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Beyond the Marketplace of Ideas: Bridging Theory and Doctrine to Promote Self-Governance
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the longstanding debate over the First Amendment’s purpose and explains why the marketplace of ideas theory has come to dominate both judicial and public understanding of the First Amendment’s speech and press clauses. The marketplace theory’s ascendancy, however, has proven to be problematic. It rests on an overly simplified account of public discourse, treating speech as merely a commodity that can be allocated through market-style transactions, and it has come to embody an extreme version of libertarian economic thinking that is undermining the very democratic processes the First Amendment was intended to serve and strengthen.
Part II looks beyond the superficial appeal of the marketplace theory to highlight the structural role the First Amendment plays in the American constitutional system. Building on the work of Charles Black, John Hart Ely, Alexander Meiklejohn, and Robert Post, I maintain that whatever else the First Amendment was meant to achieve, a core function of its speech, press, assembly, and petitioning clauses was to ensure that citizens could effectively exercise their right of self-governance. As an increasing number of First Amendment scholars are beginning to recognize, unbridled faith in a supposedly self-correcting speech marketplace is a dangerous foundation for a democracy.
Part III considers how the First Amendment can foster self-governance. It lays out three principles that should guide the development of legal doctrines that support an informed and empowered electorate. First, we need to move beyond the idea that the First Amendment’s only function is to enshrine free market ideology. Second, the First Amendment does not bar the government from addressing market failures in the actual markets in which communication takes place, especially when those failures undermine the public’s capacity for self-governance. Third, the capacity for self-governance turns, at least in part, on whether the public has the information it needs to effectively evaluate issues of public policy.
Building on this last point, Part III proposes several ways to bridge theory and doctrine to promote self-governance, including using antitrust law to address concentrated economic power in communication markets, expanding and enforcing privacy and consumer protection laws to create more competition among speech platforms, and initiating programs that support journalism and other knowledge institutions within society. It also argues that as an influential participant in public discourse, the government should have an obligation to wield its influence in ways that support self-governance, not undermine it by misleading its citizens or starving them of the information they need. Part III therefore proposes two new rights that should be recognized under the First Amendment: a right not to be lied to by the government when it undermines the public’s capacity for self-governance and a right to information in the government’s possession that can assist the public in its efforts to understand and evaluate issues of public policy
COVID-19 and the Perils of Free-Market Parenting
U.S. public policy has for decades rested on the expectation that parents will privately provide the cash and conditions their children need. This expectation is exceptional: most other wealthy countries’ public policies support children through a mix of public and private funds. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, radically changed U.S. policy. The severe economic dislocation that resulted led Congress to pass a series of measures that funneled trillions of public dollars to families and parents. Whether these measures should represent a temporary deviation from the nation’s free-market expectations during an unprecedented emergency or the first step in a long-term shift toward routine public funding for children remains an open question.
This Essay makes the urgent case for the United States to join other countries in permanently shifting its approach toward one that combines private support of children with generous public support. It argues that “free-market family policy” failed to adequately support American children long before the pandemic.
Supplementing private funding with a generous stream of public funding is necessary to support the well-being of U.S. children even after the pandemic’s economic effects recede
A Nation Joins in Tears: Implications of the Domestic Deployment of Federal Troops in Portland, Oregon
A Slam Dunk Against Discrimination: The Lawsuit That Could Spearhead Accessibility in the Digital World
The Unbearable Emptiness of Formalism: Autonomy, Equality, and the Future of Affirmative Action
“Shall Not be Construed”: Reversal of Supreme Court Decisions by Constitutional Amendment
This Article considers the way in which small changes of wording can signal large changes of thought in the United States Constitution (Constitution). Drawing upon examples found in the Eleventh and Sixteenth Amendments, and in the Reconstruction Amendments, the Article shows that there are two ways to reverse a U.S. Supreme Court decision by constitutional amendment. The first type of amendment may reverse the decision by instructing the Court on the proper construction of a particular provision, as in the case of the Eleventh Amendment. The second means involves reversing the decision by altering the constitutional provision in question, rather than its construction, as by the Sixteenth Amendment