4328 research outputs found
Sort by
There Are Cracks in the Civil Commitment Process: A Practitioner’s Recommendations to Patch the System
Get PDFWhen a dangerously mentally ill person is in need of in-patient psychiatric hospitalization, the apparatus for involuntary civil commitment goes into motion. As a result, a mentally ill person can be confined against his or her will, to remain in the hospital indefinitely. The mentally ill person’s freedom depends on the outcome of a single hearing. The civil commitment process raises a number of legal questions: What are the constitutional protections against self-incrimination and the right to remain silent? Who presides over the hearing? Do the rules of evidence apply, specifically hearsay? Is the burden of proof standard by the preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing, or beyond a reasonable doubt? Should the mentally ill person have the right to an independent evaluation of his or her psychiatric condition to contest the view of the hospital psychiatrist? Is the adversarial hearing process best suited to address the need for in-patient hospitalization? Should legal guardians and those designated as power of attorney be given the authority to voluntarily admit a patient into a psychiatric hospital? This Article will explore the current involuntary civil commitment process for confining a mentally ill and dangerous person in a psychiatric hospital. A criminal defendant is often guaranteed greater protections than a mentally ill person facing involuntary civil commitment. As a person’s freedom is at stake, the serious nature of confinement warrants a critical review of how we address the need for psychiatric treatment of our dangerously mentally ill. Part I will examine the government’s power to confine a mentally ill person and the minimum due process safeguards for involuntary admission. Part II will explore the applicability of the constitutional right to remain silent in civil commitment proceedings. Part III will discuss the authority of mental health professionals to testify at the civil commitment hearings and consider issues of privileged communication. Parts IV and V will look at issues pertaining to the rules of evidence, ranging from the burden of proof to hearsay evidence as heard by the hearing judge. Parts VI and VII will analyze respectively the right to an independent psychiatric evaluation and alternative procedures to resolve the determination of the need for hospitalization. Part VIII will address the rights of others to consent to voluntary hospitalization of a mentally ill person, including guardians, persons with power of attorney, and parents of minor persons. Part IX will make recommendations for improving the involuntary civil confinement process. This Article provides an analysis of the current system and practical, concrete suggestions for improving the involuntary civil confinement process through the eyes of the attorney representing the mentally ill client facing involuntary psychiatric hospitalization
DISAGGREGATING “IMMIGRATION LAW”
Get PDFCourts and scholars have long noted the constitutional exceptionalism of the federal immigration power, decried the injustice it produces, and appealed for greater constitutional protection for noncitizens. This Article builds on this robust literature while focusing on a particularly critical conceptual and doctrinal obstacle to legal reform—the notion that laws governing the rights of noncitizens to enter and remain within the United States comprise a distinct body of “immigration laws” presumed to be part and parcel of foreign affairs and national security. This Article argues that the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent immigration jurisprudence suggests a willingness to temper, and perhaps even retire, that presumption. In particular, the majority opinions in Zadvydas v. Davis and Padilla v. Kentucky evidence a growing skepticism among the Justices that the regulation of noncitizens comprises a discrete, constitutionally privileged domain of distinctly “political” subject matter that is properly buffered against judicial scrutiny. To rescind that presumption would, in effect, disaggregate the category of “immigration law” for the purpose of constitutional review and subject federal authority over noncitizens to the same judicially enforceable constitutional constraints that apply to most other federal lawmaking. The disaggregation of immigration law would thus give full expression to noncitizens’ constitutional personhood. Foreign policy and national security considerations would continue to serve as constitutionally viable warrants for laws burdening noncitizens, but Congress and the President would no longer enjoy the extraordinary judicial deference that they currently receive as a matter of course
Putting Public Law into “Private” Sport
Get PDFAcross all levels of sport—professional, Olympic, intercollegiate, interscholastic, and youth recreational—the prevailing view is that the government should not take an active role in regulating athletics. As a result, there are relatively few federal or state statutes directed at regulating sports, and those that are aimed at sports primarily serve to support the professional sports industry. Moreover, courts show great deference to sports leagues and administrators, most often applying law in a way that insulates and empowers them. This creates a climate where leagues and administrators are permitted wide latitude to structure and conduct their respective sports as they see fit, especially with regard to athlete regulation. With this environment in mind, this Article examines what I define as the “legal and policy response to concussions in sports,” which includes state statutes, proposed federal legislation, “bully pulpit” initiatives such as a White House summit and Congressional hearings, and substantial tort litigation. This Article explains the ways that the legal and policy response to sports concussions is consistent with the current sports law landscape and it highlights how the legal and policy response to sports concussions charts the course for a new approach to law and sports. In doing so, this Article makes two main points. First, the legal and policy response to sports concussions provides a useful vehicle for considering the underlying values that affect law and policy related to sports. These values include minimal government involvement, playing despite injury, and the view that aspects of sport are essential or fundamental. Second, the legal and policy response to concussions in sports provides an important pathway for future sports regulation, particularly of youth and amateur sports programs
Recent Development: Varriale v. State: The State May Store and Use a Voluntarily Provided DNA Sample and Resultant Profile For Any Future Criminal Investigations, Unless the Suspect Provides an Express Limitation
Get PDFThe Court of Appeals of Maryland held that when a suspect does not expressly limit consent to DNA testing, the Fourth Amendment does not prevent the State from storing and using his voluntarily provided DNA in later, unrelated criminal investigations
Using the NFL as a Model? Considering Zero Tolerance in the Workplace for Batterers
Get PDFDomestic abuse is a workplace issue. \u27
The impact of domestic violence can increasingly be felt in the workplace, and it can adversely affect the safety and productivity of employees. Legislators and employers have begun to recognize the effect of domestic violence on employment, and many have adopted policies to protect the interests of domestic violence survivors. This article suggests that wider adoption of domestic violence policies are needed and these policies should be broadened to directly address batterers in the workplace. The article argues that employer based sanctions would increase batterer accountability and workplace safety. It uses the newly revised NFL Personal Conduct Policy as a starting point for addressing whether more employers should adopt zero tolerance in the workplace for batterers
En-Gendering Economic Inequality
Get PDFWe live in an era of growing economic inequality. Luminaries ranging from the President to the Pope to economist Thomas Piketty in his bestselling book Capital in the Twenty- First Century have raised alarms about the disparity between the haves and the have-nots. Overlooked, however, in these important discussions is the reality that economic inequality is not a uniform experience; rather, its effects fall more harshly on women and minorities. With regard to gender, American women have higher rates of poverty and get paid less than comparable men, and their workplace participation rates are falling. Yet economic inequality is neither inevitable nor intractable. Given that the government creates the rules of the market, it is essential to analyze the government’s role in perpetuating economic inequality. This Article specifically examines the role of the Supreme Court in contributing to gender-based economic inequality. The thesis is that the Supreme Court applies oversimplified economic assumptions about the market in its decision-making, thereby perpetuating economic inequality on the basis of gender. Applying insights of feminist economic theory, the Article analyzes recent Supreme Court jurisprudence about women workers, including Wal-Mart v. Dukes (denying class certification to female employees who were paid and promoted less than men), Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (granting business owners the right to deny contraception coverage to female employees on religious grounds), and Harris v. Quinn (limiting the ability of home health care workers to unionize and thereby improve their working conditions). In these cases, the Court elevates its narrow view of efficiency over more comprehensive understandings, devalues care work, upholds harmful power imbalances, and ignores the intersectional reality of the lives of low-wage women workers. The Article concludes that the Court is eroding collective efforts by women to improve their working conditions and economic standing. It suggests advocacy strategies for reforming law to obtain economic justice for women and their families
Friends, Followers, Connections, Lend Me Your Ears: A New Test for Determining the Sufficiency of Service of Process Via Social Media
Get PDFThe emergence of social media as a driving force in modern society has brought it to the forefront of legal discussion in all areas of law. Fields of study such as evidence, ethics, and constitutional law are all currently wrestling with how social media ought to be handled. In particular, courts have attempted to determine whether service of process (or simply “service”) should be satisfied by the use of communication through social media. Since 1950, courts have relied upon the same test, regardless of the method used, to determine the sufficiency of service: the Mullane test. Mullane as currently applied, however, does not sufficiently scrutinize service via social media in a manner conducive to understanding the peculiarities of this method of communication. This Comment will not attempt to determine whether the use of social media to effect service of process is constitutional. Rather, it will show how the current application of the Mullane standard leads courts to categorically accept or reject service as effected, and, therefore, a new test ought to be adopted to measure the individual social media communication method used to attempt service. This test ought to be utilized to determine whether a particular use of a specific social media platform has fulfilled the constitutional requirements for service, vis-à-vis Mullane.
This Comment will begin by examining the standard for sufficient service of process established by the Supreme Court in Mullane, followed by the cases expanding that decision; in particular Greene v. Lindsey, Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, and Jones v. Flowers. This Comment will also survey the technological advancements that have affected courts’ determinations regarding service. It will then observe how foreign courts have treated issues of electronic service, as well as review the development of this issue in the United States. Finally, this Comment will scrutinize current methods of service, propose a new test that courts ought to use to determine the sufficiency of service effected via social media, and compare the test’s advantages to the current test