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FSU Law Focus - 10/25/2019
Get PDFFrom the Dean: FSU College of Law awarded 8th best value law school by preLaw magazine; Students Present Oral Arguments at Florida Supreme Court; Alum Profile: Corey J. Portnoy (’15); Student Profile: 3L Joseph Burnshttps://ir.law.fsu.edu/fsu-law-focus/1023/thumbnail.jp
FSU Law Focus - 12/06/2019
Get PDFFrom the Dean: 202 Summer for Undergraduates program; Dean Emeritus Weidner Provided Keynote for 2019 LLC Institute; Alum Profile: Ginger Barry Boyd (’00); Student Profile: 3L Malasia McDuffie;https://ir.law.fsu.edu/fsu-law-focus/1060/thumbnail.jp
FSU Law Focus - 02/01/2019
Get PDFFrom the Dean: Dean Ameritus Don Weidner receives 2019 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Distinguished Service Faculty Award; Faculty Profile: Douglas A. Kahn; Alum Profile: Travis Voyles (’17); Student Profile: 3L Maria\u27h Givenshttps://ir.law.fsu.edu/fsu-law-focus/1301/thumbnail.jp
FSU Law Focus - 01/04/2019
Get PDFFrom the Dean: Now Accepting Summer Program Applications; Faculty and Alum Profile: Cynthia Tunnicliff (’71); Alum Profile: R. Mark Williamson (’91); Student Profile: 3L Chelsie Lyonshttps://ir.law.fsu.edu/fsu-law-focus/1387/thumbnail.jp
Snapchat\u27s Gift: Equity Culture in High-Tech Firms
Get PDFSnap, Inc., the company that owns the platform Snapchat, controbersially offered nonvoting common shares to the public in 2017. This Article asks what it means to invest in Snap or other (mostly technology-based) companies in which common shareholders collectibely have little or no power to influence corporate policy. In particular, why do such investors expect to be compensated? This Article explores the familiar rationales for equity investing, including stock appreciation and dividends, and the logical shortcomings of those rationales in these circumstances. Adopting Henry Manne\u27s two systems approach to corporate affairs through both law and economics, we show that corporation law fails to ensure that corporations return business profits to shareholders. A similar analysis of the market for corporate control concludes that, without shareholder boting, the market for corporate control also fails to ensure a return to shareholders. Shareholders who invest in firms in the absence of legal or market mechanisms to secure a return on their inbestment, howeber, are not irrational. Instead, inbestors rely on cultural understandings of appropriate reciprocity. This Article employs Marcel Mauss\u27s cultural anthropology classic, The Gift, to explain the equity culture in which shareholders invest in Snap and other high-technology firms, and in which such firms operate. This Article concludes by suggesting some ramifications of understanding shareholding, and consequently management, in terms of equity culture. This Article also complements the substantial work of behabioral economics in explaining inbestor choice and organizational behabiors. The field of corporate finance traditionally has been organized around the figure of the rationally self-interested indibidual. Behabioral economics argues that people are not as rational as orthodox corporate finance assumes. This Article argues that people in markets are not as individual as corporate finance assumes
Antitrust and Democracy
Get PDFOur solution of the anti-monopoly problems must be in terms of our ideals-the ideals of political and economic democracy. We want no economic or political dictatorship imposed upon us either by the government or by big business. We want no system of detailed regulation of prices by the government nor price fixing by private interests. We do not want bureaucracy or regimentation of any kind, but we will prefer governmental to private bureaucracy and regimentation, if we have to make such a choice. We cannot permit private corporations to be private governments. We must keep our economic system under the control of the people who live by and under it
Right at Home: Modeling Sub-Federal Resistance as Criminal Justice Reform
Get PDFOver the past two decades, state and local governments have crippled the federal war on marijuana as well as a series of federal initiatives designed to enforce federal immigration law through city and county police departments. This Article characterizes these and similar events as sub-federal government resistance in service of criminal justice reform. In keeping with recent sub-federal criminal reform movements, it prescribes a process model of reform consisting of four stages: enforcement abstinence, enforcement nullification, mimicry, and enforcement abolition. The state and local governments that pass through each of these stages can frustrate the enforcement of federal criminal law while also challenging widely-held assumptions regarding the value of criminal surveillance and criminal sanction. In promoting sub-federal government empowerment within the framework of criminal federalism, this Article breaks from conventional theories in the criminal law literature regarding the legal and policy strategies most likely to deliver fundamental change in American criminal justice
Context-Specific Seminole Rock Reform
Get PDFUnder Bowles v. Seminole Rock, courts will defer to an administrative agency\u27s interpretation of rules that the agency produced. For decades, Seminole Rock deference was an uncontroversial part of the administrative law landscape. But recently, the doctrine has come under siege. Drawing on concerns about the flexible structure of the administrative state, critics of the doctrine have won an increasingly sympathetic ear in the Supreme Court and in Congress. This Essay suggests that any reform of Seminole Rock should be driven by three principles: Fidelity to congressional intent, avoidance of undesirable side effects, and careful targeting of a clear problem. It goes on to argue that these goals can best be satisfied by tailoring deference to the context created by each regulatory regime. For courts, this would mean looking to guideposts in the underlying statutes that authorize agency action. For Congress, this would mean specifying the level of deference on a statute-by-statute basis. The resulting context-specific Seminole Rock regime would avoid many of the pitfalls that have plagued past reform efforts while placing the doctrine on a proper footing