University of Baltimore School of Law

Turvey, Erin

English

Previously Chart(er)ed Waters: The Case for the Revival of Corporate Purpose Clauses as a Basis for Corporate Rights

Kwoka, John

Inherently Stable Cartels: Economics and Policy

Hine, Madison

Recent Developments: Freeman v. State

Ross, Stephen F.

Applying the FTC Act to Anti-Consumer Contract Terms That Are Not Key Salient Terms to Most Consumers

Baldacci, Spencer

University of Baltimore Law Forum 
Volume 54 Number 2 Article 8 
4-1-2024 
Recent Developments: Doe v. Cath. Relief Servs. 
Spencer Baldacci 
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 Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Baldacci, Spencer (2024) "Recent Developments: Doe v. Cath. Relief Servs.," University of Baltimore Law 
Forum: Vol. 54: No. 2, Article 8. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol54/iss2/8 
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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
 
DOE V. CATH. RELIEF SERVS.: “SEX” AND “SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION” ARE TWO DISTINCT PROTECTED CLASSES 
UNDER THE MFEPA AND MEPEWA, AND THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY DID NOT INTEND TO MAKE THE TERMS 
INTERCHANGEABLE.   
 
By: Spencer Baldacci 
 
     The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the terms “sex” and “sexual 
orientation” are to be treated as two distinct protected classes under the 
Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (“MFEPA”) and its corresponding 
religious exemption.  Doe v. Cath. Relief Servs., 484 Md. 640, 659, 300 A.3d 
116, 127(2023).  The court also determined that the protected class of “sex” 
under the Maryland Equal Pay for Equal Work Act (“MEPEWA”) does not 
include “sexual orientation.”  Id. at 662, 300 A.3d at 129.   Lastly, the 
Supreme Court of Maryland established five guiding factors for determining 
if an employee’s duties fall within the religious exemption of MFEPA.  Id. at 
673-74, 300 A.3d at 136-37.   
     John Doe (“Doe”), a married gay man, was a data analyst with Catholic 
Relief Services (“CRS”).  At a career fair, a CRS representative notified Doe 
that his husband would qualify for spousal health benefits.  Doe’s 
employment duties at CRS involved business functions with CRS’s Gateway 
business and Salesforce platforms.  Upon being hired, CRS accepted Doe’s 
same-sex spousal benefits application.  However, CRS’ human resource 
department (“HR”) later alerted Doe that his husband was not eligible for 
spousal benefits at CRS and that the enrollment acceptance was in error.  HR 
informed Doe that CRS did not offer benefits to same-sex couples because it 
conflicted with their Catholic values.  CRS then promptly ended Doe’s 
husband’s benefits. 
     After filing a Charge of Discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), Doe received a right to sue letter.  Doe 
subsequently filed a complaint against CRS in the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland (“U.S. District Court”) that included 
claims under MFEPA and MEPEWA in addition to two federal law claims.  
The U.S. District Court made rulings regarding the federal law claims made 
by Doe but sought guidance from the Supreme Court of Maryland for the 
claims involving MFEPA and MEPEWA.  The U.S. District Court certified 
to the Supreme Court of Maryland three questions of law: (1) does the 
MFEPA’s prohibition of sex discrimination also apply to sexual orientation, 
(2) does the MEPEWA’s prohibition of sex discrimination also apply to 
 University of Baltimore Law Forum         [Vol. 54.2 
 
190
sexual orientation, and (3) what does, “to perform work connected with the 
activities of the religious entity,” mean within the religious entity exemption 
of the MFEPA?  Doe, 484 Md. at 676, 300 A.3d at 138.   
     The court first examined the definition of “sex discrimination” within the 
MFEPA.  Doe, 484 Md. at 651, 300 A.3d at 123.  The court ruled that sex 
discrimination under MFEPA does not equate to sexual orientation 
discrimination.  Id. at 660, 300 A.3d at 128.  In looking at the plain language 
of the MFEPA, both sex and sexual orientation are prohibited forms of 
discrimination.  Id. at 654, 300 A.3d at 125.  The court reasoned that the 
General Assembly amended the statute to include sexual orientation as a 
prohibited form of discrimination because it was not originally covered under 
the category of sex discrimination.  Id. at 657, 300 A.3d at 127.  The MFEPA 
also contains a religious exemption provision which only lists “sexual 
orientation” and not “sex” as an exemption.  Id. at 659, 300 A.3d 127.  The 
court found that the General Assembly intended for sex and sexual 
orientation to be separate protected classes because the General Assembly 
only added sexual orientation to the religious exemption.  Id. at 659, 660-61, 
300 A.3d at 127-28. 
     The court then addressed the language in the MEPEWA which only lists 
“sex” and “gender identity” as protected from pay discrimination.  Doe, 484 
Md. at 661, 300 A.3d at 129.  The court found the statute to be unambiguous 
and decided that only “sex” and “gender identity” are protected classes 
regarding pay disparity under the MEPEWA.  Id. at 662, 300 A.3d at 129.  
The court ruled that “sex” in the context of the MEPEWA referred to 
someone being either male or female.  Id.  Additionally, the General 
Assembly amended the MEPEWA in 2016 to define gender identity as, “the 
gender-related identity, appearance, expression, or behavior of a person, 
regardless of the person’s assigned sex at birth.”  Id.  Just like its rationale for 
MFEPA issue, the court determined that if the General Assembly wanted to 
include sexual orientation as a protected class, they would have added it 
during the amendment process.  Id. at 663, 300 A.3d at 130.  The court 
reasoned that both the MEPEWA and MFEPA were amended in the same 
General Assembly session — within a few years of each other — and 
therefore, it is unlikely that the General Assembly “simply forgot to include 
sexual orientation” in the MEPEWA.  Id. at 663, 300 A.3d at 130. 
     In analyzing the language of the MFEPA’s religious exemption, the court 
found that the General Assembly intended to only include employee positions 
that “directly further the core mission of the religious entity.”  Doe, 484 Md. 
at 667, 300 A.3d at 132.  To make this determination, the court first looked 
to the plain language of the exemption, which states, “MFEPA’s protections 
do not apply to claims against a religious corporation...with respect to the 
employment of individuals of a particular religion, sexual orientation, or 
2024]  DOE V. CATH. RELIEF SERVS. 
  
191 
gender identity to perform work connected with the activities of the religious 
entity.”  Id. at 665, 300 A.3d at 131.  The court found that the Maryland 
General Assembly did not intend to include a blanket exemption but tailored 
the exemption for specific work or employee positions.  Id.   
     The Supreme Court of Maryland established five factors to help future 
courts determine which types of duties fall within the religious exemption as 
the legislature did not explicitly list examples or guidelines: (1) all relevant 
information related to the employee’s duties, (2) direct duties as those, “that 
are not one or more steps removed from taking the actions that affect the 
goals of the entity,” (3) the size of the religious entity, (4) that religious 
entities can have religious and secular missions, and (5) the mission 
description, services provided, the people who are served, and how the 
religious entity utilizes its funds.  Doe, 484 Md. at 673-74, 300 A.3d at 136-
37.  The court did not decide whether Doe’s duties fall within the religious 
exemption but left it up to the U.S. District Court as that decision was a matter 
of fact and not law.  Id. at 675, 300 A.3d at 137.   
     The dissent, written by Justice Shirley M. Watts, argued that 
discrimination based on sexual orientation is related to discrimination based 
on sex and that Doe’s duties in his position at CRS did not fall within the 
religious exemption under the MFEPA.  Doe, 484 Md. at 677, 300 A.3d at 
138.  Justice Watts found that sex and sexual orientation are “overlapping” 
since employers consider sex when discriminating based on sexual 
orientation.  Id. at 684-85, 300 A.3d at 143.  Justice Watts also argued that 
the religious exemption “bars claims against religious entities with respect to 
the hiring (or not hiring) of individuals of a particular sexual orientation,” but 
does not allow religious organizations to hire people and then give them 
fewer benefits or different treatment because of their sexual orientation.  Id. 
at 698, 300 A.3d at 150-51.   
     Per the court’s holding in Doe, practitioners must treat “sex” and “sexual 
orientation” as two unrelated protected classes.  Because the MEPEWA does 
not specifically identify “sexual orientation” as a protected class, clients 
cannot bring discrimination claims based on sexual orientation under the Act.  
This delineation seemingly conflicts with federal interpretation of sex 
discrimination.1 The court’s establishment of a five-factor test to determine 
whether one’s job duties fall within the religious exemption will open up 
positions to those who would otherwise be discriminated against by religious 
employers. Should someone have a job with duties that are not considered 
 
1 In 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act’s ban on sex discrimination as inclusive of discrimination based 
on sexual orientation. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 662 (2020). 
 University of Baltimore Law Forum         [Vol. 54.2 
 
192
“directly” related to the core mission, a religious entity cannot discriminate 
against them based on their sexual orientation pursuant to the MFEPA. 


Recent Developments: Doe v. Cath. Relief Servs.

Mobley, Travis

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Trudeau, Claire

University of Baltimore Law Forum 
Volume 54 Number 2 Article 10 
4-1-2024 
Recent Developments: Woodlin v. State 
Claire Trudeau 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf 
 Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Trudeau, Claire (2024) "Recent Developments: Woodlin v. State," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 
54: No. 2, Article 10. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol54/iss2/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of 
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please contact slong@ubalt.edu. 
 
RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
 
WOODLIN V. STATE: THE COURT HAS DISCRETION OVER WHAT 
FACTORS WILL DETERMINE THE ADMISSIBILITY OF A 
DEFENDANT’S PRIOR SEXUALLY ASSAULTIVE BEHAVIOR. 
 
By: Claire Trudeau 
 
     The Supreme Court of Maryland held that when §10-923 of Maryland’s 
Courts and Judicial Proceedings (“CJP”) Article applies to a case, the trial 
court has discretion over what factors to consider when determining whether 
prior sexual acts may be admitted into the record.  Woodlin v. State, 484 Md. 
253, 294–95, 298 A.3d 834, 858 (2023).  The Woodlin court provided non-
exhaustive factors that a circuit court may consider when assessing 
admissibility.  Id. at 263-64, 298 A.3d at 840.  Using these non-exhaustive 
factors, the court held that the motions judge did not abuse his discretion by 
admitting Petitioner’s prior sexual assault conviction into evidence.  Id. at 
293, 298 A.3d at 857.  Finally, the court held that the Petitioner waived his 
ability to contest the scope of admission as to the prior conviction when he 
failed to raise the issue at trial.  Id. at 264, 298 A.3d at 840.  
    On a stormy September night, Petitioner John Woodlin (“Woodlin”), a 
man experiencing homelessness, stayed the night at his daughter’s home.  
Woodlin’s daughter had three children, one of whom was A.H., a ten-year-
old boy.  At some point between late that evening and early the next morning, 
Woodlin went upstairs to find A.H. in his underwear.  After briefly play 
fighting, Woodlin sexually assaulted A.H.  During the assault, Woodlin held 
his hand over A.H.’s mouth to prevent him from calling out for help.  
Woodlin was later arrested and charged with several sexual offenses. 
     Prior to trial in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, the State 
introduced evidence of Woodlin’s 2010 conviction for a third-degree sexual 
offense under § 10-923.  At the evidentiary hearing — over Woodlin’s 
objections — the motions judge determined that the evidence was admissible.  
Woodlin filed a motion to reconsider in October 2020, which the court 
denied.    
     During the trial, Woodlin raised several objections to the admission of his 
prior conviction; all of which the trial court judge overruled.  A jury then 
convicted Woodlin of several sexual offenses, including abuse of a minor.   
     Woodlin appealed the admission of his prior conviction to the Appellate 
Court of Maryland.  The court held that while the trial court is required to 
consider the similarities between multiple instances of sexually assaultive 
behavior when determining admissibility, the motions judge did not abuse his 
 University of Baltimore Law Forum         [Vol. 54.2 
 
198
discretion by admitting the evidence. Woodlin then sought review by the 
Supreme Court of Maryland, which granted certiorari. 
     The Supreme Court of Maryland identified four issues to be addressed on 
appeal:  1) whether there are certain factors that a circuit court is required to 
consider under CJP § 10-923(e)(4), 2) how those factors are weighed, 3) 
whether there was abuse of discretion by the motions judge, and 4) whether 
the motions judge was required limit the scope of the prior conviction.  
Woodlin, 484 Md. at 263, 298 A.3d at 840.    
     The Supreme Court of Maryland began its review by explaining that CJP 
§ 10-923 is an exception to the evidentiary rules prohibiting introduction of 
other crimes or wrongful acts to prove propensity. Woodlin, 484 Md. at 267, 
298 A.3d at 842. Under this section, a defendant’s “sexually assaultive 
behavior may be admissible”, even if the prior behavior does not result in 
conviction if certain elements are met.  Id.  Under § 10-923, the State must 
satisfy four elements: 1) the evidence is offered to rebut allegations that the 
minor victim lied about the sexual assault or to show lack of consent, 2) “the 
defendant had the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witness or 
witnesses testifying” to the sexual assault, 3) the behavior was proven by 
“clear and convincing evidence”, and 4) the danger of undue prejudice does 
not substantially outweigh the probative value.  Id. at 268, 298 A.3d at 842.  
If the circuit court finds all four elements are met, the court may admit the 
evidence.  Id.   
     The court continued its analysis by rejecting the Appellate Court of 
Maryland’s holding regarding what factors the trial court must consider when 
determining admissibility of prior sexually assaultive behavior.  Id. at 280, 
298 A.3d at 850.  The court held that the language of § 10-923 is 
unambiguous and, if the General Assembly intended to require specific 
factors when determining admissibility beyond the four already in the statute, 
the General Assembly would have added such factors to the statute. Id. at 
279-80, 298 A.3d at 849-50.   
     Next, the court provided a list of factors that a circuit court may consider 
when evaluating the probative value of evidence under §10-923(e). Woodlin, 
484 Md. at 283, 298 A.3d at 851.   
     The first factor is the similarity of the acts. Woodlin, 485 Md. at 284, 298 
A.3d at 852.  If this issue is raised, the court should evaluate the victim’s 
characteristics and the nature of the defendant's conduct in both cases.  Id. at 
284, 298 A.3d at 852.  The next factor considered is the temporal proximity 
and any intervening circumstances that could explain a gap in the events.  Id. 
at 286, 298 A.3d at 853.  The less time that has elapsed between the other 
assaultive behavior and the issue at hand, the more probative the evidence 
becomes.  Id.  Any intervening circumstance that could explain a gap between 
the assaults also weighs on the probative value.  Id. at 286-86, 298 A.3d at 
2024]  WOODLIN V. STATE 
  
199 
853.  The next factor is the frequency of the sexually assaultive behavior. Id. 
at 287, 298 A.3d at 854.  The court explained that the higher the frequency, 
the more probative the evidence.  Id.       
     The court then moved onto the factors concerning unfair prejudice, 
providing two that  were deemed as potentially important. Woodlin, 484 Md. 
at 287-89, 298 A.3d at 854-55.  The first is whether the previous act will 
overshadow the crime currently charged, and the second is the jury's 
knowledge of any previous punishment.  Id. at 287-88, 298 A.3d 854-55.  The 
rationale for both factors was similar; if a prior act is significantly worse than 
the one at issue, it could result in a jury determination based on the prior act 
and not the one at hand.  Id. at 287-88, 298 A.3d at 854.  As to the jury’s 
knowledge of previous punishment, the court explained that whether there 
was a prior conviction could impact the jury’s belief the defendant escaped 
punishment.  Id. at 288-89, 298 A.3d at 854-55.   
     The final list of factors the court noted concerns the admissibility after the 
elements required by § 10-923(e) are satisfied. Woodlin, 484 Md. at 289, 298 
A.3d at 855.  The court lists two factors: (1) need, and (2) clarity and manner.  
Id. at 289-91, 298 A.3d at 855-56.  The court explained that need is a very 
difficult factor to address.  Id. at 289-90, 298 A.3d at 855-56.  If the State 
lacks substantial evidence of the assault in question, the State’s need for the 
evidence increases, and so does the probative value of the prior act.  Id. at 
289-90, 298 A.3d at 855.  However, so too does the risk that the jury will 
decide the case based on improper reasoning.  Id.  As to the clarity and 
manner with which the evidence is presented, both are usually encompassed 
in other evidentiary rules and are decided based on judicial discretion.  Id. at 
290-91, 298 A.3d at 856.   
     Finally, the court concluded its analysis by explaining that the motions 
judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting the evidence of the prior 
conviction. Woodlin, 484 Md. at 293, 298 A.3d at 857. The court explained 
that motions judge’s ruling was “well-supported” and that a reasonable 
person could have reached the same conclusion.  Id.  The court also agreed 
with the appellate court’s ruling that Woodlin waived his ability to contest 
the admission of the unredacted transcript after being given ample 
opportunities to object at trial and failing to do so.  Id. at 293-94, 298 A.3d at 
858.   
     Given the exceptional discretion the Supreme Court of Maryland gave 
circuit court judges to determine admissibility, attorneys must ensure that 
they formulate strong arguments for exclusion or admission of prior sexual 
acts. Moving forward, this discretion may lower the bar for victims in some 
cases; however, there is no guarantee that the bar will not be higher in others. 
The higher bar may then present another reason victims do not come forward, 
for fear that their word alone is not strong enough against their abuser.


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