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Assessing the Effectiveness of the Eco-Patent Commons: A Post-mortem Analysis
Get PDFThe authors revisit the effect of the “Eco-Patent Commons” (EcoPC) on the diffusion of patented environmentally friendly technologies following its discontinuation in 2016. Established in January 2008 by several large multinational companies, the not-for-profit initiative provided royalty-free access to 248 patents covering 94 “green” inventions. In previous work, Bronwyn Hall and Christian Helmers (2013) suggested that the patents pledged to the commons had the potential to encourage the diffusion of valuable environmentally friendly technologies. The updated results in this paper now show that the commons did not increase the diffusion of pledged inventions, and that the EcoPC suffered from a number of structural and organizational issues. The authors hope these findings will inform future fforts to make environmentally friendly technologies more broadly available for use
Non-Discrimination and FRAND Commitments
Get PDFA pledge to license standard essential patents (SEPs) on a non- discriminatory basis is a common element of SDO IPR Policies, part of the larger commitment to license on Fair, Reasonable, and Non- Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. In this chapter we consider what non-discrimination pledges imply for SDO member conduct. We review the basic variants of such pledges, how they may be informed by broader legal and economic defi nitions of discrimination, and recent cases and agency guidance interpreting such commitments. We conclude with open questions regarding the legal implications of non-discriminatory licensing pledges
The Case for More Debt: Expanding College Affordability by Expanding Income-Driven Repayment
Get PDFOne of the most important—but least discussed—legislative and regulatory accomplishments of the Obama administration was the reform and expansion of income-driven repayment (“IDR”) for federal student loans. By 2016, anyone with a federal student loan—old or new—could choose to cap their monthly student loan payments to 10 percent of their discretionary income (after a large exemption) and have any unpaid balances forgiven after a minimum of ten, twenty, or twenty-five years of repayment, depending on the plan. IDR has the potential to effect a massive change in how the United States pays for higher education. At its core, the promise of IDR is that higher education will always be affordable, no matter what a person’s income is after the person leaves school.
However, Monthly payment as a percentage of income, and ultimate forgiveness after the full repayment period, apply only to money borrowed from (or guaranteed by) the federal government. But it turns out that most undergraduates can’t actually borrow that much at all—only about half the average net cost of a public university, and a quarter of the cost for a private university. Federal law imposes hard caps on the amount it will lend to undergraduates—caps that have barely budged since 1993—even as tuitions continue to rise faster than inflation
Green Technology Diffusion: A Post-Mortem Analysis of the Eco-Patent Commons
Get PDFWe revisit the effect of the “Eco-Patent Commons” (EcoPC) on the diffusion of patented environmentally friendly technologies following its discontinuation in 2016, using both participant survey and data analytic evidence. Established in January 2008 by several large multinational companies, the not-for-profit initiative provided royalty-free access to 248 patents covering 94 “green” inventions. Hall and Helmers (2013) suggested that the patents pledged to the commons had the potential to encourage the diffusion of valuable environmentally friendly technologies. Our updated results now show that the commons did not increase the diffusion of pledged inventions, and that the EcoPC suffered from several structural and organizational issues. Our findings have implications for the effectiveness of patent commons in enabling the diffusion of patented technologies more broadly
In Re: Petition for Appointment of a Prosecutor Pro Tempore by Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, Jane Doe 3, and Jane Doe 4 : Petition for Appointment of Prosecutor Pro Tempore
Get PDFThis is a petition filed in the Utah Supreme Court on behalf of four women (Jane Does 1, 2, 3, and 4) who were sexually assaulted, and yet the public prosecutor with jurisdiction refused to file criminal charges against their attackers. The petition relies on Utah Constitution, article VIII, § 16, which anticipates situations where a crime victim might need her own avenue for initiating criminal prosecution. Accordingly, this constitutional provision provides that “[i]f a public prosecutor fails or refuses to prosecute, the Supreme Court shall have power to appoint a prosecutor pro tempore.” Indeed, to underscore the fact that other ways to initiate a prosecution are available, the provision specifically states that public prosecutors in this state shall have the “primary responsibility” for prosecuting crimes. “Primary” responsibility is, of course, not the same as exclusive responsibility.
This petition explains why the Utah Supreme Court to use its power to appoint a prosecutor, both to bring justice for these four particular sexual assault victims and, more broadly, to help protect a class of victims – women and girls who have been sexually assaulted – who are under-protected by current prosecutorial practices in our country. The petition argues that the Court can address systemic under-prosecution of rape cases through its power under the Utah Constitution, not only under the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision, art. VIII, § 16, but also to protect rights contained in Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment, art. I, § 28, the Utah Uniform Operation of Laws Clause, art. I, § 24, and the Utah Equal Rights Provision, art. IV, § 1. It also has power to act through the federal Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Const., amend. XIV.
The petition concludes by asking for the Court to appoint a prosecutor to prosecute the sexual assaults committed against the four Jane Does
NEPA and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 Statutory Categorical Exclusions: What Are the Environmental Costs of Expedited Oil and Gas Development?
Get PDFA decade ago, concerned that National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) compliance caused delays in permitting oil and gas (“O&G”) development on federal land, Congress enacted Section 390 of the Energy Policy Act (“EPAct”) of 2005. Section 390 is intended to expedite the environmental review of O&G development projects on federal lands. To effectuate that end Congress created several statutory categorical exclusions (“CEs”) to NEPA that apply to O&G development. Prior to the EPAct, the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) would permit new O&G development after conducting an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) or Environmental Assessment (“EA”). EISs and EAs were the only NEPA compliance option available to the BLM because the agency had not promulgated regulations creating CEs for O&G projects. After the EPAct was passed, the BLM began permitting a substantial number of wells using the less rigorous CEs provided in Section 390. In fiscal years 2006 through 2008, the BLM used Section 390 CEs to permit approximately 28 percent of all wells nationally. States, members of Congress, and environmental groups have expressed concerns that the Section 390 CEs would lead to otherwise avoidable environmental impacts by circumventing conventional NEPA review. This article reviews 189 NEPA decisions and assesses whether the EPAct’s CEs result in more environmental harm then would occur had the projects undergone EA or EIS review
Sources of Conflict in a Divided America
Get PDFThe Sixties and early Seventies were a time of great conflict in America, including the assassinations of JFK, MLK, and RFK; the civil rights movement; the Vietnam War and our invasion of Cambodia; and Watergate and Nixon’s forced resignation. Today we seem to be in another period of great conflict, including nationally about the 2016 presidential campaigns and election, and locally about our state’s efforts to control federal public lands. This blog post discusses sources of current conflict in a divided America
Should Mutual Funds Invest in Startups? A Case Study of Fidelity Magellan Fund\u27s Investments in Unicorns (and Other Startups) and the Regulatory Implications
Get PDFMutual funds are acting like venture capitalists. Contrary to longstanding practice and to their reputation for investing in public companies, mutual funds, including some of the most prominent, are allocating portions of their portfolios to private startup firms, including famous unicorns like Airbnb and Uber. Through a case study of Fidelity Magellan Fund’s startup portfolio, this article analyzes the regulatory implications of this development. I argue that the new interest in venture investing poses several potential investor-protection concerns: lack of awareness among mutual-fund investors, lack of liquidity for mutual-fund shares, lack of venture-capital (“VC”) expertise among mutual-fund management, and lack of accountability over how fund’s value their ownership stakes in startups for purposes of calculating their net asset values, which creates an opportunity for management to manipulate such estimates. Based on Magellan’s practices, liquidity is not a salient concern, but the other gapsappear significant. Magellan’s disclosures on its website, and in its prospectus, statement of additional information, and quarterly reports provide investors with little meaningfulinformation about the fund’s investments in startups. They also provide nothing to suggest that Magellan has experience in this area. At the same time, however, the fund reports returns from its startup portfolio that far exceed the public market and the VC-industry average. While exceptional performance from a novice does not prove misconduct, it reinforces concerns about the dependability of fund valuations. To address the above risks, I suggest new rules governing how mutual funds value their startup investments, which tie changes to objective evidence, and new disclosure requirementsthat would shed light on the rationale for valuation changes and provide mutual-fund investors with notice that startups are in their portfolios and that these investments pose certain risks
The Disability Politics of Abortion
Get PDFWith Ohio considering passing the nation’s second ban on abortions motivated by Down Syndrome, the relationship between abortion and disability law has taken on new importance. Disability based bans raise unique legal, moral, and political difficulties for those supporting legal abortion. The core commitments supporting legal abortion—including sex equality—stand in some tension with justifying abortion in the case of a fetal defect or disability.
Given the problems with disability-based bans, it may seem that there is no urgent need to resolve these tensions. Disability-based statutes likely create an impermissible undue burden under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern v. Casey and seem impossible to enforce. However, historical analysis shows that the bans under consideration may transform the abortion debate even if they are never enforced.
First, this history explains the puzzling lack of discussion of disability in abortion politics, illuminating the political payoff of disability-based justifications used by activists otherwise committed to equal treatment. Second, this history makes clear the perils that a disability-based ban creates for supporters of legal abortion. Raising the salience of “selective” abortion may allow pro-lifers to win over ambivalent voters and legislators who are concerned about disability discrimination. Moreover, the arguments made prominent by such a law can easily justify other restrictions that might fare better in the courts, including limitations on access to noninvasive prenatal genetic diagnosis and prohibitions on abortion after the twentieth week of pregnancy.
To avoid the danger illuminated by the history studied here, prochoice attorneys and legislators should push for laws that actually reduce the odds of disability-based abortion. Ironically, parents who might not otherwise choose to terminate a pregnancy in the case of disability do so because they feel they have no choice, particularly given the bleak outcomes faced by many disabled adults confronting both poverty and unemployment. Reproductive justice should include a commitment to adequate funding for the programs on which disabled adults and children depend, as well as the removal of perverse legal incentives that discourage disabled Americans from taking steps that would make employment more realistic. Guaranteeing meaningful choices inevitably involves the removal of the discrimination and tangible obstacles that make abortion more common in cases of fetal defect or disability
International Military Tribunals’ Genesis, WWII Experience, and Future Relevance
Get PDFYears after the prosecution of Nazi and Japanese war criminals, the United Nations created an International Criminal Tribunal as part of its commitment to bring to justice persons engaged in war crimes, as those crimes were defined during the WWII proceedings. Ultimately, specific tribunals, organized by the United Nations, were created to bring to justice war criminals. In 1993, a tribunal was formed to prosecute former Yugoslav officials and military personnel for atrocities committed during what is known as the Yugoslav wars. In 1994, a tribunal was formed to prosecute officials in Rwanda for evidence of ethnic genocides. There is no permanent tribunal, however, as the United States stands as a vocal opposition to such a criminal court with a pronounced antipathy to such courts proceeding against US military personnel. As the US State Department has stated, there are “insufficient checks and balances on the authority of the ICC prosecutor and judges” and “insufficient protection against politicized prosecutions or other abuses.” In the absence of US support, there will be no permanent tribunal and, at best, on an individual basis, the United Nations will create separate tribunals to address war crimes, leaving the choice of such prosecutions open to criticism that political objectives not appropriate for the wielding of such international resources govern, thereby diminishing the precedential value of the wielding of such power.
Today, prosecution of war criminals is undertaken on a case by case basis by a permanent ICC established pursuant to the Rome Statute of 1998. As the US State Department has made clear, the US will not agree to a permanent court but rather accepts a case-by-case prosecution thereby avoiding the prospect of politics or other public relations considerations serving as the basis for singling out US citizens, including US political officials. We are 70 plus years away from that time of international unity to bring to justice the military and political officials of vanquished nations. We do not have that unity today. In the absence of the US support of such a permanent court, the efficacy of international criminal tribunals as not only the source of law on the substantive crimes prosecuted but on procedural obligations of the prosecution and rights of the defendants is doubtful