborn with felony eluding a peace officer, aggravated battery on a 
law enforcement officer (by striking a police car with his pickup truck), misdemeanor driving 
Electronically Filed
9/27/2021 3:37 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
under the influence, and a persistent violator enhancement.  (47554 R., pp.65-70.1)  Pursuant to a 
plea agreement, Clayborn pled guilty to felony eluding and admitted to being a persistent violator.  
(47754 R., pp.91-92.)  The remaining charges were dismissed.  (47554 R., p.121.)  The district 
court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed.  (47554 R., pp.120-24.)  The 
district court also entered several restitution orders.  (47554 R., pp.148-62.)  Clayborn 
unsuccessfully appealed the restitution orders.  State v. Clayborn, Docket No. 47554 (Ct. App. 
Nov. 12, 2020) (unpublished). 
Thereafter, Clayborn initiated post-conviction proceedings.  (See 1/19/21 Tr., p.6, Ls.6-
10.)  Clayborn’s post-conviction counsel discovered an Idaho State Police crash report that the 
state had inadvertently failed to disclose in the underlying criminal case.  (2/23/21 Tr., p.17, Ls.8-
18.)  The crash report related to the dismissed aggravated battery charge and corroborated the 
opinion of the defense’s expert witness who concluded that Clayborn did not strike a police car 
with his pickup but that the police car struck Clayborn’s vehicle.  (2/23/21 Tr., p.17, L.19 – p.18, 
L.22.)  Based on the discovery of the previously undisclosed crash report, the district court vacated 
Clayborn’s sentence and granted his post-conviction request for resentencing.  (48695 R., p.11.)   
During resentencing, Clayborn argued that he was entitled to a more lenient sentence in 
light of the information in the ISP crash report and based on his good behavior while in custody.  
(2/23/21 Tr., p.29, L.18 – p.34, L.6.)  The state argued that the information in the crash report did 
not justify a different sentence because it related to a charge that Clayborn did not plead guilty to 
and that the state had dismissed before the initial sentencing hearing.  (2/23/21 Tr., p.19, L.4 – 
p.26, L.17.)  Thus, the state contended that the previously imposed ten-year sentence was 
                                            
1 The clerk’s record and transcripts filed in Docket No. 47554-2019 (Clayborn’s prior appeal) were 
augmented into the record in this case. 
 3 
appropriate based on Clayborn’s underlying conduct and his criminal history.  (Id.)  The district 
court re-imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed.  (48695 R., pp.38-41; 
2/23/21 Tr., p.38, Ls.13-16.)  Clayborn timely appealed.  (48695 R., pp.42-44.) 
 On appeal, Clayborn asserts that the district court imposed an excessive sentence in light 
of certain mitigating information such as “his acceptance of responsibility, family support, good 
behavior while in custody, and a corrected understanding of the underlying facts of his criminal 
conduct.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.5.)  Clayborn’s arguments lack merit.  The district court imposed 
a reasonable sentence after weighing the aggravating and mitigating information and properly 
considering the relevant goals of sentencing.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, [the] Court considers the entire length 
of the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.”  State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 
P.3d 621, 628 (2016).  When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the 
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.  State v. Smith, 168 Idaho 463, ___, 483 P.3d 1006, 
1019 (2021). 
 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
“When a trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing, ‘the most fundamental 
requirement is reasonableness.’”  McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting State v. 
Hooper, 119 Idaho 606, 608, 809 P.2d 467, 469 (1991)).  “A sentence is reasonable if it appears 
 4 
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of 
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.”  Id.  The district court has the 
discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when deciding upon the 
sentence.  See id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629 (holding the district court imposed a reasonable sentence 
where it considered and weighed the objectives of criminal punishment and both mitigating and 
aggravating factors); State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 824-25, 965 P.2d 174, 184-85 (1998) (holding 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of punishment, 
deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation).   
Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily 
not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial court.”  State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 
P.2d 323, 324 (1982).  Where a sentence fits within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden 
of demonstrating that the sentence imposed is a clear abuse of discretion.  McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 
8, 368 P.3d at 628.  To carry this burden the appellant must show the sentence is excessive under 
any reasonable view of the facts.  Id.; State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 50 P.2d 707, 711 (Ct. 
App. 1982).  To establish that the sentence was excessive, the appellant must demonstrate that 
reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing 
goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.  State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 
732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).  However, “[i]n deference to the trial judge, [the] Court will 
not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.”  McIntosh, 
160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 
226-27 (2008)).   
Clayborn concedes that his sentence “does not exceed the statutory maximum.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)  Felony eluding is punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed 
 5 
five years.  Idaho Code §§ 49-1404(2), 18-112.  However, because Clayborn admitted that he was 
a persistent violator of the law, he was subject to a five-year mandatory minimum sentence and a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment.  I.C. § 19-2514.  The district court imposed a unified 
sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, which falls well within the statutory limits.  (48695 
R., pp.42-44.)  Because the sentence imposed fits within the statutory limits, Clayborn “must show 
that [his] sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the 
facts.”  State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002).  He cannot do so.   
The district court imposed a reasonable sentence.  During both sentencing hearings, the 
district court considered the necessary sentencing factors as well as the factors set forth in I.C. 
§ 19-2521.  (7/15/19 Tr., p.24, L.13 – p.25, L.4; 2/23/21 Tr., p.37, Ls.6-16.2)  The district court 
considered Clayborn’s criminal history, which began when he was a juvenile and included 
convictions for possession of controlled substances, grand theft, burglary, arson, and eluding.  
(7/15/19 Tr., p.26, L.2 – p.27, L.15; 2/23/21 Tr., p.20, L.1 – p.22, L.3.)  The court found that 
Clayborn’s criminal conduct “consistently causes or threatens harm to others.”  (7/15/19 Tr., p.26, 
Ls.1-2.)  The court also correctly found that Clayborn was a “multiple offender” based on his 
“extensive” criminal record.  (7/15/19 Tr., p.25, L.5; p.26, Ls.21-22.)  The court concluded that 
probation or a period of retained jurisdiction was “out of the question” because Clayborn continued 
to reoffend despite prior prison sentences and several previous “chances” to complete riders, 
“therapeutic community,” drug court, probation, and parole.  (7/15/19 Tr., p.26, L.21 – p.27, L.16; 
2/23/21 Tr., p.20, L.1 – p.22, L.3.)   
                                            
2 During the resentencing hearing, the district court based its decision in part on the comments and 
findings it made during the initial sentencing hearing.  (2/23/21 Tr., p.34, Ls.16-19.)   
 6 
Additionally, the district court considered the underlying criminal conduct.  (7/15/19 Tr., 
p.25, Ls.6-14.)  According to the prosecutor, officers attempted to pull Clayborn over on I-84, but 
he fled at over 100 miles per hour while passing other cars on the interstate.  (2/23/21 Tr., p.22, 
Ls.19-23); see also State v. Clayborn, Docket No. 47554 (Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2020) (unpublished).  
He crossed into the median, lost control of his vehicle before somehow recovering, and then drove 
into oncoming traffic.  (2/23/21 Tr., p.22, L.19 – p.23, L.2.)  After exiting the interstate, he drove 
over 100 miles per hour in a 55-miles-per-hour zone, drove in the barrow pit, and again drove in 
the median.  (2/23/21 Tr., p.23, Ls.3-15.)  Officers pursued Clayborn for over 50 miles and were 
only able to stop him after they performed four separate pit maneuvers on his car.  (2/23/21 Tr., 
p.23, L.16 – p.24, L.25.)  During the chase, Clayborn injured police officers and damaged three 
police vehicles and a building.  (7/15/19 Tr., p.25, Ls.15-20.) The court justifiably found 
Clayborn’s conduct to be “extremely dangerous” and that he was “very fortunate that other 
innocent people were not injured.”  (7/15/19 Tr., p.25, Ls.21-25.)   
The district court also considered the mitigating information presented by Clayborn such 
as his expression of remorse and his familial support.  (7/15/19 Tr., p.28, L.22 – p.29, L.4; p.29, 
Ls.24-25.)  Weighing this mitigating information against such aggravating factors as the nature of 
the offense and Clayborn’s criminal history, the court determined that all of the sentencing factors 
pointed towards incarceration and supported the state’s “measured and considered” 
recommendation of ten years, with five years fixed.  (7/15/19 Tr., p.28, L.9-21; p.30, Ls.3-15.)  
The district court rationally determined that a lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of 
the offense given Clayborn’s criminal record.  (7/15/19 Tr., p.27, L.16 – p.28, L.8.)  The court 
expressly stated that it was imposing the unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, to 
protect society and to punish Clayborn.  (7/15/19 Tr., p.29, L.25 – p.30, L.15.)  The court also 
-- --- ------------
 7 
indicated that the sentence imposed was intended to deter Clayborn from future criminal conduct, 
which could result in a life sentence given his criminal history.  (7/15/19 Tr., p.29, Ls.5-23.)  
Because the court imposed Clayborn’s sentence in order to achieve the goals of sentencing in light 
of both aggravating and mitigating factors, the sentence imposed was reasonable.  The district 
court did not abuse its sentencing discretion.   
Clayborn contends his sentence is excessive in light of mitigating factors including his 
expression of remorse and acceptance of responsibility; the support he has from his wife; his good 
conduct while in custody; and the mitigating information contained in the ISP crash report.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-7.)  According to Clayborn, proper consideration of these mitigating 
factors warranted a more lenient sentence.  (Appellant’s brief, p.7.)  Clayborn’s argument is 
unavailing for several reasons. 
First, as shown above, the district court properly considered Clayborn’s acceptance of 
responsibility, expression of remorse, and his family support.  (7/15/19 Tr., p.23, L.25 – p.24, L.12; 
p.28, L.24 – p.29, L.4.)  Even considering this mitigating information, the court sensibly 
determined that the sentence imposed was necessary to protect society due to the aggravating 
factors present in this case.  (7/15/19 Tr., p.24, Ls.13-23; p.29, L.25 – p.30, L.15.)  In other words, 
the court determined that the mitigating information was outweighed by the aggravating nature of 
Clayborn’s extensive criminal history and the nature of his underlying criminal conduct.  Clayborn 
has failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion simply because it gave 
less weight to this mitigating information than he desired.  See State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 
773, 229 P.3d 374, 378 (2010) (finding no abuse of discretion upon a weighing of mitigating and 
aggravating factors in sentencing); State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 932, 104 P.3d 969, 974 (2005) 
(emphasizing the discretionary nature of weighing mitigating and aggravating factors).   
 8 
Second, Clayborn’s behavior in custody does not justify a more lenient sentence.  During 
resentencing, Clayborn presented the testimony of his case manager who testified that he had not 
received any disciplinary offense reports or infractions while incarcerated, and that he had a job 
and volunteered at the facility.  (2/23/21 Tr., p.13, L.15 – p.14, L.20.)  The district court 
acknowledged that Clayborn’s conduct in prison had been “excellent.” (2/23/21 Tr., p.36, Ls.18-
25.)  However, the court correctly concluded that it is not required to reduce his sentence based 
upon good behavior in prison.  (2/23/21 Tr., p.37, Ls.1-5)  After all, good behavior in prison is the 
expectation.  See Cobler, 148 Idaho at 773, 229 P.3d at 378 (“[T]he district court did not abuse its 
discretion in giving little or no weight to Cobler’s good behavior while in prison.”); State v. 
Copenhaver, 129 Idaho 494, 496, 927 P.2d 884, 886 (1996) (“The district court further did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to view Copenhaver’s good behavior in prison between his 
sentencing and the Rule 35 hearing as a mitigating factor.”).  Clayborn’s potential reward for good 
behavior in prison is parole, not a more lenient sentence. 
Third and finally, the information contained in the ISP crash report did not justify a more 
lenient sentence.  Prior to resentencing, Mr. Clayborn submitted three exhibits relating to the 
collision between Clayborn’s pickup and the law enforcement vehicle. (48695 R., pp.13-35.)  
Clayborn included an affidavit from an accident reconstructionist who opined that an officer 
intentionally ran into Clayborn’s vehicle, not the other way around. (48695 R., pp.15–21.) 
Clayborn also submitted the expert’s curriculum vitae. (48695 R., pp.22–28.) Clayborn also 
submitted the ISP crash report, which indicated that the officer drove into Clayborn. (48695 R., 
pp.29–35.)  Even after considering this new information, the court concluded that Clayborn’s 
criminal record and the underlying conduct supported the original sentence and could have 
justified a much higher sentence.  (2/23/21 Tr., p.38, Ls.6-12.)   
 9 
Because the district court properly considered and applied the goals of sentencing and 
weighed the aggravating circumstances against any mitigating information in fashioning 
Clayborn’s sentence, the sentence imposed was reasonable.  Smith has failed to show that the 
district court abused its sentencing discretion.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 27th day of September, 2021. 
 
 
        /s/  Justin R. Porter  
      JUSTIN R. PORTER 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 27th day of September, 2021, served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of 
iCourt File and Serve: 
 
JENNY C. SWINFORD 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  Justin R. Porter 
      JUSTIN R. PORTER 
      Deputy Attorney General 
JRP/dd 
 


State v. Clayborn Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48695

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UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
8-25-2021 
State v. Richins Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48727 
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Recommended Citation 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9263
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO. 48727-2021
)
v. ) TWIN FALLS COUNTY
) NO. CR42-18-2718
EMMA KATHLEEN RICHINS, )
) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
Defendant-Appellant. )
____________________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Emma Richins admitted to violating her probation, the district court revoked her
probation and executed her fixed five-year sentence for criminal possession of a financial
transaction card. Ms. Richins appeals. She argues that the district court abused its discretion by
revoking her probation.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In June 2018, Ms. Richins pled guilty to criminal possession of a financial transaction
card (“FTC”). (R., pp.32–33, 25.) In August 2018, the district court sentenced Ms. Richins to
five years fixed, suspended execution of the sentence, and placed her on probation for three
years. (R., pp.51, 52–55.)
Electronically Filed
8/25/2021 2:19 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
As a condition of probation, the district court ordered Ms. Richins to complete drug
court, but the program terminated her for noncompliance in February 2019. (R., pp.58–59, 69.)
In March 2019, the State moved to revoke Ms. Richins’ probation for the drug court
termination, drug use, and other issues. (R., pp.73–76.) In April 2019, Ms. Richins admitted to
violating her probation for (1) being terminated from drug court, (2) having communication with
a prohibited person, (3) using methamphetamine, (4) failing to appear for drug testing, and (5)
failing to appear for treatment sessions. (Tr., p.9, L.6–p.13, L.2; see also R., p.124.)
After the admit/deny hearing, Ms. Richins submitted four letters in support. (R., pp.125–
30.) In May 2019, the district court held the disposition hearing. (R., p.131.) The State
recommended the district court execute her sentence. (Tr., p.17, Ls.7–14.) Ms. Richins requested
the district court retain jurisdiction (a “rider”) or continue her on probation. (Tr., p.20, Ls.7–12.)
The district court agreed with the State and executed her fixed five-year sentence. (Tr., p.21,
L.24–p.22, L.4; see also R., pp.132–33.) After obtaining post-conviction relief for her counsel’s
failure to file an appeal, Ms. Richins appealed from the disposition judgment. (R., pp.142, 144–
45, 147–49.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Richins’ probation and executed
her sentence of five years fixed for criminal possession of a FTC?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Ms. Richins’ Probation And
Executed Her Sentence Of Five Years Fixed For Criminal Possession Of A FTC
The district court is empowered by statute to revoke a defendant’s probation under
certain circumstances. I.C. §§ 19-2602, -2603, 20-222. The Court uses a two-step analysis to
review a probation revocation proceeding. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). First, the
3
Court determines “whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation.” Id. Second, “[i]f it
is determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation,” the Court
examines “what should be the consequences of that violation.” Id. The determination of a
probation violation and the determination of the consequences, if any, are separate analyses. Id.
Here, Ms. Richins does not challenge her admissions to violating her probation. (Tr., p.9,
L.6–p.13, L.2.) “[W]hen a probationer admits to a direct violation of his probation agreement, no
further inquiry into the question is required.” State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 50 (Ct. App. 1992)
(citation omitted). Rather, Ms. Richins submits that the district court did not exercise reason and,
therefore, abused its discretion by revoking her probation.
“After a probation violation has been proven, the decision to revoke probation and
pronounce sentence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Roy, 113 Idaho
388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987). “A judge cannot revoke probation arbitrarily,” however. State v. Lee,
116 Idaho 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1989). “The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an
opportunity to be rehabilitated under proper control and supervision.” State v. Mummert, 98
Idaho 452, 454 (1977). “In determining whether to revoke probation a court must consider
whether probation is meeting the objective of rehabilitation while also providing adequate
protection for society.” State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995). The court may
consider the defendant’s conduct before and during probation. Roy, 113 Idaho at 392.
In this case, Ms. Richins submits that the district court did not exercise reason by
revoking her probation. She argues that her probation was achieving its rehabilitative objective,
or a rider could have provided her with the tools to be successful on probation. Notably,
Ms. Richins’ underlying criminal offense of grand theft was caused in large part by her relapse
4
on methamphetamine. (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”),1 pp.5, 14.) One of
Ms. Richins’ goals at the time of sentencing was to maintain her sobriety, and she still hoped to
achieve that goal at the time of the disposition hearing. (PSI, p.14; see Tr., p.17, L.16–p.20,
L.14.) Although Ms. Richins had some setbacks with the drug court termination and surrounding
events, she had a strong support network to help her reach her goal and comply with the terms of
probation. Her family lived nearby, and she had an . (Tr., p.17, Ls.17–19;
see also PSI, pp.8, 10.) One of her friends from a twelve-step program wrote that Ms. Richins
had her support and the support of others in the program. (R., p.129.) Another friend wrote that
Ms. Richins actually helped start the twelve-step program and believed that she could change.
(R., p.130.) To reach these goals, Ms. Richins hoped to go on a rider so she could participate in
the CBI-SA program. (Tr., p.18, Ls.3–10.) Alternatively, Ms. Richins had a bed available at the
Jubilee House Ministries, which provided an intensive, in-patient eighteen-month recovery
program. (R., p.127.) She requested that the district court make the completion of that program a
condition of her probation. (Tr., p.19, Ls.18–23.) This information showed that probation would
give Ms. Richins the opportunity for rehabilitation under proper supervision, or that the rider
would give her the resources to comply with the terms of probation.
In light of these facts, Ms. Richins submits that the district court did not exercise reason
in revoking her probation and executing her fixed five-year sentence. She asserts that the district
court should have retained jurisdiction or continued her on probation with the Jubilee House
condition.
1 Citations to the PSI refer to the eighty-six page electronic document with the confidential
exhibits.
5
CONCLUSION
Ms. Richins respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s disposition
judgment and remand her case to the district court for a new probation violation disposition
hearing.
DATED this 25th day of August, 2021.
/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of August, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
ROSEMARY EMORY
233 W MAIN ST
E-Service: remory@co.jerome.id.us
MELISSA KIPPES
320 2ND AVE N.
E-Service: lawyers@kblawmv.com
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Kylie M. Fourtner
KYLIE M. FOURTNER
Administrative Assistant
JCS/kmf


State v. Richins Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48727

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Watkins v. Idaho Transportation Department  Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48830

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State v. Davis Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48569

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/8285/thumbnail.jp

UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
10-14-2021 
State v. Sagers Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 48590 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
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https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7286 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
JACOB L. WESTERFIELD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9841
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO. 48590-2021
)
v. ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-20-29099
)
JENNIFER E. SAGERS, ) APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jennifer Sagers argued that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence when it ordered her to serve ten years, with three years fixed, for attempted
robbery.  The State responded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed
the aforementioned sentence.  Ms. Sagers submits this reply brief to respond to the State’s claim
that Ms. Sagers informed the presentence investigator that she would not be a good candidate for
probation.
Electronically Filed
10/14/2021 11:46 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Ms. Sagers to serve ten years, with
three years fixed?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Ms. Sagers To Ten Years, With
Three Years Fixed
In its Respondent’s brief, the State asserted that “[n]oting Sagers’ extensive criminal
history; lack of stable housing, employment, or a support system; and Sagers’ own
acknowledgment that she was not a good candidate for probation, the presentence investigator
recommended a period of incarceration.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.7 (citing (PSI, p.17).)
However, in the presentence investigation report (“PSI”), Ms. Sagers stated that she would not
be a good candidate for “a rider” and requested that the district court give her an opportunity for
probation with a requirement that she attend an inpatient treatment program at the Walker
Center.  (PSI, pp.16-17.)  Ms. Sagers informed the presentence investigator that “[i]f I couldn’t
get probation with a treatment stipulation, then I need a year or two in prison.  I don’t want a
rider, I’m not a good candidate, it won’t help my mental health.”  (PSI, p.16.)
The presentence investigator specifically noted in her report that “Ms. Sagers said she is
‘not a good candidate’ for a period of retained jurisdiction, and she would rather serve a prison
sentence.”  (PSI, p.17.)  At sentencing, Ms. Sagers told the district court that “[a]nd I did ask to
go to prison instead of a Rider.  It’s not that I feel like I would beat somebody up there.  I don’t
feel like I’ll get the proper treatment that I need there, and I want to go to prison so I have long
enough time away from the streets and people I know that did heroin.”  (Tr., p.37, L.25—p.38,
L.6.)  Ms. Sagers also informed the district court that she did not believe that she would receive
“what [she] needed” to address her mental health issues while on a rider.  (Tr., p.38, Ls.11-17.)
3
In sum, Ms. Sagers maintains that the district court did not exercise reason, and therefore
abused its discretion, by imposing an excessive sentence.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Sagers respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it deems
appropriate.  Alternatively, she requests that her case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 14th day of October, 2021.
                                       /s/ Jacob L. Westerfield
JACOB L. WESTERFIELD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of October, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JLW/eas


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State v. May Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48759 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 48759-2021
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) MINIDOKA COUNTY
) NO. CR34-19-1585
v. )
)
JON CURTIS MAY, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
______________________________)
________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
________________________
HONORABLE MICHAEL P. TRIBE
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
State Appellate Public Defender Deputy Attorney General
I.S.B. #6555 Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
KIMBERLY A. COSTER Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender (208) 334-4534
I.S.B. #4115
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
ATTORNEYS FOR ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
Electronically Filed
10/1/2021 11:17 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ........................................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ..................................................................................................... 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ............................................................................................ 5
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................................. 6
 The District Court Erroneously Denied Mr. May’s Motion
 To Return Property ................................................................................................................ 6
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................................................... 7
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
State v. Kessler, 151 Idaho 653 (Ct. App. 2011) ..........................................................................6
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102 (2009) .......................................................................................6
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jon Curtis May appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to return
property, specifically the $2,318 cash seized by police at the time of his arrest.  Mr. May testified
at an evidentiary hearing that the police had removed the money from his wallet at the scene, and
that the money belongs to him.  The district court found Mr. May lacked credibility and relied
instead on the officers’ testimonies to conclude that the money belonged to individuals other than
Mr. May.
On appeal, and mindful of the deference given to credibility determinations made by a
trial court, Mr. May argues the district court clearly erred by rejecting his testimony and by
failing to grant his motion.  Accordingly, Mr. May asks this Court to reverse the district court’s
order denying his motion to return property.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On April 6, 2019, Minidoka Sheriff’s Detective Shane Murphy received a call from a
Rupert City Police Officer, Daniel Van Leeuwen, requesting assistance in the apprehension of
Mr. May.  (Tr., p.4 (Prelim.Tr., p.6, Ls.12-24).)  Officer Van Leeuwen advised that Mr. May was
implicated in an ongoing check-fraud investigation and was currently at a Minidoka residence.
(Tr., p.4. (Prelim.Tr., p.6, Ls.12-24).)  Detective Murphy went to the residence and, as Mr. May
was walking out, arrested Mr. May on an outstanding parole warrant.  (Tr., p.4 (Prelim.Tr., p.9,
Ls.7-22).)
Before submitting to the arrest, Mr. May dropped a duffle bag, a brief case, and a small
safe that he had been carrying and attempted to flee.  (Tr., p.4 (Prelim.Tr., p.9, L.24 – p.10,
L.10).)  After other officers arrived at the scene, Mr. May was apprehended and handcuffed, and
2
he, along with the three items he dropped, were searched.  (Tr., p.4 (Prelim.Tr., p.9, L.24 – p.10,
L.10).)  The officers found drug contraband inside the duffle bag, and Mr. May admitted those
items belonged to him; however, Mr. May disclaimed owning any items in the briefcase or safe,
which appeared to contain evidence related to the check-fraud investigation. (Tr. pp.5-8
(Prelim.Tr., p.11, L.11 – p.22, L.8).)  Detective Murphy retained custody of the duffel bag and
drug evidence, and he handed the briefcase and safe over to the custody of Officer Van Leeuwen.
(Tr. pp.5-8 (Prelim.Tr., p.11, L.11 – p.22, L.8).)  Detective Murphy recalled seeing a wallet, and
also recalled that $2,318 in cash was turned over to the City of Rupert as part of the check-fraud
investigation.  (Tr., p.9 (Prelim.Tr., p.24, Ls.13-24).)
Mr. May ultimately pled guilty to possessing a controlled substance and was sentenced to
an indeterminate term of four years, and he was ordered to pay various costs and fees totaling
$835.50.  (R., pp.36, 129-33.)
Following his sentencing, Mr. May filed a Motion to Return Property, pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 41.1.  (R., p.134.)  He filed an Affidavit stating the money was seized from his
wallet on the day of his arrest, and he requested those funds be used to pay his court-ordered
costs.  (R., p.152.)  The State objected, asserting the money did not belong to Mr. May.
(R., pp.144, 165.)  According to the State, no money was taken from Mr. May’s person or wallet;
rather, the money was discovered in either the safe or the briefcase, and Mr. May had disclaimed
any ownership of their contents.  (R., p.144.)
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to resolve the conflicting
accounts.  (See R., pp.173, 175; Tr., p.23, L.5 – p.84, L.16.)  Mr. May testified that he was
apprehended at the scene by Detective Murphy and Sargent Taft, and that the officers removed
his cell phones and wallet from his person and placed them on the ground in front of the items he
3
had dropped.  (Tr., p.73, Ls.9-14.)  He testified that Detective Murphy removed the cash from
the wallet and “actually counted the money in front of me.”  (Tr., p.73, Ls.20-22.)  Mr. May
testified there was about $2,318 in his wallet at that time, and that he had made the money in the
oil fields in North Dakota.  (Tr., p.74, L.10.)
The State called three witnesses who testified to their roles in the events surrounding the
arrest and seizure of the property.  Detective Murphy testified he had been the first officer to
have contact with Mr. May, and that Mr. May had been carrying the duffle bag, a briefcase, and
a small safe when he initially encountered him.  (Tr., p.53, Ls.10-15.)  He testified that Mr. May
admitted owning the duffle bag, but disowned the safe and briefcase.  (Tr. p.57, Ls.13-16.)
Detective Murphy testified that, while he recalled a wallet, he could not recall specifically where
the wallet had been located.  (Tr., p.54, L.18 – p.56, L.24, p.67, Ls.15-16.)  Detective Murphy
denied he had removed any property from Mr. May’s person.  (Tr., p.58, L.20 – p.59, L.2.)
Detective Murphy testified that another officer at the scene, Sargent Jake Taft, also from
the Sheriff’s office, had opened the locked safe after struggling with it.  (Tr., p.58, Ls.6-12.)
Officer Van Leeuwen testified that he arrived at the scene after the arrest, and that the
safe and the briefcase were locked and unopened at that time.  (Tr., p.40, L.25 – p.41, L.1, p.43,
Ls.20-25.)  He testified he watched “the Sheriff’s Office” open both the safe and the briefcase,
look through their contents and then close them, before handing them over to his custody.  (Tr.,
p.41, Ls.1-8.)  Officer Van Leeuwen testified he saw nothing removed from, or put into, the safe
or the briefcase.1  (Tr., p.41, Ls.5-8.)  He also testified he could not know if Detective Murphy
had opened the safe prior to his arrival.  (Tr., p.44, Ls.5-7.)  Officer Van Leeuwen testified he
found the cash when he inventoried the contents of the safe.  (Tr., p.40, Ls.16-24, p.42, Ls.3-18.)
1 Detective Murphy denied handing over any property to the Rupert Police, other than the
briefcase and safe.  (Tr., p.58, L.20 – p.59, L.2.)
4
He also testified there were other items in the safe and in the briefcase, including a passport and
mail, which did not belong to Mr. May.  (Tr., p.40, Ls.5-12.)
Officer Richard Koyle testified that he had transported Mr. May from the scene to the
jailhouse.  (Tr., p.30, L.24 – p.31, L.12.)  Officer Koyle testified that Mr. May had a wallet on
his person when he was booked, but there was no money in it.  (Tr., p.30, L.24 – p.31, L.12.)
At the conclusion of the hearing, and with the consent of both parties, the district court
took judicial notice of the preliminary hearing transcript.  (Tr., p.71, Ls.7-19.)  No other evidence
was submitted.
The district court issued a written decision denying Mr. May’s motion to return property.
(R., pp.177-81.)  The district court explained that in arriving at its decision, it found that the
testimonies of the three officers were credible and that Mr. May lacked credibility.  (R., pp.179-
80.)  Rejecting Mr. May’s testimony and relying on the testimonies of the officers, the district
court found “no money or cash was found on the Defendant, and that the $2,318.00 was located
in a safe or briefcase, which the Defendant disclaimed any interest.”  (R., p.180.)  The district
court additionally found that, because documents in the safe and briefcase contained personal
items that belonged to other individuals, it was more likely than not the money belonged to
individuals other than Mr. May.  (R., p.180.)  The district court posited that Mr. May’s motion
was an attempt to claim $2,318 that is not his, and a continuation of his criminal conduct.
(R., p.180.)
Mr. May filed a Notice of Appeal that is timely from the order denying his motion to
return property.  (R., p.188.)
5
ISSUE
Did the district court erroneously deny Mr. May’s motion to return property?
6
ARGUMENT
The District Court Erroneously Denied Mr. May’s Motion To Return Property
Mr. May claims the $2,318 in cash seized by officers belonged to him and was removed
from his wallet at the scene, and that the district court erred when it denied his request to order
the property be returned to him. Mindful of the deference given to the trial court’s decisions
regarding witness credibility, and that an appellate court will not set aside a trial court’s findings
that are supported by substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, see State v.
Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009); State v. Kessler, 151 Idaho 653, 655 (Ct. App. 2011),
Mr. May asserts the district court erred by rejecting his testimony and by instead relying on the
officers’ testimonies to conclude that money belonged to individuals other than him.  The order
denying Mr. May’s motion to return the property therefore should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Mr. May respectfully asks that this Court reverse the district court’s order denying his
motion to return property.
DATED this 1st day of October, 2021.
/s/ Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
7
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of October, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
KAC/eas


State v. May Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48759

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10-14-2021 
State v. Wilson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48887 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Wilson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48887" (2021). Not Reported. 7323. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7323 
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Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
EMILY M. JOYCE
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #10410
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 48887-2021
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-20-19667
v. )
)
DANIEL EASTON WILSON, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
______________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Daniel Wilson appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled
substance. Mr. Wilson pleaded guilty to possession and was sentenced to seven years, with two
years determinate. On appeal, he argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
One evening, police began following Mr. Wilson as he drove away from a residence.
(Conf. Ex., p.6.) Police signaled for Mr. Wilson to pull over. (Conf. Ex., p.6.) Before pulling
Electronically Filed
10/14/2021 8:37 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
over, Mr. Wilson threw a container out of the passenger side of the vehicle. (Conf. Ex., p.6.) In
addition to the container—which held a large quantity of methamphetamine—police found
methamphetamine and paraphernalia in the car and in the direct possession of a passenger in the
car. (Conf. Ex., p.6.) Mr. Wilson and the passenger were later charged with drug offenses,
including trafficking in methamphetamine and destruction of evidence. (R., pp.8, 28, Conf. Ex.,
pp.2-3.) Pursuant to a plea agreement (R., p.59-60, Tr., p.9, Ls.4-9), Mr. Wilson pleaded guilty to
one count of possession of methamphetamine. (Tr., p.10, Ls.5-16.)
At sentencing, Mr. Wilson requested that he be sentenced to a determinate period of
“time served,” or 393 days, and a non-specified indeterminate period of time. (Tr., p.19, Ls.21-
25.) The State recommended seven years, with three years determinate. (Tr., p.19, Ls.9-11.) The
district court emphasized Mr. Wilson’s lengthy criminal history, and then sentenced him to seven
years, with two years determinate. (Tr., p.29, Ls.16-17.) Mr. Wilson timely filed a notice of
appeal from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.69-71, 76-77.)
ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of seven
years, with two years determinate, upon Mr. Wilson following his guilty plea to possession of a
controlled substance
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Seven Years,
With Two Years Determinate, Upon Mr. Wilson Following His Guilty Plea
Mr. Wilson asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of seven years,
with two years determinate, is excessive.  Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court
imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
3
of the record considering the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982).
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). In determining if an abuse of discretion occurred, appellate
review centers on whether the trial court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise of reason.” State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 591 (2019).
Here, Mr. Wilson’s sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 37-
2732(c) (seven-year maximum sentence). Accordingly, to show the sentence imposed was
unreasonable, Mr. Wilson “must show that [his] sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
4
Mr. Wilson asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of seven years, with
two years determinate, is excessive.
After years of run-ins with the law, Mr. Wilson changed his life. He was clean for the
first time in a very long time. (Tr., p.22, Ls.9-10.) He had completed treatment (Tr., p.23, L.6),
and he was doing well. He was certified and employed as a welder. (Tr., p.23, Ls.7-8.) In
addition, Mr. Wilson was helping his kids and being a positive role model to them. (Tr., p.24,
L.23 – p.25, L.4.) He also started a program that helped kids refocus their energy and attention
on biking rather than on drugs. (Tr., p.25, Ls.5-8.)
During this period, his parole officer stated that Mr. Wilson had “been compliant”
(Tr., p.21, L.15), and that he was recently “reassessed and assigned a low risk.” (Tr., p.21, L.17.)
His Parole officer also stated that Mr. Wilson was a “prosocial member of the community” (Tr.,
p.21, L.19), “maintained significant positive changes in his life” (Tr., p.21, L.18), and
“portray[d] a positive and respectful attitude in an effort to be successful.” (Tr., p.21, Ls.20-21.)
While Mr. Wilson has made poor decisions, he is still committed to changing his life around.
Since he has been incarcerated for the instant offense, he has been doing well, and working the
whole time. (Tr., p.20, Ls.9-12.) While Mr. Wilson may have had his share of disciplinary issues
in the past (Tr., p.19, Ls.1-5), he has had no disciplinary issues since the instant offense. (Tr.,
p.18, L.24 – p.19, L.4.) In addition, he has been doing as much programing as possible. (Tr.,
p.20, Ls.17-19.) Indeed, at the time of his sentencing, he had taken nearly seventy classes in his
just-over-a-year of incarceration (Tr., p.20, L.22 – p.21, L.2), and had a job lined up upon his
release. (Tr., p.23, Ls.9-12.) See State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 118 (1955) (recognizing gainful
employment as a mitigating factor).
5
While Mr. Wilson has a fairly extensive criminal history (Conf. Ex., pp.66-75, 80-87), he
was determined to change for the better, and he started doing so. (Tr., p.21, Ls.5.) Indeed,
Mr. Wilson’s substance use began at an early age (Conf. Ex., p.167-68), in addition to an early
onset of mental health issues. (Conf. Ex., p.165.) See I.C. § 19-2523; see also State v. Delling,
152 Idaho 122, 132–33 (2011) (mental health as mitigating factor). However, he successfully got
sober (Tr., p.22, Ls.6-10, p.24, L.6), and his goal is to get treatment and stay sober. (Conf. Ex.,
p.169.) When he applies himself, Mr. Wilson is a very valued employee. (Conf. Ex., p.171.) He
is ready to apply himself to his sobriety and being a productive member of society. (Conf. Ex.,
p.169.)
Mr. Wilson submits that the combination of mitigating factors in this case warrants a
lesser sentence. Therefore, Mr. Wilson asserts the district court did not exercise reason, and
thereby abused its discretion, by imposing an excessive sentence.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Wilson respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 14th day of October, 2021.
/s/ Emily M. Joyce
EMILY M. JOYCE
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of October, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
EMJ/eas


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