4328 research outputs found
Sort by
Who Cares Whether A Monopoly is Efficient? The Sherman Act Is Supposed to Ban Them All
Get PDFSection 2 of the Sherman Act was designed to impose sanctions on all firms that monopolize or attempt to monopolize regardless whether the firm engaged in anticompetitive conductor, and regardless whether the firm is efficient. This conclusion emerges from a textualist analysis of the language of Section 2. This article briefly analyzes contemporaneous dictionaries, legal treatises, and cases, and demonstrates that when the Sherman Act was passed the word “monopolize” simply meant that someone had acquired a monopoly. The term was not limited to monopolies acquired through anticompetitive conduct or monopolies that were inefficient. An attempt to monopolize also had its current colloquial meaning. A textualist analysis therefore demonstrates that Section 2 was designed to impose sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize. A textualist approach to statutory construction should not imply or create unstated exceptions. Since Section 2 of the Sherman Act contains no explicit exception for efficient monopolies or for a monopoly acquired without proof of anticompetitive conduct, none should be created by the courts. Current case law requiring plaintiffs to prove that defendant engaged in improper conduct should be overturned
When Justice Depends on It: The Need for Professional Standards for Mitigation Development in All Criminal Cases
Get PDFTo Ban or Not to Ban: The Impact of Exceptions in Maryland Firearms\u27 Regulations on Legislative Intent
Get PDFThe Right to Migrate
Get PDFSince the late-19th century, the Supreme Court has insisted that the preservation of national sovereignty requires a constitutional chasm between immigration law and ordinary law. If the Court is to bridge that chasm, it must reimagine the long-standing premise of the federal immigration power that the presence of noncitizens in U.S. territory menaces the nation’s sovereignty and security. This Article contributes to that reimagining by chronicling a compelling alternative worldview with a venerable historical pedigree—that of a quintessentially American right to migrate.
During the Founding Era, American statesmen described the impoverished subjects of Europe’s monarchies as protagonists in an unfolding world-historical drama of human liberation and enlightenment, shaking off the servitude and privations of the Old World and reinventing themselves as free, equal, and independent republican citizens. Although the scope of that vision originally was limited to Europe, it nevertheless seeded a field of American national identity that eventually would yield a genuinely universal (though ultimately unconsummated) right to migrate to the United States and be incorporated within the American political community. Following the Civil War, leading congressional architects of Reconstruction sought to expand the right to migrate beyond Europe to an emerging global theater of cosmopolitan culture, commerce, and labor. To the liberal internationalists of the postbellum era, migration was not a discrete, constitutionally exceptional subject of federal policy-making; rather, it was integral to the monumental post-Civil War project of renovating and reinvigorating American liberty, equality, and citizenship. Theirs was a worldview in which federal sovereignty and citizenship were paramount, yet the border between citizen and alien was both porous and transitory, and in which immigrants were regarded as “Americans in waiting.” That worldview serves as a forceful rebuttal to the Court’s presumption that preserving national sovereignty and security requires that immigration law occupy a constitutional world apart
